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
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THE FAR EAST

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

RUSSIA IN ASIA

A RECORD AND A STUDY, 1558-1899.

With Twelve Maps.

EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS.

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The Far East

ITS HISTORY AND ITS QUESTION

BY
Sidney
ALEXIS, KRAUSSE

AUTHOR OF "RUSSIA IN ASIA," "CHINA IN DECAY," ETC., ETC.

WITH EIGHT MAPS AND FIVE PLANS

LONDON: GRANT RICHARDS

HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN

MCM

RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,
LONDON AND BUNGAY.

PREFACE

THE aim of the present volume is to afford in handy form a complete account of the history of the countries of the Far East, in so far as they have come into contact with Western civilisation. In carrying out this scheme, I have not deemed it necessary to dwell upon ancient history, beyond indicating the events which have served to bring the Occident and Orient together. I commence with an account of the earlier phases of Eastern Asia, sufficient to enable the reader to appreciate the conditions under which the Pacific borderland was first visited by the emissaries of Europe. From this point I have followed the story of the Far East in some detail, in the hope that the record thus presented may answer the requirements of the political student who seeks to obtain a clear understanding of the problems involved.

In the second portion of the book I have attempted an examination of the existing factors in the Far Eastern question, and endeavoured to weigh the evidence available with a view to forming an estimate of the probable future. Throughout I have sought to view my material

impartially, and to let facts speak for themselves. The result I leave to the reader, to judge according to his predilections.

In face of the controversies which have followed the publication of my previous works, I am tempted to refer to that fruitful cause of misunderstanding, the misinterpretation of the words *Russophile* and *Russophobe*. Correctly rendered, the former implies one who favours Russia, the latter one who fears her. I submit that neither term is applicable to a writer who derives his impressions from facts, and gives reasons for his belief that Russian methods are superior to British, and that for this reason Russia is tolerably certain to triumph over Great Britain in diplomacy. A study of Asiatic policy extending over a series of years has taught me that, assuming the test of diplomacy to be its success, Russia must always triumph over Great Britain by force of her superior ability, insistence, and lack of scruple, as well as by her disregard of those principles by which the hands of our own diplomatists are tied. The more I see of Russian statesmanship, the more I am impelled to admire it as an instance of irresistible triumph of mind over mere intelligence. But while I admire her success, I refuse to be blind to its dire results on the interests of Great Britain; and the more firmly am I convinced that the writer who exposes the methods by which that success is attained, and points out the means by which it may be counteracted, is doing his duty to the country he is proud to call his own.

In a volume of the present range it is practically impossible to acknowledge every authority to whom one is under obligation. The more important of these will be found indicated as references to their works occur. I have, I believe, consulted every book on China, Japan, and Korea now obtainable.

ALEXIS KRAUSSE.

27 CHARLOTTE STREET,

PORTLAND PLACE.

October, 1900.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE COUNTRIES OF THE FAR EAST

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| The countries of Eastern Asia—Their antiquity—Their population— Early intercourse with foreigners—China—Its area and population— Its provinces and government—Its resources—Manchuria—Korea— Its coast line—Its islands—Japan—Area and population—The Japanese—Modern Japan—Oriental France—Asiatic Russia—Britain in the Far East—America on the Pacific—Rivalries between the Eastern Powers—Contrast in methods | 1 |

CHAPTER II

THE DAWN OF WESTERN INFLUENCE

| | |
|---|----|
| Early travellers in Asia—Marco Polo—Raphael Perestralo—Fernand Perez D'Andrade—Arrival of the Portuguese—Mendez Pinto— William Adams—English travellers in the East—Captain Saris—The British East India Company—Captain Weddell—Russian intercourse with China—The opening up of Siberia—Feodor Golovin—Treaty of Nerchinsk—Kamchatka—Leon Ismaloff—Vladislavitch—American relations with the East—Portuguese efforts—Lord Macartney's mission—Lord Amherst's mission—Singapore—Captain Elliot— Commissioner Lin—The "Opium War"—Sir Henry Pottinger— Treaty of Nanking | 15 |
|---|----|

CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

THE OPENING UP OF CHINA

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| China after the Treaty of Nanking—Sir John Bowring and Commissioner Yeh—Canton forts seized—Treaty of Tientsin—Sir Hope Grant—The march on Peking—Treaty of Aigun—Treaty of Peking—The opening of the Yangtse Kiang—The Taeping Rebellion—Western intercourse—China and Japan—Formosa—Murder of Augustus Margary—Chifu Convention—France and China—The Emperor Kwangsu—China-Japanese War—Events in Korea—The Cassini Convention—Occupation of Kiao Chau—Port Arthur—Wei Hai Wei—Railway schemes—Their prospects—The Emperor's reform decrees—His retirement—Tai Hsi's <i>coup d'état</i> —The Kowloon extension—The Anglo-Russian agreement | 35 |

CHAPTER IV

THE AWAKENING OF JAPAN

| | |
|--|----|
| First contact with Western nations—Overtures from the United States—Commodore Perry—The first treaty—Sir John Stirling—Treaty with Great Britain—Diplomatic amenities—Commercial agreements—Anti-foreign feeling—Attack on the British representative—Attack on British Legation—Murder of Mr. Richardson—Bombardment of Kagoshima—Saghalin—Attack on foreign vessels—The Shimonoseki expedition—More outrages on foreigners—Sir Harry Parkes—Recognition of the emperor's power—Abolition of the Shogunate—The first audience—Attack on Sir Harry Parkes—A constitution promulgated—First railway opened—Murder of Okubo Toshimichi—Extra-territoriality—The war of 1894-5—Treaty of Shimonoseki—The revised treaties | 58 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER V

UNCLOSED KOREA

| |
|--|
| Exclusiveness of the Korean people—Early traditions—Relations with China—Japanese descents—The invasion of Hideyoshi—Arrival of missionaries—Their persecution—First French expedition—Oppert's filibustering attempt—Fate of the <i>General Sherman</i> —Admiral Rodgers—Trouble with Japan—Opening of Fusan—Herr von Brandt's failure—Commodore Shufeldt negotiates American Treaty—The British Treaty—Destruction of Japanese Legations—Conven- |
|--|

CONTENTS

xi

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| tion of Tientsin—Murder of Kim Ok Kiun—The rising of the Tong Haks—The China-Japanese War—Decline of Japanese influence—Reform measures—Advent of Russia—The Treaty of Seoul—The Treaty of Tokio—Russian activity in Korea—The Masanpho concession—Railway enterprise—The coming struggle | 80 |

CHAPTER VI

RIVAL POLICIES

| | |
|---|-----|
| Contrasts in method—Britain's idea in her Eastern intercourse—American aims—Unselfishness of both—The charter of British rights in China—Her predominance—Lack of appreciation of the Oriental character—Chinese peculiarities—Corruptness—Venality—Growth of trade—Policy of non-interference—The struggle for China—The Russian aim—Rapidity of its attainment—Her methods—Militarism—Communications—Precautions—Her thoroughness—The seizure of Saghalin—Origin of the Siberian Railway—The Liaotung peninsula—British interests—Diplomatic negotiations—Russian pledges—Their value—Manchurian railway agreement—Its effect—Chinese desire for British support—Her fear of Russia—Cession of Port Arthur—Party government and autocracy—French aims in the Far East—Her ambitions political, not commercial—Her jealousy of England—Her policy in the South—German aims—Portugal—England and America the arbiters of the Far East—The treaty-port system—Spheres of influence versus equality of opportunity—The prospects of each—Doom of the latter—Future necessities—Growth of Russian influence—The Powers and the "open door"—American interests—The battle of the policies | 101 |
|---|-----|

CHAPTER VII

OCCIDENT AND ORIENT

| | |
|--|--|
| The workings of the Oriental mind—Its contrast with the European—Chinese and Japanese—Variations in aim and character—Progression and retrogression—China's weakness—Japan's strength—The future of Japan—A Vishnu or a Frankenstein—Her conceit—Her self-restraint—National honesty—Abolition of extra-territoriality—The government of China—Its lack of cohesion—Corruptness of the officials—Attitude towards foreigners—Prejudice against progress—Intercourse with Korea—The future of that country— | |
|--|--|

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Rival aims of Western Powers—The constitution of Japan—The growth of Liberalism—Japan's influence in the Far East—Her prospects and future—Hopelessness of a mutual understanding—The struggle to the strong—The ambition of Japan—its attainment | 133 |

CHAPTER VIII

THE SITUATION

| | |
|--|-----|
| Factors in the balance of power—Influence of force—Superiority of Great Britain—Her resources—Her neglect of opportunities—Status of Japan and Russia—Relative strength of the Powers in the Far East—Preponderance of British interests—Hong Kong—Its defences—Wei Hai Wei—Kiao [Chau—Vladivostok—Port Arthur—China's weakness—Her navy—Her army—The Korean army—Japan—Her armaments—Her navy—Her arsenals—Her army—Rival aims in the Far East—The policy of Japan—The limits of Russian action—Conflict in method—England's gullibility—Muscovite influence—Its success—Responsibility for crisis in China—How to check Russia—The partition of China—Difficulty of agreement—Chances of the struggle—British action—The rôle of Japan—The alliance of France—The crisis bound to come—The only hope for China | 150 |
|--|-----|

CHAPTER IX

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

| | |
|---|-----|
| The future of the Siberian railways—The fate of China—The Yellow Peril—The flooding of the markets of the World—C. H. Pearson's theory—Lord Curzon's—The common-sense view—The reconstitution of China—Contrast between Russia and that country—The future of Japan—Her methods—The coming struggle—Its outcome—The mission of civilisation | 175 |
|---|-----|

CHAPTER X

THE DUTY OF BRITAIN

| | |
|--|--|
| The failure of British policy in the Far East—Evidence thereof—Authorities quoted—Governmental vacillation and the "open door"—Growth of anti-foreign feeling in China—Its causes—Neglect of | |
|--|--|

CONTENTS

xiii

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| precautions—The only course of action—Policy of Great Britain—Prospects of an understanding among the Powers—Superiority of Russian diplomacy—Necessity for strong action—The Stupid Party—Neglect of Asiatic peoples—Missionaries—Necessity for a strong minister at Peking—Interests of the Powers—Russian aggressiveness—Impossibility of an understanding—Russian treatment of Asiatics—Necessary steps to restore British influence—Spheres of influence—England's policy | 192 |

CHAPTER XI

THE STORY OF THE CRISIS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese—British vacillation and its consequences—The trouble in Pechili—Rising of the rabble—Remonstrance of the foreign Ministers—Destruction of the railway—Isolation of Peking—Admiral Seymour's advance—Taking of the Taku Forts—Murder of the German Minister—Capture of Tientsin—News from the Legations—Conflicting rumours—The advance of 1860—That of 1900—Delay on the part of the Powers—Dr. Morrison's letter to the <i>Times</i> —Advance of the relief force—Its successful progress—Relief of Peking and succour of the besieged—The arming of the Chinese—Who is responsible?—The Russian press on the situation—The prospect of the future—Difficulties of the situation—The position of Japan | 221 |
|---|-----|

CHAPTER XII

THE PROSPECT

| | |
|---|-----|
| Causes controlling the future of the Far East—Civilisation bound to triumph over barbarism—Dislike of hearing the truth—British interests imperilled in Asia—The remedy—Necessity for prompt and decisive action—Contrast between British and German methods—Germany's Asiatic policy—The United States—The future struggle—Tangible interests—Contrasts in method—The balance of action—The financial question—Chinese debt—The debts of Western Powers—The ambitions of Russia—Prospects of their fulfilment—The absorption of Manchuria—Mongolia—North China—Lessons of history—The prospect | 237 |
|---|-----|

APPENDIX A

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| CHRONOLOGY OF LANDMARKS CONNECTED WITH THE HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST | 257 |

APPENDIX B

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

| | |
|--|-----|
| TREATY OF NERCHINSK | 265 |
| TREATY OF NANKING | 267 |
| TREATY OF TIENTSIN | 277 |
| TREATY OF YEDO | 294 |
| TREATY OF PEKING | 300 |
| CONVENTION OF CHIFU | 302 |
| TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND KOREA | 308 |
| TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN | 316 |
| TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI | 326 |
| TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA | 332 |
| STATUTES OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY | 335 |
| PRÉCIS OF THE GERMAN AGREEMENT WITH CHINA WITH REGARD TO KIAO-CHAU | 345 |
| DESPATCH FROM HER MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT PEKING, FORWARDING COPIES OF THE NOTES EXCHANGED WITH THE CHINESE GOVERN- MENT RESPECTING THE NON-ALIENATION OF THE YANG-TSZE REGION | 347 |
| CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA CONCERNING PORT ARTHUR AND TALIENTWAN | 349 |
| CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RESPECTING AN EXTENSION OF HONG KONG TERRITORY | 351 |
| CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RESPECTING WEI HAI WEI | 353 |
| EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND RUSSIA WITH REGARD TO THEIR RESPECTIVE RAILWAY INTERESTS IN CHINA | 355 |

APPENDIX C

| | |
|---|-----|
| BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AUTHORITIES OF THE FAR EAST | 359 |
| INDEX | 363 |

MAPS


| | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| THE FAR EAST | <i>In pocket at end of volume</i> |
| CHINA, SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF INTERESTS | „ „ „ |
| STRATEGIC MAP OF THE FAR EAST | <i>To face page 1</i> |
| CHINA, SHOWING TERRITORIES ABSORBED BY RUSSIA AND FRANCE . . | 15 |
| JAPAN | 58 |
| KOREA | 80 |
| RUSSIAN RAILWAYS IN NORTH CHINA | 175 |
| THE PARTITION OF CHINA | 237 |

PLANS

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| HONG KONG AND KOWLOON. | <i>To face page 151</i> |
| WEI HAI WEI | 155 |
| KIAO-CHAU | 157 |
| VLADIVOSTOK | 159 |
| PORT ARTHUR | 161 |

EMPIRE IN THE FAR EAST.

| | Area. | Population. | Density per sq. mile. |
|------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| RUSSIA Total | 3,962,678 | 2,359,000 | 1½ |
| Eastern Siberia | 3,044,512 | 1,992,000 | ½ |
| Amur Province | 172,848 | 118,500 | ½ |
| Primorsk Province | 715,982 | 220,500 | ½ |
| Sakhalin | 29,336 | 28,000 | 1 |
| CHINA Total | 4,218,401 | 409,180,000 | 97 |
| The Eighteen Provinces . . | 1,336,841 | 386,000,000 | 292 |
| Manchuria | 362,310 | 14,000,000 | 13 |
| Mongolia | 1,288,000 | 2,000,000 | 2 |
| Tibet | 651,500 | 6,000,000 | 9 |
| Jungaria | 147,950 | 600,000 | 4 |
| Eastern Turkestan | 431,800 | 580,000 | 1 |
| JAPAN Total | 161,245 | 44,757,000 | 278 |
| Hondo | 87,485 | 32,647,000 | 373 |
| Shikoku | 7,031 | 2,948,000 | 419 |
| Kiu-shiu | 16,840 | 6,604,000 | 392 |
| Yezo | 36,299 | 508,000 | 14 |
| Formosa | 13,541 | 2,000,000 | 148 |
| Pescadores | 49 | 50,000 | 915 |
| KOREA | 82,000 | 10,528,000 | 128 |
| FRANCE Total | 315,250 | 18,000,000 | 57 |
| Tonkin | 145,000 | 9,000,000 | 64 |
| Annam | 106,250 | 5,000,000 | 50 |
| Cochin China | 24,000 | 2,000,000 | 83 |
| Cambodia | 40,000 | 2,000,000 | 50 |
| GREAT BRITAIN Total | 679 | 310,000 | 456 |
| Hong Kong | 29 | 160,000 | 5,517 |
| Kowloon | 400 | 100,000 | 250 |
| Wei Hai Wei | 250 | 50,000 | 200 |
| UNITED STATES— | | | |
| Philippines | 115,300 | 8,000,000 | 69 |
| GERMANY— | | | |
| Kiao Chau | 120 | 60,000 | 500 |



CHAPTER I

THE COUNTRIES OF THE FAR EAST

The countries of Eastern Asia—Their antiquity—Their population—Early intercourse with foreigners—China—Its area and population—Its provinces and government—Its resources—Manchuria—Korea—Its coast line—Its islands—Japan—Area and population—The Japanese—Modern Japan—Oriental France—Asiatic Russia—Britain in the Far East—America on the Pacific—Rivalries between the Eastern Powers—Contrast in methods.

THE countries of Eastern Asia have little in common with those in other parts of the world. Possessing features which are unique, peopled by races practising a civilisation of their own, and invested with a natural wealth unrivalled elsewhere; the region known as the Far East stands apart from the comity of nations, and calls for special study at the hands of those who would unfathom its mysteries.

While possessing a history more ancient than any other portion of the globe, these lands of the furthest Orient have only recently united their records with those of cooler climes; and, though antedating all other known records in point of antiquity, it is only during recent years that they have taken their places in the category of current history. Thus China, which dates back to nearly three thousand years before the Christian era, was not visited by a European until the close of the thirteenth century. Japan first came in contact with foreign governments after an existence of upwards of nineteen hundred years, and Korea emerged from the exclusiveness which dates from twelve hundred years before Christ, less than thirty years ago.

Varying though they do in their emplacement, language, and surroundings, the peoples of the Far East have much in common ; and in one respect they may be said to be in absolute agreement. The Asiatic races are without exception exclusive in their dealings with the stranger. The farther East one goes, the more marked is this peculiarity ; and the dislike to foreign communion is in China so great as to prompt the people to go to any extreme in their desire to avoid contact with others than themselves. The conservatism of the Japanese has practically disappeared since the adoption of the great reform movement, but in Korea the love of isolation dies hard, and it is only during recent years that foreigners have been able to venture in the country without risking their lives.

The gradual opening up of the Far East has been the work of close on three centuries, and to-day it is only half achieved. It is, however, interesting to note that as time passes, the erstwhile prejudice against the foreigner is more easily overcome, and in consequence more rapid strides are now being made in negotiating further Asia, than was possible a century ago. Of late years changes have been accomplished in a few months, which would have required as many years to bring about during the past century ; and the consensus of interests which have recently been attracted to the Pacific coastline is responsible for a more rapid march of events than has ever before been deemed possible.

To-day the attention of all the Western powers is directed towards the Far East, where each has interests vast and increasing, which react upon the prosperity of the country concerned. The possibilities of the future of China are becoming one of the most vital questions of the hour. The prospects of Japan provide matter for speculation in every commercial centre, and the outcome of Russian policy in further Asia occupies the attention of politicians in every capital.

Of the countries constituting what is known as the Far East, the most important, the most vast, and the most

ancient in its history, is China ; an anomaly among nations, a mammoth mass of inertia in the track of progress ! While nominally an united kingdom ruled by a single individual, China is actually a confederation of countries, governed by a benevolent autocracy, and pursuing the even tenor of its way without any definite aim or object. At one period China was of far greater extent than is the case to-day. But circumstances have greatly altered the empire, and by depriving her of several of her erstwhile possessions, has left her, as she is to-day, a diminished empire boasting of an area of 4,218,401 square miles. In order to rightly apprehend the constituent portions of which China is built up, it may be well to place them in tabular form.

Area and Population of the Chinese Empire.

| | Square miles. | Population. |
|--|-----------------|-------------------|
| China proper (i.e. the 18 provinces) . | 1,336,841 | 386,000,000 |
| Manchuria | 362,310 | 14,000,000 |
| Mongolia | 1,288,000 | 2,000,000 |
| Tibet | 651,500 | 6,000,000 |
| Turkestan | 431,800 | 580,000 |
| Jungaria | 147,950 | 600,000 |
| | <hr/> 4,218,401 | <hr/> 409,180,000 |

For the purpose of the subject under consideration, only two of the above-named divisions are of importance, the eighteen provinces which are alone referred to when China is mentioned, and Manchuria. Both of these impinge on the Pacific coast line, and each plays a prominent part in the affairs of the Far Eastern question. Mongolia, lying to the north of China and to the west of Manchuria, does not play an important part in present developments, excepting as a line of advance by which a footing may be obtained in the maritime region. Tibet, Turkestan, and Jungaria are in Western Asia, and do not concern us here.

The eighteen provinces of which China consists vary greatly, alike in physical features, size, and population.

They may be conveniently divided into four divisions, as follows:—On the North are Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, and Pechili. In Central China are Sechuan, Hupeh, Honan, Anwei, Kweichow, Hunan, and Kiangsi. On the South are Yunnan and Kwangsi; and on the East, along the coast line, are Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung. The biggest of these, Sechuan, is nearly half as large again as the British Isles, while Fukien, the smallest, is rather bigger than Ireland. The provinces on the north and east sides are generally level and productive. Those on the west and south are mountainous and rich in minerals; while the valleys are so fertile as to produce, in many districts, three crops a year.

The waterways of China are among the finest in the world. Great rivers penetrate the country in every direction, and their tributaries are mostly connected by canals, which enable one to reach well nigh any part of the country by water. Indeed, water communication is practically the only available means of travel, inasmuch as roads, in the European definition of the word, are non-existent. Thus, the Yangtse, the Sikiang, the Peiho, the Min, the Han, and other rivers form the great arteries along which the trade and traffic of the country flow, and, by means of its tributaries and canals, each opens up a vast tract of territory, which sends its produce along their surface till it reaches the great commercial centres or the sea. Thus it happens that all communication held with China by Western Powers has been by water, and with the single exception of Peking, the capital of the empire, every treaty port is situated either on the sea, or on one of the rivers which afford a means of access.

In regard to the wealth of China, it may be said that the resources of the country are in the infancy of their development. The produce which seemed first to attract the attention of Western traders, is, owing to the conservatism of the native Chinese, on the decline. The tea trade has almost ceased except with Russia. Silk has in a great measure taken its place, but the establishment of

filatures proceeds slowly, and the china trade is run close by that of France. The manufacture of cloth from the cotton and hemp which grows so prolifically on the alluvial lands, languishes owing to the inferiority of the methods of manufacture employed ; but the cultivation of the opium poppy, tobacco and sugar is carried on in many districts with great and continued success.

The true wealth of China lies however in her mineral deposits, which abound in nearly every province. The coal fields of Pechili, Shansi, Honan, Shantung, Hunan, and Yunnan are said to equal the stores possessed in the remaining countries of the world, but with a few exceptions they have not as yet been developed, and their wealth remains unexplored. Iron is also found freely throughout the country. Lead, tin, and mercury have been produced in paying quantities. Copper abounds in Hupeh, Hunan, and Shantung, and gold is known to exist in several districts.

The most valuable commercial asset in the resources of China is, however, her population, which is as intelligent as it is vast. Owing to the strenuous efforts which have for centuries been made to exclude foreigners of all nations, however, the Chinese of to-day remain practically unacquainted with the necessities of Western civilisation. The experience of the past half century has shown that, notwithstanding his exclusiveness, the Chinaman is in no wise reluctant to adopt such new things as appeal to his convenience ; and the result of the trading of the past few years shows, that if once the country is opened up, and made available to the traders of the West, a market will be created such as has never been known since the commencement of commerce. With a possibility of four hundred million consumers, the opportunities afforded the trader exceed all calculation. The position becomes too vast to discuss. All that is possible is to hasten, in order to be on the spot and obtain a fair share of the traffic when it begins.

It is this course which is being followed by the European Powers interested in China. The Chinese question

is not of itself a political one. It is a purely commercial question, in which each and every Power is anxious to be enabled to compete with the best chance of success. And thus it is we see the different Powers each striving with others in its effort to obtain concessions for the development of districts, in order that the trade in those districts when developed may come its way.

Manchuria, the most important of China's dependencies, is about three times as large as Great Britain. It is for the most part thinly populated, and so far has remained practically undeveloped. Manchuria is a mountainous country, except along the western border, where it impinges on the plains of Mongolia. It is watered by several fine rivers, mostly tributaries of the Amur, and occupies an important situation politically, owing to its being the frontier province of China on the Russian border.

Adjoining Manchuria to the southward, is the peninsula of Chosön or Korea, a country comprising an area of 82,000 square miles, and containing a population of ten and a-half million people. Korea lies between the Yellow Sea and that of Japan, and, despite its exposed position, has come less into contact with other nations than any other country in the world. Situated midway between the empires of China and Japan, Korea has for centuries been a cause of jealousy and ambition to both. On the whole, however, Japanese influence has triumphed, and the future of the country, in regard to its Eastern neighbour, supplies one of the most crucial points in the question of the Far East.

Korea is remarkable for the length of its coast line, which is out of all proportion to its area. Its total length is 1,740 miles, and its shores are largely indented with bays and harbours, affording great possibilities for naval and commercial purposes. Surrounded by the sea on three sides, its only land frontier is that supplied by the Tuman and Yalu rivers, which flowing north-east and south west, delimitate Korean territory from that of Russia and Manchuria.

The Korean people are of the Mongolian type. They

are mostly agriculturists, but their characteristics are uninviting, and they have the reputation of being indolent and corrupt. While boasting a civilisation of their own, they are far behind the Chinese in intelligence. They are, moreover, extremely exclusive, and have carried their dislike of foreign intercourse even further than their neighbours. For several centuries a belt of land some fifty miles wide was set apart along the Manchurian frontier as a neutral zone separating the two countries. Any person crossing this belt, in either direction, was accorded the penalty of death. Of late years this observance has fallen into desuetude, and the neutral zone is now in course of being settled on along both frontiers.

Of the many islands which dot the coast line of Korea, only four call for remark. Quelpart, the largest, some 45 by 18 miles, lies 60 miles south of the mainland in the Yellow Sea. Port Hamilton, a much smaller island, once occupied by Great Britain, is placed between Quelpart and the coast. Tsushima, comprising two islands, some 30 miles south of Fusan, at one time belonged to Korea, but was ceded to Japan in 1615 and remains her nearest outpost to the mainland of Asia. Close to Fusan is the island of Koje, which offers exceptional opportunities for the construction of a harbour and naval base. The harbours and inlets on the west coast are frozen in the winter, but those on the east remain open all the year round.

The government of Korea is formed on the Chinese model, and is carried on through ministers responsible to the emperor. The Korean social system is one of caste. The population may be divided into two classes: the lower, who mostly work in the fields, and are poor, dirty, and shiftless; and the officials, who are secretive and corrupt. For administrative purposes the country is divided into thirteen provinces. Seoul has a population of 240,000. The industry is mainly agricultural, and large quantities of cereals are produced. There are considerable mineral deposits which are not developed, and

the chief industries are the production of silk and bamboo products.

To the south and east of Korea is the Archipelago of Japan. The islands number upwards of a thousand, many of them being very small. The chief are Hondo, Shikoku, Kyushiu, and Yezo. In addition to these and their many satellites, Japan owns the island of Formosa and the islets forming the Pescadores and Kurile groups. The total area of Japan, including the last named, is 158,245 square miles, and the population about 45 millions.

The various islands constituting the empire are as follows :—

| | Square miles. | Population. |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Hondo | 84,485 | 32,647,000 |
| Shikoku | 7,031 | 2,948,000 |
| Kyushiu | 16,840 | 6,604,000 |
| Yezo | 36,299 | 508,000 |
| Formosa | 13,541 | 2,000,000 |
| Pescadores, &c. . . . | 49 | 50,000 |
| | <hr/> 158,245 | <hr/> 44,757,000 |

The most marked physical characteristic of Japan is the number of indentations along the coast line of the various islands, which form admirable harbours. The interior is in most cases mountainous and subject to frequent volcanic disturbances. The plains are mostly fertile and highly cultivated, the principal occupation of the people being agriculture. Silk, sugar and tea are produced in quantities. The rice harvest supplies the bulk of the food of the masses.

Japan possesses extensive mineral deposits which have recently been developed. Silver, coal and iron abound, and gold, copper and lead are also worked.

The Japanese, who are supposed to be of mixed Korean and Malayan descent, are as a race small but highly intelligent. They possess many excellent attributes. The great majority are law abiding, industrious and frugal, and possess a keen sense of honour and a patriotic spirit.

They are ardent admirers of European civilisation, which they miss no opportunity of studying and following, and seem bent on persevering in self teaching until they equal those countries which have served as their example.

The remarkable strides in progress made by the Japanese during the past fifty years has placed the country in a pre-eminent position in the Far East. Not only has Japan emerged from her exclusiveness into a career of phenomenal activity, but by dint of her intelligence and her patriotism, she has become a power fitted to hold her own in the comity of nations. Her government has been built up in imitation of that of Germany. An hereditary monarchy, with a cabinet of ministers who attend to the administration, a privy council and an imperial diet of two chambers, provide the necessities for a liberal and prosperous government. The laws of Japan, both civil and criminal, have been drafted on the model of our own.

The building up of modern Japan has had a marked influence on the politics of the far East. The strides made by the people of Nippon have not only heralded their intention of becoming a first-class power, but have served to sound a note of warning to the ambitions of Russia. Although the fact does not appear to have attracted notice, there can be little question but that Russia's descent on Manchuria, which in itself is a movement preparatory to the acquisition of the coast lines of Korea and Northern China, has been greatly accelerated by the rapidity with which Japan has consolidated her position, and provided herself with the means of asserting her interests on the Pacific.

Differing from the countries above described in that they are not indigenous kingdoms of the Far East, but outlying bulwarks of Western empires, are the Asiatic possessions of France and Russia, which have come to play an important rôle in the destinies of the Pacific.

French Indo-China, a conglomeration of provinces absorbed during the past forty years, comprises the kingdoms of Annam, Cambodia, Cochin China and Tonkin,

with a total area of 315,250 square miles and a population of about eighteen millions. The details of these provinces are as follows :—

| | Square miles. | Population. |
|--------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Cochin China . . . | 24,000 | 2,000,000 |
| Cambodia | 40,000 | 2,000,000 |
| Annam | 106,250 | 50,00,000 |
| Tonkin | 145,000 | 9,000,000 |
| | <hr/> 315,250 | <hr/> 18,000,000 |

These countries, at one time tributaries of China, have come under French rule by right of conquest and annexation. Their climate is tropical and unhealthy to most Europeans. The attempts made to develop their resources by the French have only been partially successful, and as colonies they may be said to have failed. Several large rivers irrigate the plains of Indo-China, and these supply, as in China, practically the only means of communications. The products are such as usually emanate from tropical countries. Rice, maize, and other cereals are plentiful. Spices and medicinal plants flourish. Silk, sugar, cotton, and tobacco are produced. The importance of Indo-China in the Far Eastern problem is entirely due to political causes. While financially unsound and unlikely to bring either increased prosperity or reputation to its owners, the colonies on the China Sea afford a footing from which France can prosecute her aims in Asia. Without possession of the coast line of Cochin China, it would be difficult for her to pose as a naval power in Asiatic waters, and with it she is in a position to make her voice heard in any question which may arise respecting Far Eastern affairs.

Russian influence on the Pacific dates from 1858, when, by the Treaty of Aigun, the Amur Province was made over by China to Alexander II. Since then Russia has considerably improved the occasion. In 1860 she obtained the maritime province of Manchuria with the fine harbour of Vladivostok, and in 1897 she added the southern extremity of the Liaotung Peninsula with Port

Arthur and Talienwan. In her descent on Asiatic waters Russia has been impelled neither by the need of extended territory nor by the desire for commercial relations with other countries. Her absorptions have been prompted partly by a craving for a seaboard, and partly by the instinct of expansion necessary to a country which maintains a vast standing army without the means of keeping it occupied.

The Russian provinces on the Pacific freeboard are at present as follows :—

| | Square miles. | Population. |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Amur | 172,848 | 200,000 |
| Primorskaya | 715,982 | 220,000 |
| Sakhalin | 29,336 | 28,000 |
| | <hr/> 918,166 | <hr/> 448,000 |

The Amur region is too far north to serve as a base for action in the China seas. Its coast line is bleak and bare, and its navigation dangerous. It possesses a single port, that at Nicolaievsk on the estuary of the Amur river. Primorskaya, formerly the maritime province of Manchuria, affords a first-class naval base at Vladivostok, but even here the sea is frozen during the winter. Sakhalin is useless except as a protection to the Siberian coast line opposite. It is one of the bleakest countries in the world, and has only been utilised as a convict depot. Port Arthur and Talienwan are harbours in the Liaotung peninsula, which, owing to their geographical situation, are of great political importance. They afford bases from which operations could be undertaken against China, Japan, or Korea, and, further than this, they command the approaches to Peking and Newchang. By the leasing of these ports in 1897, Russia obtained a dominant situation in the very heart of the Far East, which may one day be utilised in more ways than one.

Quite recently Russia has acquired a still more southerly harbour on the Pacific, by the leasing of a site for a coaling station at Masanpho in southern Korea and close to Fusan. The importance of this step becomes apparent

on a glance at the map. It will be noticed that Masanpho is midway between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, forming the first of what will probably ere long be a series of Russian naval harbours round the Korean coast, uniting the Promorsk base with the Liaotung arsenal.

It remains only to refer to British and American possessions in the Far East. Notwithstanding the vast interests possessed by this country on the Pacific, the territory covered in that region by the British flag is infinitesimally small. Omitting Singapore, which appertains to the Indian Ocean, our outports in the Far East are only two, Hong Kong and Wei Hai Wei.

Hong Kong is an island off the mainland of China, near the estuary of the Canton river. It is some eleven miles long and five broad, and is for the most part occupied by mountains. Ceded in 1841, the colony has uniformly prospered, and, despite its limited extent, it to-day possesses a population of 221,000 persons. Since its original occupation, the colony has been extended by the lease of a tract of territory on the mainland opposite, which was increased in 1898. The whole of the colony of Hong Kong, including Kowloon, now includes 400 square miles with a population of 300,000. Hong Kong is the chief British naval station in the Far East. It possesses a series of dockyards and docks, and contains a small garrison.

Wei Hai Wei comprises a strip of land along the bay of the same name on the north coast of Shantung, facing the Gulf of Pechili. This place, which was leased to Great Britain in compensation for the cession of Port Arthur to Russia in 1897, is well suited for the purposes of the naval and military base which is at present being constructed. Though still early to gauge the value of the port, there can be little doubt but that in the event of this country being engaged in hostilities in North China, Wei Hai Wei would prove of the utmost value to our interests. The concession comprises the port and bay, with a belt of land ten miles wide along the entire coast line, on which we are at liberty to construct fortifications or earth-works.

The latest addition to the Powers possessing territory in the Far East is the United States of America, which obtained the group of islands known as the Philippines as part of the indemnity from Spain at the termination of the Cuban war of 1898. The archipelago in question extends north and south between Formosa and Borneo, and includes some two thousand islands of varying size and importance. The largest is Luzon, which contains an area of 40,024 square miles. The total area of the Philippines is 115,300 square miles, and the population is estimated at 8,000,000. The capital is Manila, with a population of 154,000. The inhabitants are mostly Malays. There is a European population of 25,000 persons and about 10,000 Chinese.

The acquisition of the Philippines by the United States was resisted by the natives, who had previously risen in rebellion against Spain, and the country became plunged in civil war. Matters have quietened down since then, but the interior is still far from being pacified, though there are signs of improvement. The Philippines are fairly productive, and do a considerable trade with Europe, notably in sugar, hemp, and tobacco. The total revenue is rather under three millions.

The possibilities of these islands are politically very great. The many fine harbours they contain afford exceptional facilities for naval and commercial purposes, and the geographical situation affords their possessors considerable influence in the affairs of the Far East. It is as yet too early to speak of the ultimate effect of the American occupation on Asiatic politics, but it cannot be other than considerable.

Such are the locations of the various countries centred in the Far East: three of them, the outcome of centuries of evolution, sharing between them the wealth and the resources of outer Asia; four others, intruders, bent on the safeguarding of those interests they have acquired, and eager to add to their number and value as occasion serves. It is a fair example of the political struggle for existence, which, like that for life itself, must be fought,

lest its possessors be struck with inanition and perish. No nation can stand still and retain its nationality. It can progress like Japan, until it enters the rivalry of its one-time greater powers. It can retrograde like China, and witness its despoilers quarrelling over the partition of its carcase, before it is yet dead ; or it can be still-born like Korea, and feel its body being absorbed without even attracting the attention of possible objectors.

The forces of national being in the Far East, as elsewhere, are always moving. In the case of those countries which move wisely, it is not difficult to forecast the attainment of their aims. But with the sluggards, the end, though far off, is certain, and the only problem is, not the result but the circumstance by which it is to be brought about. It is the study of this principle which supplies the crux of the Far Eastern question, a topic which is bound up in the fate of empires, and the dominion of that part of the earth whereon the sun does rise.



CHAPTER II

THE DAWN OF WESTERN INFLUENCE

Early travellers in Asia—Marco Polo—Raphael Perestralo—Fernand Perez D'Andrade—Arrival of the Portuguese—Mendez Pinto—William Adams—English travellers in the East—Captain Saris—The British East India Company—Captain Weddell—Russian intercourse with China—The opening up of Siberia—Feodor Golovin—Treaty of Nerchinsk—Kamchatka—Leon Ismaloff—Vladislavitch—American relations with the East—Portuguese efforts—Lord Macartney's mission—Lord Amherst's mission—Singapore—Captain Elliot—Commissioner Lin—The "Opium War"—Sir Henry Pottinger—Treaty of Nanking.

¹ FOR upwards of four thousand years the destinies of China rested in the hands of the Chinese and their immediate neighbours. From the accession of the first Emperor Hwangti, who is said to have exerted his sway over the Celestial Empire about the year 2637 B.C., to the advent of the first ruler of the Mongol dynasty, Chitsou, better known as Kublai Khan, who was a contemporary of our own Edward I., no European had penetrated into the recesses of the farthest East. The Pacific shores of Asia

¹ NOTE.—The sources from which the present account of the early intercourse between Western civilisation and the Far East are derived are exceedingly numerous. They include the chronicles of such travellers as Marco Polo, Mendez Pinto, Perez D'Andrade, and Raphael Perestralo; the records of Will Adams and Hendrik Hamel, and the journals of Lord Amherst, Sir George Staunton, Sir Hope Grant, Sir John Davis, Lord Elgin, Commodore Perry, and other of the early navigators of the China Seas. I have relied for the details of Russia's elementary dealings with China on my own *Russia in Asia*, in which these events are fully discussed, and where the various authorities consulted are set forth. It is only necessary here to express my obligations to Ravenstein's *Russians on the Amur*, Fischer's *Sibirische Geschichte*, Middendorf's *Nord und Ost Sibiria*, and the journals of Ysbrand Ides, Golovnin, and other early travellers, to which I am indebted for much that is of value and interest.

remained during this period as unknown to the civilisation of the West, as were the location and races of Europe unsuspected by the peoples of China and Japan. Lacking the roving instinct, enwrapped in their self-esteem, practical rather than imaginative in their reasoning, it is doubtful whether these Orientals even suspected the existence of a civilisation other than their own; and it affords no matter for surprise that its first manifestations among them were received in an attitude of contempt and incredulity.

The first European who visited China was one Nicolo Polo, a prosperous Venetian merchant, who made a journey into Asia in the middle of the thirteenth century. While in Bokhara, Polo chanced on some envoys who were returning from the court of Persia to that of Kublai Khan. The traveller accompanied the ambassadors, and was extremely well received by the Mongol emperor at Cambaluc,¹ whither he had recently transferred his capital from Nanking. Kublai was greatly interested in what Polo told him of European learning and religion, and entrusted him with a letter to the Pope asking that a number of skilful men of scientific attainments might be sent to China for the purpose of instructing the Mongols in Western knowledge.

Nicolo Polo returned to Venice in 1269, but failed to persuade the monks, whose aid he sought, to accompany him on his next journey to China. He set out therefore alone in 1271, taking with him his young son Marco, who was only seventeen at the time, and reached Cambaluc in 1275. He was received with the greatest honour. The emperor seemed greatly taken with young Polo, who set about educating himself in the Mongol language. And such favour did he find with Kublai Khan that he became employed in his service, and was sent on various important missions to distant countries. Eventually he became the governor of a provincial city.

The Polos remained in China for seventeen years, after which they returned to Venice by sea, arriving there in

¹ Cambaluc was the ancient name of Peking.

1295. Marco Polo has detailed his experiences in a book which is remarkable in its way, and the oldest of existing works describing Eastern Asia.¹

For upwards of two hundred years after the departure of the Polos from China, no Westerns entered the portals of the Far East; but in 1511 one Raphael Perestralo reached Canton. He was well received, being regarded as a curiosity by the natives, and is supposed to have remained in the country, though of his subsequent fortunes there is no record. Six years later a Portuguese vessel put into the Canton river in charge of Don Fernand Perez D'Andrade, who, like his predecessor, was accorded a welcome by the mandarins. The news of his arrival spread, and in consequence of the interest evoked, D'Andrade was conducted to Peking, where he was received as an ambassador from his country. The high favour shown him at the capital gave promise of a permanent understanding between the Chinese and Portuguese courts; but the situation became strained when it was announced that a large Portuguese fleet had arrived at Canton, and that the crews were committing outrages on the natives. On receipt of this intelligence the Emperor Woutsong ordered the arrest of D'Andrade, who was imprisoned, and after being kept confined for several years, was executed by the Emperor Chitsong in 1523.

About the year 1544, the exact date is uncertain, Fernao Mendez Pinto, a Portuguese traveller, found his way to Japan in a Chinese junk. He was taken before the Shogun, who bade him welcome, and received from him the gift of a gun, which was a novelty in that country. Subsequently Pinto, having found continued favour with the ruler of Japan, was offered employment by him. This hardy Portuguese spent nearly fifteen years in Japan, returning to write his experiences in Portugal in 1558.²

While D'Andrade had enjoyed favour at Peking, a number of Portuguese traders had profited by his example, and ventured to China, where they had succeeded in

¹ See *The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian*, by Col. Henry Yule, 1875.

² See *Perigrinacão*. Trans. by F. Cogan, 1663.

developing a considerable commerce with the natives in the province of Kwangtung. These traders prospered greatly and increased rapidly. In 1560 they obtained permission to erect buildings on an island near the mouth of the Canton River, in which to store their goods. This place, which speedily assumed the appearance of a thriving settlement, became known as Macao, and by dint of the payment of bribes to the mandarins, it came to be regarded as a concession for the exclusive use of the Portuguese. Thus was founded the first European colony in the Far East ; and it prospered so greatly that within a few years of its being established, Macao comprised a population of several hundred traders, who held the whole of the import trade of the country in their hands.

The news of Portuguese doings in China found its way in due course to the Iberian peninsula, and the Spaniards determined to emulate the success of their neighbours. In 1571 a Spanish fleet under command of one Legaspi set sail for the Far East. Instead of reaching for the China coast, however, it found itself in the Philippines, which were duly seized, and after massacring the native and Chinese inhabitants to the number of over 10,000, Spanish rule was established throughout the Archipelago, where it continued until 1898.

The Portuguese traders who had come in the wake of Mendez Pinto to Japan, had been followed by numbers of Jesuit missionaries, who had made numerous converts among the Japanese. This was resented by the people, who in 1590 rose against this species of interference, and by means of a fierce persecution obtained the expulsion of the Jesuits. Hideyoshi, at this period at the height of his power, also took the matter in hand, and condemned many of the Christian converts to death. Thus after existing for close on fifty years, Portuguese influence came to an end in Japan in 1591, just as Hideyoshi set out on his invasion of Korea, which country he desired to bring under Japanese dominion.

In the year 1600 occurred an incident which, though slight in itself, resulted in developments of considerable

importance. A fleet of British merchant vessels was overtaken by a hurricane in the Pacific. All the ships but one were lost, and the crew of that one, the *Charity* by name, had perished all but eight. Among the survivors was a young man named William Adams, a native of Rochester, who remained the most fit of the ship's company; and on the 11th April, 1600, he succeeded in steering the greatly damaged *Charity* to the north coast of the island of Kyushiu in Japan. Adams and his mates were permitted to land, and were well treated; and after resting awhile, Adams was conveyed by boat to Osaka, where he was interviewed by the Shogun, who sent him to prison. After awhile he was set at liberty, and attached to the Shogun's following. He appears to have showed much cleverness in his relations with the Japanese, and soon found favour with his protector. In 1609 he was ordered to construct a vessel like that in which he had come to Japan, and he was rewarded by a grant of land near Yedo. He continued to enjoy the Shogun's confidence for nearly twenty years, during which he was more than once taken into consultation in respect to negotiations with Dutch and Portuguese traders. He died in 1620, after seeing one of the streets in Yedo named after him.¹

In the year 1604 James I. issued a licence to Sir Edward Michelborne on behalf of the East India Company, "to discover the countries of Cathaia, China, Japan, and Corea, and to trade with the people there." The result of this publication was a renewed interest in the Far East, which was not restricted to Great Britain.

The strides made by the Dutch East India Company, which had been established in 1602, led to an increased activity among the traders of Holland. Dutch vessels made Java their headquarters, and sought their way along the coasts of China and Japan. In 1609 a Dutch vessel anchored off Hirado. The crew was interviewed by Adams, and, doubtless owing to his good offices, was well received by the Daimyo, who procured for them a letter addressed to the King of Holland, which they duly conveyed back

¹ See *Letters of William Adams*, Hakluyt Soc.

to Amsterdam. This letter contained an undertaking for the safety of all Dutch subjects who came to Japan for purposes of trade, and supplies the first approach to a treaty given by the Japanese. It suggested, among other things, that the King of Holland should send a ship or two to trade with Japan each year, and the Dutch duly conformed to this proposal by sending a small ship the following year (1611).

In 1613 Captain John Saris, a merchant seaman who had seen much of the Pacific, arrived at Hirado, where he was well received by the Daimyo. Aided by William Adams, he made excellent progress with the Japanese, and succeeded in negotiating a charter enabling the East India Company to trade with any Japanese port. He also established a store at Hirado, notwithstanding the opposition of the Dutch, who resented the competition of the British trader.

In 1617 the East India Company took advantage of the Japanese charter, and despatched a fleet of vessels to trade with that country. But considerable friction ensued with the Dutch traders, and, after a series of attempts to open up the country, the British ships were withdrawn. The departure of the English naturally gratified their Dutch rivals, who, realising that they were masters of the situation in Japan, sought to utilise the opportunity by extending their trading sphere elsewhere. In 1624 accordingly a Dutch fleet set sail for Macao, but was repulsed by the Portuguese, who refused to permit a landing. This incident started that rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese which continued so virulently and so long, and resulted in the expulsion of the latter from Nagasaki in 1640.

Commercial relations between Great Britain and China date from 1634, in which year Captain Weddell reached the mouth of the Canton river, which he explored as far up as the city of the same name. His visit did not lead to any immediate result, inasmuch as he was ill received; but the accounts he brought back with him of the country and its possibilities were largely instrumental in bringing

about the subsequent relations between England and China.

In 1655, Russia, having established her dominion over the greater portion of Siberia, sent a mission to the Emperor of China with the object of establishing friendly relations with that country. The Russians were well received at Peking, but refused to perform the kow tow,¹ which it was explained they would have to undergo before the emperor, in token of his superiority to the Russian Tsar; and returned to Siberia without having received an audience. In 1675 the Tsar Alexis determined to despatch another mission to China, on the chance that the newly throned emperor would accord a more friendly reception than his predecessor had done. He appointed one Nicolas Spayfarik his ambassador, and he set out for Peking with a large retinue. The Russian envoy was met by a Chinese mandarin at Tsitsihar, and conducted with great ceremony thence to Peking, where he was received with high honour. He returned to Moscow in 1676 after a most successful embassy, charged with letters from Kanghi to the Tsar.

The attention drawn to China by the narrative of Captain Weddell, and the arrival of the first parcel of tea in England in 1660, had served to direct public attention to the trading possibilities of the Far East. The outcome of this was the determination of the East India Company to make efforts to trade with China, and agents were despatched to Canton in 1680 charged with the taking of measures for the development of commerce with the Celestials, instructions which were carried out with an intelligence and ability which assured immediate success.

While England was thus engaged in her first serious attempt to develop commercial relations with China, Russia set herself a similar task. In her opening up of Southern Siberia, Russia had more than once been confronted by the Chinese, under whose rule a great portion of the territory claimed by Russia had been. The result

¹ The kow-tow is a form of abasement in which a suppliant prostrates himself.

was a series of collisions which rendered the despatch of additional bodies of men necessary to Siberia. On the accession of Ivan V. and his brother Peter, in 1682, the joint Tsars determined to seek a friendly understanding with China; and to this end they despatched, in 1685, two trusted councillors, Nikifor Venukof and Ivan Fafarof, to the Chinese capital. These emissaries duly arrived in the celestial city, assured Kanghi of their master's good intentions, and announced the speedy arrival of a fully qualified envoy, who would be charged with powers for the delimitation of the Russo-Chinese frontier.

The special envoy chosen for the allotted task was one Fedor Alexievitch Golovin, who left Moscow accompanied by a regiment of militia on the 20th January, 1686. He was preceded by a courier to proclaim his coming, and he travelled surrounded by every suggestion of state. The expedition wintered near Yeniseisk, and proceeded in the early spring to Selenginsk, whence was despatched a messenger to arrange a place of meeting with the Chinese officials. Considerable delay ensued owing to the troubled state of the frontier and the lack of promptitude on the part of the Chinese; and Golovin, mindful of his dignity, sent a letter direct to the Chinese emperor, written in Russian and Latin, expressing his desire to settle the frontier question, and requesting that no more time should be wasted. On the 18th May Golovin received notification that the Chinese envoys specially nominated by the emperor, would meet him at Nerchinsk. Various delays occurred after this appointment, but eventually the representatives of the two empires met at Nerchinsk in August, and after a good deal of difficulty a treaty was negotiated which settled the frontier question for the time being.

The treaty of Nerchinsk is noteworthy on account of its being the first convention arrived at between China and another Power. It is further interesting, in that it supplies one of the few instances in which Russia has forgone territory she had previously occupied. Its provisions need not be dwelt on in detail, inasmuch as they have all of them long since been nullified by more recent treaties. In

general spirit, the conditions agreed on restore a considerable portion of the land recently occupied by Russia in China, and decreed the demolition of a fort which had been erected by Russia at Albazin.¹

The terms of the treaty of Nerchinsk were faithfully carried out. Russia demolished the offending fort, and withdrew across the rivers Kerbechi and Argun, and Golovin returned to Moscow, where he was received with great distinction.

Three years after the signing of the treaty of Nerchinsk Peter, who now ruled alone, decided to send yet another mission to China. During the frontier struggles which had preceded the signing of the treaty, a number of Russian soldiers had been taken prisoners by the Chinese. These had been conveyed to Peking, where they had been well treated, and where they formed a colony in the north east corner of the city. The Russians had been indulged with many acts of consideration, being allowed to build a church for themselves, which they had dedicated to St. Nicholas. It was understood that these Russians were without a priest, and it was largely in the hope of being able to minister to their spiritual needs, that Peter decided to despatch an emissary to the court of Kanghi. The person chosen for the mission was General Eberhard Ysbrand Ides. He reached Peking in 1693, was well received by Kanghi, and succeeded in obtaining permission for a priest to reside in the celestial capital to minister to the Russians there.²

In 1707 Russia seized the peninsula of Kamchatka, and this act so terrified the Chinese that they hastened to take measures which would, they believed, effectually prevent their neighbour tampering with any of their own territory. The garrisons along the Manchurian frontier were strengthened, and a series of regulations introduced for the purpose of preventing communications between the natives and the Russians across the border. Chinese subjects were forbidden to emigrate, and the right of

¹ See Appendix B.

² *Three Years' Travels from Moscow Overland to China*, by E. Y. Ides. Trans. 1706.

trading on the Amur was restricted to a few merchants specially licensed at Peking.

Notwithstanding these precautions, the mandarins of those days, like those of more recent date, were at all times amenable to judicious bribery, and a reasonable payment sufficed to purchase a permit to enable goods to be sent out of the country in exchange for Russian gold. So the trade across the frontier gradually increased, and the Russians came to realise how much they had sacrificed by the treaty of 1689.

Whereupon Peter decided to send another embassy to China, in order that an attempt might be made to regain some of the ground which had been lost. The ambassador chosen was Captain Leon Ismaloff, who arrived at the Chinese capital in 1721, and was warmly received by the court. A house was placed at his disposal, and he was, with his party, made the guest of the emperor during his stay. After some friction on the subject of the kow tow, which Ismaloff refused to perform, an audience was arranged, and the Russian envoy was received in person by Kanghi, who took the Tsar's letter with his own hand, and agreed to allow one of Ismaloff's staff to remain in Peking as the permanent diplomatic agent of Russia. Ismaloff accordingly appointed his secretary De Lange "resident" at Peking, and returned to Moscow to report his reception, and the many expressions of friendship which Kanghi had expressed for the Tsar.

Thus direct diplomatic relations were created between Russia and China in the year 1721. But the Russian envoy had reckoned without the mandarins, who formed the Chinese court. Shortly after Ismaloff's departure, De Lange found himself practically a prisoner in his own house. All access to the emperor was denied him, and he remained little better than a hostage in the hands of the Chinese.

Meanwhile Peter, much gratified at the reports brought him by Ismaloff, decided to take immediate steps to strengthen the bonds of friendship between Kanghi and himself. He fitted out a large caravan, which he sent to

China to open up a trade with the natives, and this in due course reached the Chinese frontier in 1722. On reaching Peking, however, a new condition of affairs was apparent. Kanghi lay dying. The mandarins refused to trouble themselves with commercial affairs; and the caravan was curtly dismissed without any opportunities being allowed for trade. Simultaneously, De Lange was expelled the city, and instructed to inform his master, that for the future any trade which might be transacted between the two countries could be carried on at the frontier; beyond which no Russian subjects would be permitted to come.

Finding himself thus rebuffed along the Chinese frontier, Peter determined to seek other means for obtaining those trading facilities so much desired in Eastern Asia; and he turned his attention to further Siberia, where it had become necessary to obtain a direct outlet to the Pacific, in order that communications might be maintained with the newly created province of Kamchatka. Accordingly a series of expeditions were arranged with the object of opening up the country and subjugating the natives lying between Russian Siberia and the sea.

In 1727, Count Vladislavitch negotiated the treaty of Kiakhta, which decreed an everlasting friendship between Russia and China, and authorised the establishment of a permanent Russian mission at Peking, in which a number of students might be maintained for the purpose of studying the Chinese language.

In 1741, a considerable portion of Siberian territory in the neighbourhood of the Amur river was declared a portion of the Russian empire, without evoking any protest from the Chinese; and the ensuing half century was employed in surveying the extent of the new provinces and organising their military government.

In 1784, the American flag first reached China on the United States ship *Empress*, which sailed from Washington to Canton. This event did not, however, tend to bring about an immediate development of trade between the two countries.

The year 1786 saw the commencement of relations between America and China. In that year the government of the United States appointed Captain Shaw consul to China, and he sailed for Canton, where he took up his duties, greatly to the advantage of American trade.

Fifteen years later occurred the first relations between Annam and France. A number of Jesuit missionaries had found their way to the Far East in the train of the growing commerce with the West, and some of these had penetrated into Annam. This country was, in 1787, the scene of a rebellion which threatened to overthrow its ruler ; and, acting on the suggestion of a missionary who had obtained his confidence, the king sent one of his trusted ministers to seek the aid of Louis XVI. in the re-establishment of his authority. Louis agreed to the request, and despatched a number of officers with a quantity of arms to the king's assistance, obtaining in return the cession of the peninsula of Tourane and the island of Pulo Condore, with the right of stationing consuls in any part of Annam. Thus was it that France obtained her first footing in the Indo-Chinese peninsula ; and though Louis failed to make immediate use of the opportunity afforded, owing to the outbreak of the French Revolution, the treaty signed at Versailles in 1787 was not forgotten.

In 1791 Portugal made an effort to obtain a footing in Korea, but the missionary sent for this purpose failed to enter the country. In the same year the first cargo of American cotton was landed at Canton.

Meanwhile British relations with China had been progressing, and British trade had grown apace. The arrival of a small parcel of Indian opium at Canton in 1680 served to show its superiority over the native product. The consumption of opium in China was, even in those days, exceedingly great, and a large proportion of Southern China was devoted to poppy culture. But the Chinese method of expressing and preparing the drug was crude, and greatly inferior to that employed by the East India Company. No wonder then that the demand for Indian

opium spread rapidly throughout the province of Kwangtung. In 1767 the import of Indian opium amounted to upwards of a thousand chests, averaging a value of £200 apiece, and the annual value of the opium traffic at Canton at this period exceeded that of all the other imports added together.

In the year 1792 William Pitt decided to take advantage of the trade development in China, and ordered the despatch of an envoy to Peking to seek an audience with the Emperor Keen Lung, and open up diplomatic relations between the two countries. The person chosen for this mission was Lord Macartney. He sailed from Portsmouth in September, provided with a number of costly presents, and the squadron which accompanied him comprised two of the finest vessels in the British Navy.

Lord Macartney arrived at the Peiho early in 1793, and was welcomed by the Viceroy of Pechili, who escorted him up the river to Tientsin. There, and everywhere along the route, he was received with every honour; and he was subsequently, after an attempt on the part of the mandarins to prevent the interview, received on two occasions by Keen Lung at his palace at Jehol near Peking, with marked distinction. On his return, Lord Macartney paid a visit to Canton, proceeding thence overland from Peking. The ambassador was considerably annoyed by the importunity of the crowds who viewed his progress, many of which assumed an attitude by no means friendly; but he reached the south in safety, and duly returned home to report his experiences.¹

In marked contrast to the reception accorded to Lord Macartney was that rendered to the embassy sent by the Dutch East India Company to the Court of Keen Lung in 1796. The emissaries were subjected to a variety of indignities, and were treated with a marked want of consideration. The embassy produced little or no result, and did not recoup its cost, which was considerable.²

¹ See *An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China*, by Sir George Staunton, 1797.

² *Authentic Account of the Embassy of the Dutch East India Company in the years 1794 and 1795.*

In 1797, the first American ship arrived in Japan without effecting very much; and the century closed without any Western nation having penetrated further than the threshold of the Far East.

The first step taken in the nineteenth century towards the extension of European interests in China was that of the French, who in 1802 sent a gunboat to Canton to protect the interests of merchants there. The crew was landed and the tricolor hoisted, but it was not allowed to remain; and, in response to the remonstrances of the mandarins, the gunboat was withdrawn.

In 1805, Alexander, who had ascended the Russian throne four years before, nominated Colonel Golovkin special envoy to Peking, charging him to negotiate for the right of Russian navigation on the Amur river. But the mission failed, and, after being received none too civilly, Golovkin returned to Moscow without having attained his aim. In 1807 arrived at Canton Robert Morrison, the first Protestant missionary to reach Eastern Asia, and he was followed by several others in the same year.

The success which had attended Lord Macartney's mission in 1793 had served to stimulate British trade in China, and the prosperity of the merchants trading with that country had increased in a marked degree. The satisfactory commercial relations between the two countries led to Lord Liverpool deciding, in 1815, to despatch a second embassy to the Celestial Empire. Lord Amherst was the ambassador chosen, and he sailed on the 18th February, 1816, charged with the obtaining of a commercial treaty with China. On arriving at Tientsin, the British envoy met with a very different reception to what he had expected. The attitude of the Chinese towards foreigners had undergone a change since Lord Macartney's visit. Keen Lung had died, and Kiaking was an avowed opponent of the "outer barbarians." Something very like a squabble arose at Tientsin over the question of Lord Amherst's continued progress. The eternal kow tow was made the subject of a wrangle,

and it was only after considerable delay that the British representative was permitted to resume his journey. He was then conveyed in a boat to Tungchow, with a banner flying bearing the inscription "Tribute Bearer;" and on arriving at Yuen ming yuen, where the emperor was staying, Lord Amherst was told that Kiaking would receive him forthwith. Hot and tired from his dusty journey, the ambassador expressed himself unprepared to enter the emperor's presence until he had rested and partaken of refreshment. The Chinese would however take no denial, and when Lord Amherst threw himself on a bench in search of repose, the Duke Ho took him by the arm and somewhat roughly sought to lead him away. On this, his victim protested that force alone should compel him to attend the emperor at that moment. The mandarins then left him, and proceeded to the emperor, to whom they gave their version of the affair. A few hours afterwards there came a message to the effect that the emperor had been so incensed at the ambassador's refusal to visit him, that he commanded his immediate departure. Thus Lord Amherst's mission failed to attain anything except a knowledge of the irreconcilable dislike to foreigners entertained by Chinese officials.¹

So far from disheartening the British government, the rebuff accorded to Lord Amherst's embassy seemed rather to cause it to make renewed efforts to develop the country's commercial interests in the East. In 1819 the island of Singapore was purchased from the Sultan of Johore as a suitable halfway station between India and China, and the town was founded by Sir Stamford Raffles in the same year. This activity on the part of the British was followed by the French, who proceeded to exploit the southern end of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. In 1828 a French vessel was wrecked off Cochin China, and the crew, who scrambled ashore, were all massacred by the natives. This outrage was made the subject of lengthy negotiations with the Chinese government, which executed a number

¹ *Narrative of Lord Amherst's Embassy to the Court of Peking*, by Clarke Abel, 1818.

of natives suspected of having taken part in the massacre. But France refused to be consoled, and, by dint of threats of war, she succeeded in obtaining, what she had long desired, the right to station a consul at Canton. Meanwhile, the United States had evinced her increased interest in the Pacific by a treaty with Russia recognising the right of fishing and navigation in both countries in 1824.

The year 1834 was notable for the fact that the East India Company's Chinese charter expired, and the government decided not to renew it, but to place our trade with China under the care of a British superintendent. The failure of Lord Amherst's embassy had not tended to lessen the hostility displayed by the official classes among the Chinese towards the British traders, and it was realised that the presence of a responsible official on the spot was very desirable in the country's interests. Lord Napier was accordingly nominated British Superintendent in China, and his duties were to protect and foster trade at Canton, to endeavour to obtain markets in other parts of China, and to seek an opportunity of establishing direct communication with the court at Peking.

Lord Napier reached Canton in July, 1834. His announcement of his arrival, sent in a letter to the viceroy, was met with a refusal to hold communication with him, and an order forbidding his entry into the city. On arriving at the English factory at Canton he learned that all intercourse between the Chinese and the English had been prohibited. Nor did Chinese action end here. All natives were withdrawn from the British service, the river was pronounced closed to British ships, and heavy penalties were imposed on those dealing in British goods. Finding himself helpless, Lord Napier withdrew to Macao, where he fell ill and died shortly after.

Captain Elliot was appointed to succeed Lord Napier as British agent, and he found the Chinese masters of the situation. The mandarins refused to recognise his position as superintendent of British trade, and consented to renew dealings with British merchants only on terms exceedingly onerous. After a lengthy series of negotiations Captain

Elliot was permitted to reside at Canton on condition that he should not rank above a supercargo. It was at this juncture that Loo, the viceroy of Kwangtung, died, and Lin Tsisoo was appointed his successor. This man Lin was probably the most pronounced enemy the foreigner in China had yet seen. His antagonism was the more marked against the British, inasmuch as there were more of these than of any other nation in China. His enmity and his rapacity were always on the *qui vive*, and scarcely a week elapsed from the time of his appointment without some new edict being issued against the English in Canton. On the arrival of Lin, Captain Elliot again withdrew to Macao; and it must be confessed that in the subsequent negotiations in which he became engaged, he showed a timidity and lack of purpose ill according with his duty.

One of Lin's first edicts forbade the importation of opium, which at this period formed the most important item of British trade. To this Captain Elliot replied by issuing a notice warning all British subjects to refrain from the opium trade, notwithstanding the fact that the import of the Indian drug had continued for many years without protest on the part of the Chinese. In January, 1839, Lin improved the occasion by a fresh edict, denouncing the British in opprobrious terms, and ordering that all opium stored in Canton should be surrendered within three days. Captain Elliot advised that this demand should be complied with, and a large number of chests were handed over; but Lin refused to be contented with these, and threatened to attack the foreign settlement forthwith. Thereupon the British superintendent called upon the merchants to surrender all their opium to Lin. Over twenty thousand chests, valued at more than two million sterling, were thus delivered to Captain Elliot, who handed them over to Lin, by whom they were destroyed.

It is unnecessary to follow the development of events which led up to the first Chinese war. Elated at his triumph over the British within his grip, Lin followed one

edict discomforting his victims by another. He finally demanded that sixteen English merchants should be handed over to him, in order that he might punish them for having imported opium into the country. On this, the merchants closed the factory and retired to Macao, while Captain Elliot despatched a report of what had occurred to the British government, with a request for protection.

A British fleet of fifteen men-of-war, four steamers, and twenty-five transports, carrying 4,000 troops, was sent to the Far East, where it arrived in June, 1840, to find that the British merchants, who had been driven out of Macao by the Portuguese, had taken refuge on the rocky island of Hong Kong at the mouth of the Canton river.

A blockade of Canton was immediately declared by Sir Gordon Bremer, in command of the British fleet, and this was followed by the seizure and occupation of the island of Chusan off Ningpo. Lin's reply took the form of a proclamation offering a reward for English heads. The Bogue forts at the mouth of the Canton river were thereupon bombarded.

Still the Chinese continued their offensive attitude, and on the 7th January, 1841, the Bogue forts were taken and occupied by British troops. This achievement appeared to bring the Chinese to their senses. A mandarin of high degree, one Keshen, sued for peace, and offered any terms which might be demanded. The island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British, and the right to hold direct communication with the Peking government promised. Difficulties appeared to be disappearing, and the dispute at an end. British merchants were indeed preparing to return to Canton, when the news arrived that the Emperor Taoukwang refused to endorse the promises made by his commissioner, and that Keshen had been recalled in disgrace; while Eleang, another mandarin, had been appointed to succeed him, and ordered to drive the British out of the country forthwith.

It was at this juncture that Sir Hugh Gough, who had been appointed to the command of the British forces in

China, arrived at Hong Kong. Without loss of time he proceeded to reduce the various forts around Canton, and then hastened to attack the city, which speedily surrendered. Thus were the Chinese taught a lesson; and peace having been declared, the British merchants re-entered Canton on the 18th March, 1841.

A fortnight later Captain Elliot was insulted in the streets, and the mob rose, bent on attacking the English, who managed to escape without suffering much damage. The factories were however destroyed, British property burned, and the Chinese remained triumphant once more.

Sir Hugh Gough hastened back to Canton with all his available forces, and proceeded to bombard the city. But the Chinese realised their position, and offered to pay an indemnity of six million dollars if the British would withdraw. Contrary to the advice of Sir Hugh Gough Captain Elliot closed with this proposal, and a portion of the money was paid; when further disturbances broke out, which continued for another month.

Eventually a peace was patched up and a truce declared, Captain Elliot, whose term of service had expired, left for Europe; and Sir Henry Pottinger, a man of a very different stamp, took his place. He found everywhere signs of the success of the British in their contest with the Chinese. The Bogue forts were destroyed. Amoy and Ningpo had been captured. Most of the more important towns on the Chinese coast line were occupied; and explorations had been begun inland. The successes attained were followed up without pause. The British fleet entered the Yangtse Kiang in June, 1842. Woosung was taken, Shanghai fell immediately after. Chinkiang was occupied on the 20th July, and Nanking on the 4th August. It was while at the ancient capital that Sir Henry Pottinger received the mandarin Keying, who had been sent as special commissioner from Peking to treat with the foreigners.

After a fortnight's negotiations, the first treaty made between Great Britain and China was signed on board

the *Cornwallis* off Nanking by the representatives of the two countries. The treaty is of importance, inasmuch as it supplies the keynote to the relations which have since existed between China and the Western Powers. It serves as the charter of trade with China, and acknowledges, for the first time in history, the existence of a Western Power on an equality with the Celestial Empire. Its enactments are simple in the extreme, and leave little room for misconception. They are :

1. The conclusion of a lasting peace between China and Great Britain.
2. The payment of an indemnity of \$21,000,000 by China to England.
3. The opening of Amoy, Canton, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai to British trade.
4. The cession of the island of Hong Kong to England.

The signing of the treaty of Nanking marks the first step in the opening up of China to Western intercourse. The process, commenced thus late, has been one of remarkable sluggishness, and it is doubtful whether the attitude of the Chinese official classes of to-day is any more favourable towards the foreigner than it was in the middle of the past century. But while vast portions of the Chinese Empire still remain a sealed book to the Western, the events of 1842 stand out as a border line between the exclusiveness of early ages, and the mere conservatism, due to a false sense of self-interest, of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER III

THE OPENING UP OF CHINA

China after the Treaty of Nanking—Sir John Bowring and Commissioner Yeh—Canton forts seized—Treaty of Tientsin—Sir Hope Grant—The march on Peking—Treaty of Aigun—Treaty of Peking—The opening of the Yangtse Kiang—The Taiping Rebellion—Western intercourse—China and Japan—Formosa—Murder of Augustus Margary—Chifu Convention—France and China—The Emperor Kwangsu—China-Japanese War—Events in Korea—The Cassini Convention—Occupation of Kiao Chau—Port Arthur—Wei Hai Wei—Railway schemes—Their prospects—The Emperor's reform decrees—His retirement—Tsi Hsi's *coup d'état*—The Kowloon extension—The Anglo-Russian agreement.

¹ THE treaty of Nanking was intended to serve as the charter of commercial rights in China, and to settle the disputes which had arisen between the mandarins and the British traders, for all time. It was the first diplomatic understanding which China had entered into with an European Power,² and England accepted it in final settlement of the annoyances which had led to the war of 1839. In doing this she reckoned without her host. The Chinese

¹ NOTE.—The summary of Chinese political history, which forms the bulk of this chapter, is founded on the authorities originally consulted by me when writing my *China in Decay*. They will be found set out to the number of over one hundred in that volume. I have adapted Mr. Boulger's large *History of China* as the standard in cases where experts differ, deeming that work the most reliable, as it is the most up-to-date on its subject. I have also utilised Mr. McGowan's *History*, Professor Douglas's compact *Story of China*; the same author's life of Li Hung Chang, Mr. H. E. M. James's *Long White Mountain*, and many other volumes of equal merit, the more important of which will be found in the notes to the ensuing pages.

² The treaties of Nerchinak and Kiakhta were mere friendly conventions rectifying common frontiers with a neighbouring Power, and in no sense contracts between Eastern and Western nations for purposes of trade.

view of the treaty was in marked contrast to its terms. She had signed it merely to stop the incursions of the British in her realms, and, having attained her aim, she made no attempt to abide by its provisions.

Trouble continued among the people of Canton. In 1846 rioting occurred in the streets. In 1847 a party of English narrowly escaped with their lives, after being attacked at Fatshan. The opening of Canton to Europeans, which had been fixed for April 6th, 1849, was delayed, and the Chinese vowed that they would not tolerate foreigners among them on any terms.

The charge of British interests in China was entrusted to Sir John Bowring, who had considerable experience of Chinese character. He sent home a report on the situation in which he said, "The treaty of Nanking has inflicted a deep wound in the pride, but by no means altered the policy of the Chinese government;" and circumstances soon showed the correctness of his judgment.

In 1854, Sir John Bowring sent a request to Commissioner Yeh, who had become viceroy of Kwangtung, asking for an interview. The mandarin sent an ambiguous reply, and would have nothing to do with the British superintendent of trade. And so Sir John, discomfited, waited the turn of events. Nor had he long to wait.

In 1856 occurred the incident of the lorch *Arrow*, a vessel owned by a British subject, which, while trading in accordance with treaty rights, was seized by a party of mandarins, and impounded, while the crew were put in prison, and the British factory was destroyed. Remonstrances were sent to the viceroy without result. Yeh refused to discuss the question. There was an impasse, and the matter was serious. Sir Michael Seymour, the admiral on the station, was communicated with, and he entered the river and seized the Bogue forts. Still the viceroy did nothing.

The Canton forts were taken on October 21st. The Chinese fleet was destroyed early in November, and the bombardment of Canton commenced immediately after. Then occurred an interval pending the arrival of troops.

The outbreak of the Indian Mutiny caused delay in the arrival of the desired force. Eventually, however, in September, 1857, all was ready. Canton was stormed and taken; Yeh captured, and sent to Calcutta; and Lord Elgin, who had been sent to China as special envoy to demand reparation for the damages done to the English at Canton, arrived, and set out to interview the high mandarin at Shanghai. That dignitary, like Yeh, would have nothing to do with the British representative, whereupon Lord Elgin decided to appeal to headquarters, and go and interview the authorities at Peking. In this undertaking he was joined by the French admiral, Baron Gros, who was charged with the protection of French interests in China.

The combined squadrons reached Tientsin without opposition. There they were met by two high commissioners sent to treat with them by the Emperor Hienfung. After an interview between the parties, the mandarins agreed to the demands made for the right of access to Canton, but they refused to accord permission for the despatch of an ambassador to Peking. A long wrangle ensued, and finally the point was conceded, and a treaty drawn up embodying the points named. This was duly signed by Lord Elgin and the mandarins on the part of England, and Baron Gros on the part of France, and the combined squadrons returned to Canton.

The treaty of Tientsin strengthens that previously arranged at Nanking, and supplies several omissions in the former. It provides for the sending of an ambassador to the court of Peking, and the despatch of a similar representative from China to London. It decrees the freedom of trade with China, the toleration of Christianity, the right of British subjects to travel in all parts of China, the payment by China of a war indemnity, the revision of the existing tariff, and the disuse of the word "barbarian" as applied to foreigners in China. It also authorised the opening of five more treaty ports to foreign trade, Chanchow, Kiungchow, Newchang, Taiwan, and Tangchow, as well as the opening of treaty ports at

Chinkiang, Hankow, and three other places on the Yangtse Kiang, and the cession of the Kowloon promontory opposite Hong Kong. In 1859 Mr. Frederick Bruce was appointed to proceed to Peking for the purpose of exchanging ratifications of the treaty of Tientsin. He arrived at the entrance to the Peiho on June 20th to find the river closed against him by a boom and stakes. On endeavouring to force an entrance his ship was fired upon by the forts, and the fleet withdrew after suffering considerable loss.

In November a fresh expedition sailed from Hong Kong under Sir Hope Grant, with 13,000 men, Baron Gros accompanying him in charge of 6,000 French. Chusan was again occupied without opposition, to serve as a base; and the combined fleets arrived at the Peiho on the 12th August, 1860. The obstructions at the river mouth were successfully forced, and the expedition arrived at Tientsin on the 26th. The attitude of the people was friendly. A high mandarin appeared and proceeded to treat with the invaders. An apology for the attack of the previous year was demanded, and the payment of an indemnity, and the exchange of ratifications of the treaty within the walls of Peking, was insisted on by the English and French leaders. On this the mandarin raised difficulties, and, after wasting some days in fruitless negotiations, the forces marched towards Tungchow, *en route* for Peking. At Tungchow further negotiations ensued, and more time was lost. A number of British officers were seized and made prisoners by the Chinese, several of whom died under the treatment awarded them.

Finally the Allies pushed on, and on the 12th October they entered Peking. The Emperor fled to his country seat at Jehol, but, though unable to follow him, it was determined to give the Chinese a lesson, and the emperor's summer palace was destroyed, and a compensation of £100,000 demanded for the murder of the prisoners.

The French and English leaders then took up their quarters in the Hall of Ceremonies in Prince Tsai's palace, and the ratifications of the treaty of Tientsin were there

exchanged. The forces then withdrew, and returned to Canton just as the winter set in.¹

While these events were in progress, a series of noteworthy incidents had been transpiring in Siberia. The surrender of her right to trade on the banks of the Amur under the provisions of the treaty of Nerchinsk, had in no wise reconciled Russia to the loss of the territory concerned, and many attempts were made to evade the conditions laid down. Nor had the failure of Golovkin's mission in 1805 served to impress Alexander with the hopelessness of the situation. In 1820 a party of Cossacks were despatched to explore the river. In 1851 a Russian warship sailed up the Amur estuary, and founded the towns of Nikolaievsk and Mariinsk, and two years later Alexandrovsk and Konstantinovsk were established on the Tartary coast, both well within the limits of Chinese territory as defined by the treaty of Nerchinsk, and in 1853 a post was established at Duri on the west coast of Saghalin. The news of this action was promptly complained of by the mandarins, who issued a formal complaint of the breach of faith. General Muravieff, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, replied that it was a matter of necessity to despatch stores to the Russian traders who had effected a friendly settlement among the Chinese, and that there was no other way of supplying them. The mandarins answered that they could not assent to this arrangement, and demanded that the Russian vessels should be withdrawn to Nerchinsk.

The Crimean war was being waged at the time, and the Black Sea blockaded. It was impossible for the Russians to maintain communications with the Sea of Okhotsk, except by the Amur route, and Muravieff was not the man to stick at trifles. He accordingly fitted out an expedition comprising a large flotilla of barges, and these, laden with Cossacks and guns, he took down the river, without being interfered with by the Chinese. This expedition was followed by three more. Russian posts were established along the whole of the north bank of the river.

¹ *Lord Elgin's Mission to China and Japan*, by Lawrence Oliphant, 1860.

The Chinese protested, but were helpless. The Taeping rebellion had broken out, and all available troops were required to cope with the rebels.

Aware of this circumstance, and realising that the psychological moment had arrived, Muravieff in 1858 sent a formal demand for the rectification of the frontier. The Chinese were powerless, and the mandarins, thinking discretion the better part of valour, concluded the treaty of Aigun, which ceded to Russia the whole of the Chinese territory north of the Amur, a region covering an area eight times as large as Great Britain and Ireland.

Having thus obtained possession of all the country north of the Amur river, Russia cast her eyes on that which lay to the south. After biding her time awhile, she fixed on the presence of the allied French and English forces in Peking as a moment when the Chinese could not afford to be particular. In 1860 then, General Ignatieff was despatched to the celestial capital, where he without difficulty negotiated the Russian treaty of Peking, which has ever since served as the basis of international relations between the two countries. Under this document the whole of the Manchurian coast line between the Ussuri river and the sea was ceded to Russia without any restrictions whatever. In addition to this, it conveyed the right of Russian traders to go to Peking, and annulled the treaty of Nerchinsk. Thus did Russia obtain an accession of close upon three quarters of a million square miles to her territory, and an extension southward to the bay of Vladivostok. More than this, the treaty brought the southern frontier of Russia into contact with that of Korea, and gave her an advance of 200 miles in the direction of Peking.

In 1861 the first French and English ambassadors took up their residence in Peking, and arrangements had to be made for the purpose of enabling them to have access to the Chinese government. To allow the right of audience with the emperor was not at all in accordance with Chinese ideas; and after a deal of negotiations, it was decided to create a board in which should be vested the

nominal control of foreign affairs, and the duty of conferring with the representatives of foreign countries. Hence arose the Tsungli Yamen, that unique body which has proved such a thorn in the sides of successive ambassadors from Europe.

One of the first tasks undertaken by the British after the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin was the exploiting of the Yangtse Kiang, on which the right had been accorded to establish treaty ports. Accordingly Sir James Hope was despatched in charge of a flotilla to explore the great waterway, and make the necessary arrangements for the development of British trade on its banks. The Taeping rebellion was at its height, and Nanking with other riverside cities was held by the rebels; but Admiral Hope conducted his mission successfully, and established consulates at Chinkiang; at Nanking, where the British were well received by the rebel leaders; at Wuhu, Kiukiang, and Hankow, all of which places rapidly became thriving ports, and tended to promote European interests in the kingdom of China. In 1861 the British concession at Canton was enlarged, and the development of foreign trade at the treaty ports increased to a phenomenal degree. But the country was plunged in a cataclysm of rebellion, the Taepings had overrun the whole of the southern provinces, and succeeded in holding the government at defiance. By 1864 the rebellion had assumed vast proportions, and the British government; seeing that stern measures of repression were necessary, sent Major Gordon, an engineer officer, to the Chinese government, to lead its army against the Taepings. The success attained by the British officer was instantaneous. He speedily drilled his Chinese troops into form, and marched against the rebels with such unvarying success that he gained for them the title of the "ever victorious army." By these means the Taepings were soon subdued, and peace reigned in China once more, thanks to the action of her British invaders.

There can be no question as to the value of the service rendered to China by our aid in quelling the Taeping

rising, which at one moment threatened to overwhelm the whole country and depose the Manchu dynasty. Nor did the more enlightened Chinese fail to recognise the service rendered. But this very fact caused an exhibition of ill-feeling among the "literati" and certain other official classes; and the animosity exhibited by these against the "barbarians" in their midst, culminated in a series of disturbances, which had for their object the driving of the hated foreigners from their shores. The Protestant mission houses at Yangchow were accordingly attacked and destroyed in August, 1868, the missionaries only saving their lives by flight; and this outrage was the prelude to a series which ended in the tragedy at Tientsin, where twenty-two persons connected with the Roman Catholic mission were murdered in 1870; and the subsequent massacre at Whasang of 1895.

The success attending the rising of the Taepings had served to accentuate China's inability to protect her dominions, and led to the government's aid in putting its defences in order. Accordingly, the services of Captain Sherard Osborn were placed at the disposal of the authorities. Captain Osborn was appointed to command the Chinese fleet; but on arriving at Tientsin he found that he was expected to act under the orders of mandarins, most of whom had never seen a vessel other than a Chinese junk. Captain Osborn refused to share his authority with the Chinese, while they insisted on the interference of the mandarins. And so matters stood at an *impasse*, until the triumph of Gordon's army showed the Chinese, to their satisfaction, that the necessity of a fleet no longer existed, and Captain Osborn's services were dispensed with; after which the ships were sent to England and sold.

The year 1866 was a noteworthy one in Chinese annals from the fact that it saw the first attempt on the part of the government to open relations with foreign Powers. In that year the Chinese despatched a mission to the European States; and in the year following a second commission, consisting of Mr. Burlinghame and two mandarins set out on

a diplomatic tour round the world. Neither of these expeditions did much, however, to close the bonds of sympathy between the East and West.

In 1867 America strengthened her interests on the Pacific by the purchase of Alaska from Russia; and in 1870 Russia, who had long since occupied the town of Kiakhta on the confines of Siberia and Mongolia, took possession of the town of Urga on the fringe of the Gobi desert, and in the following year China sent Chung How, a mandarin of high rank, to represent her as her ambassador in London.

About this period trouble broke out between the Chinese and Japanese. For many years there had been friction between the two countries on the subject of Korea, over which China claimed suzerainty, while Japan maintained that the country was independent; but that if any other Power had a right to be consulted in regard to its affairs, that country was herself. In 1867 a Japanese junk had been wrecked on the rocky coast of Formosa, an island which, while nominally Chinese, was peopled by turbulent and savage tribes, who rendered the maintenance of authority difficult. The crew of the vessel were murdered in cold blood by the natives; and Japan failing to obtain any compensation, or, indeed, any response to her remonstrances, from China, sent in 1871 a punitive expedition to Formosa. The island was occupied and held. China made a counter demonstration, and war appeared imminent. At the last moment, however, Mr. Wade, the British minister at Peking, stepped into the breach, and by dint of much patient diplomacy succeeded in arranging a treaty which was duly accepted by the representatives of both China and Japan. Under this, Japan undertook to evacuate Formosa, while China consented to pay an indemnity, in satisfaction of her neighbour's grievance. Thus were the issues between the two countries deferred, and their settlement postponed till twenty-three years later.

It was at this period that the French showed renewed activity in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. But the circum-

stances attending the seizure of Annam, Cambodia, and Tonkin are better dealt with elsewhere.

The demise of the Emperor Tungche in 1875 placed an infant on the Celestial throne, and the reign of the present emperor, Kwangsu, was ushered in by means of a regency. The beginning of the new reign was marked by an untoward circumstance, in the murder of Mr. Augustus Margary, who was assassinated at Manwyne, near the Burmese frontier, while preceding the authorised British expedition from Bhamo to Shanghai on the 21st February, 1875.

This outrage was not avenged for over a year, during which the procrastinating tactics of the mandarins were allowed full play. Eventually, on the 13th September, 1876, was signed the convention of Chifu, which, besides providing compensation for the family of the murdered man, conferred the right of travelling in China on all foreigners provided with passports, responsibility for their safety being placed on the viceroys and governors of the provinces in which they travel; the opening of Ichang, Wuhu, Wenchow, and Pakhoi as treaty ports; and a number of minor concessions, including the right of sending an expedition across China from Peking to Tibet, and thence to India, or the reverse, at the option of the British government.

The squabble between Russia and China, which broke out over the Kulja incident in 1879, afforded another opportunity for the mediation of Great Britain. By dint of judicious interference, Colonel Gordon, who since his repression of the Taiping rebellion had become a *persona grata* with the Peking authorities, succeeded in arranging matters between the Tsungli Yamen and the Russian authorities and avoiding the threatened war.

In 1884 the British government decided to despatch the expedition authorised in the Chifu convention across Tibet and China. As soon as the formal application for the necessary passports was made, the Tsungli Yamen urged various excuses, on the ground that it was, greatly to its regret, impossible to guarantee the safety of British subjects on such a journey; and thus another instance was

afforded of that breach of faith with which China treats her neighbours. In the same year was signed the Fournier treaty between China and France, on the subject of Tonkin, which will be found discussed elsewhere. On proceeding to exert the rights accorded her by the treaty in question, the French found themselves opposed by the Chinese, who, despite the terms of the treaty, turned out troops to prevent the occupation of the territory ceded. The opposition was speedily overcome, and the French advanced in force. The protests which were issued by the Peking authorities in response to French insistence, evoked the issuing of an ultimatum, and, despite the promptitude with which the Chinese came to their senses and offered to adopt the terms laid down, including the payment of an indemnity, Admirals Courbet and Lespés moved northward; the former in the direction of Fuchow, the latter towards Formosa. The French ambassador was thereupon withdrawn from Peking, and the fleets proceeded to deal out punishment to the faithless Chinese.

Admiral Courbet reached the Min river on the 23rd August. There he seized the Chinese fleet, captured the arsenal, and bombarded the forts. Admiral Lespés took Kelung on the 8th October, and blockaded Formosa. The war was prosecuted vigorously during the winter. Kelung, which was retaken by the Chinese, fell a second time in January, 1885. A number of junks were sunk, and the Pescadores seized. At last, Sir Robert Hart intervened, and by his efforts preliminaries of peace were arranged at Peking.

The treaty between France and China which followed gave the former Power the control of the whole of the coast line of Indo-China, together with extensive rights in the interior, and the privilege of opening up routes across the frontiers of Kwangsi and Yunnan; privileges which she lost no time in availing herself of, to the dismay of the native population.

In 1887, the youthful Emperor Kwangsu, who had attained his sixteenth year, came of age, and assumed the reins of government, and China turned her attention once

more to the question of naval defence. The events of the French war served to remind the Chinese of their openness to foreign attack ; and the Tsungli Yamen decided to appeal to England again for aid in strengthening the national defences. Arsenals already existed in China, that established by Sir Halliday Macartney having been copied in several ports ; but the country possessed no ships, having disposed of those which were at one time under charge of Captain Osborn. Accordingly, five ironclads were purchased in England, and the services of Captain Lang requisitioned. The result was very similar to that attained on a previous occasion. Captain Lang was placed on his arrival under the orders of a Chinese admiral, and while he was entrusted with the training of his crews, he was rigorously excluded from having any voice in matters of organisation and expenditure. As soon as the men had obtained a vague notion of rudimentary seamanship and gunnery, the national arrogance of the Chinese asserted itself, and Captain Lang received his discharge. In view of this repeated action, it is no wonder that the Chinese came out of the contest of 1894-5 as badly as they did.

In 1889, the Emperor Kwangsu intimated his intention of granting an audience to the representatives of foreign Powers accredited to his court. His predecessor, Tungche, had, on one occasion, consented to a similar ceremonial in response to the request that the foreign ministers might be allowed to offer their congratulations on his accession. The reception took place in a pavilion in the palace grounds ; and this fact gave evidence of the determination of the "Son of Heaven" not to alter the invariable rule forbidding the presence of barbarians within the precincts of the palace itself. The ceremonial introduction of the Emperor Kwangsu to the corps diplomatique took place in March, 1891, with observance similar to that followed by Tungche. Three years later, however, it was decided to admit the foreign representatives to the sacred building ; and on the 12th November, 1894, the ministers were received in the Wen Hua Tien,

an apartment in the palace which was for the first time entered by Europeans.

In 1891 was issued the Tsar's rescript, ordaining the construction of the trans-Siberian Railway; and the ceremony of turning the first sod of this gigantic undertaking, which is destined so largely to affect the fate of China, was performed by the present Tsar, at that time Tsarevitch, at Vladivostok, in territory which prior to 1860 had been Chinese, on the 5th March.

The great event of 1894 was the outbreak of the war between China and Japan. The circumstances which led up to hostilities are complex, the key to the situation being the attitude exhibited by China towards Korea, which was such as to prompt the Japanese to demand the recognition of that country's independence, and the cessation of Chinese interference in her affairs. A conspiracy, having for its object the overthrow of the king, broke out at Seoul in March, which speedily threw the whole country into a state of great excitement. The tension was increased by the murder of Kim Ok Kiun, the prime minister, at Shanghai on the 27th. The murdered Korean was an avowed supporter of Japanese policy, and his death was the cause of much rejoicing among the anti-foreign party in Korea. The tension thus caused resulted in rioting, and the king thereupon appealed to China for aid. On hearing of this the Japanese despatched a force of troops to Korea in order to protect their interests, which were recognised to require the strengthening of Korea so as to enable that country to maintain an independent existence, and lessen the danger of interference from Russia or China. It had long been recognised by Japan that a strong Korea was necessary for the protection of the island empire, and that any occupation of Korean territory by a foreign Power would be a constant danger to her prosperity. In order to prevent this, it was decided to take the steps necessary to enable Korea to protect her territory and resist foreign interference. As soon as China learned of the arrival of Japanese troops she also despatched a force to Korea; not to exert any

interference with the Koreans, whom she had always left to their own resources, but to counteract Japanese action, and compel the withdrawal of the invading force. Japan thereupon occupied Seoul, and held the king prisoner. The Chinese replied by despatching a large body of troops to Korea by sea, issuing a declaration of war upon Japan the while.

The combatants met at Asan on the 29th July, where the Chinese proved the victors, while a Japanese cruiser encountered a British vessel named the *Kowshing*, which was conveying 1500 Chinese troops to Korea, and sunk her. The Japanese defeated the Chinese at Ping Yang on the 17th August, and a great naval battle was fought by the rival fleets off the mouth of the Yalu river on the 19th September. The fleets were as nearly as possible of equal strength, but the Japanese won an easy victory, sinking four Chinese vessels and losing none of their own. On this, Japan, which had been making gigantic exertions to carry the war to a successful issue, sent 40,000 troops to the Liaotung Peninsula, where they landed and captured Port Arthur. Kinchow and Talienwan were occupied, the Chinese fleet destroyed, and Wei Hai Wei taken. Newchang was also seized, and Formosa and the Pescadores taken possession of. At this juncture the European Powers intervened, with the result that Li Hung Chang was appointed special envoy to negotiate a treaty of peace.

This was concluded at Shimonoseki on the 17th April, 1895, and embodied the following conditions :—

The recognition of the full and complete independence of Korea by China.

The cession of the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.

The cession of Formosa and the Pescadores islands to the same Power.

The payment to Japan of an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels.

The opening of Shashih, Chungking, Suchow, and Hangchow to foreign trade.

The opening of the Upper Yangtse and the Woosung rivers to navigation.

The occupation of Wei Hai Wei by Japan until the whole of the indemnity is paid.

Onerous as were the terms of this treaty, Li Hung Chang accepted them without demur. He had as a matter of fact previously come to an understanding with the Russian representative at Peking, by which the intervention of the Tsar was promised to prevent the permanent occupation of the Chinese mainland by Japan, and he knew that the most important clause in the treaty would not be allowed to be carried out.

Six days after the signing of the treaty, a joint note was forwarded to Peking by the Russian, German and French governments, protesting against the cession of the Liaotung peninsula; and as Great Britain did not offer to support Japan, that country felt constrained to abide by the objections raised, and consented to abandon its claim on the mainland, in return for an increased indemnity.

In 1896 Li Hung Chang was sent to represent China at the Coronation of Tsar Nicholas II. Before leaving Peking the viceroy of Pechili had a series of interviews with Count Cassini, the Russian minister at Peking, with whom he negotiated a secret treaty, which was subsequently ratified by Prince Lobanow, the Russian minister for foreign affairs. The terms of this treaty, known as the Cassini convention, have never been officially published, but it is known that they included guarantees to China for the integrity of the empire, especially in the event of any further attempt on the part of Japan to obtain a footing on the mainland; while China bound herself to afford facilities for the construction of a system of Russian railways through Manchuria, together with certain contingent rights along the coast lines of Northern China.

In November, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in the province of Shantung; and immediately the outrage became known, a German squadron anchored off the harbour of Kiao Chau and landed troops, which occupied the town of that name. After a series of negotiations, Germany demanded the cession of Kiao Chau for the purpose of a naval base, in compensation for

the crime ; and, powerless to resist, China acceded to the demand, with the result that Germany set about fortifying the harbour, and preparing to turn the place into a German colony.¹

The occupation of Kiao Chau, though now supposed to have been achieved after arriving at an understanding on the subject with Russia, was made the excuse for the airing of a grievance by that country. It was urged that the obtaining of a naval base by Germany in Northern China had disturbed the political *status quo*, and affected Russian interests adversely. Accordingly, Russia occupied Port Arthur on the 18th December, in compensation for the grievance complained of ; and meeting the inquiries of Great Britain first by the announcement that she only intended using the place for the purpose of wintering her fleet there, and later by a pledge that the place had been leased for the purpose of an ice-free harbour which would remain open to the navies of the world, she hastened to reconstruct the range of forts which had been destroyed in the war with Japan, placed powerful guns on the surrounding heights, filled the town with troops, and closed the harbour to all except her own vessels.²

Thus, after protesting against the retention of the Liao-tung peninsula by Japan, Russia herself occupied the very spot from which she had caused her neighbours to be ousted, and she has hastened to take the steps necessary to convert the place into a naval port which may be regarded as well nigh impregnable. The full significance of this step has not yet been made apparent, but the additional strength achieved by Russia in China waters by the occupation of Port Arthur cannot be over estimated.

Having secured a footing in Northern China, Russia hastened to produce an agreement made in 1896, according her a concession for the construction of a railway through Manchuria, uniting the trans-Siberian Railway at Chita near Nerchinsk, with Vladivostok, and a branch line running north and south between Tsitsihar and Port Arthur. This undertaking enables Russia to dominate

¹ See Appendix B.

² See Appendix B.

the whole of Manchuria, besides placing her in possession of a direct route to Peking, and at once gives her a predominance in Northern China which places Great Britain and the other Powers at a marked disadvantage.

This fact served to stir up the ambitions of the other countries possessing an interest in China; and the year 1898 witnessed a keen struggle between the contending concessionaires for the authorisation of rival schemes for the construction of railways which might tend to bring about the development of the trade and resources of China. Among the concessions granted, the following are the most important.

A concession to a nominally Belgian syndicate, for the construction of a trunk line of railway between Peking and Hankow on the Yangtse-kiang. This railway, which is destined to play a very important part in the future of China, is understood to be really a Russian venture, which was placed in the hands of Belgian nominees in order to obviate any objection on the part of Great Britain.

A railway, to be built by a British syndicate, between Tientsin and Chinkiang.

A line, vested in a French company, uniting Hankow with Canton.

A railway, to be constructed by the British government, from the Burmese frontier via Yunnan to Suifu on the upper Yangtse.

A line, uniting Ningpo and Hankow with Shanghai, by a British syndicate.

A branch railway between the "Belgian" line at Chengting and Siganfu.

An extension of the existing Peking-Tientsin line northwards to Newchang, by a Chinese company, in British hands.

A railway between Shanghai and Nanking, in English hands.

A line, to be constructed by German capitalists, uniting Tsinanfu and Ichaufu with Kiao Chau.

The amount of capital necessary for the construction of these railways is of course very large, and

their completion could not, even if the works are vigorously pushed on, be looked for till many years were past. But, up to the present, very little has been done in the way of construction. So far as is known, the only schemes which are in active progress, are the extremities of the Luhan line, which is vested in the Belgian syndicate, and the extension of the Tientsin railway, which is now known as the Northern Railway of China. The construction of this last has been the cause of a good deal of friction between the Russian authorities and the British government. The former claimed that they hold the sole concession for railway construction north of the Great Wall, and sought to obtain a cancellation of the concession to the British company entrusted with the work beyond that point. The dispute, which at one time appeared likely to become serious, was eventually settled in favour of this country, though it is possible that the last has not yet been heard on the subject.

Of the vastness of the possibilities open to railways in China, there can be no two opinions. Owing to the density of the population the prospects of traffic on working lines are immense; and notwithstanding the suspicion with which the first railways were regarded, the Chinese have already taken kindly to the new method of transport; and the two lines now running, that between Peking and the coast, and from Shanghai to Wusung, are both doing an enormous trade.

In their commercial and political aspect, the future of railways in China is assured. Their influence on trade would be difficult to over estimate, while as a means of accustoming the natives to progress, and intercourse with foreigners, they must have an enormous bearing. Notwithstanding the pessimistic attitude assumed on more than one occasion by Lord Salisbury towards Chinese railway concessions, I make bold to opine that these undertakings will do more than any other to open up the country, and to bring the people in touch with Europeans.

The seizure of Port Arthur by Russia, and, in a lesser degree, the occupation of Kiao Chau by Germany, caused a general feeling of alarm in this country. It was realised that the existence of foreign naval harbours in the vicinity of the gulf of Pechili placed British interests at a disadvantage, and gave undue influence to our rivals in their proximity to the Peiho river and Peking. It was thus borne in upon the government that it was desirable to take steps to equalise this advantage, and negotiations were entered into with the Tsungli Yamen which resulted in the leasing to England of the harbour of Wei Hai Wei on the north coast of Shantung, on the same terms as Port Arthur had been leased to Russia. The convention for the cession of Wei Hai Wei was signed on the 1st of July, 1898, and the territory was taken over shortly afterwards.¹ The new naval base includes the bay of Wei Hai Wei, the walled city of the same name, and a strip of land ten miles wide round the bay, with the island of Liukung which commands the harbour. Wei Hai Wei bay is some eighteen miles in circumference. It affords anchorage for a considerable number of vessels, and has a good depth. The surrounding coast-line is mountainous, and the place well adapted for purposes of defence. It is, however, open to attack from the land side, and is exposed to storms from the north-east, which prevail in this locality at certain times of the year. As compared with Port Arthur, moreover, Wei Hai Wei takes a second-rate place, but the gain to British interests by its lease, is unquestionable, and by the opportunities it affords for massing troops in the vicinity of Peking, must strengthen our position greatly in time of war.

The autumn of 1898 was remarkable for a sudden new departure in policy by the Chinese emperor. On the 20th September the world was astonished by the issue of an edict granting the right of memorialising the throne to all Chinese subjects. This was followed by others decreeing the rendering of monthly accounts of all govern-

¹ See Appendix B.

ment expenditure and receipts, and directions were given for the posting of these edicts throughout the empire.

The publication of these decrees caused the utmost surprise among those people who knew Chinese ways, and it became evident that there was a reform party at work in Peking, and that the young emperor had fallen under their influence. The news evoked the greatest satisfaction in Europe, except among people who had lived in China, and realised the amount of opposition likely to be evoked against the emperor's reforms by the corrupt official class.

Further decrees were issued a few days later, by which marine academies, mining schools, and training ships were ordered to be established, and a minister to Korea appointed; and the emperor improved the occasion by expressing his views on the condition and prospects of his country. He urged that China was suffering by a too firm adherence to old traditions. He avowed his intention of coming to the rescue of the empire, and urged his ministers and servants throughout the eighteen provinces to assist him in reorganising the country.

While these notifications were the topic of the hour, and people were discussing the probability of a real awakening in China, a jarring note was struck by the issue of a counter edict emanating from the dowager empress, who had acted as regent during Kwangsu's minority from 1875 to 1887. In this it was announced that the emperor had resigned his power to the dowager empress, and that all reports were to be delivered to her in future.

Immediately on this, the ministers who had advised the emperor, and whose opinions were responsible for his policy of reform, took to flight; and the majority succeeded in getting free from the clutches of the reactionary party. Chang Yin Huang, a prominent member of the Tsungli Yamen, well known for his progressive views, was arrested and dismissed his office in disgrace. Li Tuan Feng, vice-president of the Board of Punishments, was banished. Six members of the reform party were executed, and a

reward of two million dollars was offered for the arrest of Kang Yu Wei, the leader of the party and most trusted counsellor of the emperor. Kang succeeded in escaping to Hong Kong, and the empress had to content herself with issuing an edict cancelling the proclamations which had caused all the trouble.

It was then rumoured that Kwangsu was dead : that he had been poisoned by the empress. But after a while he was proved to be alive, though kept in strict seclusion, and later in the year he appeared at a reception given by the dowager empress to the ladies of the foreign embassies in Peking.

The troubled look of affairs at the Chinese capital caused some anxiety among the foreign ministers stationed in the city, and it was decided by them to send for a force of troops who might serve to protect the embassies in the event of a general rising against foreigners. As soon as the Tsungli Yamen was notified of this intention they objected ; and when bodies of Russian cossacks and British bluejackets arrived at Tientsin on their way to Peking, their further passage was obstructed by Chinese officials. As soon as the diplomatists showed that they were firm in their intention of bringing the men to Peking the Chinese relented. The Russian representative took the lead in the matter, and informed the Yamen that he hoped it would give permission for the guard to enter the capital ; but that, if they refused, the men would be reinforced, and would come all the same. The Chinese promptly came to their senses, and thirty British marines, thirty German marines, thirty-three Russian sailors, and thirty-three cossacks entered Peking in full marching order and proceeded to the respective embassies. This was the first occasion on which foreign troops found their way into the celestial capital, fully equipped and armed, since it was entered by the French and English forces in 1860.

Among the last acts performed by the Tsungli Yamen before it was deprived of its reforming members was the arrangement of a treaty with Great Britain for the leasing of an extension of the territory of Kowloon which had

been ceded to this country by the treaty of Tientsin. The measure was necessary in order to allow of the adequate protection of the island of Hong Kong, which was commanded by the heights behind Kowloon city; and the placing of these under British control enables Hong Kong to be made safe from any attack in this direction. The territory leased covers some 200 square miles of land, and includes certain islands between Hong Kong and the mainland. The treaty was signed on the 9th June, and the territory was occupied in the following summer.¹

The strained relations which had been caused between Russia and Great Britain by the former's action in the Liaotung peninsula, and the friction which had arisen over her aggressive action in regard to railways, and interference with British rights in North China, rendered it desirable to come to an understanding with that country in regard to mutual privileges and spheres of influence in China. After a long series of negotiations an exchange of notes was effected between the two countries in April, 1899,² by which it was mutually agreed that Great Britain would not seek any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall, and that she would not attempt to obstruct any Russian schemes in that region, and Russia bound herself not to demand any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtse Kiang, or to obstruct British schemes in Central China. Subsequent notes were also exchanged, guaranteeing the freedom of the railway in course of construction between Shan Hai Kuan and Newchang by British engineers from foreign control.

Shortly after this exchange of ideas, the government of the United States, which, though it has never taken an active part in the opening up of China, had gradually developed a very considerable trade in that country, sent a circular letter to the European Powers to seek information as to the possibility of coming to an understanding in regard to the maintenance of treaty rights, and the safeguarding of the integrity of the empire. The requirements of the policy of equal opportunity known as

¹ See Appendix B.

² See Appendix B.

"the open door" were categorically set out in this circular, with the object of obtaining the definite adherence of the various Powers to its support.

The replies in the case of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan were unanimously favourable; and each of these countries undertook to be bound by the principles laid down, provided that all the Powers agreed to be so bound. The reply of Russia was, however, less satisfactory; and, while it evaded the plain questions put in the original circular, sought, by a cleverly worded statement, to assure the United States of Russia's good wishes in regard to the desired end, without in reality pledging her to anything whatever. The skill with which this document was drawn was such as to attain its object; and the United States government, failing to penetrate the real signification of the reply, accepted it as an adoption of the conditions set, and informed the governments of Europe that having received the unanimous consent of all the Powers concerned, the guaranteeing of the principle of the open door might be regarded as complete. Lord Salisbury fell into the trap laid by Count Muravieff as readily as did the Americans; and in his acknowledgment of this last communication from the American minister wrote, "The successful termination of the negotiations carried on by the United States government in the matter has been a source of much gratification to her Majesty's government."

After remaining in a state of undisturbed tranquillity for nearly five years, China became, in May, 1900, suddenly the scene of a local rising, which speedily attained serious proportions. The events comprised are recorded in a subsequent chapter.


CHAPTER IV

THE AWAKENING OF JAPAN

First contact with Western nations—Overtures from the United States—Commodore Perry—The first treaty—Sir John Stirling—Treaty with Great Britain—Diplomatic amenities—Commercial agreements—Anti-foreign feeling—Attack on the British representative—Attack on British Legation—Murder of Mr. Richardson—Bombardment of Kagoshima—Saghalin—Attack on foreign vessels—The Shimonoseki expedition—More outrages on foreigners—Sir Harry Parkes—Recognition of the emperor's power—Abolition of the Shogunate—The first audience—Attack on Sir Harry Parkes—A constitution promulgated—First railway opened—Murder of Okubo Toshimichi—Extra-territoriality—The war of 1894-5—Treaty of Shimonoseki—The revised treaties.

¹ It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that Japan entered into formal relations with Western countries, and her modern history may be said to date from the signing of the first treaty with America in 1854. The withdrawal of the British, who failed to derive permanent advantage from the labours of Captain Saris in 1613, had left the Dutch and Portuguese in possession of the foreign

¹ NOTE.—For the historical facts in this chapter I have mainly relied on the elaborate histories of Sir Francis Adams (1875) and Sir C. J. Reed (1880). My account of the recent changes in the political and social system of Japan is based on Dr. David Murray's admirable volume in the *Story of the Nations* series and Mr. Griffin's scholarly compilations dealing with the Mikado's empire. In addition to these I have derived much assistance from Dr. Rein's *Travels and Researches*, M. Lamairesse's elaborate *Le Japon*, Manjiro Inagaki's *Japan and the Pacific*, de Rosny's *La Civilisation Japonaise*, and Mr. F. V. Dickins's excellent life of Sir Harry Parkes. My record of the events connected with the China-Japanese War is founded on the histories of Inouye, Vladmir, and Eastlake and Yamada, works which are models of patient research, and which leave little to choose between them. The more important of the remaining authors consulted will be found named as occasion arises.



trade of Japan, and, despite the attempts made by foreign countries to obtain a footing there, nothing was accomplished for close on two hundred years.

In 1780, the Japanese came for the first time into contact with Russia. A Japanese vessel was wrecked on the Siberian coast in the autumn of that year; and the crew, after being rescued by the Russian settlers, were seized by the governor's orders, and sent to Irkutsk, where they were compelled to teach their language to their captors. This incident prompted the Russians to visit the unknown country whence their captives came, and an expedition crossed the gulf of Tartary and visited the island of Saghalin, where they found the Japanese Aino inhabitants ill disposed to hold communication with them. After making several attempts to open up trade with the Japanese, Alexander I., whose attention had been drawn to the circumstances, sent a letter to the Shogun, asking that a commercial treaty might be arranged between the two countries. The letter was borne by an ambassador, who duly arrived at Nagasaki; but after delaying there for several months he returned to Russia without having attained anything. Despite this failure, the Russians did not give up their attempts to arrive at an understanding with their neighbours. In 1806, two Russian vessels visited Kushunkotan, the most important Japanese town in Saghalin, and on the inhabitants exhibiting resentment at the intrusion, the place was attacked, pillaged, and burned; and a number of Japanese and Ainos made prisoners and taken back to Siberia. An inscription was left on the Temple, to the effect that if the Japanese should change their minds and wish to trade with Siberia, they might send a message to Iturup; but if they persisted in refusing to treat with the Russians, the northern parts of Japan would be attacked and ravaged. In the following year the Russians made a descent on the island of Iturup in the Kurile group, which they took without resistance on the part of the natives, who fled. After burning the houses and destroying their contents, they issued a proclamation which was

forwarded to Japan, in which the situation, from the Russian standpoint, was explained.

This document has been preserved. It sets out that the distance between Russia and Japan being very small, the Russian emperor had sent officers across the sea to request that trade might be permitted between the two countries. Instead of arranging a friendly treaty, the Japanese had refused to negotiate; and, as a punishment, the emperor had ordered "that you should be given a specimen of his power as a punishment for refusing his request. If you persist in your conduct, the emperor will take all your northern territory away from you. The Russians can always cross to Saghalin and Iturup to punish you. If you comply with the emperor's wishes, we shall always be good friends with you. If not we will come again with our ships and behave in the same way as we have done before."

In 1811 Russia sent a ship to survey the Kurile islands. The Japanese utilised the opportunity to take their revenge for past affronts, and seized the captain and most of his officers while they were ashore at Kunashiri. These were imprisoned by the Japanese. An account of their treatment was written, on their release two years later, by Captain Golovnin, who bears tribute to the humanity of his gaolers. The seizure of the officers of the *Diana* served only to strengthen the determination of the Russians to teach the Japanese a lesson. The people on the Siberian coastline were encouraged to emigrate to Saghalin, where a considerable number of Russians took up quarters in the north of the island, which was very sparsely inhabited. Meanwhile the Japanese settlements in the south of the island increased, and the two peoples gradually approached one another as they grew in numbers, and spread each towards the other.

Nor were the Russians the only foreigners who sought to have dealings with the Japanese. In 1837, the United States deemed it time to make a second attempt to penetrate the exclusiveness of the Japanese. A brig, the

Morrison, was entrusted with the task of improving on the achievements attained by the expedition which had failed in 1797 ; and in 1845, the British ship *Saramang* sought to renew the relationship arrived at with the Japanese by Captain Saris in 1613. Neither venture succeeded in penetrating the reserve of the Japanese, nor did the attempts made by Captain Cooper in 1845, Commodore Biddle in 1848, or Admiral Cecile later in the same year, prove more effective.

The opening up of China under the treaty of Nanking had served to draw renewed attention to the possibilities of Japan ; and the development of California, coincident with the discovery of gold there in 1847, gave an impetus to American trade which resulted in a scheme for the establishment of a line of steamers between San Francisco and the Chinese treaty ports. The running of these steamers further served to concentrate public attention on the islands of the China seas ; and in 1852 the United States government approved the proposal of Commodore Matthew C. Perry for the fitting out of an expedition for the purpose of opening up the country of Japan to the trade of America.

Commodore Perry soon proved his fitness for the task. A good organiser and clear-headed leader of men, he made the necessary preparations with the greatest care, and provided himself with a large supply of goods, as well as models of railways, scientific instruments, and other appliances, likely to prove of interest to the Japanese. He further decided to avoid the southern ports, where Dutch and Portuguese influence was likely to handicap his chances, and made Yedo, the capital, his destination.

The fleet, consisting of four vessels, sailed from Norfolk on the 24th November, 1852, and reached the bay of Yedo on 8th July, 1853. The arrival of the squadron caused great excitement among the Japanese. The preliminaries to the negotiations which ensued were conducted by Commodore Perry with consummate skill. At the very outset he showed that he had a definite object in view, and would brook no opposition. The request that he

should depart to Nagasaki and communicate with the Japanese through the Dutch traders there, as had been done by all previous foreign visitors, was indignantly refused; and after a short delay, the Japanese consented to formally receive the letter which Perry had brought from the President of the United States.

This document, having been duly handed to the Shogun, the American announced his intention of departing, but added that he would return to receive an answer. The squadron sailed on the 17th July, and made a round of visits to Chinese treaty ports, returning to Yedo, where he anchored on the 13th February, 1854. Here his fleet was strengthened by the arrival of other ships, until no fewer than ten vessels flying the American flag lay off the island capital.

The Japanese had utilised the time between Perry's visits to discuss the situation, and a very strong opinion became manifest against opening relations with their visitor. But the display of renewed strength, evident on the return of Commodore Perry, proved more forcible than the prejudices of the Japanese; and after lengthy deliberation, interspersed with banquets and receptions, a treaty was agreed on, and signed on the 31st March, 1854.

The treaty between Japan and the United States, the first between that country and a foreign Power, contained a dozen clauses tending to promote intercourse and trade between the signatories. The provisions made were as follows :—

Peace and amity between the two countries. The immediate opening of the port of Shimoda, and that of Hakodate in a year's time. The kind treatment of shipwrecked persons. Americans to be free to go about within the treaty ports. Any privileges granted at any time to any other nation to be allowed to Americans. Consuls to be permitted to reside at Shimoda, and a ratification of the treaty to be exchanged within eighteen months.

The announcement of the conclusion of this treaty with the United States gave rise to a desire on the part of

other nations for similar facilities. On the 15th October, 1854, Admiral Sir John Stirling, who had gone to Japan for that purpose, signed a treaty with Japan on behalf of Great Britain, at Nagasaki. This treaty contained very similar clauses to those in the American treaty, and opened Nagasaki and Hakodate to British trade. In the following year Admiral Poutiatine signed a similar treaty on behalf of Russia, and early in 1856 another was arranged with the government of Holland; thus placing the intercourse between the Dutch and Japanese on an international footing. Each of these treaties contained the stipulation that the signatory power should be allowed to participate in any rights accorded to other Powers, and thus these four nations became placed on the same footing in regard to their dealings with the Japanese.

The notification of the signing of these treaties was greeted with expressions of marked dissatisfaction by the bulk of the Japanese people, and the expressions of hostility to foreigners became more pronounced than they had ever been before. The Shogun was charged with having sold his country, with having exceeded his powers, and acted as a traitor. It was further pointed out that the Shogun could not pledge the emperor by his negotiations with strangers. And so public feeling became more and more excited, and the storm raged.

The treaty authorised the stationing of an American consul at Shimoda, who might take up his residence there eighteen months from the date of signing. In obedience to this clause, the President of the United States nominated Mr. Townsend Harris to Japan, and he arrived at Shimoda in August, 1856. He was permitted to take up his post without interference, and, by his display of tact and astuteness, became at first tolerated, and later trusted by the government.

Although the Japanese received the first foreigner officially stationed among them with toleration, they had in no wise become reconciled to the new order of things. There was by this time a pretty general feeling among the

masses of aversion to the idea of foreign intercourse ; and the feeling of resentment which was excited against the American consul, found vent in maledictions not loud but both deep and general, against the authorities who had made his advent possible.

The treaties already concluded had been restricted to the question of foreign intercourse and opportunities for trade. Neither of them could be regarded as a commercial treaty, and no terms had been laid down for the regulation of trade between Japan and her signatories. The first task set himself by Mr. Harris was the negotiation of the needed commercial treaty ; but he found the Shogun's government decidedly averse to plunging any deeper in foreign relations, and it was with considerable difficulty that a subsidiary treaty was arranged in June, 1857, for the purpose of regulating the intercourse between the two countries. Thirteen months later a second treaty was signed at Yedo, which dealt more fully with the questions of imports, shipping, &c., &c., and forms practically the basis on which foreign trade has ever since been conducted in Japan. Similar treaties were concluded with the other Powers, that with Great Britain being signed by Lord Elgin on the 26th August, 1858. The chief clauses of this treaty are as follows :

Peace and friendship between Great Britain and Japan. The appointment of a diplomatic agent and consuls to reside in the treaty ports. The similar appointment of agents and consuls to reside in Great Britain by the Emperor of Japan. The opening of Hakodate, Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Nigata, Hiogo, and Osaka, to British trade and residence. The settlement of questions affecting British subjects to be left to the jurisdiction of the British authorities. The freedom of British subjects to trade at the treaty ports. A tariff of duties payable on the import of foreign goods was attached to the treaty, which was required to be ratified within twelve months of signature.

The signing of these treaties gave the final impetus to the fanatical hatred of the conservative Japanese, who promptly started a campaign against the government which had made itself responsible for the presence of

the hated Europeans. The movement attracted plenty of sympathisers and spread rapidly. Anti-foreign doctrines were openly discussed, and finally the objectors gave expression to their discontent by falling upon Ii Kamonno-kami, the prime minister, who had made himself conspicuous by his foreign sympathies, and murdering him as he was being conveyed to the Shogun's palace. They cut his head off, and, carrying it to the Mito castle, exhibited it to the public gaze on a pike placed outside the main gate.

This outrage served to whet the appetite of the mob. Rioting became frequent. On the 14th January, 1861, Mr. Heusken, secretary to the American Legation, was attacked and mortally wounded while riding home at night from the Russian Legation, a crime for which the American minister obtained an indemnity of ten thousand dollars in compensation to the family of the victim. On the 5th July of the same year, the Tozenji Temple, which had been converted into the British embassy at Yedo, was attacked by a gang of Japanese, who had sworn to be avenged on the accursed foreigner. Some of the Japanese guards were killed, and Mr. Oliphant, the Legation secretary, and Mr. Morrison, the British consul at Nagasaki, severely wounded.

These outrages greatly alarmed the government, who, while sympathising with the foreigners, were powerless to prevent them. A prompt message of regret was sent to Mr. Alcock, the British minister, with expressions of eagerness to prevent the repetition of such acts; but the message concluded with a confession that the authorities could not guarantee any foreign representatives against similar outrages, to which all Europeans in Japan were liable. Punitive measures of a mild description were taken, but, owing to the attitude of the people, it was not deemed safe to adopt strong repressive measures, and the Legations became akin to prisons, out of which it was not deemed safe for the foreign representatives to venture. The situation was a difficult one. The governments of Yedo and Kioto were constantly at loggerheads, and the

public discontent continued to increase. It was asked that the opening of the port of Hiogo and the establishment of the foreign concessions at Yedo and Osaka, decreed by the commercial treaties, should be postponed for a further period of five years ; and in order to maintain a friendly understanding with the European Powers, a Japanese embassy, the first which had ever left the country, started from Yokohama in January, 1862, on a tour to the United States and Europe. The mission was well received, and attained its object, the postponement of the opening of the treaty ports being agreed to. The visit of the embassy to foreign courts had also a marked result in the evidence it afforded of the intelligence and ability of its members ; and it came to be realised that the Japanese were a thoroughly civilised people, who merited the good will, and were qualified to receive the friendship of Western nations. The effect of their travels on the envoys was even more marked. They realised for the first time the wealth and power of other nations, and they recognised the futility of attempting to run counter to them.

A second attack was made on the British embassy, which had in the interim been removed to Yokohama, on the 26th June, 1862. Two of the guards were killed. The leader of the rioters subsequently committed suicide to evade arrest, and the government paid an indemnity of £10,000 to the families of the murdered men.

Despite the conciliating attitude assumed by the Japanese officials, the people remained as anti-foreign as before, and their antipathy was shared, and encouraged, by several of the daimyos, who exercised considerable influence in the interior. In 1862, one, Shimazu Saburo, father of the daimyo of Satsuma, marched at the head of a rabble army to Kyoto, to urge the emperor to take measures for the expulsion of the foreigners, who had been encouraged to settle in the country by the government of Yedo. The Satsuma chieftain was speedily joined by other powerful leaders ; and these issued a programme, including, besides the riddance of the Europeans, the abolition of the

Shogun's government. After presenting a memorial to the emperor, the rebels marched on Yedo, gathering strength as they went. On its way, the mob overtook a party of English, comprising a lady and two gentlemen, who, in company with Mr. C. L. Richardson, a Shanghai merchant, who was on a visit to Japan, were bound on a visit to the temple at Kawasaki. On coming up with this party, a soldier ran out from the crowd and aimed a blow at Mr. Richardson, which cut him down mortally wounded. Other rebels then attacked the foreigners, with the result that both gentlemen were severely wounded, while the lady escaped badly bruised and hurt. The party then beat a hasty retreat towards Yedo, where they arrived without further mishap, leaving Mr. Richardson dead on the road where he fell.

As soon as the news of the outrage became known, the foreign community demanded instant revenge upon the rebels. Colonel Neale, the British chargé d'affaires, succeeded, however, in bringing his intimate knowledge of the Japanese character to bear upon his compatriots, and persuaded them to restrain their vindictiveness, in the hope of preventing further outrages being committed on the Europeans by an enraged mob. A formal protest was forwarded to the Shogun, with a demand for the payment of £100,000 to the family of the murdered man, the capture and punishment of the assassin, and a further payment by the Satsuma leader.

These demands were not responded to with the willing alacrity which had been displayed on previous occasions. The assassin was not arrested, nor the indemnity paid. Accordingly, Admiral Kuper was despatched to Kagoshima to teach the Japanese a lesson. He arrived in August, 1863, and failing to reduce the daimyo to compliance by negotiation, he destroyed three Japanese vessels in the harbour, and bombarded the forts along the coast. In the result, the city of Kagoshima took fire and was destroyed. This punishment sufficed to bring the Japanese to reason, and the indemnity was promptly paid, though the murderer was never brought to justice.

Shortly before the bombardment of Kagoshima, the Russians had reopened the Saghalin question. The Siberian emigrants who had poured into the island had spread southwards, and come into frequent collision with the Japanese, and in 1862 Japan had sent an embassy to treat with Russia and arrange for a definition of spheres between the two countries.

The Russians met this proposal with an assumed air of astonishment. They protested against any Japanese right to the soil of any part of Saghalin, and stated that if asked to name the boundary of Russian influence there, the name of Aniwa Bay would be given, that being the most southerly limit of the island.

The Japanese envoys thereupon returned to Japan to report, while Russia hastened to extend her settlements and encourage the immigration of her Siberian subjects to Saghalin. The matter was then allowed to rest until 1867, when, learning of the activity displayed by Russia in the island, Japan sent an embassy to St. Petersburg in the hope of coming to an arrangement regarding the respective spheres. After a lengthy series of discussions, during which the Russian minister protested against the Japanese claim to any part of the island, a convention was drawn up, under which Saghalin was to be occupied jointly by Russian and Japanese subjects; and after this arrangement had existed for eight years, a treaty was arranged in 1875, by which Saghalin was surrendered to Russia, while that Power agreed to Japan's occupation of the Kurile islands, which Russia had never owned.

The measures taken by the British agent to punish the Japanese for their outrages on foreigners served to convince the government of the superiority and power of the European representatives. The relentless manner in which compensation had been extorted served to impress on the Japanese mind the futility of attempting to oppose the Western Powers, and the desirability, in the interests of Japan, of studying and imitating Western methods. Shortly after the bombardment of Kagoshima, a party of high-born Japanese started for Europe on an educational

tour, and a number of purchases of ships and guns were made on behalf of the government.

Meanwhile, the anti-foreign feeling among the Kioto party did not decrease. In the autumn of 1862 two Englishmen were murdered in the garden of the British residency at Yedo by one of the guard, who committed suicide immediately after. The demands made for satisfaction were responded to by the despatch of the dead body of the murderer, with an apology, to the minister. Nor was the activity of the conservatives limited to outrages on individuals. The daimyo of Choshu, who was a leading light among the Satsuma party, took steps to fortify his territory along the shores of the Straits of Shimonoseki, which afforded the most direct route for vessels bound to the Western ports.

On the 25th of June, 1863, an American cargo vessel on her voyage to Nagasaki was fired on by two Japanese men of war, while traversing the strait. She was, however, not touched, and made good her escape. On the 8th July a French gunboat, the *Kienchang*, was fired upon while at anchor, and badly damaged. And shortly afterwards a Dutch vessel was bombarded by the Japanese ships and forts, in the same place. The Dutchman, however, refused to accept this treatment quietly, and returned the fire with interest and effect.

As soon as these outrages were reported at Yokohama the foreign representatives decided on the despatch of a punitive expedition. The American steamer *Wyoming* sailed forthwith, and making full speed for Shimonoseki, sank a ship and blew up a steamer. She was followed by the French frigate *Semiramis* and the gunboat *Tancrede*, which silenced the forts and occupied them with their boats' crews. Negotiations were then started by the Japanese, who eventually agreed to pay 12,000 dollars for the affront. It was further urged that the inland sea should be thrown open to the navigation of foreign vessels, which were to be ensured from opposition or attack; but the Shogun expressed himself powerless to effect that arrangement. Determined to secure immunity from

future attack, the foreign representatives decided to send an expedition to Shimonoseki in order to teach the recalcitrant Japanese a lesson. A fleet was accordingly constituted, comprising nine British, four Dutch, three French, and one American vessel. Shimonoseki was reached on the 5th September, 1864, and the shores were bombarded for the three following days.

This action reduced the Japanese to a mood for negotiation, and on the 22nd October a convention was signed between the Shogun and the foreign Powers, by which an indemnity of three million dollars was to be paid in settlement of all claims for the damage caused by the action of the daimyo of Choshu. At the same time it was decided to despatch a body of British troops from Hong Kong for the purpose of supplying a military guard for the British embassy at Yokohama, and the same precaution was taken by the French, who imported a contingent from Annam.

The vigorous action taken by the foreign Powers in Japan had resulted in a recognition by the Japanese government of the advisability of putting up with the presence of Europeans in the country. The daimyos were, however, still unconvinced of the hopelessness of an anti-foreign policy, and their supporters continued to carry on the feud. The French and English Legations were accordingly attacked and burned; British subjects were insulted and attacked; Lieut. Cannes, commanding the French guard, was assassinated; and Major Baldwin and Lieut. Bird, two British officers, were murdered at Kamakura.

Alarmed at these events, and fearing the consequences of its inability to protect the foreigners among them, the members of the government held counsel, and decided that in the interests of the country it was desirable to be rid of the presence of the Europeans, who served so greatly to excite the people. An edict was accordingly passed decreeing the expulsion of all foreigners from Japan. But though this measure was passed and published, the executive hesitated about taking the responsibility of

putting it into force, and the foreigners remained as before.

The daimyo Chosu, always the most violent opponent of the foreign idea, had become the rallying point of all the most dangerous classes of the community, and, encouraged by the enthusiasm of the anti-Europeans, he determined on taking action against the authorities, in the hope of bringing about a new *régime*. He accordingly marched out and encountered the emperor's troops, with whom a battle was fought extending over three days. Kyoto was attacked, and 27,000 houses destroyed. A state of civil war supervened, and the country was given over to bloodshed.

In June, 1865, Sir Harry Parkes, who had shown his remarkable abilities in China, arrived at Nagasaki to take over the duties of British envoy at the court of Japan. Viewing the situation without regard to any preconceived ideas, he was struck by the anomaly of the treaties between Japan and foreign Powers being made with the Shogun, who was at best a third-rate official; and he called the attention of his colleagues to the fact that the existing treaties were scarcely binding, inasmuch as they had not received the assent of the actual ruler of the country.

It was accordingly decided to request the Shogun to obtain the imperial signature to the existing treaties, and, in order to ensure the success of the attempt, a demonstration of the allied fleets was made off the town of Osaka, where the Shogun was. These measures proved successful. An imperial decree sanctioning the treaties was issued by the emperor on the 23rd October, 1865, thus legalising the understanding which had been arrived at after so many difficulties between the Europeans and the Japanese. The placing of the emperor in direct contact with the foreign representatives was brought about by this action, and tended to make matters smoother among even the ill-affected Japanese. Shortly after the event, the Shogun died, and his demise was followed after a short interval by that of the emperor, 3rd February, 1867. The overlord of Japan was succeeded by his son

Mutsuhito, who still reigns, and has always shown himself a keen sympathiser with, and supporter of, the Europeans within his dominions. The accession of a liberal ruler to the throne of Japan tended to smooth over the factious opposition to foreigners. The appointment of a reforming Shogun served to replace the distrust of foreign influence by a desire for the consolidation of the government, and the progress of Japan. Finally, on the 19th November, 1867, the Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, resigned his power into the hands of the emperor, who thus became the sole arbiter of Japan's destinies; and from this date may be said to have come into existence the New Japan.

The first step taken by the emperor after the abolition of the Shogunate was to make a solemn promise to his court that he would as soon as possible establish a popular diet in Japan. This notification was variously received by different parties, and a good deal of high feeling arose over the question of the emperor's *entourage*, the various clans squabbling with one another for the honour of proximity to the imperial person. Much dispute was also caused by the question of the allocation of the ex-Shogun's duties under the new *régime*, and a number of the daimyos who considered themselves aggrieved joined forces, with the object of fighting for their privileges.

The disputants came to blows in January, 1868, when the daimyos Owari and Eehizen sought under various pretexts to gain possession of the ex-Shogun. This course was prevented by Aizu and Kuwana, two daimyos who desired to preserve the *status quo*. These having raised a force of 10,000 men, set out with the ex-Shogun for Kioto. Outside the city the advancing host was informed that it would not be allowed to march to the palace, but that the ex-Shogun was at liberty to go there, and would be received. But the daimyos feared foul play, and insisted on forcing their way in, with the result that their advance was resisted by an imperial force of 1,500 men, who, despite their inferiority of numbers, succeeded in defeating the rebels. This incident served to fan the sparks of rebellion into a blaze. The Satsuma daimyos went for

their opponents whenever found. Collisions were frequent and fierce, and the exertions of the combatants served not only to place the ex-Shogun in prominence as an important factor in the dispute, but caused him to reconsider his position ; and, influenced doubtless by the devotion of the conservatives who desired his resignation, and demanded a continuance of his influence, avowed his desire to reassume power as a factor in the government of the country.

Early in February, 1868, the emperor sent a notification to the foreign representatives requesting them to inform their respective governments that henceforth the administration of the country would be conducted by him, and that officers would be appointed to carry out the provisions of the foreign treaties. An invitation was also sent to the diplomatists to attend an audience, to be given by the emperor in the following month.

This last announcement attracted much attention among the Japanese, and, as might have been expected from so radical a departure, was received with ill-disguised disgust by the irreconcilable anti-foreign party. The audience was held on March 23rd. The French and Dutch ministers, who were the first to arrive, were duly received by the emperor with every mark of distinction. Sir Harry Parkes, while on his way to the palace, was attacked by a party of fanatics, who wounded nine of his escort. The minister's guards, who were taken by surprise, succeeded in killing one of their assailants and wounding another, but the rest effected their escape. Sir Harry was not wounded, though his belt was cut, but he decided to return to his residence, and not to attend the audience as arranged.

The most abject apologies were promptly accorded to the British minister by the emperor and his court. The highest officials at once waited on Sir Harry with expressions of sympathy and sorrow. Another invitation to an audience on the following day was forwarded by the emperor ; and the British minister attended and had an interview with the ruler of Japan for the first time.

An edict was then issued warning the people that the treaties had received the approval of the emperor, and that the safeguarding of foreigners was enjoined on all classes; and, further, that any future attack on Europeans would be punished by death and the exposure of the offender's decapitated head, as a token of disgrace.

Meanwhile the ex-Shogun continued his operations. But the issue of the emperor's decrees and the attitude of the loyalists served to shake his self-reliance. And the issue of an edict by the government setting out the line of conduct required of him, served to convince him of the hopelessness of his cause. The conditions offered were that he should retire to Mito and live there in seclusion, that he should give up the vessels and arms in his possession, and that he should relinquish the castle at Vedo. Deeming discretion the better part of valour, the ex-Shogun agreed to these terms, and he withdrew from political life forthwith.

His supporters were, however, not so ready to abandon his cause. They continued to frequent the capital, where on 4th July, 1868, they gave battle to the imperial troops by whom they were defeated, and the officers of the ships which the ex-Shogun contracted to give up, refusing to comply with his undertaking, took their vessels to sea, pursued by the imperial fleet, by which they were finally captured.

Early in 1869 a constitution was promulgated in which the government was divided into eight *bureaux*, with a minister in charge of each. The site of government was moved to Yedo on November 26th, the name of which was changed to Tokyo (eastern capital), and a new "year period" was decreed to begin from January, 1868. A startling innovation was also made by the issue of an edict prohibiting Christianity in the country; and it was ordered that all those who would not revert to the established dogma should be arrested. The indignation which this order evoked on the part of the foreign representatives caused it to remain unenforced, and in 1872 it was rescinded.

In April, 1869, the emperor promulgated five articles of a constitution which decreed the establishment of a deliberative assembly, and the abolition of "the absurd usages of former times." In the same year the first Japanese parliament was established, composed of persons representing the various daimiates. In August a decree was issued abolishing the feudal system. The daimiates ceased to exist, and their revenues were diverted to the imperial treasury. Prefectures were established for the purpose of local administration in 1871.

The refusal of the Korean authorities to supply coal and stores to a Japanese vessel caused an outburst of indignation in Japan, which found vent in the despatch of a punitive expedition in January, 1876. In the result a treaty of friendship was arranged between the two countries, in which Korea was recognised as an independent nation, and the right of mutual trade was conceded. The signing of this treaty was followed by the despatch of a Korean embassy to Japan.

In 1872 the first railway was opened between Yokohama and Tokyo, and the following year saw the adoption of the European calendar. Despite the marked progress, which became evident about this period, the anti-foreign feeling among certain classes of the natives continued to flourish, and the progressive policy of the government had numerous opponents among the more influential conservatives. In 1877 occurred the Saigo rebellion, which, having for its object a return to the ancient policy of Japan, plunged Kagoshima and its neighbourhood in bloodshed for a period of seven months, and only terminated in the death of its leader, who fell in the defence of Shiroyama on September 24th of that year.

On 14th of May, 1878, Okubo Toshimichi, one of the most able and patriotic statesmen in the service of Japan, was murdered on his way to the emperor's palace, thus affording yet another proof of the antagonism of the conservatives.

It was not until the 11th February, 1889, that the

emperor was able to keep his promise of granting a constitution to his country. On that date was promulgated an enactment conferring the right of constitutional government on the Japanese people, and the emperor took a solemn oath to govern under its limitations. The constitution was ordered to take effect from the beginning of the year 1890 and its enactment passed off without trouble, except in the case of Viscount Mori Arinori, who was known to have taken a prominent part in the preparation of the document, and was assassinated on the day on which it was signed. The first parliamentary election in Japan took place on the 1st of July, 1890, and the house met on the 29th November following. In 1891 the present Tsar, then Tsarevitch, paid a visit to Japan in the course of his journey round Asia, and while there was attacked and wounded by a fanatic at Otsa on the 11th May. The dissolution of the first parliament at the close of the same year was followed by rioting at the ensuing election, and a political crisis occurred in 1893, when the house was prorogued, and the diet closed. The resumption of legislation which succeeded the compromise arranged, was followed by a decision to increase the Japanese navy, which had been already strengthened by a purchase of battleships built in England. A second parliamentary crisis, however, occurred in 1894, and this resulted in a liberal victory at the election. It was just after this event that trouble broke out in Korea, which resulted in the China-Japanese war, the incidents of which are elsewhere narrated. Immediately it became evident that it would be impossible to settle the matters in dispute by peaceful means, a loan of fifty million dollars was raised with ease; and the amount having been considerably over subscribed, hostilities were begun amid the unanimously patriotic approval of the population.

The marked progress which had been attained by Japan during recent years resulted in the establishment of a Japanese party, which imbued, by a patriotic spirit, desired relief from those restrictions in regard to foreign intercourse which had been authorised by successive

treaties. The provisions in these treaties granting extra-territorial rights to foreigners residing in the treaty ports were especially resented as a trespass on national rights. The tariff restrictions were also proclaimed inimical to the interests of Japan, and their abolition clamoured for; while the foreign monopoly of the coasting trade, due to the preferential privileges conferred in the treaties, was regarded as unjust. These matters were repeatedly discussed in the diet, and by degrees a general unanimity of feeling became manifest on these points.

A series of negotiations were entered on with the Powers interested, and many interchanges of views took place between Count Ito and the British government. Eventually, on the 16th July, 1894, a treaty of commerce and navigation was signed in London between the two countries, which revokes the earlier treaties, and serves as the Magna Charta of Japan in regard to her dealings with foreign States.¹

The most vital clauses of this treaty are those which abolish extra-territoriality, and place all foreigners residing in Japan under Japanese law. The foreign settlements at the treaty ports are declared abolished, and incorporated in the respective communes. The coasting trade is brought under the operation of Japanese law, and reciprocity of commerce and navigation between the two countries decreed. By this treaty, the special ordinances imposed on Japan during the early period of foreign intercourse are abolished, and the country placed on the footing of an equality with the European Powers.

The conclusion of peace by the treaty of Shimonosaki, negotiated by the Marquis and Li Hung Chang, on the 17th April, 1895, was received with universal enthusiasm throughout Japan. It was realised that this treaty, coming after the triumphant victories which had everywhere distinguished Japanese arms, must place the country in the front rank of nations; and the extension of territory awarded by the cession of the Liaotung peninsula and Formosa served to flatter the pride of the people. When,

¹ See Appendix B.

a week later, the joint protest against the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, or any other portion of the mainland of China, made by Russia, France, and Germany, reached Japan, the people evinced the utmost indignation, and the Government feared awhile that if they were to take the obvious course, and assent to the demand made, it would cause a national rising throughout the country. But it was realised that it would be hopeless to enter on a contest with three first-class Powers, and, after a moment's hesitation, the government decided to renounce the Liaotung peninsula, and demand an additional indemnity of seven and a-half million pounds sterling in its place. These terms were agreed to by China, and the treaty was ratified at Chifu on the 8th May.

The acceptance of these modified terms by the government greatly irritated the people, who did not relish the abandonment of their country's hard won spoil. But prompt measures prevented any popular rising, and the suppression of the publication of the newspapers for a while, tended, by the absence of published news, to lull the mob into quietude.

A commercial treaty with Russia was arrived at on the 8th June, and the government proceeded to occupy the island of Formosa, while preparations for the augmentation of the army and navy were entered on at home. A treaty also with Russia, relating to rights in Korea, was signed, and will be found to be dealt with on pp. 97-100.

Early in the following year a treaty was arranged with Germany, and a period of marked commercial prosperity set in throughout the empire. In 1897 a gold standard was adopted by a large majority in both houses, and a difference of opinion on the subject of the emigration of Japanese labourers to the islands of Hawaii with the United States, appeared at one time likely to assume serious dimensions. The announcement of the annexation of these islands by the American government evoked a protest from Japan, but the matter was allowed to subside without further trouble.

On the 17th July, 1899, the revised treaties came into

force, and the whole of Japan was thrown open to European traders. On the last day of June the emperor issued a rescript referring to this event as one for heartfelt gratification, and enjoining his people "to unite with one heart to associate cordially with the peoples from afar." Edicts were subsequently issued according equal treatment and equal protection to followers of all religions, and the Buddhists were especially exhorted against any opposition to Christianity.

CHAPTER V

UNCLOSED KOREA

Exclusiveness of the Korean people—Early traditions—Relations with China—Japanese descents—The invasion of Hideyoshi—Arrival of missionaries—Their persecution—First French expedition—Oppert's filibustering attempt—Fate of the *General Sherman*—Admiral Rodgers—Trouble with Japan—Opening of Fusan—Herr von Brandt's failure—Commodore Shulfeldt negotiates American Treaty—The British Treaty—Destruction of Japanese Legations—Convention of Tientsin—Murder of Kim Ok Kiun—The rising of the Tong Haks—The China-Japanese War—Decline of Japanese influence—Reform measures—Advent of Russia—The Treaty of Seoul—The Treaty of Tokio—Russian activity in Korea—The Masanpho concession—Railway enterprise—The coming struggle.

¹ THE history of Korea is remarkable in the consistency it exhibits on the part of its inhabitants to maintain the exclusion from their shores of the people of every country but their own. The traditions of the founding of the kingdom go back to primæval times, and shadowy rumours are still current of the deeds and ordinances of its rulers, as early as eleven hundred years before the Christian era. The accounts of these events of antiquity

¹ NOTE.—The record of Korean history comprised in this chapter is mainly based on two works, which have come to be accepted as in every way worthy of reliance, and the ground covered is so thoroughly done as to render it a work of supererogation for any other writer to attempt to perform the task afresh. The volumes are Mr. John Ross's *History of Korea* and Mr. W. E. Griffis's *The Hermit Nation*. In addition to these I have profited by the encyclopædic *Histoire de l'Eglise de Corée* of Père Dallet, Mr. Morris's *War in Korea*, Mrs. Bishop's *Korea and her Neighbours*, Mr. Gundry's *China and her Neighbours*, Lord Curzon's *Problems of the Far East*, and the mass of information comprised in the *Korean Repository*. Other authorities will be found referred to as the information derived from them appears in the text.



are however largely supposititious ; and the facts which figure in the records which survive must be accepted with caution. It is known that owing to her situation, midway between China and Japan, Korea was viewed with envious eyes by both, and that at various times she tried her strength against the forces of each. China, desirous of adding the peninsula to her dominions, waged war against Korea during the Sisi and the Han dynasties ; and the Emperor Yangti, who became famous as the constructor of the Grand Canal in China (605-17, A.D.), invaded the country with a prodigious force, exceeding a million men, which was discomfited and repulsed by the Koreans. The challenge thus offered by the Chinese was not withdrawn on their defeat, and a war which lasted for half a century followed, without enabling them to obtain possession of the country. The advent of the Empress Wu in 684, however, marked a change in the fortunes of Korea. A fresh expedition was despatched to the peninsula, with the result that the greater part of the country was conquered, and the whole submitted to China's suzerainty, which continued with few periods of intermission, until 1894.

While the Chinese urged their frequent attempts on the independence of Northern and Western Korea, the Japanese made frequent descents on her Eastern provinces. Repeated expeditions were made on Southern Korea, in one of which the husband of the famous Empress Jingu was killed. The masterful widow thereupon decided on an invasion of the country, with the result that the province of Shinra was taken, and its ruler proclaimed "the dog of Japan."

On the strength of this success Japan claimed a suzerainty over Korea, which was repeatedly maintained, and only finally abandoned in 1876, when a treaty of mutual rights was concluded between the two countries.

In the beginning of the seventh century Japan declared war against China in support of Korea ; but the Japanese were surprised by the sudden arrival of the Chinese fleet, and had to retire with heavy loss. Shortly after this

episode occurred the descent of Kublai Khan, who, with a fleet of 300 ships, sought to invade and seize the archipelago. The Japanese, however, succeeded in defeating the all-conquering Mongol, and, exalted by the success of their arms, hastened to harry the Koreans and Chinese, who had been compelled to aid the invader. The Japanese accordingly sent out large numbers of pirates who haunted the coasts of China and Korea, and committed such ravages that Hung-wu, the first Ming emperor, was driven to organise a force for coast defence against the despoilers.

The rise of Hideyoshi has been chronicled by more than one historian.¹ In point of ambition and ability his equals have been few, and his conquests supply an exciting chapter in the archives of Japan. When at the height of his fame, he conceived the idea of subjugating China and parcelling that country out among his *protégés*. He accordingly made overtures to the King of Korea, whom he desired as an ally in the undertaking. The king declined to co-operate with Hideyoshi as he considered the scheme ridiculous, and the Japanese warrior changed his plan, and determined on the conquest of Korea as a preliminary to his more extensive scheme. He thereupon raised a large army, stated to have comprised 150,000 men, and landed these at Fusan in 1592. The success of the invaders was from the outset remarkable. Southern Korea was overrun, and the towns captured with ease. The natives fled everywhere on the approach of the Japanese; and Seoul, the capital, was occupied within eighteen days of the landing at Fusan. The invasion took the Koreans by surprise, and they were everywhere defeated.² But a change came over the fortunes of Hideyoshi. He became so gratified at his easy conquest of Korea that he decided on pushing his forces on and invading China, and to this end ordered his fleet to hasten to embark an army for the crossing of

¹ See *Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi*, by Walter Denning.

² See *Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea*, by W. G. Aston, Asiatic Society Transactions.

the Yellow Sea. The Koreans were, however, better sailors than the Japanese, and they opposed the passage of the squadron and drove it back into Fusan harbour with considerable loss.

Eagerly availing himself of this turn in fortune, the King of Korea fled to Liaotung, where he begged the support of the Chinese, who promptly despatched an army against the invader. Notwithstanding the approach of a superior force, the Japanese held their ground, and a fierce battle was fought at Seoul, where the Japanese, after being nearly overcome, succeeded in vanquishing the Chinese and putting them to flight.

By this time both sides had had enough of fighting, and overtures were made towards a peaceful agreement, the Chinese offering to cede the three southern provinces of Korea to Japan. Hideyoshi delayed the negotiations and raised all sorts of difficulties, which caused a postponement of the negotiations without any result being attained. The Japanese then withdrew to the coast, and peace reigned for a while in Korea.

After a brief armistice, the Japanese recommenced their attacks on the Koreans, and Hideyoshi advanced his reinforced army up country once more. This time the defenders were better prepared. A large Chinese force was already in the country waiting for the invaders. The Japanese advanced as far as the capital. But they could make no impression on the force posted there. After stubborn fighting, the invading army deemed it wise to retire, and they returned to the sea, burning and looting all the towns they came to, and laying the country waste along their path.

Arrived in the vicinity of Fusan, the retreating Japanese were attacked by a large force of Chinese and Koreans. Finding themselves overwhelmed, refuge was taken in the town of Urusan, where they fortified themselves and stood a siege during the whole winter. It was not until the beleaguered force had suffered heavily, and nearly been reduced to starvation, that a fresh army arrived at Fusan and marched to their relief. The

besiegers were at last dispersed, and the Japanese released, too greatly exhausted to carry on the struggle.

The death of Hideyoshi in 1598 put an end to the attempted conquest of Korea. A period of constrained peace ensued, during which negotiations between the countries concerned resulted in the consent of Korea to pay tribute to the governments of Peking and Yedo every year. Besides this, the only gain to Japan for her six years' bloodshed was the occupation of Fusan, which she continued to hold as a monument of her prowess in her neighbour's territory.

The descent of the Manchus on China involved Korea in trouble, owing to her refusal to transfer her allegiance to the new dynasty. The conquerors of China twice invaded the peninsula in order to persuade the Koreans to better their manners; and after being overrun in 1637, the king acknowledged the validity of the Chitsou's claim to the Chinese throne, and resumed the payment of tribute to Peking.

The incidents of the eighteenth century in connection with Korea are mainly concerned with the attempts of missionaries to obtain a footing in that country.¹ The first Christian missionary entered Korea in 1777, and he was followed by others who, with varying fortunes, taught their creed to the people with moderate success. The efforts of these visitors were regarded with marked suspicion by the authorities; but they were upon the whole well received by the people, many of whom underwent baptism. This fact was resented by the king and his ministers, and edicts were issued in 1784 prohibiting the presence of foreigners, and interdicting the introduction of Christianity. One Kim, an early preacher of the Gospel, was seized, tortured and imprisoned. On the 8th December, 1791, two Christians, after refusing to recant, were decapitated. During the ensuing forty years a considerable number of missionaries suffered torture and death for their ministrations; and while the teaching of Christianity undoubtedly made progress among the

¹ See Dallet's *Histoire de l'Eglise de Corée*.

masses, the ruling class maintained an inexorable attitude towards the intruders, who were in every case accorded a short shrift. In 1835 Barthélémy Brugière, a French Catholic missionary stationed at Bangkok, was nominated Vicar of Korea. He died before reaching the country, but one Pierre Maubant, his colleague, took up his appointment, found his way into Seoul, and started on a proselytising mission which attracted many converts. He was joined by another Frenchman in 1838, and these two continued their ministrations regardless of the pains and penalties to which the law made them liable. In July, 1839, both were seized, placed in chains, tortured, and beheaded; their execution being followed by that of one hundred and thirty of their converts.

In 1841 more French priests ventured into Korea, but circumstances, due to the news of the murdered priests having reached France, were destined to bring about a marked change in the conditions under which the Gospel had hitherto been preached in Korea. In the beginning of this year, Captain Cecile, in charge of a fleet of three French men-of-war, arrived off the Korean coast, and delivered a letter demanding satisfaction for the murder of Maubant and his colleague two years before. In the following July, Captain Pierre set sail from Macao for Korea, for the purpose of obtaining a reply to the letter left by Captain Cecile. Off Chulla the vessel went ashore and became a wreck. The crew landed and were well received and kindly treated by the natives, who supplied their wants, but maintained a cordon round them to prevent their going inland.

In 1860 the French co-operated with the English in ascending the Peiho and taking Peking. The news of the loss of Chinese prestige created a great sensation in Korea, where the Celestial Kingdom had ever been regarded as the wisest, best, and most powerful empire the world had ever seen. The information which reached Seoul of the capture of the capital, and the destruction of the emperor's palace, caused the utmost consternation, which was not abated by the sight of a copy of the treaty

concluded between China and the Allies, by which freedom of trade and religion were accorded to the "barbarians."

Nor was this the only item of startling news which shocked the sensitive Korean ears. Information came to hand of a second treaty between China and Russia, which involved the cession of the whole of the Ussuri province to the latter country. This notification produced the utmost excitement in Seoul, for it compassed the transfer of the territory abutting on the Korean border, and brought Russia into juxtaposition with her northern frontier.

The crisis thus caused created the greatest activity among the Koreans. Various schemes were proposed for dealing with the dangers which threatened. It was decided to adopt a policy of armed neutrality, which was to be maintained under all circumstances and at all costs. The Chinese were in future to be refused admittance into the country, and the frontier was to be strengthened against possible invasions. The coast forts were gar-
risoned, and the country prepared to stand a siege.

The year 1866 is an important one in Korean history. The French had taken no further steps to obtain compensation for the murder of the missionaries twenty-seven years before, and the outrage had practically been forgotten. Meanwhile several French ecclesiastics had ventured across the frontier, and plied their calling with considerable success among the natives. Suddenly the cry "Death to the Christians" was raised in the capital, and the king proceeded to hunt out the hated preachers, and to serve them as their predecessors had been served. At the end of February, one Berneux, who had made many converts, was seized, and with four of his fellow-countrymen put to death with horrible torture. A few days later two other Frenchmen, with twelve of their converts, were executed; and this was in turn followed by the murder of three more French priests, who had taught Christianity among the people. Besides these, hundreds of converts were beheaded. But the news of these doings had got wind,

and reached Admiral Roze at Tientsin, who at once prepared to start for Korea on a punitive expedition. He took two ships, the *Déroulède* and the *Tardif*, and ascended the river as far as Seoul, before which he anchored. His arrival struck the natives with the utmost dismay. They refused to hold any intercourse with him. The Frenchmen remained at the capital for several days, making surveys and taking soundings. The fleet then, without having attempted or achieved anything with the Koreans, set sail and returned to China.

As soon as the foreign vessels had withdrawn from their sight, the Koreans, in the greatest state of excitement, set about strengthening the defences of their country. A message was sent to Japan, asking for protection ; but that country had her own hands full, and could not respond. Instead, she sent two agents to Seoul to advise the king to throw open his ports to foreign trade, as Japan had done, and thus avoid war.

On the 11th October, the French fleet, comprising seven vessels, and conveying 1,000 troops, set sail for Korea, when Kangwa was speedily taken. Tongchin was stormed, but the Koreans gathered heart and turned on the French in superior force, and their attack was carried out with such energy that large numbers of the invaders were killed, and the admiral deemed it wise to withdraw his force and return to China without having achieved his purpose.

In June, 1866, the *Surprise*, an American ship, was wrecked off the Korean coast. The captain and crew managed to get ashore, and, after being taken before a commissioner from Seoul, they were well treated, fed and clothed, and conducted to the frontier, whence they found their way back to China. In the following month another American vessel, the *General Sherman*, set out from Chifu with a miscellaneous cargo which it was hoped to dispose of in Korea. The crew consisted of an American captain and officers, an Englishman, a Chinese interpreter, and a crew of Malay sailors. At the mouth of the Ta Tong river, the ship fell in with a Chinese junk, the captain of

which agreed to pilot him up the river. He did so for two days, and then returned to the sea. Nothing further was ever heard of the *General Sherman*. The Koreans were greatly excited against foreigners at the time, and their hatred of the French caused them to regard every European as an enemy. It subsequently became known that the natives had overpowered the ship's crew, and after driving them below, battened down the hatches, and, set the ship on fire. Another rumour set out that the crew had been tortured and beheaded, but authoritative details never transpired.

In 1867 occurred the filibustering expedition of Ernest Oppert,¹ a German, who set sail with a crew of desperadoes for Korea with the object of robbing the graves at Tollasan, where the Korean kings are interred. The real intention of this venture has never been fully disclosed, but its aim was unquestionably unjustifiable; and although Oppert and his abettors were discharged for want of evidence at the trial held at Shanghai, the bad result of their escapade was shown by the renewed aversion displayed by the Koreans to the advent of foreigners among them.

The fate of the crew of the *General Sherman* had attracted much attention in the United States, where the matter was discussed in Congress. And it was decided to despatch a fleet to Korea to obtain tidings of the ill-fated vessel, and exact reparation from the government. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Rodgers, and extensive preparations were made to ensure the success of the undertaking.

Admiral Rodgers sailed in April, 1869, and arrived off the Han river at the end of May. His fleet comprised five well-found vessels, and these ascended the river and silenced the forts, five of which were taken by the Americans. Attempts were then made to negotiate a treaty with the government at Seoul, but without success; and having fought his way to the very outskirts of the capital, the admiral, for some inexplicable reason, thought

¹ See *A Forbidden Land*, by Ernest Oppert, 1880.

fit to emulate the example of the French commander who had preceded him, and retired, without having effected anything, leaving the Koreans convinced that the invaders had been repelled by their valour.

In 1875, trouble cropped up once more between Japan and Korea. Some Japanese sailors who had landed on Kangwa island for the purpose of obtaining water for their vessel, were attacked by natives. A large party of Japanese left the ship in order to rescue their comrades, and proceeded to storm the fort, dismantle it, and kill the garrison. The news of this affair caused considerable excitement in Japan, and it was decided to take immediate steps to teach the Koreans better manners. A fleet of five vessels was despatched to make a demonstration off Seoul. Arrived there, the troops on board were landed, and measures taken to impress the people with the power available. No fighting was attempted, but the display of force achieved its purpose, and on the 27th February, 1876, a treaty was signed, under which Fusan was opened to Japanese trade.

In 1877, Li Hung Chang sent an expedition to wipe out the robbers who infested the neutral strip of land, still maintained bare and uncultivated, between the Chinese and Korean frontiers. After having cleared out the pariahs who rendered the region unsafe to travellers between the two countries, the border land was annexed by China, whose confines were thus extended to the Yalu river.

In 1878, the first attempt to obtain a footing in Korea was made by Germany, in the person of Herr von Brandt, the German minister at Peking, who landed at Fusan and sought an interview with the governor of Tong Nai. His attempt was aided by the Japanese representative at Fusan, who offered to introduce the visitor. But the Korean official refused to be drawn. The Japanese agent's good offices were repulsed, and Von Brandt's request was none too politely refused. The German minister thereupon quitted Korea and returned to Peking.

The news of the opening of Fusan to Japanese trade

served to revive the Korean ambitions of the American government. The United States had not approved the failure of Admiral Rodgers's attempt, and the time was deemed ripe to make another effort to open up the country to American trade. Accordingly an expedition was ordered, under command of Commodore Shufeldt, who set sail for Korea, where he arrived in May, 1880.¹

The interval between the first and second American expeditions had been utilised by other nations to make attempts to attain a footing in Korea. In the autumn of 1876, the British vessels, *Sylvia* and *Swinger*, while engaged in surveying the coast line, anchored off Fusan, and were permitted to purchase stores. In the same year a British ship, *Barbara Taylor*, was wrecked on the west coast, and the crew rescued and kindly treated by the natives. In 1881, a number of foreign vessels reached Korea, including two British ships in May, and a French cruiser in June. In the same month, H.M.S. *Pegasus* arrived off Chemulpho, but was not allowed to land her officers.

The opening of Fusan to the Japanese proved to be a not unmixed blessing. The subjects of the Mikado were frequently attacked by the natives, and the roads blocked. Riots were of constant occurrence, and the Japanese were afforded ample opportunities of gauging the feelings of the Europeans whose presence had, in the early days of foreign intercourse, been resented in their own ports.

But by dint of their insistence and ability, the Japanese succeeded in living down these troubles, and the trade of Fusan began to develop with leaps and bounds. The Koreans soon found their occupation gone, for they were in no way qualified to compete with their smart visitors. Thus gradually the Japanese secured the trade of Fusan, and came to be tolerated by the Koreans, and in 1880 they succeeded in negotiating the opening of the port of Gensan to trade. This was followed shortly after by the addition of Chemulpho to the treaty ports, just as Com-

¹ See *America in the East*, by W. E. Griffis, 1899.

modore Shufeldt, finding it impossible to obtain a messenger to carry the letter setting out the object of his mission to Seoul, retired to China in dudgeon.

After spending over a year in China, Commodore Shufeldt returned to Korea in May, 1882, and succeeded in negotiating a treaty, the first entered into between a Western Power and Korea, according the right of trade at certain ports to be opened in different parts of the coast, and agreeing to treat Americans coming to Korea for purposes of trade with consideration. The conclusion of the American treaty served to encourage the other Powers to obtain similar undertakings. Admiral Willes reached Chemulpho in June, and promptly obtained a convention securing freedom for British trade in terms similar to those of the American treaty; and before the end of the same month Germany and France had obtained equal privileges for their people.

In July trouble arose out of a very simple circumstance. Two Korean officials of rank had paid a visit to Japan, where they had been greatly impressed by all that they had seen. On their return they painted Japanese civilisation in the brightest colours to the ex-regent, who was an avowed opponent of every thing foreign. Inspired by him, orders were given for the persecution of the Japanese throughout the peninsula; and the people did not need any further reminder. Every Japanese in Korea was insulted and attacked. Seven men were murdered in a single day. The Japanese Legation at Seoul was burned, and its staff had to fight their way through the streets and across the twenty-six miles of country to the coast, where they found refuge on the British gunboat *Flying Fish*, which conveyed them to Nagasaki.

The Japanese lost no time in making a reprisal. Troops were embarked and landed in Korea. Seoul was occupied, and further measures were only stayed by the despatch of a special embassy of apology to Japan, the payment of an indemnity, and the authorisation of the maintenance of a regiment of Japanese in the capital. On hearing of this arrangement, China insisted on stationing a number

of her troops in Seoul also ; and, this having been done, things quietened down, and for a while peace was maintained.

In December, 1884, an official banquet was given in Seoul to celebrate the opening of the post office there. The function was attended by all the foreign ministers. Suddenly there was an alarm of fire ; and Prince Min, the leader of the anti-foreign party, who was among the guests, rose and left the room, in order to see where the fire was. He was at once set upon and assassinated. During the night several of the conservative leaders were killed. On this the progressives asked for the assistance of the Japanese troops to protect the palace. The request was granted ; but the conservatives, supported by the Chinese troops, attacked the Japanese, who defended themselves bravely. In the midst of the disturbance, the king fled, and the Japanese thereupon beat a retreat to the Legation, which was attacked and burned, after which they fought their way through the mob, who endeavoured to stay their progress, to the sea.

Japan thus had serious grievances against both Korea and China. She proceeded to deal with them separately. From the former was extracted an indemnity, a promise to punish the murderers, and the rebuilding of the Legations at the government's expense. From China was obtained a convention, signed at Tientsin on the 18th April, 1885, in which it was stipulated that both China and Japan should withdraw their troops from Korea, that neither country should send any more officers there, and that in case of any future disturbances occurring, neither government should take action without informing the other.

For nine years after the signing of that convention, Korea refrained from any overt act of political importance. In 1885, the leaders of the party who had committed the outrage on the ministers had fled to Japan, where they found asylum. In 1894, the chief of these, one Kim-Ok-Kiun, found his way to Shanghai, where he remained in the American settlement, in company with a Korean

named Hung Tiyong-On. On the 28th March, Hung murdered Kim in his bedroom. The assassin made his escape at the time, but was arrested the next day, and made no secret of his identity, stating that he had been instructed to do the deed by the King of Korea. After being taken before a magistrate, Hung was handed over to be dealt with by the Chinese authorities, who placed him on a Chinese warship and sent him to Korea, where he was received with every mark of honour.

It was this episode which, despite its ordinary features, was mainly responsible for the events which culminated in the war between China and Japan.

The arrival of Hung in Korea was made the occasion of an anti-foreign demonstration which was led by a secret society, known as the Tong Haks, whose programme was strongly opposed to Western religion and intercourse. This organisation set about converting the people to their views and illtreating those who refused to join them. The feeble attempts made by the government to disperse their meetings failed, and their organisation spread so rapidly that their numbers became sufficiently great to openly oppose the government troops sent against them. By the spring of 1894, the insurrection became general, and the whole of Southern Korea rose in open rebellion. The authorities sent troops by sea to repress the rising, but they fell into an ambushade and were routed. On receipt of this news, a panic set in at Seoul, and the king invoked the aid of China to quell the rebels. The Chinese responded by the despatch of some 2,000 troops, who succeeded in checking the advance of the Tong Haks, and they were further restrained by the moral effect of the arrival of Chinese men-of-war at Chemulpho and Asan.

According to the provisions of the convention of Tientsin, China duly informed Japan that she had sent troops into Korea, and Japan at once decided to follow suit. Six Japanese battle-ships were despatched to Chemulpho, and a number of marines were landed and marched to Seoul. A large force of troops was next embarked at Hiroshima ; and these, to the number of 8,000, were placed

in contiguity to the capital. The situation which thus arose caused friction between the Chinese and Japanese commanders. The former contended that China had been well within her rights under the Tientsin convention, in sending troops to restore order in Korea, which was a State tributary to her. The latter protested that the Japanese had an equal right under the same treaty to send troops, and denied that Korea was a tributary to China. The position became more critical when the Chinese issued a proclamation requiring the rebels to lay down their arms, in the course of which Korea was referred to as a tributary State. This greatly incensed the Japanese, who responded by urging the necessity of reform on the Korean government, and asking for the aid of China in enforcing her advice. China was thus placed in the position of having to choose between supporting the misgovernment of Korea, which was responsible for the trouble, or siding against it after having sent her troops to give it support. She chose the former alternative. The Japanese, undismayed by China's refusal of support, drew up a programme of reforms which they demanded of the Korean government forthwith. The officials replied that they would adopt the measures proposed, but that no steps could be taken until the Japanese troops had been withdrawn. On this Japan announced her intention of compelling the carrying out of the reforms laid down, and sent a demand to China that no more Chinese vessels should be sent to Korea.

On the 18th July, the Korean government formally requested the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from their country. On the 20th the Japanese minister sent an ultimatum to the Koreans giving three days in which to consider the needed reforms, which, if not adopted, it announced would be carried out by force. On the 22nd the Korean government replied that the Chinese troops had come to Korea at its request, and would remain until their presence was deemed no longer necessary.

The Japanese accepted this announcement as a declaration of war, and the troops were ordered to attack the

king's palace. The guards were driven off, and the king seized. After a few hours' fighting the Japanese possessed themselves of the whole city, and issued a proclamation announcing the beginning of a new era in Korea. Measures were then at once undertaken for the attainment of the intended reforms. The conservative party was expelled, the deposed regent recalled, and entrusted with high office; and then the conquerors set about driving the Chinese troops out of the country.

Such were the events which led to the war between China and Japan. The Chinese, seeing how things were going, resolved to make their position in Korea secure. They despatched reinforcements by water to Asan and the mouth of the Yalu river; but their means of mobilisation were not sufficiently rapid, and the transports were cut off by the Japanese, and sunk, as has been recorded elsewhere.¹

Korea suffered very little from the incidence of the hostilities between China and Japan, and had she only possessed sufficient energy and moral discipline she might have turned the occasion to account by making it a turning point in her history, from which to date a new era of prosperity. But she failed to grasp the opportunity, and the reforms inaugurated were taken up unwillingly at the instance of Japan. Acting under pressure from that Power, hereditary rank was abolished in so far as it was considered to constitute a claim to office, slavery and child-marriage was decreed illegal, the right of petition was accorded, and the Christian calendar adopted. An undertaking was given that the civil list should in future be kept distinct from the national expenditure, and the edicts against priests were withdrawn. On the 8th January, 1895, the king went in full state to the tomb of his ancestors, and solemnly adjured his vassalage to China; and the formal declaration of the country's independence was celebrated by the erection of a triumphal arch, on the spot where, in previous times, the kings had been

¹ An account of the leading incidents of the war of 1894-5 will be found on page 47.

accustomed to attend the coming of the Chinese envoys, and perform the kow tow, in significance of the suzerainty of China.

At the close of the campaign in Korea, the Emperor of Japan appointed Count Inouye resident at the court of Seoul; and on that statesman's arrival he set about the further development of the country's resources. The military system was reconstituted, the provincial governments reorganised, and a system of universal postage established throughout the country.

The introduction of these reforms induced a period of prosperity throughout the country. The power of Japan became supreme, and her commerce developed at such a rate that by the summer of 1895 she controlled nearly all the shipping, as well as the leading banks and trading establishments in Korea. The bulk of the capital employed was Japanese, and most of the crops and resources of the country, became mortgaged to the financiers of Nippon.

Count Inouye left Korea in September, 1895, at which time there were close on 8,000 Japanese settled in the country. He had, as his last act, used his influence to appoint the father of the king, Tai Wen Kun, or regent for the time being, in order to counterbalance the well-known Chinese leanings of the queen, who exerted considerable influence over her husband. As soon as the count had left the country, the queen summoned the turbulent Tong Haks to rise. Local trouble ensued, and the ministry resigned, leaving the country in a perturbed state. In April an alleged conspiracy to dethrone the king was discovered, with the result that five of the ministers said to be implicated were executed. A crisis then ensued, which the newly arrived Japanese minister, Viscount Miura proved himself unable to cope with. A number of troops mutinied, and declaring themselves ready to follow the Tai Wen Kun, seized him and forced an entrance to the palace. The rebels were next joined by a number of turbulent Japanese, who seized the queen, killed her and after exposing her body in the streets, burned it. A

forged proclamation bearing the name of the king was then issued degrading the dead queen.

On matters reaching this pass, the Japanese recalled their minister, and sought to regain the prestige they had lost by strong measures. A force was sent to Seoul. The queen was accorded a state funeral of great splendour. Further reform edicts were issued, and the order was given for all Koreans to cut their hair and discard the topknots universally worn, so as to resemble the people of civilised countries. The palace was held by the Japanese, and the king kept practically a prisoner.

These measures went far to destroy the remains of Japanese influence throughout the country. The mandate for hair cutting caused a wail of indignation throughout Korea. The king, distrusting his captors, resolved to escape, and he succeeded in stealing out of the palace, disguised as a servant, in the small hours of 11th February 1896, and went to the Russian Legation where he sought refuge at the hands of the consul. He was received with the greatest honour, and took up his quarters under the double eagle, issuing proclamations thence ordering the execution of the members of his cabinet. The following day the prime minister and the minister for agriculture were murdered, and their bodies hacked to pieces in the streets of Seoul. A few days later the cabinet was abolished, and its place taken by a national council.

The Japanese were greatly alarmed by these circumstances, and realised the danger to their interests of a possible Russian interference in the affairs of Korea. A series of negotiations between the Japanese and the Russian agents resulted in the signing of the treaty of Seoul on May 14th, under which the representatives of the two countries retained equal rights of residence in Korea, together with advisory powers for the purpose of introducing a sound financial system in the peninsula. It was set out in one of the final clauses that as soon as the new order of things had been accepted, the representatives both of Russia and Japan should withdraw.¹ The

¹ See Appendix B.

king shortly after chose another queen, and assumed the title of emperor on May 28th.

The Japanese had come to recognise their errors, and sought to mend matters by the issue of a declaration as to their policy. In this it was stated that the Japanese troops remaining in Korea were not intended to interfere in the affairs of that country, but to protect the Japanese Legation and ensure tranquillity. Japan, it was stated, did not desire to maintain a force in the peninsula any longer, than was absolutely necessary. She pledged herself to withdraw as soon as the Koreans appeared capable of keeping order in their country.

The action of the king in placing himself under Russian protection served to afford an excuse for Russian interference in the state of affairs. A force of 200 cossacks was landed at Chemulpho, and marched to Seoul for the protection of the Legation there. Notwithstanding this, the Japanese kept their pledge, and gradually evacuated Korea, while the "emperor" sent an envoy to St. Petersburg, where he was cordially received by the Tsar, who presented him with a quantity of rifles and ammunition, as well as offered to lend some officers to serve as military instructors to the Korean army. This offer was accepted, and a treaty was arranged under which the whole of the territorial and financial resources of Korea were practically placed in Russian hands, Japan being especially excluded from the contract.

On hearing of this, Japan determined to assert herself. She notified Russia, in terms none too polite, that this treaty must be forthwith revoked, and demanded that another, securing equal rights to both countries, should be substituted. After a series of negotiations, Russia, realising that she must either give way or fight, chose the former alternative; and in April, 1898, concluded the treaty of Tokyo, in which both countries recognise the independence of Korea, and pledge themselves to refrain from any attempt either to nominate military commanders or government officials in that country. And Russia further undertakes not to meddle in the

commercial or industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

Notwithstanding this treaty, Russia showed no signs of abandoning her tactics. The Russian outposts along the Korean frontier, which adjoins the Primorsk province for a distance of forty miles, were doubled ; the strength of the Russian squadron was increased ; and Russian subjects posing as private individuals, while carrying out the instructions of the general commanding at Vladivostok, sought to obtain leases of land in more than one Korean harbour. In May, 1900, a piece of land was actually obtained on Masanpho harbour which it has since been announced will be used for the purpose of a coaling station by Russia. The acquisition of this territory, which is said to cover 409 acres of ground, constitutes a breach of the undertaking given by Russia to China in 1886, never to occupy any portion of Korean territory ; but the breach of faith was promptly condoned by the British government, which, when questioned on the subject in parliament, justified Russia's act, and refused to regard it as a breach of faith.

In June the Korean government, acting doubtless on the prompting of Japan, notified its desire to cancel the lease of the Masanpho concession, on the score of a misunderstanding as to the payment of the terms arranged ; and there so far as is at present known, the matter rests. The question involved is of the utmost importance, not only to Russia but to all the Powers interested in the Far East. The possession of a naval base on the southernmost coast of Korea would give Russia an immense accession of strength in Eastern Asia. It would enable her to command the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, to dominate the Sea of Japan, and it would, moreover, bring her into close proximity to the British sphere of influence in the Yangtse region. Further than this, it would give her a half-way station between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and mark a stride, and that a long one, towards the final acquisition of Korea.

For these reasons it may be regarded as certain, that

Russia would not be suffered to acquire a footing in Korea without something more than a protest on the part of Japan. From the Japanese standpoint, Russia has no shadow of an excuse, beyond a mere desire for self-aggrandisement, for interference in Korea. Japan, on the other hand, is already greatly pressed for an extension of her area, and she hopes by the acquisition of some colonies to find the needed outlet for her surplus population. She realises that a Russian domination of Korea would mean a constant peril to Japan, and would prefer to come to blows with Russia and stay her continued descent on the shores of the Japan Sea, rather than imitate the timid vacillation of Great Britain and allow her rival to forge ahead and choose her own time for that struggle which must one day come.

In 1898, Japan had advanced the money necessary to complete the long talked of railway between Seoul and Chemulpho, and in August of the same year Russia gave fresh evidence of her designs on Korea by despatching M. Pavloff, minister to Seoul. M. Pavloff, who had previously held the post of Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Peking, had shown himself unusually able and unscrupulous even for a member of the Russian diplomatic service, and most of the gains attained by Russia in China during the previous three years had been due to his initiative. The posting of so able a man at Seoul affords undoubted evidence of Russia's intention of attempting to gradually absorb that country. An attempt to poison the emperor was made in September, but it only resulted in making him very ill. The suspected conspirators were arrested and hanged. In 1899, the Japanese government took over the scheme for a railway to unite Seoul and Fusan, a distance of 300 miles. The country remained quiet during this year, the only incident being the occurrence of a famine due to the dry weather during the summer. The air was, however, full of rumours respecting Russia's intentions, and it gradually came to be regarded as certain that a struggle between that country and Japan for the mastery of Korea could not be much longer deferred.

CHAPTER VI

RIVAL POLICIES

Contrasts in method—Britain's idea in her Eastern intercourse—American aims—Unselfishness of both—The charter of British rights in China—Her predominance—Lack of appreciation of the Oriental character—Chinese peculiarities—Corruptness—Venality—Growth of trade—Policy of non-interference—The struggle for China—The Russian aim—Rapidity of its attainment—Her methods—Militarism—Communications—Precautions—Her thoroughness—The seizure of Saghalin—Origin of the Siberian Railway—The Liaotung peninsula, British interests—Diplomatic negotiations—Russian pledges—Their value—Manchurian Railway agreement—Its effect—Chinese desire for British support—Her fear of Russia—Cession of Port Arthur—Party government and autocracy—French aims in the Far East—Her ambitions political, not commercial—Her jealousy of England—Her policy in the South—German aims—Portugal—England and America the arbiters of the Far East—The treaty-port system—Spheres of influence versus equality of opportunity—The prospects of each—Doom of the latter—Future necessities—Growth of Russian influence—The Powers and the open door—American interests—The battle of the policies.

THE foregoing accounts of the development of European relations with the countries of the Far East will have brought into prominence the contrast between the nations concerned. It will have been noted that the overtures for mutual intercourse have always come from the stranger, and never from the native. Indeed, up till quite a recent date, and so far as China and Korea are concerned up till to-day, the presence of Europeans among the Orientals of Eastern Asia has been resented, and no abuse has been considered too strong to be hurled at the detested invaders.

On the other hand, while the incursions of Western

nations in the countries of further Asia have been persistent, and at times marked by methods which must be deplored, there is a material difference in the *modus operandi*, followed by the different races who have succeeded in pushing their way among the exclusive Asiatics. No greater contrast could, for instance, be found than that between the objects and methods of the early English traders in China and the Russian prospectors who crossed the Chinese frontier about the same time. France, again, has been egged on, in her operations in China, by aims entirely different from those which actuated England, and the variety in the attitudes and actions of these different countries has not been wasted on the observant natives.

We have seen that it was England that succeeded in opening up China to the trade of the world; for the earlier efforts of Portugal were on a very inferior scale. But the credit of making Japan available to European commerce rests with the United States, and with the same Power lies the honour of having inserted the thin edge of the wedge into implacable Korea. As is customary among the most highly civilised nations, the first duty recognised, alike by England and America, after obtaining a new outlet for trade, is to share that right with other countries; and thus the acquisition of trade facilities in Japan and Korea by America was followed by the conclusion of similar treaties between those countries and Great Britain, just as we have invariably accorded our privileges in China to the government of the United States.

With the other Powers the case has been reversed. The first step taken alike by France and Russia after acquiring an accession of territory in the Far East, has always been to close that territory against the trade and intercourse of foreign nations; and, in the case of Russia, the measures taken are so stringent as to prevent even travellers from traversing her Asiatic provinces, unless provided with a special permit issued for a particular purpose by favour of the authorities.

This contrast in method is of the utmost concern to the

question of the Far East. It is the true origin of the crux of the matter, and marks the demarcation of interests which has of late years become so acute in Eastern Asia.

Great Britain, in her Asiatic activities, has been actuated by a desire which is dictated by the necessities of her existence. A small country, possessing a teeming population the majority of whom are traders, it becomes a vital necessity for her to obtain an extension of area for the emigration of her people, and facilities for the extension of her trade. Ever the leader in the progress of the world, Britain early solved the problem of the conditions most favourable to national prosperity, and realised that open competition without fear or favour was the best and in every respect most healthy condition for ensuring the prosperity of the people. From the period of her earliest intercourse with Eastern Asia she has sought no territory. Nor has she endeavoured to attain any form of exclusive privilege or superior opportunity for the benefit of her trade. All that she has striven for has been access to the countries of the Far East for the purpose of trade, and the enjoyment of such privileges as have been accorded to other nations, and no more. Such territory as she has become possessed of has been attained in self-defence, for the purpose of protecting her subjects in times of stress, and serving as a base where the forces necessary for the safeguarding of her interests may be stationed so as to be available in case of need.

The government of the United States, profiting by the example of Great Britain, has till quite recently, followed the same principle in regard to the Pacific coast line. During the whole of her intercourse with China and Japan, which dates from the year 1786, America made no attempt to obtain an acre of Asiatic territory for her exclusive use, until 1898, when she proclaimed her rule over the Philippines in token of her successes in the war with Spain.

France and Russia, on the other hand, appear to have vied with one another in their efforts at despoiling China; and the result shows vast stretches of territory undeveloped, closed to foreign trade, and held by forces which

cause a constant unrest in their vicinity, and hold threats of war, like the sword of Damocles, over the heads of the terrified subjects of the countries they have despoiled.

The aims of the various Powers who have sought a footing in the Far East vary as much as do those of the countries which they seek to exploit; and the contrast between the progressive attitude of Japan and the retrograding tendencies of China and Korea is no more marked than is the antagonism displayed by the policies of Russia and of England in regard to them. The objects held in view of these Powers in their Asiatic endeavours are indeed distinct from one another.

Thus while England has been prompted solely by a desire to extend her markets, and so indulge in her weakness for conversion of the heathen, Russia aims only at the extension of her territory, and the pushing of her frontiers southward, in order that she may attain strength and take a prominent part in the naval and military interests by which the balance of power is maintained. Germany and Japan are alike primarily interested in the development of that increased trade which they do not find elsewhere, and the latter is further intent on consolidating her interests and obtaining an access of territory suited to the requirements of her surplus population. France, on the other hand, is actuated mainly by that love of display which forms so prominent a characteristic in her political existence, and seeks territorial aggrandisement, not with a view to the development of the territory attained, so much as in order that her colonies may increase in extent and add to the gratification of her military ardour. In addition to this, our neighbours across the Channel have for many years past played a leading part in the attempted Christianising of the Chinese, and she has in this regard attained a greater measure of success than have any of her rivals.

The leading factor then in the policy of England in the Far East has always been a desire to open up friendly relations with the countries of that region, without attempting to obtain any territory for her exclusive posses-

sion, or to interfere in any way in the government of those countries, provided they refrained from harassing or ill-treating British subjects who might visit them for the purposes of trade. The action taken by her emissaries has been consistently judicious and pacific. Treaties for the authorisation of unrestricted intercourse between British traders and the natives have been negotiated, and the desire of the English to avoid any act which might cause friction among the Chinese and their neighbours, has been testified beyond dispute by the readiness with which the limitations provided by the treaty port system have been accepted by us, from the earliest period of our intercourse with Eastern Asia to the present day. The fault, if any, in our relations with the celestials has been the readiness with which we have tolerated the often insulting regulations which they have imposed on our intercourse with them, and the reticence we have always exhibited in taking the steps necessary to compel the official classes to abide by the terms of the treaties they have made. In this respect we have exhibited a patience which would have been sublime if it had not become ridiculous! At this very moment the clause in the treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858, and ratified in 1860, which accords the right of travel and residence to British subjects throughout the Chinese empire, remains unfulfilled; and Nanking, declared a treaty port in the same year, remains closed to Europeans.

The ratification of the treaty of Tientsin marked the height of British prestige in China. The measures taken, in conjunction with France, for the attaining of that end, had served to impress the celestials, not only with a sense of our power, but with an appreciation of our readiness to use it; and the spectacle of the destruction of the sacred summer palace, together with the undignified flight of the Emperor Hienfung from his capital, caused the Pekingese to regard the Western "barbarians" as a race who were to be feared and respected.

From 1860 British trade with China grew by leaps and bounds. The treaty ports became prosperous cities, where

the hum of commerce and the din of traffic advertised the advent of a new order of things, and, despite the competition which speedily arose as the result of the rumoured wealth which was to be speedily acquired in China, none of her rivals ever came within measurable distance of the dimensions attained by British commerce in the China Seas. In this achievement England was greatly aided alike by the possession of her Asiatic stations, and the strength of her mercantile marine. Her outposts at Malta, Aden, Calcutta and Singapore, rendered her communications easy, and added strength to her resources; while the island of Hong Kong, which developed within a few years of its cession in 1839 into a prosperous British colony, served to finally establish her prestige in the East, and became the most important trading centre on the Pacific border.

For close on forty years the predominance of Britain in the Far East was admitted on all hands. No rival sought to dispute her prerogative; and her influence with the Chinese themselves, except in occasional disputes with the mandarins over outrages on missionaries and breach of treaty obligations, was paramount. Evidences of this were everywhere apparent. British trade methods were adopted, and became the methods of all European nations dealing with the Far East. The English language, adapted in a bastard form to the capacities of oriental enunciation, became the patois of intercommunication between different races; and the word of the British consuls, supported when occasion arose by the guns of British ships, became law unto the Chinese.

Yet, all this while there were causes at work which led to that struggle for prestige in the Far East which, though not yet ended, has already shorn England of much of her erstwhile power, and threatens ere long to relegate her to a second, if not a third place, in the councils of Eastern Asia.

In all her intercourse with the celestials, British officialdom has never really grasped the true inwardness of the Chinese character. This fact is as astonishing as it is

regrettable, but the fact remains. And England to-day, though she rules over more orientals than any other European Power, remains ignorant of the true workings of the Eastern intelligence. It would be absurd to deny that among our fellow countrymen there have been many who have studied the celestial to advantage, and have gained an acquaintance with his language, his literature, and his method of reasoning, which has placed them in the closest intellectual concord with the subject of their study. But these have been exceptions ; and the talents of such men as a Giles, Douglas, Lay, Mayers, Medhurst and Parkes, while they have resulted in the provision of much valuable material for the use of students, have not tended to inculcate a realisation of the Chinese character in the minds of English officialdom. As a consequence British governments are accustomed to deal with the Chinese as though they were a Western people with Western ideas ; and at the very outset of the relations entailed, the celestials are irritated by the bluntness of the diplomatic methods followed, which, if tempered by an appreciation of the oriental idea, might enable all necessary negotiations to be carried on with a mutual feeling of friendship and regard.

The Chinaman, spoiled in his own conceit by the segregation of upwards of four thousand years, during which no foreigner succeeded in penetrating his domain, is by nature arrogant, conceited and cunning. But he possesses a number of excellent qualities which might be imitated by some Western nations with advantage. He is law-abiding to a marked degree. He is peaceful, full of reverence for age, beauty, and custom ; industrious, reliable and economical. He is the hardest worker and the simplest liver in the world, and his ingenuity would be hard to beat. His long exclusion from the outside world has tended to make him self-reliant and full of confidence in the excellence of his own methods, and, as a natural result, he is slow to adopt new ideas, and apt to prove a stickler for his own particular views of etiquette and propriety. The curse of the Chinese governmental system is venality and

corruptness; and these qualities are indulged in by the officials of every degree, all of whom utilise their positions for the purpose of extorting bribes and enforcing taxes which are alike illegal and unauthorised. The effect of the high ideals inculcated by Confucius and Mencius, and handed down through countless generations of Chinese, is to place the celestial standard of morality on a far higher plane than is attainable by human effort; and in the result the mandarins, while they are constantly enunciating the most unexceptionable doctrines, and interspersing their conversation with moral apophthegms beyond praise, grow rich by dint of oppression, bribery, and corruption.

It needs no great stretch of imagination to understand that to approach such people in the same way as one would approach a cultured European, is not the best means by which to win their confidence, or arrive at a mutual understanding. To arrive at a working basis with such as these, it is necessary to humour them, and to gradually gain their friendship by studying their mode of thought and avoiding shocking their susceptibilities. It must be admitted that in this respect the majority of British accredited agents have been singularly unfortunate, and the result has been constant misunderstandings which have more than once brought the two countries to the verge of war.

The depth of the corruptness of the Chinese official classes is almost beyond belief. The mandarins sell justice in their Yamens openly to the highest bidder. Taxes are farmed out many times over, each middleman taking his profit in the increase he obtains over his own bid; and the final contractor sets to work to extort by persuasion, threats or even torture, his pound of flesh, over and above what he has himself invested in the nefarious transaction. Nominally ill paid, the mandarin draws a salary insufficient to defray the cost of his Yamen. But actually he sticks to the bulk of the taxes he collects, in addition to the fines, bribes, and blackmail he extorts. The methods of enrichment practised by these gentry are

as ingenious as they are original, but these hardly come within the scope of the present volume.¹ The amount of the inland duties collected by native officials which reaches Peking is said never to exceed thirty per cent., and this estimate has been endorsed by many men who have occupied consular posts and enjoyed exceptional facilities for gauging the truth of the matter. The innate corruption among the official classes of China is far reaching. It extends to the conferring of appointments, the promotion of officials, and even to the passing of examinations and conferring of degrees, which may be obtained with ease by means of judiciously bribing the examiners. It follows that in dealing with such a people it would be absurd to treat them according to the European standard. Such traits have nothing in common with Western notions; and in order to cultivate an understanding with them, it is necessary to view them from their own standpoint, and to treat them accordingly.

It is the failure to attain this desideratum that is in the main responsible for that decrease in British influence which has marked the record of China during the past few years.

In face of the lack of understanding with which the British have always approached the Chinese, their trade has developed in a truly remarkable degree, and it would doubtless continue to so increase if only our methods were not calculated to rouse ill feeling among the celestials by the errors so often committed in our political relations. The growth of British trade with China is indeed one of the most remarkable of the facts connected with that country's history; and the excess of our commerce over that of other nations, despite the minuteness of our territorial interests in the country, is a phenomenon replete with material for thought.

It may be convenient to summarise the respective Chinese interests of the Powers in tabular form.

¹ An account of mandarin peculiarities in this direction will be found in the author's *China in Decay*.

| | Chinese territory held. Square miles. | Annual trade. |
|-------------------------|--|---------------|
| Great Britain | 529 | £41,000,000 |
| Japan | 13,541 | 7,000,000 |
| United States | Nil. | 8,000,000 |
| France | 315,009 | 5,000,000 |
| Russia | 339,127 | 4,500,000 |
| Germany | 120 | 2,500,000 |
| Portugal | 4 | 1,000,000 |

Thus the trade of Great Britain with China is not far short of double that of all the other countries added together, and more than five times as great as that of Japan, which appears second on the list. And the returns of the trade of foreign countries with Japan show an equal preponderance in favour of this country.

| | Trade with Japan. |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Great Britain | £17,424,000 |
| United States | 8,913,000 |
| China | 6,096,000 |
| France | 2,804,000 |
| Germany | 2,800,000 |
| Russia | 300,000 |

It would naturally be supposed that with such an overwhelming superiority in the trade of the Far East, British influence would be supreme in that quarter. This is, however, not the case, owing to the peculiarities of the policy which has been followed by this country in her dealings with the people of further Asia.

The policy of non-interference which was invariably maintained during the earlier years of British intercourse with China and Japan, was regarded by the Chinese as a sign of weakness on our part; and the failure to maintain our influence in the struggle for supremacy which has been waged in China during the past few years, has served to allay the fear with which our power was in earlier times regarded by the natives, who have come to believe that England is a weak country, which cannot hold her own against the power of Russia, and which may, therefore, be disregarded with impunity.

The existing struggle for the domination of China may be said to have begun towards the close of the year 1897. The forces which set the struggle in motion, have, however, been at work for a number of years, and while their incubation must be sought far back in the 18th century, their effective working may be calculated as dating from the signing of the Russian treaty of Peking in 1860.

By this treaty Russia obtained the maritime province of Manchuria, and the occupation of this territory brought her for the first time in close contact with the Chinese. The Amur province, ceded by the treaty of Aigun two years earlier, had placed her in juxtaposition only with the Tunguses, Ostiaks, Mongolians and Manchus, who inhabited the outermost borders of the Chinese empire. The regions bordering the Amur river, which served to mark the boundary between Siberia and Mongolia, were so thinly populated, and the people of such domestic habits, that the actual intercourse between the Russians and the Chinese in those days may be said to have been nil.

From the moment that Russia came into contact with China, she lost no opportunity of impressing the celestials with a sense of her power. By the treaty of Peking, the right of Russia to retain an envoy at Peking was conceded ; and, from that time to the present, she has retained her most able diplomatists at the celestial capital for the purpose of developing her aims and extending her interests in China. For, at a very early stage in her career, Russia recognised the magnificent opportunities for extension and development which were afforded her by the geographical situation of China. As soon as she had extended her sway over the whole of Siberia, she realised that the absorption of China meant, in addition to increased territory and wealth, a descent on the mid-latitudes of the world, with its attendant advantages of ice free harbours, an extensive seaboard, and best, of all, what Russia most desired, the opportunity of developing a naval power and competing in the councils of nations. So she set her agents to work ; and by dint of an admixture of cleverness, resource-

fulness and lack of scruple, she has in little more than forty years attained a grip over the country and the people infinitely greater than any other Power; and by dint of the readiness with which she has exhibited her determination to further her interests at Peking, has come to be regarded by the Chinese as the greatest force with which they have come into contact; in comparison with which all other countries are unworthy of notice.

While, for a series of years, Russia gave no outward sign of her intentions, she was by no means idle. Though she refrained from making any attempt to develop the territories she had obtained, or to educate the inhabitants who had fallen under her rule, she spared neither money nor men in the taking of measures for strengthening her position strategically in her new provinces. Vladivostok was taken in hand, and the harbour, docks, and forts, which to-day make it the Cronstadt of the Far East, constructed. Military posts were established at convenient points along the Manchurian and Korean borders, and arms and munitions of war stored so as to be ready for emergencies.

The organisation of the military government of the Primorsk province, with the construction of the various works entailed, occupied a considerable number of years, the undertaking being considerably handicapped by the enormous distances over which men and material had to be conveyed. The only means of communication between the seat of government and the Far East provinces of Russia were by sea from Odessa, involving a journey of some 7,000 miles, or overland across Siberia, with its lack of roads and wayside accommodation; and it was realised that it would be hopeless to attempt any further extensions in Eastern Asia until the existing communications became improved.

It was pointed out that in the event of Russia becoming involved in a dispute in Eastern Asia, she would be powerless to protect her interests or defend herself, owing to the fact that she could not hope to despatch troops to the Pacific border in time to avert an attack by the

Chinese or other enemy ; and, with a circumspection which does credit to her good sense, it was decided that no steps were to be taken to continue the onward movement until the danger pointed out had been averted.

It is impossible not to feel an admiration for the ability and thoroughness with which Russia set about this undertaking. No consideration, however slight, escaped her notice. Every eventuality was realised and prepared for. In 1875 it was determined to take measures for the expulsion of the Japanese from the southern portion of the island of Saghalien, where numbers had settled ; and this was effected by a convention under which Japan was ceded the Kuriles, a poor exchange. Thus the presence of an unwelcome neighbour who might at any time desire to exhibit a disconcerting curiosity as regards Russian action was got rid of, and the administration of Siberia became at liberty to turn its attention to other details.

The idea of a trunk line of railway across Siberia was mooted by Russian engineers as far back as the early fifties ; and in 1858, immediately after the treaty of Aigun had given Russia undisputed possession of Eastern Siberia to the shores of the Northern Pacific, three English prospectors offered to construct a railway from Moscow to the mouth of the Amur river, in return for certain privileges in the development of the resources of Siberia.¹ This offer was declined, owing to the Russian dislike of placing the country under the administration of foreigners ; and so nothing was done until the period already referred to, when the representations made by Count Muravieff and General Ignatieff brought the idea of a railway once more into prominence. Surveys were begun in the early seventies. In 1878 the European system was extended as far as the Urals. In 1882 the construction of railways in Siberia was practically decided on ; and it was determined to build a line to unite Vladivostok with the Amur river, so as to place that naval base in direct communication with Siberia by means of the waterways of the country.

¹ *Side Lights on Siberia*, by J. Y. Simpson.

Thus the scheme grew and took definite shape, until 1890, when a special commission was held under the presidency of Alexander III, who approved the proposal for a trunk line across the whole of Siberia, to unite Moscow and St. Petersburg with Vladivostok. The present Tsar, then Tsarevitch, was entrusted with the supervision of the work; and in 1891, while on his tour round Asia, he turned the first sod of the Ussuri line, between Khabarovka and Vladivostok, which was opened for traffic in 1896. Since that date various sections of the railway have been completed, and the line is now open for traffic between Moscow and Irkutsk, while the road is practically complete as far as Chita, near Nerchinsk.

The total length of the Siberian railroad when completed will be (reckoning from the Asiatic frontier station at Cheliabinsk) 4,741 miles. Its estimated cost is £35,000,000. The line is a single one, of the usual Russian gauge 5 ft. ($3\frac{1}{2}$ in. wider than the British gauge), and its construction is extremely light, so much so that the rails are already being replaced by heavier ones, despite the slightness of the traffic.

The progress made in the construction of this railway was so rapid that Russia felt justified in resuming her activity; and in December, 1897, she occupied Port Arthur. It requires no very deep insight into Russian motives to appreciate the fact, that the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula had long been determined on; and the persistent protest raised by her when Japan obtained the cession of that territory from China in 1895 served only to delay the march of events until it was deemed that the psychological moment had arrived for Russia to seize it herself.

The occupation of Port Arthur by Russia was the most important event which had occurred in the history of China since the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin. The area seized by the invader was not extensive, and the pretence maintained of the obtaining of the harbour by a temporary lease, served in some measure to divert attention from the real import of the achievement.

But the Russian descent on the peninsula of Liaotung did far more than accord her an ice free port and provide her with a naval base six hundred miles nearer to the sphere of British interests in the Far East. It placed her in a position to dominate the Chinese at Peking, and enabled her to obtain a control over celestial actions sufficient to make her mistress of the situation.

The restraint exhibited by this country in refraining from any protest against Russia's action is one of the most remarkable instances of misdirected policy to be found in the history of our foreign relations. The methods of Russia are so well known as to leave no room for doubt as to the uses to which she would put her newly acquired position. The extent of British trade with China and Japan rendered it a prime necessity that no steps should be spared in ensuring the freedom of that trade from foreign interference; and the cession of Port Arthur to Russia not only gave her the fullest opportunity for interfering with that trade, but further gave her an undue influence, which she was not likely to allow to remain unused, over the Chinese; which might be, and which has been, utilised to the detriment of this country in the Far East.

Yet England took no steps to meet the danger by which she was threatened, and she has since begun to reap the result of her weakness. The lack of protest on our part in this matter of Port Arthur did even more than encourage Russia in her opposition to our aims. It afforded China proof, of what she had previously only suspected, that England was afraid to traverse Russian pretensions, and the timidity displayed by her in 1898 dealt the first severe blow at her prestige in the estimation of that country in which her influence had been paramount for more than two hundred years.

Nor did Russia herself fail to profit by the example shown by England to the Powers. The readiness with which Lord Salisbury's government accepted the new order of things came as a surprise even to Russian diplomatists, who had formed their estimate of our

political ability on the failure of our policy on the Afghan frontier. The supineness of 1898 so far exceeded the incompetence of 1885-6, however, as to come as a revelation to the Muscovite agents, who had expected at least a series of protests, if not an appeal to arms, as the result of their temerity. But nothing of the sort occurred. Instead of insisting on the withdrawal of Russia, and demanding a reversion to the *status quo*, the British government not only accepted the situation, but, through the mouthpieces of its members in parliament, justified Russia's action and defended it. The manifestation was as welcome as it was unexpected; and Russia settled herself down to develop her newly acquired base, to fortify her latest stronghold, and to devise fresh inroads into British interests.

Thus in 1897-8 did Russia at a single bound attain a commanding situation on the Gulf of Pechili, from which she to-day views the situation in the Far East with a sense of dominant security and control. It must have afforded her intense amusement to have read the vaticination of Lord Salisbury, who sought to belittle the effect of Port Arthur on her power in Asia. Speaking at the Albert Hall on 4th May, 1898, the prime minister said—

“I think Russia has made a great mistake in taking Port Arthur. I do not think it is any use to her whatever.”

The diplomatic correspondence which took place at this period is instructive. The object of Russia was to obviate suspicion of her real purpose in the seizure of Port Arthur, while that of England was to obtain an undertaking from Russia, which would serve to allay the uneasiness of parliament as to Russia's intention of coercing China, and prevent the loss of votes among the electors in the event of a general election taking place. The British ambassador at St. Petersburg was accordingly instructed to obtain an undertaking from Russia as to her intentions in regard to Port Arthur.

On the 16th March, 1898, Sir Nicholas O'Connor telegraphed to Lord Salisbury—

“At his weekly reception of the foreign representatives at the Ministry this afternoon, Count Mouravieff authorised me to inform her Majesty's government that, if the Yamen grant a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan to the Russian government, foreign trade shall have free access to both these ports similarly to the other ports in the Chinese empire.”

And this telegram was followed by a despatch in which the undertaking given was renewed—

“I have the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch of the 13th instant, that Count Mouravieff informed me last night that he had seen the emperor in the morning, and that his Imperial Majesty had authorised him to give me the assurance that both Port Arthur and Talienwan would be opened to foreign trade, like other Chinese ports, in the event of the Russian government obtaining a lease of those places from the Chinese government. His Excellency further said that he had also repeated to his Imperial Majesty the remarks I had made to him in regard to the supreme importance attached by her Majesty's government to the maintenance of all rights and privileges secured to Great Britain by their existing treaties with China, and that his Imperial Majesty had told him to assure me that Russia would respect those rights, and that there was no intention to infringe them or to impair the sovereignty of China.”

A week later (March 30th) Sir Nicholas O'Connor wrote—

“I saw Count Muravieff this afternoon, but refrained from touching on the affairs of China, except that I expressed surprise that in the telegram which he had sent on the 27th March to the Russian representatives abroad, his Excellency had only said that Talienwan would be open to foreign commerce, and had made no mention of Port Arthur; and I called his attention to the formal assurances on this subject which I had been authorised by him to communicate to her Majesty's government on the 16th instant. The minister informed me in reply that he adhered to the assurances he had given me, but that the moment was inopportune for publicly announcing them.”

These assurances attained their object in satisfying the British government, despite the fact that had they been

acted on, the gain of the cession of Port Arthur would have been neutralised to Russia. They were duly reported to parliament, and swallowed by the bulk of the members; and the subsequent announcement that Port Arthur would "for the present" remain closed to other nations came as a surprise! The incident is only one of many in which the lack of scruple on the part of Russia has been aided by the simplicity of British statesmen in conducing to the attainment of her ends.

Shortly after the occupation of Port Arthur by Russia, publicity was given to an agreement between that country and China, authorising the construction of a railway in variation of the original Siberian survey, across Manchuria, in such a direction as to unite the existing Siberian line near Nerchinsk with Vladivostok, with a branch connecting Port Arthur and the same at Kirin. The agreement bears the date 4th October, 1896, and was therefore signed shortly after the exclusion of Japan from the Liaotung peninsula. This fact affords unquestionable evidence as to Russian intentions, and the true motive of that country in objecting to the Japanese occupation.

The Manchurian railway agreement is in many respects a very remarkable document.¹ It is framed on the lines of an ordinary commercial contract, and is drawn up between a society spoken of as the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Chinese government. It authorises the construction of railways across Manchuria to Vladivostok and Port Arthur, accords a preferential tariff on Russian goods imported into China as compared with those of other countries, and decrees that the shares in the undertaking can only be legally held by Russian and Chinese subjects. The agreement is in short a charter authorising the Russification of Manchuria; and by the reduction of one-third duty in favour of all Russian imports conveyed into China over the line, it creates a special facility for Russian trade, and places that country in open opposition to the policy of equality of opportunity

¹ See Appendix B.

known as the "open door," which has been adopted by Great Britain and the United States.

The increased influence attained by Russia on her occupation of Port Arthur was in no wise diminished by either the German activity in Shantung, or the leasing of Wei Hai Wei by Great Britain. This last adventure tended rather to lessen than to heighten British prestige in China, for the reason that it afforded further evidence of the country's inability to continue that policy of non-interference which had been so often voiced by her statesmen. From the Chinese standpoint, the occupation of Wei Hai Wei by England showed that, finding herself unable to stem the advance of Russia in China, she had resolved to imitate her example, and despoil the country for her own benefit. The effect of this reasoning on the celestials was very marked. British prestige sunk to a lower ebb than it had ever before attained, and the weakness of her policy was openly stated to be the natural corollary of her fear of the action of Russia.

When questioned respecting the leasing of Port Arthur to Russia the members of the Tsungli Yamen had been perfectly candid with the British minister at Peking. It would, they urged, cause them the greatest satisfaction to refuse Russia's request, but they felt unable to do so, for the reason that Russia was so infinitely more powerful than China that they could not effectively resist her forcible acquisition of that which had been demanded. If, however, England would afford them the necessary support to resist Russian designs on Chinese territory, they would gladly refuse the demand made, and refuse any further concessions she might seek.

England declined to take the proffered hint. Port Arthur was ceded to Russia. And when shortly after China sought to negotiate a loan and England offered to supply the money, the Tsungli Yamen declined the offer, on the score that to borrow of Great Britain might give offence to Russia, and expressed itself anxious not to provide that country with any pretext for making a hostile move on China.

In reply to this Sir Claude Macdonald pointed out that if Russia desired to make a hostile move on China she would easily find a pretext in any case. To which the mandarins responded that a promise of protection against Russia was the only thing that would help them; and the matter ended, for such an idea was utterly opposed to the policy of England.

The added influence gained by Russia in her occupation of Port Arthur and the publication of the Manchurian railway agreement encouraged her to carry matters with a high hand in North China. The signing of a contract between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank for the construction by the latter of the continuation of the Shan hai Kuan railway to Sinminting and Newchang was made the occasion of a series of protests on the part of Russia, which only just kept within the bounds of diplomatic courtesy; and it was only after a lengthy and heated series of interviews between the representatives of the two countries, that England consented to waive her claim on that portion of the line north of the Great Wall, as security for the repayment of the capital invested. This result was again a score for Russian diplomacy, and was not wasted on the Chinese, who by now had come to realise the incapacity of Great Britain to hold her own against her northern rival.

Thus do the policies of Great Britain and of Russia present a contrast so marked as to present no single factor in common; and while the former has rested content with the indulgence of a desire for peace at any price, the latter as consistently forged ahead, ever seeking new outlets for her energy, and fresh opportunities for the attainment of her ambitions.

The causes of this contrast in the working of the greatest influences in the Far East lie deep down in the national character of the peoples concerned. They may be summarised as the outcome of the governmental system of each. The administration of the Russian empire, resting nominally in the hands of the Tsar, is actually entrusted to a body of ministers who are answerable only to him

for their action. So long as the course desired is approved by the Tsar, the executive officials are untrammelled in their action, and their freedom is restrained neither by the criticism of a free press, the influence of public opinion, nor the liability to be deprived of office by a parliamentary vote of censure. It follows then that the Russian diplomatist is in a position to attain any object he may have in view, provided that object is approved of by the Tsar ; and the freedom afforded by the lack of those restraining influences which cripple individual action in this country makes success easy, excepting when reprisals are threatened by an appeal to arms on the part of other nations.

In the case of Great Britain, the hands alike of the government and its administrators are tied by the very forces which are absent in Russia. The working of the party system, which dominates our political life, restricts the actions of our rulers, who are impelled to discount their actions by their probable effect on public opinion ; and as the main object of a cabinet existing under such a system is to continue its tenure of office as long as possible, the action necessary in the interests of the country is generally tempered by the question of expediency in regard to its probable effect on the attitude of the opposition, and its result on the life of the government.

The development of party politics has attained such a pitch in the British parliament that it has come to be regarded as the principal aim of the opposition to oppose the government, just as it is the object of the latter to crush the opposition. The debate on a matter of national importance is fought out, not on the merits of the question at issue, but on the lines of attack and defence, the government seeking to follow such a course as is most likely to prove popular and prolong its existence, while the opposition endeavours to discredit the ministers with a view to bringing about their discomfiture. It follows therefore that our foreign policy must be dictated by the individual interests of those in power, rather than by the requirements of imperial interests ; and this fact is further

responsible for the employment of agents rather on account of their own or their families' influence, than because of their especial fitness for the post entrusted to them.

With a few marked exceptions, the diplomatic agents of this country stationed abroad are totally unfitted to hold their own against the representatives of other countries. The well-bred Englishman, whose sole qualifications are provided by a public school education, the passing of a useless examination, and the possession of a few good connections, can be no match for the highly educated Russian or German, who, in addition to an intimate acquaintance with the problems with which he has to deal, is a man of infinite tact and resource, well versed in the language of the country to which he is accredited, and secure in the knowledge that he will be supported in any action he may take for the furtherance of the policy he is entrusted to carry out. The Russian agent is ever scheming for the attainment of his country's aims, and reaps his reward in proportion to the success he obtains. His British rival, besides being as a rule ill equipped for his task, is without any freedom of action, and metaphorically tied to the end of a telegraph wire, by which frequently conflicting instructions are sent him, as the eternal struggle among parties at home prompt the government of the day to prosecute one line of policy or another. The aims of Russia in the Far East are moreover consistent. From the signing of the treaty of Aigun in 1858 to the present day, there has been no change in the policy she has followed for the furtherance of her interests in China. With us, our action in the Far East not only alters with each succeeding government, but it blows alternately hot and cold, shifting from a course of active interference to one of passive toleration, at intervals of a few months.

In one respect, and in one only, is there anything in common between the idiosyncrasies of the Russian method of government and our own. The statements made by

neither can be trusted ; with a difference. In the Russian view, the object of diplomacy is to attain her desires without fighting for them. Its aim in short is to succeed, and no diplomatic failure is ever condoned. The end in this respect is taken to justify the means, and any methods are allowable in order to assure success. So Russia is always ready to oblige her rivals with explanations, pledges, and even treaties, which she makes in order to lull suspicions of her ultimate aim, without the slightest intention of being bound by them. The British government similarly makes statements which it does not follow out, but for a different reason. In her case it is to reassure parliament, to rally its supporters in the house, and to prevent the peril of a dissolution, that brave pledges are offered up, which are simply disregarded. Instances of this attitude have been numerous in connection with recent debates on China. If a tithe of the repeated assurances uttered by ministers in the House of Commons, respecting the "firm intention" of the government to guard British interests in the Far East, had been carried out, the anti-foreign outbreak of May last would not have occurred, and the respect for British force and British insistence in China would have sufficed to make the conspirators think twice before attempting to expel the foreigners from their shores. But, as I have already shown, the only European influence which is felt in China to-day is that of Russia ; and Russia, whatever her view at this stage of the rebellion, was not at the outset opposed to the idea of a recrudescence towards conservatism at Peking. The hurried reforms advocated by ourselves in China would be little less to the taste of Russia than of the Chinese ; and the incidence of disorder in the celestial empire is bound to afford Russia opportunities for the furtherance of her aims. I shall return to this subject later on, for the present it is necessary to turn to the other Powers, whose policies supply factors in the question of the Far East.

In contrast to the English, whose intercourse with the Chinese arose from their desire to open up trade relations with the Far East, France obtained a footing in China by

means of the missionaries she sent out with the object of proselytising the celestials. The accident of the despatch of an envoy by the King of Annam to the court of Louis XVI. in 1787, turned the attention of that monarch to the possibility of obtaining political influence in Indo-China, and the despatch of a French force to that country led to the opening up of relations which culminated in the annexation of Cochin China in 1861.

Cambodia, Tonkin and Annam followed; and to-day France rules over an area in Southern China which is only second to that owned by Russia in the North. The aims of France in China have ever been political rather than commercial, and much of what trade is done emanates from British ports, and is carried in British vessels. French Indo-China has always been regarded by the French authorities as a means of enlarging the prestige of their country, and evidencing its intention to be heard in all matters concerning the Far East. By dint of constant scheming and negotiation, she had obtained extended facilities in South China which at more than one point bring her into immediate rivalry with this country, and threaten at some future time to endanger the relations between us. She seeks to develop her trade by means of protective tariffs; but her commercial prosperity is not great, and her population stationary, while the scene of her endeavours is ill-suited for colonisation.

During recent years France has set herself a task the success of which would be fraught with peril to British interests. On the plea of obtaining extended facilities for her trade, she has obtained railway concessions in those parts of the eighteen provinces which trend on her northern borders, with the object of creating a sphere of influence in Southern China which may serve to cut off the British trade now being developed between the upper Yangtse Kiang and the Burmese border. That this aim is foredoomed to failure is already manifest; but the attempt serves as an instance of the restlessness with which France seeks to utilise her possessions rather for the attainment of political aggrandisement than of commercial gain. The readiness

with which our neighbours have always closed with any opportunity for the exhibition of their prowess among the Chinese has already been shown in the chronicle of their alliance with ourselves, though they at the time possessed practically no interests in China, in the attack on the Taku forts, and occupation of Peking; and the opportunity afforded by the Chinese protest against French action in Tonkin in 1884; was eagerly seized on as an excuse for the prosecution of a war, in the course of which the Chinese fleet was destroyed and whole districts ravaged.

Of late years France has devoted her attention rather to profiting by the stress of the Chinese in their contests with other nations, than to active spoliation of her empire. The cession of Kiao Chau, Port Arthur, and Talienwan, by China, was made a pretext for the demanding of further trade facilities in South China; and it is understood that, on the first opportunity, she will demand the cession of the island of Hainan, as an advanced barrier for French commerce.

The rise of Germany on the Chinese horizon is of quite recent date. Suggestions for the acquisition of a port on the Chinese seaboard had been made by German traders on various occasions, and political relations have existed between the two countries since 1861; but the first active interference in the affairs of the celestials was effected by the German occupation of Kiao Chau in 1897. It is as yet early to speak of German policy in the Far East. Her early efforts do not appear to have been crowned with any very great success, but she may be trusted to persevere in her attempts at the development of the trade of Shantung; and the concentration and wonderful organising power which she possesses in so eminent a degree, may be trusted to aid her in the eventual attainment of her aims—a paying trade and a voice in the fortunes of the Far East. The possibilities of the resources of Shantung are very great, and the adoption of a policy of free trade at Kiao Chau should result in a speedy growth of German interests in North China.

Of Portugal, which still flies its flag over the island of

Macao, with its four square miles of area, little need be said. The trade of this place is mainly in the hands of the Chinese, and amounts to a little over a quarter of a million annually. As is the case with most of the Portuguese dependencies, Macao is in its decadence, and its influence in the politics of the Far East a negligible quantity.

It remains then only to speak of the interests of England and America in Eastern Asia. Beginning at Canton, where a central depot for British trade was established nearly three hundred years ago, increased facilities for sea-borne commerce have been from time to time accorded under varying circumstances by the Chinese, until the whole of the coastline and a portion of the larger rivers of the country, have become dotted with treaty ports where foreign trade is carried on under the conditions laid down by the various existing treaties. These treaty ports may be roughly divided into two classes; those on the seaboard, and those inland; and at every one of these the trade of England preponderates over that of other nations. In regard to their international aspect these ports vary considerably. Tientsin, Shanghai, Foochow, Canton, and Hankow are centres which wear an aspect of cosmopolitan interest. Foreigners from every country are there to be found engaged in trade which flourishes all the more by dint of the various nationalities which come together. Ningpo, Swatow, Amoy, and Pakhoi, together with the ports on the Yangtse Kiang, are almost exclusively in British hands, and as regards the riverian centres, it may be said that, with the exception of Hankow, foreign, other than American subjects, are rarely seen.

It is noteworthy that the maritime ports are by their situation less subject to interference on the part of the Chinese, than are those inland. A settlement facing the sea cannot be surrounded by an anti-foreign mob, and, if attacked, can be defended by the aid of gun-boats off the shore. Treaty ports in the interior are more easily threatened. They can be surrounded, communications

with the coast can be cut off, and the advance of ships to their relief opposed. It follows then, that it is very desirable in a country which, like China, is peopled by a race normally hostile to foreigners, to take precautions which may serve to prevent any serious danger from a native rising ; and as the preponderating interest in these inland ports is British, it rests with Great Britain to take such measures as will ensure the object desired.

This reasoning leads to the inference that British interests along the great Yangtse valley are greater than those of other countries, and, further, that owing to this fact the Yangtse valley is of vital import to the prosperity of British trade in China. The principle is not new. It has been demonstrated times out of number, and is now generally recognised. Thus the interests of England are seen to exist in every treaty port, and her trade to flourish in every province ; the valley of the Yangtse Kiang, alike the most fertile, prosperous and densely populated region of China, is essentially the most important British sphere of interest in that country.

So important is this fact that the British government alarmed at the repeated inroads made on the integrity of China by the Powers, sought in 1898 to arrive at an understanding with the Chinese government for the neutralising of the Yangtse valley so as to preserve it to the trade of all nations without favour ; and, after a series of negotiations, a pledge was given by the Tsungli Yamen " not to mortgage, lease, or cede any territory in the Yangtse valley to any other Power." The obtaining of this undertaking is of interest for the light it throws on British policy.

From the days when Captain Weddell bartered English wares for tea, to the present time, the British aim in China has been purely commercial. At no period has she attempted to gain either territory or political influence at the hands of the Chinese. She has refrained from interference in the government of the country, and when driven to take offensive action in order to obtain the observation of treaty obligations, she has retired from

the capital without gaining any advantage for herself beyond the defraying of the cost of her effort.

Whatever privileges this country has garnered for herself in China, she has voluntarily shared with all who chose to benefit by them. The opening up of China by her has implied the opening up of that country to the world; and the readiness with which, in early days, she chose to chastise the Chinese for their neglect to carry out the contracts they had entered into served to impress a sense of the irresistible power of England on the celestials.

With the approach of Russia to the Chinese border, England found herself confronted with a policy counter to her own. Her interests being centred in the preservation of the integrity of that country, she found them threatened by the Russian seizure of whole provinces. But her hands were full at the time. In 1858 the Allies were forcing their way up the Peiho. In 1860 they were in occupation of Peking. And so Russia's action was condoned, and a precedent accorded for the further partition of the empire at some future time.

The incident blew over, and was after a time forgotten; nor was it until three years ago that it became repeated. The action of Russia in the matter of Port Arthur has already been discussed; and the failure of England to realise her duty in the matter has also been referred to. The outcome of the position then was this. While Great Britain refrained from championing China against Russian aggression, she yet adhered to her nominal policy of demanding the respecting of the integrity of China, and maintained her determination to ensure that equality of treatment in regard to trade facilities which she had proclaimed throughout her intercourse in the Far East.

These two courses are utterly irreconcilable; and sooner or later, sooner for choice, the time will come when she will have to choose between abandoning her attitude in regard to the "open door," or resisting by force the further spoliation of Chinese territory by Russia.

The necessity for this choice, when it arises, must find this country at a considerable disadvantage. The repeated

evasion of the responsibilities of the moment can only tend to strengthen our opponent's hand and make any resistance the more difficult; and the force which would in 1898 have sufficed to bring the offender to her senses, as likely as not without the necessity of firing a shot, will prove utterly insufficient when, in years to come, strengthened by her past opportunities, of which she has availed herself so ably, Russia ventures on a further *coup*, supported by those resources which our timidity has alone enabled her to develop.

The repetition of this process has resulted in affording Russia an influence among the ruling Chinese infinitely greater than our own. The constant attainment of her aims has caused the celestials to regard her as a Power who is not to be denied; and their opinion of Great Britain, whose efforts are restricted to the peaceful enjoyment of what she has attained in the past, has declined proportionately.

When, recently, witnessing the struggle going on in China for concessions and privileges among the Powers, England joined in the pursuit, and urged on the Tsungli Yamen the accordance of various rights for railway construction and development of mineral resources, in rivalry with the demands made by other countries, Great Britain sacrificed the last claim to Chinese regard by reversing her policy of previous years, and seeking to force the hand of China in directions to which she was strongly opposed.

The policy of England, as proclaimed by Lord Salisbury and his colleagues, is that known as the "open door," which provides for the sharing of all facilities for trade in China with other countries. The observance of this principle requires the establishment of free trade among all competing nations, and involves an equality of treatment in distinct contrast to that provided by protection. In her support of this course of action, England is aided by the government of the United States, which has very large commercial interests in China; and towards the close of last year America decided to take action to obtain an

exchange of views among the Powers, and, if possible, a unanimous recognition of the principle involved.

The despatch of a circular note to all the countries concerned elicited replies which, in the case of England, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, accepted the principle laid down, subject to its being equally adopted by all the other Powers. The reply of Russia was less satisfactory, and, evading the main issue, sought by a speciously worded note to satisfy the hopes of the United States government without actually committing herself to observe the principle involved.¹ The true significance of this document appears to have escaped the attention of the American

¹ This document, the last piece of smart diplomacy achieved by Count Muravieff before his death, is worthy of preservation as an instance of the cleverness with which Russia evades obligations which are distasteful to her. It is as follows :—

COUNT MURAVIEFF TO THE UNITED STATES' MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG.

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St. Petersburg,
December 18 (30), 1899.*

MR. AMBASSADOR, I had the honour to receive your Excellency's note dated the 8th (20th) September last, relating to the principles which the Government of the United States would like to see adopted in commercial matters by the Powers which have interests in China.

In so far as the territory leased by China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of "the open door" by creating Dalny (Talienwan) a free port; and if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a Custom-limit from other portions of the territory in question, the Customs duties would be levied in the zone subject to the tariff upon all foreign merchants without distinction as to nationality.

As to the ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened to foreign commerce by the Chinese Government, and which lie beyond the territory leased to Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself, and the Imperial Government has no intention whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of other foreigners. It is to be understood, however, that this assurance of the Imperial Government is given upon condition that a similar declaration shall be made by other Powers having interests in China.

With the conviction that this reply is such as to satisfy the inquiry made in the aforementioned note, the Imperial Government is happy to have complied with the wishes of the American Government especially because it attaches the highest value to anything that may strengthen and consolidate the traditional relations of friendship existing between the two countries.

I beg you, &c.

(Signed) Count MURAVIEFF.

ministers, who accepted the reply as being in agreement with the others, and sent copies of it to the Powers, with the announcement that, as all had agreed to maintain the "open door," that policy was regarded as being in operation. The British authorities were also misled by the Russian reply; and in an acknowledgment to the United States announced Lord Salisbury's gratification of the result attained, and formulated their acceptance of the principle "thus unanimously agreed to."

The interests of America in the Far East were till recently purely commercial. The annexation of the Philippines in 1898 gave the United States an increased voice in the councils of the Pacific; and when these islands are finally subdued and brought under a civilised and enlightened rule, her influence must prove very great in the politics of further Asia. Like ourselves, America has contented herself with the development of her trade among the Chinese and Japanese, and we have already seen that it was entirely due to her insistent energy that Japan was opened to external trade, and Korea abandoned that reserve which had kept her frontiers closed to the exploiting foreigner for centuries. The policies of Britain and America are identical in regard to China, Japan and Korea. The maintenance and development of trade, and the encouragement of friendly relations, are the only objects aimed at, and neither seeks to gain political or strategic ends in those regions.

It is in the conflicting tendencies of the policies thus summarised that we must seek the solution of the Far Eastern problem, which, owing to a variety of causes, is no longer dependent on the efforts of any one Power, but rests on the combined influence of future combinations. A union of aim between Great Britain and America would go far to end the rivalries which threaten to partition the continent of Asia; and the admission of Japan to such a combination would ensure the stoppage of that Russian descent on China which is so largely responsible for the incidence of the present trouble. With England and America disunited, neither is

likely to be able to stay the progress of events ; and the division of the Asiatic mainland between the Powers will follow beyond recall. The future of the Far East rests with the Anglo-Saxon race. The time for action has arrived, and the fate of empire cannot rest much longer undecided.

CHAPTER VII

OCCIDENT AND ORIENT

The workings of the Oriental mind—Its contrast to the European—Chinese and Japanese—Variations in aim and character—Progression and retrogression—China's weakness—Japan's strength—The future of Japan—A Vishnu or a Frankenstein—Her conceit—Her self-restraint—National honesty—Abolition of extra-territoriality—The government of China—Its lack of cohesion—Corruptness of the officials—Attitude towards foreigners—Prejudice against progress—Intercourse with Korea—The future of that country—Rival aims of Western Powers—The constitution of Japan—The growth of Liberalism—Japan's influence in the Far East—Her prospects and future—Hopelessness of a mutual understanding—The struggle to the strong—The ambition of Japan—its attainment.

THE crux of the whole question affecting the Powers of Western nations in the Far East lies in the appreciation of the true inwardness of the oriental mind. It is scarcely sufficiently realised that, great as is the difference in the physical characteristics of Europeans and Asiatics, the contrast in their mental attributes is greater still. An oriental not only sees things from a different standpoint to the occidental, but his whole train of thought and mode of reasoning are at variance; and the impression made on his intelligence by a given incident is frequently in direct contrast to that which would be caused by the same occurrence on the mind of a European. The very sense of perception implanted in the Asiatic, varies from that with which we are endowed; and it is only by a recognition of this principle, and a study of its outcome on the workings of the mind, that we become equipped to rightly appreciate the logic of his standpoint.

There is no more striking phenomenon connected with the Far East than that afforded by the contrast in the character and aims of the peoples of China and Japan. Nearly allied in origin, possessing a code of civilisation dating from the most remote antiquity, rejoicing in a system of moral philosophy alike admirable and effective, these neighbouring nations have of late years adopted ideals totally opposite; and while Japan has set herself to adopt the ideas of the West with such avidity as will shortly enable her to become a rival to her teachers, China remains as closely wedded as of yore to that system of exclusiveness which enabled her to remain apart from other nations until a brief three hundred years ago. After proving immune to the attempted inoculation of Western civilisation for many years, Japan swallowed the dose, under pressure and with a wry face, but at once became infected with the craving for new ideas which has resulted in the reconstitution of her empire. Yet to-day, while Japan boasts her armaments, her educational institutions, and a system of enlightened government which would do credit to more than one European nation, China is plunged once more in the throes of a life and death struggle, having for its object the expulsion of the hated foreigner from her shores.

This contrast is the more important in regard to its influence on the interests of other nations. In the case of China, the European Powers have to deal with an inert mass, whose whole aim is to remain quiescent; and, in furtherance of this policy, to oppose any action of whatsoever kind which may be taken in regard to herself. In Japan they have to reckon with a very palpable force which supplies a most important factor in any policy on which it may be desired to embark, and, while turning from one to the other in wonder at the contradiction shown, the attention is caught by Korea, midway between the two, inert like China, but without the energy to enforce her inertness, and listlessly awaiting absorption at the hands of one or other of her neighbours.

The awakening of Japan is, in fact, quite as remarkable

as is the somnolence of China, and each follows her adopted policy as the outcome of a national impulse. Japan has always been a heroic, China a tranquil nation. Tempted in its early history to invade the territory of its neighbours, Japan sought distinction in the arts of war; and the ambition thus developed, grew, until it gave rise to a sense of national pride, and ambition to excel among her rivals. China, on the other hand, has never been able to hold her own against a worthy foe. Often overrun by conquering hordes, the national character came to accept the inevitable, and replaced its lack of valour by an insensate arrogance and conceit, which, while invariably discomfited when tested, served to gratify the Chinese meanwhile. The national tendency of the Japanese was, therefore, to inculcate the use of arms, and to practise the arts of self-defence. A national pride became developed, and this in turn gave rise to a national ambition. It only needed the realisation of the superiority of the Western idea for that idea to be adopted as the aim to follow; and the thoroughness with which its pursuit has been taken up is testified by the position which Japan has since attained among the Powers.

The failure of the Chinese to hold their own in the cataclysms which have swept the Asiatic continent, combined with the political apathy induced by the teachings of Confucius, tended to divert the Chinese idea in the direction of self-interest. The national pride, which in other nations finds an outlet in the exhibition of a patriotic feeling, became replaced by an indulgence in an air of assumed superiority over other nations, and, supported by the arrogance of his idea, the celestial became at liberty to devote his efforts to his own ends. Thus it came about that corruptness, venality, and nepotism became general, and the national morality, in regard to the government, sunk to a low ebb. The hatred of foreign nations, bred in the fear of an inability to contend against them, found its vent in the growth of intolerance; and the earliest attempt made to import a sense of honesty into

the methods of their rulers, was hailed by the Chinese as an effort to sap the foundations of their empire, and served as an excuse for repeated efforts to free themselves from the incubus of Western influence. There can be no two opinions as to the part played by the corrupt classes in the development of the anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese. Every attempt to remodel the governmental methods, which served to restrain the rapacity of the mandarins, has been followed by risings, doubtless inspired or at least encouraged by the officials, against the "foreign devils"; and the influence of this cause in the present rising in China will have been noted by the reader of the foregoing pages.

Apart from these marked contrasts in the *morale* of the two nations, there are other causes at work which tend to divert their aims. Japan, since the consolidation of the government in the hands of the Mikado, has become a united country, in which the national interest is plainly indicated. A small country, densely populated, passing through rapid stages of development, Japan seeks increased opportunities for the extension of her area and the consolidation of her empire. Farsighted enough to look ahead, and realising the dangers by which she is surrounded, she appreciates the acuteness of her position. For she is threatened along her entire coast line by the restless activity of her land-grabbing neighbour, who, it is an open secret, seeks only an excuse in order to finally pen Japan back within the narrow limits of her island kingdom.

China, on the other hand, is deficient in those elements which go to build up an united empire. A kingdom only in name, she resembles rather a *congerie* of States which pay tribute to a common head. Each of the eighteen provinces, and in a greater degree the outlying provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, Jungaria, Turkistan, and Tibet, is in a sense a disunited kingdom, kept within the sway of the ruler at Peking by the necessity of obtaining protection in the time of need. The interchangeable armies of China are the only possession owned by the provinces

in common, and the lack of interdependence between these prevents the possibility of the development of any community of thought, or public opinion, beyond such as may be dictated or stirred up by the governing classes. Thus a general rising in China is only possible by the collusion of the provincial mandarins at the instigation of the Peking authorities, and any rousing of a genuine expression of public opinion impossible. The policy of China is such as may be dictated by the government for the time being; and this is not unnaturally dictated by the needs of self-interest and self-preservation, as they occur to the officials. Thus, while an impending national danger does not evoke any popular action, owing to the ignorance in which the masses are maintained, and the slowness with which news travels in the interior; the threatening of the cherished privileges of the mandarins, or the interference with the rights of the throne, find an immediate response in the provincial risings of the rabble, encouraged by a hint from headquarters.

The policy of China is to oppose reform, to retain the old-world enactments which afford the mandarins their opportunities for corruption, dishonesty and speculation, and to hinder the growth of foreign influence, with a view to render the maintenance of these principles the easier.

The respective tendencies of the two countries in regard to foreign relations is thus exactly opposite. China is naturally opposed to any new departure which may be mooted by the Powers. Japan, all things being equal, is ready to support any reforms which are not likely to prejudice her development. The tendency of the former in regard to international developments is passively negative. That of the latter actively progressive. And yet there are many factors in the policy of Japan which, while their true bearing is still an unknown quantity, afford material for cogitation. The oriental mind is so different in its ratiocination from the European, that it is no easy matter for a Westerner to fathom its workings. The ulterior aim of Japan remains unknown outside the country; and its revelation must be awaited by the

Powers interested with some anxiety. The means which have been so systematically adopted and enlarged on by the people of Nippon are clear as day. They tend towards the education and enlightenment of the race, the development of the country's resources, and the attainment of a place among the Powers of the world. But what use does Japan propose to make of her opportunities when they are finally attained? What is her ambition—her ultimate aim?

The riddle is so far unsolved, and its solution is fraught with the vastest possibilities.

As an oriental Power, Japan must not be gauged from the standpoint of Western ideas. Her Asiatic origin and development carry with them a capacity rarely present in a European intelligence, and may render it possible for her to utilise the aid of her supporters for the bringing about of their own discomfiture. What is the hope of Japan? Will she rest content with the development of her present resources? Will she abide by the limitations of her sea-girt empire; or is she destined to break her bounds and seek extended area on the neighbouring mainland of Asia, whereon to repeat that process of evolution which she has so recently passed through? Is the recent rise of Japan the symptom of the growth of a new empire in the East, which is destined to check the force of the controlling influences of to-day, and, triumphing over these, inflict her sway in their place, upon the millions of Eastern Asia? And, if that be her ambition, where is she to stop?

In the one aspect, the accession to power of the new Japan may prove a valuable adjunct to the civilisation of the Far East. In the other, it may result in the raising of a modern Frankenstein, which, rendered possible by the sympathetic toleration of the Powers, will smite and hurl destruction on their heads. Which is her destiny?

In the summarising of her attainments, Japan receives a helping hand among her new-found friends. During the past five years her achievements have been proclaimed amid a chorus of extravagant approval in England and

America, sufficient to turn the head of any ordinary youthful Power. Japan has listened attentively and believed all she heard; yet, remarkable though it appears, she does not seem to have lost her head under the process. It is really remarkable what self-restraint she is capable of. The feat she performed in 1895 of climbing down from the height of her achievements in China, and renouncing the crowning glory of her arms at the command of Russia, was gone through with a dignity and composure of which few countries would be capable under similar circumstances, and the placidity with which she has regarded the recent aggressions of Russia in Korea is similarly worthy of admiration. Japan has shown herself to be thoroughly sane and undemonstrative in her political action; but it would be an error to assume that the importance of recent events in Korea has escaped her: she is only awaiting the arrival of the psychological moment to intervene.

There are, on the other hand, weak spots in the Japanese armour which it is impossible to conceal. Her people are neither creative nor progressive of themselves. The highest tribute which can be paid to their reforming instincts is to term them imitative. The Japanese are in short a nation of copyists, which, so far as modern history goes to show, is incapable of creating anything. Even the art of Japan, beautiful though it is esteemed to be, is derived from China and Korea; and the imitative instincts of the people are so crude as to render them incapable of adapting the advantages of foreign ideas to the peculiar requirements of their country and climate. In this connection one constantly comes across things in Japan which, admirable in themselves, are quite out of place among their surroundings; yet, by the lack of that adaptability which is so marked a trait among ourselves, the Japanese fail to effect the minor alterations which would occur to any Englishman as necessary to render the innovation acceptable.

In this respect the Chinese are superior to the Japanese. The celestial is a creative race, which limits its constructive

power by a strict conservatism which restricts its indulgence. A Chinaman is, however, always ready to rise to the occasion, and will invent, design and construct what is required to meet any imaginable necessity in a very short space of time. To ask a Japanese artisan to vary the design of his workmanship by an innovation, is to cause him to spoil his work. And, lastly, there is one other contrast between the denizens of the opposite sides of Korea. I refer to the question of probity.

In his negotiations with a European, the Chinaman is as hard a bargainer as the world produces. But once a bargain has been struck, it matters not whether it be left in the form of a mere verbal understanding, or if it be engrossed in all the dignity of parchment; that bargain will be kept, and carried out to the letter. The case of a Chinese breaking faith in the matter of a compact is of extremely rare occurrence, and the honesty of the traders in money matters is proverbial.

Without desiring to cast a reproach upon an entire nation, it must be said that the Japanese do not compare favourably with the Chinese in this respect. Cases of alleged breach of faith among Japanese traders have been, and are still, of frequent occurrence, and the failure to carry out the terms of a contract has frequently occupied the attention of the consular courts at the treaty ports. There is no denying that the Japanese is a cute business man, and thoroughly competent to protect his interests; but the effect of the abandonment of the principle of extra-territoriality in Japan, under the treaty of 1894, on the maintenance of the validity of contracts between Europeans and Japanese, is being watched with some uneasiness in commercial circles.

The governmental systems of China, Japan and Korea present almost as great a contrast as do those of the two former when compared with that of Great Britain or of France. The Chinese empire is to-day controlled by the same machinery as was the case three thousand years ago. Its method is despotic, its enactment paternal. The actuating principle is that of the family; and the emperor,

whose relation to his people is in a sense comparable to that of the Tsar, while spoken of as the "Son of Heaven" is regarded as the father of his people. The emperor is the source of all authority, the fountain of all honour, and the arbiter of the nation's destiny—in name. By a system of decentralisation unrivalled in the world, the responsibilities of government are so widespread as to place the custody of the country in the hands of a number of petty autocrats, each charged with the government of a single province or district, in which he is to all intents and purposes supreme. These posts, nominally awarded as the result of examinations in the Chinese classics, are really conferred either in the spirit of favouritism, or in return for large bribes paid by the successful candidates. The blackmailing of officials does not, however, end with their appointment. The viceroys and governors throughout the empire are understood to continue to feather the nests of their powerful patrons during the whole of their tenure of office; and there is good reason to believe that the failure to remit an annual "present" or subsidy to the high mandarin by whose influence office was obtained, has frequently resulted in the sudden recall and deposition of the offender. This vicious system holds good throughout Chinese officialdom. The stipends authorised for the emolument of the official classes are totally insufficient for their needs, and every mandarin seeks to enrich himself by making the most of his opportunities. Bribes are taken openly, alike from applicants for posts, litigants, and seekers after favour; and a portion of the sums thus obtained are nearly always sent to the immediate superior of each corrupt official. It follows that while the finances of the country are thus tampered with, the observance of the country's laws and the administration of justice become a dead letter. An understanding with the mandarin concerned will justify the breach of any law, while a reasonable payment will secure a favourable verdict in most cases.

The administration of China is nominally entrusted to six Boards which regulate the affairs of the country.

These are the Civil Council, the Board of Revenue, of Rights, of War, of Punishments, and of Works. The execution of the behests of these is entrusted to the viceroys in the various provinces, and the Peking authorities have no executive power whatever. In 1861 the councils named were strengthened by the addition of another Board, known as the Tsungli Yamen, the equivalent of our own Foreign Office, charged with the conduct of negotiations with the representatives of foreign Powers whose presence at Peking was authorised by the treaty of Tientsin. Ever since its establishment, the Yamen has exhibited a rare capacity for the evasion of its duties. The efforts of its members have been unceasingly devoted to the opposing of all suggested extension of foreign intercourse, and the prevention of the introduction of any measure of reform in China.

The revenue of China is derived from various taxes and imposts, which are levied throughout the country. They are the land tax, salt duty, opium duty, native customs, "likin," or transit dues on merchandise passing from one district to another, and the maritime customs. The last named is the only impost which is systematically collected or honestly administered, that being due to the fact that the collection of import duties at the ports has, since 1854, been entrusted to Europeans, and the supervision of this important tax has rested in the hands of Sir Robert Hart since 1861. The customs tax is equal to a duty of 5 per cent. on all imports, and the proceeds of this impost amount to a very considerable annual sum.

The attitude of the Chinese towards foreigners has for many years past been one of impatient toleration. While the natives in the vicinity of the treaty ports have come to realise the advantages of foreign intercourse, and the possibilities of exterior trade, the mass of the people remain utterly ignorant of the attributes of Europeans, and are apt to show their contempt for the people they have been taught to regard as "barbarians" by acts of personal indignity. In this attitude the people have been largely encouraged by the example of the mandarins, who resent

the growth of foreign influence, and dread its outcome on their methods of administration. Thus there is in China a considerable population intensely antagonistic to foreigners, and any friction between Westerns and the Peking authorities is certain to be followed by anti-foreign demonstrations in the interior.

The Chinaman's capacity for absorbing new ideas is limited. Even those who have been educated in Europe cling to their early beliefs, and instances of a Chinaman adopting the Western mode of living on his return to China are practically non-existent.

The government of Korea is framed on the Chinese model; but the personal influence of the emperor is more marked, and the power of the minor officials more circumscribed. The emperor ranks, since 1895, as an independent sovereign, and he exercises his rule with the aid of a cabinet of ministers, whom he removes at will. The greatest contrast between Korea and China is to be found in the classification of the people. In Korea there is no middle class, the population consisting of the nobles or official ranks, and the masses, the latter being mostly indolent, squalid, and extremely poor. Less corrupt than the Chinese, the Koreans take a greater interest in the affairs of state. Intrigue is common, and palace conspiracies frequent. The unclosing of this erstwhile sequestered country served to encourage the demand for reform among a certain section of the nobles; but there has during the past few years arisen a marked reactionary feeling, which threatens to check the continuation of the small measure of progress attained. The great problem respecting Korea is tied up in its future, which from time immemorial has been subject to the influence of her neighbours. The probability of so small a country developing its resources, and attaining a position of strength as an independent kingdom, is but slight; and it can scarcely be doubted that the fate of Korea is to be, sooner or later, absorbed by another and a stronger Power. The decrepitude of China removes that country from the prospect she once enjoyed of enveloping Chosen, and the

problem to-day remains to be solved between Russia and Japan.

The value of Korea from an European standpoint is political rather than commercial. The limited area of the country and the habits of the people are neither favourable to trade development ; but, owing to her geographical situation, and the numerous fine harbours along her coast, Korea would prove a valuable acquisition to an aggressive Power such as Russia, or one with a desire for colonial expansion like Japan. The coming struggle for Korea is one of the most important of those questions which abound in the Far East. It involves not only the fate of Korea, but the future of Japan, and the reconstitution of the balance of power on the Pacific. And its solution is not unlikely to be accompanied by a war, which will revolutionise the political foundations of Asiatic empire.

There are three possible courses in view. Korea may be propped up by the efforts of the Powers, and constituted into a kingdom the independence of which is guaranteed in the same way as the Balkan States ; it may be annexed by Russia ; or it may be absorbed by Japan. Each of these possibilities opens out a vast field for speculation. The attainment of the first would be vigorously opposed by Russia, whose designs would thereby be frustrated ; and the Koreans, lacking the necessary qualities to ensure a continuity of good government, would have to be placed under some form of advisory control, the arrangement of which would be certain to cause friction amongst the Powers. Assuming that this difficulty was surmounted, Russia would leave no stone unturned which might serve to divert events in the direction of her interests ; and by dint of stirring up rebellion, and encouraging internal disputes, she would most probably succeed in bringing about a situation which, despite all precautions, would provide her with an excuse for interfering in the affairs of the country. The annexation of Korea by Russia would result in the closing of the harbours, the loss of the country to trade, and the strengthening of Russian power in the Far East. Once in possession of the peninsula, the power of

the Tsar would absolutely dominate alike the Gulf of Pechili and the Sea of Japan. The naval bases and military strongholds which would speedily arise along the coastline of Chosen would enable Russia to dictate her pleasure to her neighbours ; and, by her advanced position southwards, she would have it in her power to materially imperil British interests in the Pacific. The bringing of Korea under the rule of Japan would doubtless be to the advantage of the Koreans, and would also tend to further the desires of the great commercial Powers ; but it is very questionable whether Russia would for one moment tolerate such an arrangement, unless after suffering a defeat in arms, and being reduced to a condition of temporary impotence.

The whole question is one which is approaching solution. The aims of Russia have never been in more skilful hands, nor has her activity been greater than at the present moment. The presence of M. Pavloff at Seoul affords the clearest evidence that a great *coup* is being prepared, and the measures taken by Russia when she acts, are such as to leave no possibility of making her retreat, when once she has advanced, short of a bloody and a costly war. The policy of Great Britain has always been to go to war only when great issues are at stake. She does not realise the equal gravity of steps by which the attaining of great issues is alone possible, and it is unlikely in the extreme that she would take any action towards restraining Russia, unless she were to swoop down on Korea and proclaim the annexation of that country as a *tour de force*. Russia does not attain her ends by such clumsy means. She never bolts her food ; but nibbles, and picks at it all round, until the crumbs fall into her maw, and leave so little of the original substance that no one thinks it worth while to protest against its final seizure.

If England deems it to her interest to preserve the independence of Korea, the time to act is now. An agreement might still be arrived at among, at least, a majority of the Powers, which would prove effectual in maintaining the viability of the peninsula, and assuming that such a

course was followed by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, without any of the other Powers, Russia would have to submit to the influence of *force majeure*.

Failing some such arrangement, there can be no question of Japan's intention to resist the Russification of Korea at all costs. Apart from her own ambitions in that direction, the need of Japan for an extension of territory for the accommodation of her surplus population is already manifest. She would not suffer Russia to obtain possession of a territory which would place that Power in immediate contiguity with her own coastline, and entail a constant menace to her shores. The occupation of Fusan, Unkofsky harbour, Wonsan, or any of the inlets in Broughton bay, by Russia, would infallibly be replied to by an appeal to arms on the part of Japan ; and on the result of the naval war which would ensue, would depend the future of the Far Eastern question.

In regard to this matter, Japan realises the difficulty of her position. The treatment accorded her by the Powers after the conclusion of the war of 1895 was not wasted on her perception. She realises that it is futile to defeat an opponent unless the conqueror is possessed of sufficient strength to ensure retaining the spoils of its conquest. In 1895 Japan did not possess the necessary strength, and in consequence had to forgo the reward of her prowess. She is resolved that she will not risk a repetition of the same experience. For this reason Japan has lain low, and exhibited a tolerance of Russian activity truly remarkable. But she has not been idle ; and when the time arrives will enter on her chosen task with a vigour, a thoroughness, and a strength, which will astonish the Powers of the world. Japan will never court defeat, and she will gird herself to grasp and hold whatever reward she gains as the fruits of the victory which must be hers.

Elsewhere I discuss the prospects of Russia and Japan in the struggle which is pending between them. It is only necessary here to deal with the circumstances which are likely to bring matters to a climax.

There are a variety of these. Given two neighbouring

nations with interests opposed to one another, it requires no great stretch of imagination to divine circumstances which may serve to precipitate an appeal to arms. And when these nations are both provided with defensive and offensive possibilities sufficient to enable them to contend with a relatively equal chance of victory, the situation becomes the more acute.

The policies of Russia and of Japan, while identical in regard to their aims, are precisely opposite in the methods followed. Russia desires to possess herself of Korea, and seeks to obtain it by the repetition of that almost imperceptible progressive movement, which has enabled her to attain so much elsewhere without an appeal to arms. Japan hopes some day to obtain Korea, but realises that the time is not yet. She is, however, fixed in her intention to oppose any Russian attempt to forestall her, by war if necessary. Thus we see the one eager to obtain her end without fighting for it, while the other exhibits a determination to fight in order to prevent her rival attaining her object. The immediate causes for war are therefore to be looked for from Russia. Any further activity on the part of that country in Korea might, and very probably would, be taken by Japan as a challenge, which would at once be responded to by the despatch of troops to repel the Russians from the peninsula. Again, a protest on the part of Korea against the continuation of Russian influence in her internal affairs, and this has greatly increased of late, would be tolerably certain to bring Japan to the rescue ; and lastly there is the likelihood of the situation in China becoming so absorbing to the interests of Russia, that Japan may think it judicious to utilise the opportunity to deal with the Korean question, and take steps to terminate the constant threat involved by the continued activity of Russia along the coasts of that country. There can be no middle course in the fate of Korea. To guarantee the independence of that country would be to afford a constant opportunity for renewed Russian "pin pricks" at the Japanese ; and no guarantee, however strongly supported, can be depended on to attain its end for

any length of time, when one of the most powerful of the countries concerned, which happens also to be the nearest on the spot, chooses to disregard the understanding arrived at.

The only possibility of restraining Russia from a continued interference in Korea would be by prohibiting her from sending vessels other than traders to the Korean ports ; but, apart from the undoubted refusal with which Russia would meet such a proposal, it would be impossible for the other Powers to enforce such a scheme, even if she were to go through the formality of accepting it, owing to the greater propinquity of Russia to Korea, and the forces at her disposal.

The solution of the problem rests with Japan, whose task it is to check Russia in Korea. The only possibility of attaining this end is by the display of a power superior to that wielded by Russia ; and the capacity of Japan to exhibit this constitutes the question which only time can solve.

There remains to be considered the ulterior policy of Japan, which must to a certain extent depend in its achievements on the attitude assumed by the governments of Great Britain and the United States. I have already explained how the power of the island empire rests rather on the possibility of her retaining enjoyment of the spoils she may gain by war, than on her ability to wage it ; and in this regard the policy of the Anglo-Saxon countries must have an important bearing.

The question to be solved by England and America is the relative amount of dependence that may safely be placed on Japanese pledges. Experience, so far as it has gone, tends to show that in her own interests Japan is quite as selfish as Russia has always been ; and one or more of the traits she has shown in her relations with Western nations have caused her to be regarded with suspicion. She has earned for herself a reputation for driving hard bargains, and has shown a marked disposition to kick over those stools which she has used for raising herself from her previous level. The policy of getting rid

of those foreigners she had retained, in order that she might benefit by their instruction, which is the manifestation of the present policy of "Japan for the Japanese," has not tended to strengthen the feelings of amity which undoubtedly exist between her and the Powers of Europe and America ; and the very marked ability she displayed in her conduct of the war in 1894-5 served to make her neighbours ponder as to where that sort of thing might end. While ready to lend a helping hand for the development of Japan, the Powers had no intention of contributing to the building up of a military and naval power rival to themselves ; and the question as to the limitations of Japanese ambition became raised somewhat anxiously. And above all it was realised that the Japanese are orientals, and as such capable of all that duplicity and far-sighted persistence which renders such people intractable opponents.

Thus it comes about that the new Japan has never been accepted with that enthusiasm which was accorded the reorganisation of the Balkan States ; and the Powers, while recognising the undoubted progress going on, have come to wonder how future developments are likely to affect European interests. The question of future possibilities indeed opens up a vista of prospects staggering in their immensity. Supposing that Japan succeeded in inoculating China with her progressive spirit, what in such a contingency would be the situation ? With a united population comprising nearly one-third of the people of the entire world united in their competition with Western civilisation, and the aim of conquest sown among them, come the seeds of an Armageddon terrible to contemplate, and sufficient to justify well nigh any counter action possible to human ingenuity. But the trend of recent events does not lie in this direction ; and the perils of the yellow danger need not occupy the serious attention of the present generation.


CHAPTER VIII


THE SITUATION

Factors in the balance of power—Influence of force—Superiority of Great Britain—Her resources—Her neglect of opportunities—Status of Japan and Russia—Relative strength of the Powers in the Far East—Preponderance of British interests—Hong Kong—Its defences—Wei Hai Wei—Kiao Chau—Vladivostok—Port Arthur—China's weakness—Her navy—Her army—The Korean army—Japan—Her armaments—Her navy—Her arsenals—Her army—Rival aims in the Far East—The policy of Japan—The limits of Russian action—Conflict in method—England's gullibility—Muscovite insistence—Its success—Responsibility for crisis in China—How to check Russia—The partition of China—Difficulty of agreement—Chances of the struggle—British action—The rôle of Japan—The alliance of France—The crisis bound to come—The only hope for China.

THE political situation in the Far East is comprised in the relations between the two sets of Powers: the one moribund, lacking in energy, and conservative; and the other able, active, and ambitious. The balance between these is further complicated by the circumstance that the dominant factors, consisting of the capable and aggressive forces, are divided among themselves as to their aims and methods; and any arrangement as to a united course of action is impossible.

The controlling principle in this, as in all other political questions, is that of force. But, here again, the situation is ill defined, inasmuch as the capacity for self-assertion is so evenly distributed as to render the result of an appeal to arms an open question. Any attempt to gauge the relative strength of the Powers in the Far East must be guided as much by the consideration of





opportunity as by that of force. For purposes of active interference in Eastern Asia, the advantage remains not with the nation which is the strongest, but with that which has the greatest available strength on the spot, and although the subsequent arrival of an army, or a fleet, may considerably modify the *status quo*, the gain derivable from early, immediate, and prompt action must remain evident.

Any comparisons between the European Powers possessing interests in the Far East must result in the recognition of the ultimate superiority of Great Britain alike in strength and resources. No probable combination of the navies of the world would be superior to that of this country; and the wealth possessed by us is so inexhaustible as to ensure our being able to hold out long after the time when any other Power's resources would be exhausted. But a review of the handling of our power in the Far East during recent years leads to the conclusion that we have by no means made the best use either of our influence or our opportunities; and alike by the exhibition of a weakness in policy, and a lack of determination in action, we have allowed that influence which should be ours by right to revert to other hands. It is only necessary to glance at our spheres of influence in the Far East, and contrast them with those of other Powers, to arrive at an appreciation of this fact. Our defences are deficient, often antiquated, and in some cases entirely lacking; while every Russian, French and German station bristles with powerful guns, sheltered behind earthworks of the most modern kind. The reply given to these strictures is generally an appeal to the strength of the British fleet, which, it is urged, would deal with any enemy before she approaches our territory; but in order to do this it is necessary to have a superior fleet on the spot to that maintained by any other Power; and it is open to question whether we have this. A strong squadron in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean would avail us little in the event of an attack on Hong Kong; and the loss of time involved in sum-

moning reinforcements to our aid would probably prove a very powerful factor in the result of hostilities.

For effective purposes Japan is probably the greatest Power in the Far East. Not only has she a very powerful and modern navy, but, being on the spot, her resources are all at hand, and in the event of war she would not have to maintain a line of communications extending over thousands of miles. In a less degree Russia may be said to be in the same case. With the facilities afforded by the naval harbours of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, she possesses a main base on the Pacific which would materially help her cause in any struggle in that ocean ; and when her system of railways are completed, say in five years' time, her strength will be very much greater than it is now. Great Britain has always grudged the outlay necessary to thoroughly equip her for contingencies ; and at the present moment she does not possess a dock in the Far East capable of receiving her largest vessels. The shortsightedness of this parsimony will be made evident when she finds herself at war in the Pacific, and hard things will be said by patriotic Englishmen who are too busy over other matters to attend to details of preparation now.

While England's power in the Far East is thus kept at a strength insufficient for the adequate protection of her interests, Russia maintains an active force in Eastern waters out of all proportion to the area she has to guard. As already stated, the total Russian trade with China is a negligible quantity. Excepting at Hankow, where a small colony is endeavouring to develop a trade with Moscow and Siberia, Russian interests lie exclusively to the north of Shantung. The whole of the coast line from the estuary of the Amur to Port Arthur, including the Korean seaboard, is under 1,800 miles, and her bases of Vladivostok and Port Arthur are both attainable by land. Great Britain possesses interests in every open port from Newchang to Pakhoi, along a coast line of more than 3,000 miles, besides having to protect her commerce at inland markets, involving the patrolling of some 1,500 miles of

river navigation. In addition to this, her prime base in the West Pacific consists of an island which has to be protected, and her large trade with Japan also needs supervision, whereas Russian commerce with that country is infinitesimal. Yet is the effective strength of Russia on the Pacific greater than our own, a circumstance which one day may cost us dear.

The relative strength and interests of the principal Powers in the Far East are approximately as follows:—

| | Great Britain. | Russia. | Japan. | United States. |
|-----------------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Annual trade ¹ | £59,000,000 | £5,500,000 | £10,000,000 | £17,000,000 |
| Territory owned | 529 sq. m. | 339,127 sq. m. | 13,541 sq. m. | Nil. |
| Population | 8,000 | 100 ² | ³ 18,000 | 3,000 |
| Troops maintained | 3,000 | 30,000 | 145,000 | Nil. |
| Naval strength ⁴ | 21 | 10 | 22 | Nil. |

From this it will be seen that British trade preponderates over that of other countries to an even greater extent than does the territory owned sink below that of her rivals. She stands in a very curious position, from whatever standpoint she may be regarded. With infinitely greater interests to protect, she owns less land, maintains a smaller force, and yet sends a greater number of her people to the Far East than the other Powers; and the explanation of this phenomenon must be sought in the variation of policy between her and her rivals, rather than in any sense of weakness or lack of power. It is beyond dispute that, were Britain so minded, she could maintain a force equal to the largest in Eastern Asia. Having had greater opportunities than other nations, she could have taken to herself as much or more territory than France or Russia; but her aim has never been directed either to territorial or political aggrandisement. The desires of England in the Far East have from the earliest period of her intercourse been purely commercial; and by the pursuit of an

¹ The figures given in this line include the imports and exports with China, Japan, and Korea.

² This number does not include the official engineers and others employed on the Manchurian railway.

³ Of this number 16,000 are in Korea.


⁴ Battleships and cruisers.

honest policy she succeeded in building up a reputation for restraint and just dealing, such as has only been rivalled by the United States.

The acquisition of Hong Kong and Wei Hai Wei were forced upon her by untoward circumstances. With the growth of other influences in the China seas, England dared not leave her manifold interests unprotected ; but the uses she has made of these bases has been such as will compare favourably with the courses followed by her rivals in similar instances.

In face of the importance of the posts occupied by the Powers in the Far East, which in any future war must become the centres of the world's interest, I propose to briefly describe the characteristics of each.

Hong Kong, the chief naval station of Britain in the Pacific, is a rocky island properly belonging to the Ladrões, and situated on the north side of the estuary of the Canton river. It is nine miles long, and from two to six miles wide. Its total area is twenty-nine square miles. The greater portion of the interior is mountainous. The residential settlement, known as the city of Victoria, lies on the north side of the island, facing the Chinese mainland, which is a mile away. The harbour is one of the finest and safest in the world, and is closed in by the promontories of Kwangtung and adjacent islands. The rapid development of the colony of Hong Kong and the growth of British interests in China served early in the history of the island to make it desirable to obtain an extension of territory on the mainland across the strait, and in 1861 a portion of the promontory of Kowloon, some three miles in extent, was ceded to England by the treaty of Tientsin for that purpose. The newly acquired area was utilised for the construction of dockyards, docks, and barracks, and forms a part of the colony under the jurisdiction of a governor. Owing to the formation of the mainland opposite the island, the strategic position of Hong Kong was regarded as unsafe by military men who were charged with the safeguarding of the harbour. It was pointed out that the height of the mountains behind Kowloon rendered



it possible for an enemy attaining the position, to bombard the harbour and destroy the shipping. In order to meet this objection, an agreement was arrived at between Great Britain and China in June, 1898, under which the whole of the peninsula behind Kowloon became leased to this country as far as the heights which stretch from Deep Bay to Mirs Bay in the direction of Canton. This extension, which covers close on 400 square miles, was taken over by the British on the 18th April, 1899.¹

Hong Kong, which is frequently referred to as the Gibraltar of the Far East, is the chief naval port in Chinese waters. Its harbour, which covers ten square miles, affords a safe anchorage for vessels of any size at any time of the year, and the facilities it affords for commerce are practically unrivalled. The population of Hong Kong is 262,000 of whom about 10,000 are Europeans.

The defences of Hong Kong, which was at one time considered impregnable, have latterly been neglected, and are at present in an unsatisfactory condition. The forts on the north side of the island are for the most part armed with muzzle-loading guns, while those on Stonecutter's Island opposite Victoria have been removed. The south coast is entirely without protection, and in the event of a surprise attack, might be shelled by an enemy without being able to reply. Public attention has, however, been recently drawn to this state of things, and it is probable that it will be shortly remedied. The dockyard accommodation of Hong Kong is on the mainland, and is considerable. The largest dock will berth a vessel 560 feet in length.


As a commercial port Hong Kong stands alone. Its annual trade is approximately £50,000,000, and it is believed to be increasing. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that Victoria is a free port, where the ships of any nation can land a ship's goods without duty, and the facility thus obtained serves to attract the merchant vessels of all countries.


¹ See Appendix B.

Wei Hai Wei, Britain's second base in the Far East, has been so recently acquired that it is as yet impossible to forecast its probable future.¹ Consisting of a strip of territory ten miles wide, round a bay formed by two capes which jut out into the gulf of Pechili, the station is as yet undeveloped; and the constructive works hitherto undertaken have been restricted to the requirements necessary for the establishment of a naval and military base. The harbour, which measures two and a half miles between the protecting promontories, is guarded by the island of Liukung, which affords shelter to vessels lying between it and the mainland. Wei Hai Wei was formerly a Chinese naval station, and was captured by the Japanese in 1894. It is well protected by forts, which, at the time it was taken over by the British in August, 1898, were in a bad state of repair, but have since been strengthened. Owing to the depth of the water, large ships are able to lie close inshore at Wei Hai Wei; though on account of the harbour being exposed to the north-east winds, the anchorage is often rough, and the landing of merchandise or men difficult. This will be remedied, later on, by the construction of a breakwater between Liukung and the eastern mainland. Wei Hai Wei is eighty miles from Port Arthur, forty from Chifu, and two hundred from the entrance to the Peiho. Its naval and military possibilities are great; and it is already garrisoned by a regiment of Chinese troops raised by this country as an experiment, which promises well.

Kio Chau, occupied by Germany in 1897, is the name of a Chinese city situated near the head of a large lagoon or bay, on the south-eastern coast of the promontory of Shantung. The harbour is a good one, and capable of sheltering a fleet of any size, but it has the drawback of being extremely shallow along the coastline, necessitating vessels of large draught to lie well out, and rendering communication with the shore difficult. The possibilities of the place are, however, very great, and with the construction of a deep-water harbour protected by stone

¹ See Appendix B.





jetties, it might develop into one of the finest naval and commercial ports in North China. Additional value is given to the situation by the proximity of the coal fields of Shantung, which are now in course of development, and afford a supply of very excellent fuel. Kiao Chau is 200 miles from Wei Hai Wei, and 300 from Shanghai.

Vladivostok consists of a natural harbour, situated at the southern extremity of the Primorsk province of Manchuria, and near the northern frontier of Korea. It is known to the Russians as the Eastern Bosphorus, on account of its formation being similar to that in Turkish waters. The town was founded, in 1861, to replace the earlier Russian port of Nikolaievsk, which is closed during a great part of the year by ice. In 1885 the population of the town of Vladivostok was put at 14,000, but it has lately decreased, owing to the development of Port Arthur, and is now about 12,000, excluding the troops. Of this population some 6,000 are Chinese, and about half as many Koreans and Japanese. The Europeans do not greatly exceed 2,000.

Vladivostok is a first-class military station and naval base. Its garrison is normally about 12,000 men, but in 1899 it was increased to 20,000, and more barracks are at present in course of construction. The harbour, which borders the town on the south, is entirely landlocked, except at its western end, and the shelter it affords is perfect. The activities of Vladivostok are entirely military and naval. Its trade is small, amounting to under a million sterling, though this will probably increase when, in a couple of years time, it is brought into direct communication with the rest of Siberia by means of the railway. Vladivostok is already connected with Khabarovka on the Amur river by rail, this being the first section of the trans-Siberian Railway completed; but the change of plan since decided on isolates this line, which is not likely, for many years at least, to be extended.

Vladivostok may be regarded as practically impregnable. The double turn in the navigation channels leading to the

harbour is commanded by eight forts, armed with modern guns, and it is scarcely possible that any invading vessel could force its way along the tortuous entrance passage under their fire. Vladivostok is 400 miles from Hakodate, 600 from Nagasaki, and 1,100 from Port Arthur. Its docks are extensive and modern, comprising, besides the ordinary accommodation for ships of war, a dry dock 625 feet long, and a floating dock capable of receiving a first-class ironclad. The accommodation offered by Vladivostok in this respect is greater than that afforded elsewhere in China, not excepting Hong Kong.

Port Arthur, occupied by Russia in 1897, is at present the most southerly naval station possessed by that Power in Asia. Formerly a Chinese arsenal, constructed under supervision of European engineers, the Russians found the town laid out, and the scheme of defences already planned ; but they set about re-arming the forts and adding to the military strength of the position ; and at the beginning of the present year the state of the armaments and defences was such as to defy any probable attack. The entrance to Port Arthur is exceedingly narrow, in one place less than 200 yards ; and this of course greatly adds to the security of the harbour within, which, like that at Vladivostok, is at right angles to the main channel. The water in the inner port is, however, of insufficient depth to permit of the largest vessels lying there, and the only available berth for ships drawing more than 24 feet is in the outer roadstead, which is exposed to the sea, and where they could be seen by an enemy and attacked. The entrance or exit of a vessel must always be conducted with extreme care, owing to the formation and shallowness of the channel ; and altogether, while a well-sheltered and safe port for vessels of light draught, Port Arthur cannot be compared with Vladivostok, although it possesses the great advantage of being open practically all through the year. One other disadvantage possessed by Port Arthur is its liability to become isolated in time of war. The isthmus by which it is united to the rest of the Liaotung peninsula is exceedingly narrow, in one place only eighteen miles



wide ; and in case of hostilities breaking out, the first aim of the attacking Power would be to seize this neck of land and so sever all communication between Port Arthur and the rear except by sea. Taken as a whole, while the possession of this place adds very materially to Russian resources and influence in the Far East, its advantage must be considered political rather than strategic, and the benefit attained is likely to be found in the continued extension of Russia's hold on China, and the hastening of her descent on Korea, rather than in the superiority of her military and naval position in the gulf of Pechili. Wei Hai Wei, when once the breakwater is completed, will be a far superior naval harbour, and prove in every respect better suited, from a military and strategic point of view, to the requirements of a naval base than is Port Arthur, notwithstanding the strength of that station's position, and the formidable armament and garrison comprised. There is a dry dock at Port Arthur, with a length of 385 feet.

The naval establishments of China are, frankly speaking, unknown quantities. On paper the country's naval strength is considerable ; but in China "statistics" is in most cases a synonym for "fictions," and in no country is the contrast between fiction and reality so great. The only dockyard possessed by China is at Foochow, but docks are in existence at Amoy, Ningpo, Nanking, and Taku. There is no naval base, as we understand the term, in China, nor is there a military post to compare with those at Hong Kong or Port Arthur. The nearest approach to either is that provided by the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho, where there are also dry and wet docks, though these are not governmental undertakings. There are some fifty forts scattered over the eighteen provinces, of various form and date, some of them likely to prove very effective if only garrisoned by trained men. Of the seven arsenals, six are practically useless, the only one likely to achieve anything of value being that at Shanghai. These establishments are conducted on a principle involving the utmost waste alike of men, material, and money. As

the result of his visit in 1898, Lord Charles Beresford wrote :—

“My visit to the arsenals showed me that enormous sums of money are being expended on war material that in most cases is absolutely useless. If all the arsenals but Shanghai were closed as manufactories, and only used as depots, a very large sum of money which is now wasted would be saved. This sum of money would be more than ample to make Shanghai a manufacturing arsenal capable of equipping an army of 200,000 men in an efficient manner.”¹

The Chinese navy to-day comprises the remains of the fleet she possessed at the time of the China Japanese war, together with five modern vessels, which have since been acquired. Of the older ships, seven in all, the most important are the *Nan Yin*, *Nan Shui*, and *Fuching*, of 2,200 tons each, built in 1884, and the *Yang Po* and *Kai Tchi*, cruisers of doubtful value. Besides these there are the *Pao Min* and *Feechen*, of 1,600 tons each, armed with 6-inch and 4.7 guns. There are besides some half-dozen antiquities, which would be of little value in a fight.

The recent additions to China's naval strength comprise two fine cruisers, built at Newcastle-on-Tyne, the *Hai Tien*, and the *Hai Chai*, of 4,300 tons each, with a nominal speed of 24 knots. In addition to these there are three 3,000 ton cruisers, built in Germany, the *Hai Yung*, *Hai Schew*, and *Hai Schen*. All these carry modern guns of the most approved type, and are provided with torpedo tubes. Besides these powerful vessels, China possessed four destroyers, which were as powerful as any afloat, and possessed a speed equal to that of any vessel owned by this country. These formed the Chinese flotilla at the entrance to the Peiho river, and were siezed by the Powers when the Taku forts were bombarded. In competent hands, these vessels would be capable of doing an enormous amount of damage, but it is scarcely likely that they will be restored to China in face of recent events. Altogether China possesses the making of a very effective

¹ *The Break-up of China.*



squadron, but it is very improbable that her officers and men would be able to handle her ships capably in time of need.

The strength of the Chinese army is an unknown quantity. The corruptness of the control, and the indifference of the responsible officials, tend to render military training in China little better than a farce, and the returns of the various armies contain figures entirely misleading. It is quite a common practice for a general to raise only a quarter of the men for whom he draws pay, the deficiency being met on review days by hiring coolies to replace the absent troops. It follows, therefore, that any statistics given must be received with caution.

The reported strength of the regular forces, consisting of eleven provincial armies, is 144,000 men, in addition to which there are said to be 100,000 Manchurian cavalry, 1,500 Kaiping cavalry, and 10,000 of the Peking field force. The last-named is the only army which is armed with modern rifles and guns, and such of the others as have been raised resemble rather a mercenary rabble than a drilled force. The incidents connected with the quelling of the Taeping rebellion serve to show that the Chinaman is capable of becoming an effective soldier, but, in order to attain this aim, it is necessary that he should be intelligently drilled and handled, and led with courage. The Chinese officials are utterly incapable of such acts, and so long as the native army remains under celestial control, so long will it continue to be a grotesque mob.

It may be safely assumed that China is to-day alike helpless by land and by sea, when opposed by the armaments of a first-class power. By no concatenation of circumstances could she hold her own in battle against European troops or sailors. The only fear of the yellow man is that due to his capacity for mischief and cruelty when he bands himself together with his fellows, and descends on the Europeans in his midst, in the form of a brutal mob, adept at atrocities. At such times he constitutes a terror without parallel, a veritable Jugger-naut, run loose in order that it may seek that which to

devour. The attitude of the Chinese in any coming struggle in the Far East may therefore, under existing conditions, be disregarded as non-effective.

Nor are the forces available in Korea likely to serve as a make-weight in such a contingency. The total strength of the Korean army is rather under 5,000 men ; and though a portion of these have been drilled by Russian officers, carry Berdan rifles, and follow the Russian word of command, the men are badly clothed and fed ; their *morale* is low, and they are, for modern military purposes, practically useless. Defences, other than those provided by nature, and the walls by which her cities are surrounded, she has none. To an even greater extent than China, Korea lies a ready victim for the first despoiler, her temporary security being assured only by the rivalries among her neighbours.

The forces at the disposal of Japan in the Far East are greater than those of any of her neighbours. Japan has long since cast off the guise of an oriental nation, and by dint of her energy, ambition, and perseverance has earned for herself the right to be regarded as a first-class Power. Her armaments are quite disproportionate to her size, and appear to be well designed to protect even her exposed position. Her army and navy are alike modern and well found, and she is likely to play a very prominent part in any upheaval which occurs in her vicinity.

In the development of her navy, Japan is favoured by the physical features of her island kingdom. Her aim at sea power dates back less than forty years. In 1858 her fleet consisted of a crowd of junks. In that year was presented to the Mikado a steam yacht, as a present from Queen Victoria. This was the first vessel propelled by steam, owned by the Japanese. To-day she owns a fleet of six battleships and fourteen cruisers, equal to any vessels afloat, and for their maintenance she has created dockyards and arsenals second to none in the world.

The naval bases of Japan are four in number, well distributed throughout the archipelago, and placed in such positions as to be absolutely safe from foreign inter-

ference. They are Yokosuko, near Yokohama ; Kure, near Hiroshima, on the inland sea ; Sassebo, in Omura bay, on the coast of Kiushiu ; and Maisuru on the north-west coast of Hondo, the last named still in course of construction. Vast sums of money have been expended on these naval stations, which, replete with the most modern appliances, are regarded as impregnable to any attack ; and, in addition to the defences which have been erected, steps are now being taken to increase the strength of the torpedo flotilla, which would take part in protecting the Japanese coasts in time of war.

The army of Japan consists, on a peace footing, of 145,000 men. In time of war it would be increased to upwards of half a million. Both her army and navy have been tested as recently as 1895, when they succeeded in obtaining the astonished admiration of the world by their achievements. The despatch of troops from Japan to China in June this year to take part in the quelling of the anti-foreign riots was also effected with such ease and smoothness as to endorse the high opinion already accorded to the military and naval prowess of the island empire.

By aid of the foregoing summary of the aims and strengths of the competing Powers in the Far East, we are enabled to set out the following factors which must be weighed before making any attempt to review the situation.

1. The desire of China (and Korea) to restrain the spread of Western ideas and the increase of European intercourse.

2. The aim of Russia to absorb China and Korea and exclude other nations from the territory she may thus obtain.

3. The policies of Great Britain and the United States to continue the development of trade in the Far East, and to extend all facilities which they may obtain to that end to all nations equally.

4. The intention of Japan to resist the occupation of any portion of Korea by Russia, and to hinder as far as

possible the further growth of Russian influence in China.

5. The readiness of France to support Russia in her Eastern policy, and to avail herself of any opportunity to profit at the expense of her neighbours.

6. The desire of Germany to strengthen her position in the Far East, with her consequent interest to oppose the granting of exclusive privileges to other Powers.

In addition to these leading principles, there are two points of interest connected with the future of Great Britain and Japan which should play an important part in any future settlements.

The aim of England, which is the greatest Asiatic Power in the world, must ever be to maintain her influence in the Far East, for the reason that any set-back in that quarter must react on the estimate in which her power is held in India.¹

The object of Japan is by force of circumstances directed to the obtaining of an extension of her area for the purpose of providing a much needed outlet for her surplus population.

With a series of aims so opposite as these, it will be realised that a final settlement must be impossible. The problem is one which can only be solved by the triumph of superior force; but it is yet feasible to come to a solution without an appeal to arms. Handled with ability, a nation's power may be made as effective by its mere display as by the adoption of sterner measures, requisite only when the ultimate issue is in doubt. No sane statesman will enter on a war in which he is certain of defeat. It is when the relative strength of the opposing forces is in doubt that the dogs of war are loosed. It follows that any nation which possesses the necessary power to insist

¹ The following table shows the Asiatic interests of the various Powers :

| | Area : Sq. Miles. | Population. |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| Russia | 6,564,778 | 19,388,000 |
| China | 4,218,401 | 402,680,000 |
| Great Britain | 1,827,234 | 291,304,000 |
| France | 315,928 | 18,000,000 |
| Germany | 120 | 60,000 |

on the adoption of a line of action has only to make that force clear, and show her readiness to use it, in order to attain her aim ; and in the few cases where the weaker Power refuses to appreciate the fact, her rapid discomfiture must bring hostilities to a speedy termination. The real way to avoid war is to be prepared for it, and to leave no doubt among one's opponents as to the use which will be made of the preparation ; and the most certain means of plunging an empire into war is that advocated by the peace party with the opposite intention. To reduce a nation's armaments is to make that nation relatively weak, and a weakened Power is the natural quarry of a strong.

As Great Britain is the richest nation in the world, and as moreover her resources are the greatest, it follows that she can attain her desires with greater readiness than any of her compeers. The solution of any problem in which she finds herself concerned must therefore rest with her, assuming that she cares to bestir herself. It is, as I have already demonstrated, because England has ceased for so many years to assert herself in the Far East, that Russia has been able to assume her rightful power ; and even now, if Britain shows a determination to make her voice heard, she will speedily be listened to and obeyed.

At the same time it must be remembered that a continued lack of action tends to make it more and more difficult to return to the *status quo*. There is a limit to the period in which a nation can renounce its authority without endangering her chance of resuming it. As its influence declines, so do those of its more active rivals increase, until at a given point the added strength of the new comer exceeds the available force of the old. The immediate questions with which Britain has to deal in the Far East are two—the suppression of the present trouble in China ; and the arrival at an understanding with the Powers for the reconstitution of the government of that country, and the carrying out of the various rights and privileges granted by existing treaties. ✓

In her efforts to achieve these aims, England can afford

to be honest and disinterested. Russia, on the other hand, finds herself in a false position regarding these. Her interests are all the other way, and she has to choose between a bold announcement of her policy, which, unless abandoned as soon as it was uttered, would plunge her in war; or a tacit acceptance of an arrangement which it is her manifest object to evade, and which she would lose no opportunity of trying to upset.

The individual interests of Japan in regard to trade, being similar to those of Britain, would serve to strengthen the desire of that country to oppose Russia in her aims; and the coincident policy of the United States would bring about such a triple alliance against Russia as to compel that Power to climb down, and, apparently at least, swallow the pill of equality of opportunity, rather than face the consequences of a united attack which could only result in the destruction of her fleets, the checking of her progress for another twenty years, and the risk of actual bankruptcy. But Russia's acceptance of the alternative would not help matters, for it would not be sincere. At the earliest possible moment, she would, as she has so often done before, evade her undertaking, and, profiting by the occupation of her rivals elsewhere, start afresh on her career of exclusive interest and territorial aggrandisement. And so the sport would continue, no nearer settlement than before; and as soon as occasion arises, Russia would at one fell swoop attain her desires in the occupation of another large slice of China, in face of an astonished world.

There is only one way in which Russia can be made to restrain her activities within her proper sphere. It is for some other Power to seize, either in the form of a protectorate or actual occupation, those portions of the Far East which abut on the Muscovite frontier. So long as Russia has for a neighbour a weakling Power, unable to defend herself; so long will she, by active pressure, by conquest, or by stealth, extend her boundary and absorb her neighbour's soil; treaties, pledges and conventions notwithstanding. The alternative of a joint protectorate

over China would not be likely to serve. In the first place Russia would herself demand to be admitted to the list of guarantors, and would continually scheme against the other Powers; in the second, an independence guaranteed by other nations would not afford opportunities of a sufficiently close watch being maintained over Russian developments along the frontier.

It is only by the imposing of a boundary too strong for her to cross, that Russia can be kept within her proper sphere; and, failing the emplacing of a frontier such as that which borders her estate in Europe, she will continue her adventures, to her own advantage and the danger of the peace of the world.

I have now dealt with the conflicting interests between the various Powers in the Far East, but I have yet to speak of their contrasting methods. In the attainment of her aims Great Britain seeks to emulate the family solicitor conducting a negotiation. Scrupulously honest and straightforward, good tempered, slow to take offence, she seeks to arrive at an understanding with her rivals, which, when arrived at, she observes to the letter under all circumstances. Whether the other party to the bargain is equally complaisant is a matter about which she does not appear to concern herself and the failure to observe the conditions of a treaty; is met either by forgetfulness to take a stand on her rights, or a ready acceptance of the first clumsy apology offered. No thought of the probability of a compact failing to bind the other side ever seems to trouble her diplomats; and the readiness with which she allows any treaty of more than a few months' standing to be broken by a rival Power, affords material for ridicule at more than one foreign court. Any assurances offered to England are eagerly swallowed. Guarantees for their observation are rarely sought, and the compact arrived at remains a pledge in honour, which Britain always keeps, while her rival respects it as long as suits her and no longer.

The diplomacy of Russia presents a marked contrast to that of England. Her system is entirely opportunist, her

method without scruple. The great aim in view among her statesmen is the trend towards the South. Checked repeatedly in her designs in Europe and Westerr Asia, she turns with renewed energy towards the Far East. When she sees a possibility of attaining that reward which is denied her elsewhere. The geographical position places her advantageously for the success of her venture. Nothing can stop her but a war, and she has schooled her rivals to believe that a war with her would be a hopeless venture. Eastern Asia is marked out for her quarry pending its seizure by other hands, and no other hand reaches out towards it, for no other Power dare venture on the risk. The responsibilities involved in the ruling of a teeming population antagonistic to their rulers' ideas has no terrors for Russia, for she has a sovereign remedy for all perils, the remedy of brute force, and she never hesitates to use it. Thus resolved as to her future, she takes measures as opportunity serves to hasten it on, and stirs up trouble which, by creating strained relations among her rivals, supplies her with the opportunity to act alone.

There can to my mind be little doubt but that the present trouble in China is largely due to the policy followed by Russia in regard to that country. Aiming only at the attainment of her own ends, she sees that a rebellion supplies endless possibilities of intervention, and that the reign of disorder at Peking provides the desired excuse for her own intervention. The quasi understanding which is known to exist between Russia, Li Hung Chang, and the dowager empress, tends to strengthen the hand of that country in times of stress; and her intention to support the influence of the usurper, already outlined in a series of semi-official announcements which have appeared in the Russian press, shows the line of conduct she proposes to pursue. The policy of Russia is in short to bring about the downfall of China, in order that she may profit by the partition of that country; and any understanding which may be arrived at for the maintenance of that moribund empire will be observed until a further opportunity arrives for the absorption of another slice. No amount of diplomacy,

no species of reasoning on the part of the Powers, is likely to divert Russia's aim in this regard. The only possible way to prevent her forcing her sway over any portion of the celestial empire is for some other Power to forestall her by herself acquiring the object of her desires.

In the event of such a course being pursued, Russia would of course protest, and, under certain circumstances, such a line of action would be met by a declaration of war. But of this I am certain. Russia will continue to absorb such parts of Asia as are unable to resist her attack ; and the only barrier possible to her advance is supplied by the frontier of a Power as strong as she, which, provided its strength be apparent, will serve as a check to her encroachments.

The continuation of Russian aggression can, therefore, only be resisted either by the partition of China among the Powers, or by the declaration of a protectorate over the empire, in which the Powers become trustees. In the former case the situation would be parallel to that on the Russo-German frontier, where the strength of Germany supplies an unanswerable reason for the respecting by her neighbour of her own limits. In the latter alternative, however, Russia would herself demand to be one of the guarantors, and would, without doubt, eagerly avail herself of every opportunity of enlarging her own sphere and increasing her hold over the empire guaranteed.

The partition of China being contrary to the desires of the majority of the nations interested, is not likely to be arranged for many years to come. None the less its incidence is certain ; and, by the natural trend of circumstances, the longer it is postponed, the greater will be the share obtained by Russia, and the less that available for other Powers. It is of course possible that some attempt may be made to map out the country in spheres of influence, each being entrusted to the care of a Power which is in turn bound to maintain all existing trade privileges. But this could not work satisfactorily, inasmuch as Russia and France cannot compete with the rest of the world in an open market, and their needs would speedily necessi-

tate their closing their ports and reverting to a policy of exclusion.

Assuming that China were thus partitioned, the arrangement might be thuswise :—

Russia to exercise sole control in point of developing the resources, and opening up the North of China, including the whole of Manchuria, and the provinces of Pechili and Shansi down to the Hoang Ho.

Great Britain to receive the exclusive right of development in the valley of the Yangtse Kiang, including the provinces of Honan, Anwei, Hupeh, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Hunan, Yunnan, and Sechuan, together with the coast provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung as far south as the Canton river.

France to have committed to her care the provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung as far north as the Canton river, with the island of Hainan.

Germany to retain her influence over the whole of Shantung.

Such an arrangement as this would alienate few of the existing treaty ports from the spheres of those Powers most interested in them. The bulk of the markets where British trade is paramount would remain in the British sphere. Newchang and Tientsin would be under Russian control, Chifu would fall under that of Germany, and Pakhoi would come within that of France. All the Powers would be required to give an undertaking to retain these ports open to international trade, and further to afford equal opportunities to the ships and traders of other nations, to those which might be accorded to their own, in any other ports which might at any time be opened to trade. An agreement such as this would have much to recommend it, and, if adhered to, would settle the dangerous question of international rivalry; but the chance of it being arrived at, or, if arrived at, observed, is exceedingly slight.

The outcome of the foregoing examination into the factors in the situation is to show that any general agreement between the Powers would be difficult to arrange,

and that, if arranged, it would be speedily disregarded. The question then becomes one requiring a display of force, in which the influence of sea power must play the leading part.

Assuming that the continued breach of the undertakings by Russia culminates in an appeal to arms, what are the chances of the struggle which would ensue?

At the first glance it seems as though the advantage was entirely on the side of the despoiler. Her multiplicity of men, the ability of her rulers, her railways and well-chosen strategic dispositions, and her undoubtedly powerful fleet, all tend to give her a strong position; in addition to which, the fact of her being in possession and on the spot tends to accord her a great advantage over her opponents. Assuming that she succeeded by dint of her cleverness to obtain the consent of the Chinese to such a course, she could throw an army corps into Peking even now, while the Northern Railway and its connections are still unfinished, within a fortnight; and, when these are completed, the feat will be possible in half the time. Having accomplished this much, she will be in a position to occupy Taku and Pataiho, and become master of the situation on the gulf of Pechili.

There must, however, remain at least one weak spot in her armour. The number of troops on the spot must in any case be a limited one. The accommodation of Port Arthur, though now in course of increase, is not sufficient for a vast army. And Vladivostok even, though useful as a secondary base, is a long way off. Russia cannot move until she has her necessary strength for the contemplated movement on the spot, for the reason that the subsequent arrival of reinforcements could be easily prevented by her opponents. The despatch of large bodies of troops by the Siberian railway, even when that route is completed, must be a slow and uncertain process. Port Arthur would more likely than not be isolated before hostilities were far advanced, and the despatch of troops by sea from Europe would become impossible as soon as this country declared hostilities against Russia.

She would, therefore, have to take action with her forces available in the Primorsk province and Port Arthur. This might mean anything from 60,000 to 100,000 men, of whom 15,000 would be required to defend Port Arthur, and many more to protect the railway and line of communications to Peking. Assuming that she succeeds in despatching an effective force of 60,000 to the front, to hold Tientsin and Peking and oppose the attack of her enemies, her position becomes one of immediate danger.

The action of Great Britain in a war with Russia is clear. Port Arthur would be blockaded, and reduced either by bombardment or starvation. Its position lends itself peculiarly to attack from the rear, and a comparatively small force could hold the isthmus and bring about complete isolation. Every Russian vessel afloat on the high seas would be infallibly captured or sunk. The Baltic and Black Seas would be closed, and Russia's sea power ended. Vladivostok, better placed than Port Arthur, would be masked, and any vessels seeking to leave it destroyed, the Amur river would be entered and closed to Russian ships; and Russia would thus be tied to her land communications, which would assuredly prove insufficient to keep her forces supplied with ammunition and supplies.

But such a course on Russia's part would not have to be met by England alone. Japan is quite as much concerned in restraining her progress as we are, and Japan would, for her own ends, vie with us in crushing her. And while her fleet would enable her to relieve us of the duty of dealing with Vladivostok and the Russian coast line, Japan's army would at once put a very different complexion on the situation. A force of 50,000 men would suffice to force its way through all obstacles into Manchuria, where in the neighbourhood of Ki Tin the railway would be cut, thus disconnecting alike Vladivostok and Port Arthur from the Siberian system; and an army double that strength, pushing its way over the level country of Pechili,

would attack the advanced Russian force in both flanks and hurl it to destruction.

The Brobdingnagian land grabber would then find herself with an army of three million men, which she could not effectively move. To attempt to despatch any considerable portion of these overland would be to commit them, in a country like Northern Asia, to starvation. She could, it is true, turn a fresh front to British arms, and attack the Afghan frontier; but her chances there have been greatly over estimated, and the outcome of such a venture would most probably be failure.


The obvious retort to this line of reasoning is that Russia would have France for an ally, and that France would imitate our tactics in regard to Russia, and attack us at home. Such a combination is of course quite possible, though by no means so certain as is generally supposed; but while such a contingency would doubtless tend to prolong the war, it would hardly affect the result, while the benefit it would confer on Russia is nil. The outcome of a struggle in Asia between Russia, Japan and ourselves can only have one conclusion,—the crippling of the aggressive power, and the arresting of her aggressions for a period of years. That it would for a time bring various hardships to bear on this country is undoubted. Freights would go up, our trade would suffer, provisions would become dear, and times would be hard. The ultimate result would, however, be a vast gain to our interests. Our trade in Asia would be ensured, our prestige restored, and the most disturbing element in the councils of the world restrained. The longer the contest is postponed the more severe it will be, and the greater the suffering involved. But it has got to come; and the sooner it is over the better for the world at large.

There is no averting the crisis. The question of the commerce of China is one which is yet in its infancy. The future of its trade, when the country is opened up, is beyond the dreams of wildest avarice. Of the four hundred millions of Chinese barely one hundredth have come

into contact with Europeans, or realised the outcome of foreign trade. With the opening up of the country to international intercourse, there will be developed such a market as is not existing in any other continent; and all that is needed is the friendly guidance of Powers which have no selfish end to gain. Nor is the question limited to its commercial aspect.

Despite the ancient civilisation which the Chinese have inherited, their life is imbued with many barbarous practices, the result of ignorance and superstition. The gradual spread of European civilisation through the empire will tend to abolish these, and bring out what is best in the celestial nature. The task of opening this country is one which has a moral value which alone would make it an aim worthy of the cost. We have squandered millions in trying to Christianise the Chinese. Let us invest a few more in enlightening them.

Until the growing incubus of Russia on the empire is stayed, there can be no hope for China. By the continuation of her successful methods, she is destined to maintain her position and to strengthen her hand, until brought to book by the intervention of force. No appeal to reason will serve to thwart her aim, no extorted promise will tend to stay her hand. To-day Manchuria is hers beyond recall. Peking lies within her grip; and the whole of the northern provinces must speedily follow, if her march be not stayed by a more powerful than she.



CHAPTER IX

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

The future of the Siberian railways—The fate of China—The Yellow Peril—The flooding of the markets of the world—C. H. Pearson's theory—Lord Curzon's—The common-sense view—The reconstitution of China—Contrast between Russia and that country—The future of Japan—Her methods—The coming struggle—Its outcome—The mission of civilisation.

THE questions connected with the Far East are complicated by a number of problems which provide material for speculation. Of these the most important concern the future of the races competing for the mastery of empire: the Russians, Chinese and Japanese, between whom rests the future dominion over further Asia; and an examination of the claims of each results in the formulating of a series of paradoxes on the outcome of which their fate depends.

In regard to Russia, the most vital question of the moment is the probable effect of the completion of the Siberian and Manchurian railways on her fortunes. It has by dint of oft-repeated iteration come to be accepted as an established fact, that the outcome of these railways will be to so strengthen the Muscovite grip over Northern China as to enable her to dominate that country. It appears to be agreed that by means of the Siberian trunk line she will be able to hurl an unlimited number of men across Asia for the attainment of any end she may desire. I have heard it suggested more than once that, as soon as her communications are completed, Russia will attain a position of such strength on the Pacific as to enable her to laugh at any attempt to oust her from her advantage,

and render her invulnerable to attack alike from without and within.

I do not find myself in accord with this reasoning, and am of opinion that the direct outcome of the completion of her railways will be far less than is generally supposed. It must be borne in mind that a line of railway does not shorten the distance between any two points; it merely lessens the time requisite to cover it, and renders the journey less fatiguing. The extent to which this occurs depends partly on the distance to be covered and partly on the quality of the line and the accommodation it affords. It must further be noted that the Siberian railways, as at present designed, are cheaply constructed, lightly built, and that they consist of a single line of rail. In these facts we have endless causes of delay, and the further possibility of the whole means of transport being rendered temporarily useless by an accident or breakdown. It must not be forgotten that in reckoning the time necessary to cover any given distance by rail, allowance must be made, not only for the delays due to changing engines, taking in coal and water, and, in the case of a single line, waiting for trains going in the opposite direction to pass at given points; but it is further needful to allow double the time necessary for a train to perform the journey, for the reason that, when arrived at its destination, it becomes useless until it is returned to its starting point, preparatory to setting out on a second journey with a fresh load.

Reckoning the distance from the Urals to Vladivostok or Port Arthur at 4,000 miles, and taking the average speed of the trains as being twelve miles an hour, which is the maximum possible over so lightly constructed a road for heavy traffic, the net running time requisite to cover the distance is thirteen days. To this must be added the time necessary to coal and water, to wait for connections or passing trains, and to allow for unpreventible delays, for which an allowance of four days will not be too great. The journey will thus occupy seventeen days. As the empty trains will have to return to the starting-point before they

can perform a second journey, and the amount of available rolling stock must necessarily have a limit, the time for the return journey must be added to that occupied in the journey out, and we find that the capacity of a single train is limited to the performance of one trip out and home in thirty-four days, say five weeks. There must invariably be a considerable delay at the termini owing to the necessity of overhauling the rolling stock and making good any damage sustained; and the question then arises, how many trains will be available for the conveyance of an army? With stations twenty miles apart it will be possible in the case of a speed of twelve miles an hour to despatch trains at an interval of four hours, or, if the traffic be continued without break, six trains each day; and placing the carrying capacity of each train at 500 men with their impedimenta, we find it is possible to despatch 3,000 men daily on the four weeks' journey. To keep this activity in operation until the first train finds its way back at the starting-point again, after an interval of four weeks, would entail the existence of 168 trains, which in that period would have carried 84,000 men, provided everything had worked without a hitch. It would be possible for Great Britain to despatch the same number of men in fifty transports from England to any part of the Far East in forty days, without causing any exceptional strain on her resources. Indeed, during the war in South Africa, Britain executed this feat by landing 170,644 men and their horses and impedimenta 7,000 miles away from her shores within the space of fifteen weeks. Japan could of course throw an equal body of troops into Russian or Chinese territory with much greater speed; and the facts quoted show that any Russian attempt to mobilise a large force in the Far East must be anticipated by the action of her rivals in that quarter.

Thus the completion of the Siberian railways will not afford Russia any material advantage in point of speedy transport of large bodies of troops, over those attainable by the sea route. Putting the distance between the Black Sea and the gulf of Pechili at 10,000 miles, it follows that

with transports such as the *Rurik*, *Rossia*, *Gromoboy*, and vessels of the so-called "Volunteer Fleet," possessing an average speed of eighteen knots, the voyage can be made under a month; and provided a sufficient number of vessels be chartered it would be possible to despatch an army to Manchuria with greater speed by sea than would be the case by land. The chief value of the railway route will be in the alternative means it affords of despatching men and ammunition at a time when the sea is closed to Russian ships. But its value must be greatly discounted by the superior facilities possessed by the countries holding the command of the sea. The item of cost also enters largely into the situation. The expense of land transport as compared with that on the ocean is vastly greater, while the liability to a breakdown, entailing the temporary stoppage of all traffic, must also be taken into account.

The questions affecting China as regards the future are in a sense more vital to the interests of the world than are those of Russia, inasmuch as the fate of the celestial empire is more likely to affect humanity at large, than is any likely change in the government or people of the latter country. The problems involved are twofold, affecting the country and the people, and it would be difficult to determine which is of greater interest to the coming generation.

After having remained constant for close on four thousand years, China is to-day on the verge of a new era in her record. A variety of circumstances combine to render the continuation of her erstwhile seclusion impossible. She must either reshape herself, or suffer herself to be reshaped; the only question being whether her reformation is to come from within or from without. At the moment it seems as though a change from within were an impossibility, and that any tendency to reform will have to be effected from without; but it is quite possible that there is a surprise in store for us, when, by the removal of the existing causes of inanition, the resourcefulness of the Chinese is for the first time given fair play, and the national character afforded an

opportunity of asserting itself. By the action of the governmental and social system, the initiative of the Chinese is paralysed, and individuality becomes merged into opportunism. The network of corruptness, so widely spread over every class of society, penalises thought and limits action. The one aim of the normal celestial is to live his life without attracting the attention of his superiors, and thus the ambition of the natives is to abstain from achieving fame. With the abolition of the present system, the Chinese character would, finding itself for the first time untrammelled, infallibly come into play; and possessing a finer physique, more innately cultured, endowed with greater originality, and more virile than the Japanese, there is no reason why the Chinaman should not make at least as good and rapid progress in assimilating the ideas of Western civilisation as his neighbour has done. Whatever the immediate fate of China may be, it is certain that her present condition is foredoomed. Whether her territory is partitioned between the Powers, or her corrupt government be abolished in favour of an enlightened rule, the result must be the same. The Chinese people must be freed from the thralldom they have so long endured, and develop a national character capable of holding its own under modern conditions. What then is likely to be the outcome of the emancipation of four hundred millions of people? How is it to be assured that this tornado of humanity will not burst the confines of its location and swamp the already densely populated countries of the West? What will happen when a race comprising one-third of the population of the world enters into competition with the other two-thirds, and, by dint of its marvellous capacity for industry and thrift, undersells it in its own market? These dangers have long been foretold by prophets who have been honoured in their own countries; and in the result we find that, in more parts of the world than one, the advent of the celestial, and the incidence of his competition in the labour market, is restricted by prohibitive legislation.

The most typical instance of this is to be found in the

United States, which to the East is China's nearest neighbour. The entrance of the celestial into the State of California was due to the direct invitation of the Americans themselves. It was at the time when the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad was being commenced that the scarcity of labour threatened to endanger the progress of that undertaking. A shipload of Chinese was thereupon brought over as an experiment, and the way in which they adapted themselves to their new surroundings was so satisfactory that others followed. In this way some 15,000 celestials found their way to California, and, in return for a far lower wage than had been refused by white labourers, they built the great railroad to the satisfaction of its promoters. As soon as the railway was completed the Chinese found themselves without employment. They flocked to the towns in search of work, with the result that by their competition they reduced wages. This caused an outcry against Chinese labour, which brought in its train the existing legislation against the immigration of celestials, under which the greatest difficulties are put in the way of Chinese landing in America; and merchants leaving that country for the East are still frequently prevented from returning.

A little thought should serve to show that the much discussed danger of a Chinese invasion of Western countries is greatly exaggerated. The Chinaman is the most conservative creature on earth. He clings to his ideas with a persistency unknown to others, and under no circumstances does he permanently settle abroad except under compulsion. The idea of being buried anywhere but in the district sacred to the bones of his ancestors, is extremely repugnant to his feelings; and all Chinese who are sufficiently well-to-do have their bodies, in the event of their dying away from home, conveyed to China for interment. The only consideration which tempts the Chinaman to leave the land of his birth is that of making a living; and the real motive which prompts him to settle in such places as Singapore is the superiority of the conditions of life afforded there, as compared with those

of his native China. It is, I believe, very doubtful if a Chinaman would desire to leave his country at all, provided his government was such as to permit him to benefit by the result of his labour, without interposing the demands prompted by a corrupt and needy officialism on his earnings. With the introduction of just government in China the emigrative instincts of the Chinese will cease. As it is, there are very few instances on record where even a celestial who has benefited by European education, has elected to settle in Europe, after his duty has ceased to require his presence in that portion of the world.

A danger, which in the event of its occurrence would be far more serious than that above discussed, is the flooding of the markets of the world by the labour of emancipated Chinese. With the education of the Chinaman, and the adoption of European methods which would follow in its train, China would speedily become a manufacturing country, such as has never before existed. The numerous waterways which permeate the empire afford an unrivalled means of cheap transit. Millions of workers would be forthcoming, intelligent, economical, and industrious; and the ability of the celestial to subsist on far less than will suffice to nourish the inhabitants of any other country, would enable him to work for a wage which would allow of the underselling of every other manufacturing nation. But a little thought will suffice to show, that China's best, biggest and most convenient market must be in the eighteen provinces and their vicinity, for there is to be found a field sufficient to absorb the output of centuries. The possibilities of demand afforded by a population of four hundred millions of which three hundred and fifty millions have probably never been exploited, is sufficient to absorb the produce of as many Chinese as are likely to be tempted into the commercial calling. It remains, however, to consider what is to become of the surplus population when, in addition to being educated and enlightened, it becomes increased beyond the resources of the country.

The ratio of population to the area of the eighteen

provinces is 292 persons to the square mile, being rather more than half as many as are found in Belgium. The attainment of a certain limit of increase will mark the inset of a spirit of emigration which must seek for its indulgence areas outside the empire, where the only available territories are the deserts of Mongolia and Jungaria, alike unsuited to habitation other than by nomadic tribes. The necessity for discovering an outlet will assert itself with such insistence as will brook no refusal; and force alone is likely to serve to stem the flood of humanity which will seek to emancipate itself from the thralldom of overcrowding.

In what direction is this exodus likely to force its way? When will it find its haven of repose?

The problem is not a new one. It has occurred to many thinkers, and by one it has been worked out to a conclusion which bodes ill for generations to come. Mr. C. H. Pearson has discussed the future of the Chinese race with much erudition, and arrives at the conclusion that its destiny is to assert its dominion over Asia.¹ This theory, which has attracted much attention, and in many quarters has been accepted as logical, was contested by Lord Curzon; and a perusal of his strictures on the line of reasoning followed, leaves to my mind no doubt as to the correctness of his conclusions.² The theories advocated and rebutted are too diffuse to be discussed in the present volume; but the chief reasons urged by Lord Curzon against the probability of a Chinese conquest are, the military weakness of the race, its lack of initiative, its want of adaptability, and the domesticity and dislike to travel of the natives. On the score of these, he claims that the Chinese are not likely to succeed in any attempt to force themselves on their neighbours, who would be able to bring such repressive measures to bear upon them as would render the success of such an attempt beyond question.

There is, of course, the possibility of a Chinese inun-

¹ *National Life and Character: a Forecast.*

² *Problems of the Far East.* Chapter XIII.

dation through the medium of immigration. But here again, Russia, the only Power possessing territory suitable for such an undertaking, would require to be consulted, and even if she approved of the settlement of Chinese in her sparsely populated regions of Siberia, she would most infallibly withhold facilities the moment that the immigration threatened to overwhelm her own colonists.

Examined by the light of connected facts, the theory of a future Chinese upheaval falls through. The impotence of this people to hold its own by force of arms is such as to have prevented it from having retained possession of the fringe of its own empire. In turn have been lost the one-time provinces of the Amur, maritime Manchuria, a portion of Ili, the Pamirs, Nepal, Sikkim, Burma, Cochin China, Cambodia, Tonkin, and Formosa; and incapable of regaining these, what chance can there be of a Chinese conquest of regions held with the strong grip of the Tsar?

Can. Victoria strong?

Again, the Chinaman is practically devoid of the instinct of colonisation. His motive for quitting his native land and seeking fresh fields for his ingenuity is merely to evade the constant supervision and espionage of the official classes, and to escape the repeated exactions made on his earnings by corrupt officials. If once the governmental administration were adjusted on an honest basis, the emigration among the people would not only stop, but the great majority of those beyond the seas would return to their native land. This was effectively borne out in the course of an official inquiry into the status of the numerous Chinese colonists at Singapore in 1893, when it was given in evidence that the reason for so many Chinese deserting their country, and taking up residence under the British flag, was to escape the investigations of the mandarins and the oppression of their underlings, which contributed to rob them of their earnings and to make their lives intolerable.

If ever the population of China exceeds the possibilities of its existence, the people will have to knock their heads against the barriers which surround their

empire in vain. Great Britain cannot do with them, for there is no spare room in India. Indo-China, apart from its evil climate, would not suit them, owing to the peculiarities of the French *régime*. Russia has other missions to perform than housing an army of yellow invaders; and, even if she tried the experiment, would have to hold her hand before she risked the absorption of her Siberian people.

For the celestial comes of a dominant race, which is bound to assert itself, and cannot be absorbed. He breeds with ease and frequency, and may be trusted to transmit his species in any climate and with any consort. He has been known to breed with nearly every race, and the perils of such an experiment are great.

What then is the future of China to be? The constituent factors in the celestial situation are so different to those which formerly existed in Japan, as to allow of no comparison in the respective fate of the two countries. The Japanese classes have always been permeated with a keen sense of patriotism, and the only opposition to reform came from the more ignorant among the masses. In China the reverse is the case. A small proportion of the masses are distinctly favourable to progress; and the bulk of the people, while prejudiced against the presence of foreigners, are indifferent whether new ideas are adopted or no. It is the governing class which is responsible for the anti-foreign feeling in China; and thus, eager to retain in its own hands the opportunities for peculation and extortion which it has so freely utilised for centuries, spares no efforts to stir up an anti-progressive feeling among the people under its influence.

Any measures taken for the reconstitution of China must be adopted with an appreciation of the existing order of things. The fact is, that the Chinese empire is not in reality an empire at all, but rather a confederation of States, each under a separate ruler, linked together with the seat of central government by the payment of taxes to the imperial exchequer. The viceroys and governors

of the various provinces are each supreme in his principality. All that he has to do in order to retain a continued power is to transmit a sum of money periodically to Peking, which must not show a decrease in amount as compared with previous payments; and, having complied with this prime necessity, the provincial rulers are free to exercise their power in whatsoever way they think fit. In the result, the viceroys, with few exceptions, direct their energies to the enrichment of themselves, and the employment of subterfuges for the spoliation of the people under their sway; and it follows that each of these must prove an avowed opponent of any attempt, either to constitute an active central government, or introduce the principles of honesty and justice in the supervision of the country. The salvation of China, therefore, is only possible after the most marked characteristics of her population have been outgrown, a process which must require centuries for its attainment. No end can be achieved by the employment of force. Such a course would merely serve to make the existing feeling more acute, and to increase the readiness of the people to make reprisals. If China be reformed, it must be by slow and progressive means based on example, the display of a firm hand, and abstinence from any attempt at rapid coercion.

The anomalous position of Russia in regard to China is such as to afford considerable ground for speculation as to the future. The attitude which the northern Power assumes in the face of an astonished world is a gigantic sham, under which she has succeeded in arrogating to herself a Power which could not for one moment be justified by either interest or necessity. As a commercial nation Russia takes a fifth rank. Her manufactures are in their infancy. She imports from Europe and America the very articles which those countries export to China; and in the whole of the celestial empire there is not a single Russian firm which is able to compete successfully against the representatives of other nations. Such trade as Russia does with China consists mainly of importing

articles of Chinese manufacture into Russia, notably tea, silks, and drugs. Her ambitions in regard to the celestials are purely political, and her aim, to absorb the country in order to obtain the military dominance of the Far East, and a rule over a population of many millions in order that she may tax them for the enrichment of her exchequer. By means of the imposition of taxation, conscription, the Greek Church, press censorship, and the crushing of individual liberty, she hopes to make China a source of real wealth, and to use her as a lever with which to shift the balance of power throughout the earth; and unless her aim be frustrated by the common action of the Powers, she will succeed in her efforts for retarding the progress of the world. It is then to the interest alike of the Chinese, of humanity, and of the Powers, to stay Russia's hand in China, and to consecrate that country to the benefits involved in a continued intercourse with the outer world.

The result rests neither with Russian nor with China. Its outcome lies in the hands of the Powers who would be most affected by the success of Russia's plans. And the action of England in this connection must decide the collective policy of the nations concerned.

The last of the problems connected with the Far East concerns the future of Japan, with which is closely connected the fate of Korea.

For the moment Japan stands at the junction of the ways, while her neighbours wait watchfully to observe the course she may decide to take. After a record of progress such as has in point of time and directness never been equalled, the island empire finds herself called upon to elect between two options in regard to her future career: she can, by continuing to emulate the West, gradually take a prominent place among the ruling Powers; or, by concentrating her energies on the East, she may hope to dominate Eastern Asia, in spite of her former mentors. Either course teems with possibilities and interest. There is yet another: Japan may find that her capacity for Europeanising herself has attained its

limit, and, failing to assimilate continued ideas, she may find herself gradually drifting back to her pristine orientalism.

The capacity of a nation to learn is limited only by its intelligence. A people with a fair allowance of brain may absorb all that is useful from a Western teacher; but an oriental mind can never become occidental in its train of thought, and one never knows when the point may be arrived at where the inborn ego will assert itself and revert to its untutored sense of proportion. But leaving this aspect as being somewhat beyond the scope of the present volume, there remains an undoubted possibility that Japan may find that the limit of her power of absorbing European ideas is reached, and that she may seek to reconcile herself by a return to oriental methods, especially if fate chances to place her again in unconscious opposition to the interests of such a combination of Powers as happened in 1895.

The incidents of the war of 1894-1895 served to place Japan in an anomalous position. She realised that it is not sufficient to possess the power to achieve an aim, but that it is also necessary to develop the strength to hold it. In the case of China, her calculations were upset by the action of the Powers, and, profiting by the lesson, she determined not to forget it. From then till now she has spared no effort to strengthen her armaments, and it may be taken as a foregone conclusion that the force displayed by Japan in 1894 will be found to be vastly increased when next she is called upon to evince her strength and resources in defence of her interests.

Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that Japan has not as yet been fully accepted by the Powers; and England, whose interests are most in accord with hers, seems particularly shy of any course which might be regarded as suggestive of an alliance with her Eastern prototype. With France and Germany, Japan has nothing in common. Russia must always be her avowed opponent. There remains only the United States, which, like Great Britain,

owns interests in alignment with those of Japan, and which failing England, will as likely as not be one day approached with a view to the formation of that alliance for the protection of joint interests which this country does not appear disposed to conclude. For her deliberation at the beginning of the present crisis in China, Japan cannot be reasonably blamed. After her experience in 1895, it is only reasonable that she should hold out for some guarantee that after pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the Powers, she should not be dismissed without the opportunity of achieving any return, and the deliberation she displayed in despatching troops for the quelling of the "Boxer" rebellion can only tend to gain her the respect of other nations.

The great problem in the future of Japan is her ability to obtain the extended territory she needs for the colonisation of her surplus population. The simplest remedy for her present position would without question be the acquisition of Korea, a course which should not give rise to any great trouble on the part of the Koreans. Russia would, however, undoubtedly protest against such a course, and, unless satisfied as to her own ability to absorb Northern China, she would most probably take the risk of war rather than forgo her own ambitions in that quarter. And it is further probable that other Powers would take exception to the presence of Japan on the continent of Asia, for fear that, by means of her growing armaments and resources, she might utilise her position as a base from which to spread herself over the Pacific border.

Often as the possibility of a Chinese overrunning of Asia has been discussed, I cannot call to mind any consideration of the possibility of a similar descent by Japan. And yet the Japanese possess attributes far more like those of a conquering race than do the celestials. The probability of such an event, so long at least as Russia retains her power is not great, but it is possible, and its outcome might be fraught with serious consequences to the prosperity of the world.

For the present, however, Japan's hands are full. With the future of Korea to watch, with Russia to checkmate, and with a disunited China to contend with, Japan is not likely for very many years to set out on a scheme of far-reaching conquest; and the interest for the moment centres rather in the question whether or no Japan has reached a stage at which it is justifiable to regard her as one of the Powers, rather than as a nebulous oriental empire.

In one respect Japan evokes the sympathy of the observer. It seems as though she was destined to be misunderstood. Her action in regard to the sinking of the *Kowshing* in 1894, her massacre of the Chinese at Port Arthur shortly after, and her recent hesitation in despatching troops to Peking, have been seized upon as examples of the survival of her barbaric instincts. It seems to me that such criticism is manifestly unjust. The sinking of the *Kowshing* was a mere act of war, bereft of that misplaced humanitarianism which prolongs our own struggles with our enemies, and, by the restraint it places on the action of our forces, lessens their capacity for subduing the enemy, and in the end entails far greater suffering and loss of life than would be necessitated by the prompt adoption of severe measures. This has been especially noticeable in the South African campaign, where the exhibition of a firm hand, and the prompt shooting of all rebels caught looting or destroying property, would have saved hundreds of lives, and prevented the destruction of a vast amount of property. The loss of life in the China-Japanese war was, notwithstanding the massacre at Port Arthur, and the large number of troops engaged in Korea, very much smaller than would have been the case had the campaign been conducted on British principles. In such a case the war would have been indefinitely prolonged, and the loss of life infinitely greater. The best and certainly the most humane course to follow in a repressive war is to strike hard, and seek at one blow to implant such a moral lesson on the enemy as will impress him with the futility

of further resistance. In the case of the existing trouble in China, this principle might be followed with advantage. To defeat the rebels in Pechili and enter into negotiations for the constitution of a fresh government may restore peace and order for a time but future outbreaks are certain to occur, and a final understanding of the superiority of the foreigner will only be implanted in the celestials after some years of increased intercourse. The employment of drastic measures in dealing with the present crisis would, on the other hand, serve to demonstrate the hopelessness of opposing foreign intercourse. The destruction of Peking, and laying waste of the various palaces which form an appanage of that capital, would serve for all time as a lesson to the Chinese, and such a course would end for ever opposition to Western intercourse with the country. It was this principle which the Japanese followed in 1894-1895; and the result fully justified the course adopted.

The future of Japan is a problem which cannot be solved until that country again makes an appeal to the god of war. The irreconcilability of her interests with those of Russia render it impossible for her to arrive at an amicable understanding with that country likely to settle the differences between them. There is not room for two first-class Powers in the sea of Japan; and it remains to be seen whether the Northern Colossus or the Britain of the East is destined to dominate the situation. The time is scarcely ripe for the struggle, for neither of the combatants is as yet prepared. But the contest is one which must come, and ere long; and the result can scarcely remain in doubt. Of the future destiny of Japan to rule the Eastern seas there can be no two opinions. The struggle will not be between two nations alike keen on obtaining a victory. It will rest between one united nation, keen, patriotic and resolved to venture its last drop of blood in the contest; and an overwhelming officialism, lacking all finer qualities than persistency, and a greed for expansion at the expense of its neighbours. Every Japanese is a patriot at heart.

Your Russian fights, not for his country, but because he cannot help himself. He fights well, but he lacks that inspiring incentive which renders nations like Japan, the United States, and our own, indomitable foes, whose onslaught will brook no repulse, whose destiny is victory, and whose mission the repression of brute force, in the interests of peace, civilisation and humanity.

CHAPTER X

THE DUTY OF BRITAIN

The failure of British policy in the Far East—Evidence thereof—Authorities quoted—Governmental vacillation and the "open door"—Growth of anti-foreign feeling in China—Its causes—Neglect of precautions—The only course of action—Policy of Great Britain—Prospects of an understanding among the Powers—Superiority of Russian diplomacy—Necessity for strong action—The stupid party—Neglect of Asiatic peoples—Missionaries—Necessity for a strong minister at Peking—Interests of the Powers—Russian aggressiveness—Impossibility of an understanding—Russian treatment of Asiatics—Necessary steps to restore British influence—Spheres of influence—England's policy.

AN unprejudiced survey of the relations which have existed between Great Britain and the countries of the Far East results in the exposure of a record not altogether creditable to this country. The action of England in regard to China has indeed been such as to provide amusement rather than edification, in regard to its lack of purpose and exhibition of incapacity; and while successive governments have meddled and muddled in the policy they have followed in their dealings with the celestial empire, Lord Salisbury and his colleagues have achieved a record which in sheer infatuation leaves the follies of their predecessors far behind.

Scathing as the conclusion drawn may be regarded, its justice is open to demonstration beyond question. And excuse for it is the less easy, for the reason that the interests and the aims of this country in the Far East have alike been such as to warrant the adoption of a strong and consistent policy which might with advantage

have been persisted in, as much in the interests of the world at large as in those of the British Empire. The history of our relations with China constitutes a record of incapacity and wasted opportunity. Consistency in our aims has been repeatedly lacking. We have invariably hesitated to act in time of need, and when we have done anything at all, we have generally done the wrong thing. From the departure of Lord Macartney's mission from Peking in 1793 to the *coup d'état* of 1900, England has ever hesitated as to the course she should pursue for the protection of her interests in China, and her continued vacillations have not only endangered her position in the Far East, but have seriously lowered her prestige throughout the whole of Asia.

The earliest relations between this country and China were upon the whole favourable to ourselves. Lord Macartney was well received by Keen Lung, and the attitude of that potentate encouraged the despatch of the second embassy under Lord Amherst in 1816. There is little doubt but that the airs assumed by that nobleman on the occasion of his visit to Peking were largely responsible for his failure to obtain an audience of Kiaking, who, prompted by the mandarins, desired to humble the pride of the arrogant British envoy. Similarly the attitude of Lord Napier on his assumption of the part of superintendent of British trade, was responsible for the antagonism of the viceroy of Kwantung and the serious trouble which led to the outbreak of the war of 1839. Captain Elliot, on the occasion of his first visit to the Peiho, for the purpose of enforcing the undertakings of the Chinese, allowed himself to be persuaded to return to Canton without having effected his purpose, and thereby surrendered the strong position he had taken up, and enabled the Chinese to triumph over the English in the attempt to assert themselves in China. When our forces ultimately triumphed over the celestials and we held China at our mercy, the treaty of Nanking, under which a *modus vivendi* was arranged, proved utterly unsuited to the necessities of the occasion, and its terms were such

as would have been accepted by no other Power under similar circumstances.

The outbreak of disturbances and the attacks on foreigners, which broke out shortly after the conclusion of the first treaty, were suffered to continue unchecked for a considerable time. Consular officials were assaulted with impunity; Englishmen were stoned and insulted; and the British consulate at Foochow was attacked in open daylight. Governor Davis, finding remonstrances unavailing, determined to employ strong measures, and proceeded to obtain reparation for these insults. He was promptly snubbed by Lord Aberdeen for his pains! His proclamations were withdrawn; and the Chinese, strengthened in their contempt for the barbarians, rose against the English, many of whom were murdered in cold blood. Consul Alcock, who realised the character of the people he had to deal with, thereupon took matters into his own hands. He blockaded Canton, and impounded the grain junks lying in the river, pending the handing over of the malefactors by the Chinese. This action brought the celestials to their senses. It began to dawn upon them that the foreigners were less weak than they supposed. But the news of the consul's action had no sooner reached Hong Kong, than Mr. Bonham, the British plenipotentiary, sent peremptory instructions for the discontinuance of repressive action; and Mr. Alcock was forbidden ever to employ such measures without the previous instructions of the home government! And when, shortly after, Sir John Bowring insisted on the opening of Canton to British trade, he was sternly rebuked by that most incompetent of foreign secretaries, Lord Malmesbury.

The treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858, was a decided advance on that of 1842, but its most important provisions have not been carried out to the present day. The lives of Europeans continued to be unsafe in China, and despite the accordance of the right to travel and reside in the empire, it was absolutely unsafe for any Englishman to venture outside the limits of the treaty ports. On the condition of affairs being brought within

the knowledge of Lord Elgin, that enlightened diplomatist ordered that, for the protection of life, no British subject should be permitted to go beyond the walls, thus playing into the hands of the Chinese rabble, and showing the incapacity of the British to assert themselves.

The treaty of Tientsin was agreed to by the Chinese with the object of bringing the war to a close, and without the slightest intention of abiding by its provisions. Having obtained the signature of this treaty, Lord Elgin returned to Canton, without taking any steps to obtain audience of the Emperor Hienfung, and thus sacrificed an opportunity which, had it been utilised, might have had important results. Neither did he leave a force to occupy Tientsin as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty. In consequence of these omissions, the whole procedure had to be gone through a second time, when Mr. Frederick Bruce was repulsed from the mouth of the Peiho on his way to Peking, with the object of exchanging ratifications of the treaty as set out in its terms.

After the operations which were thus necessitated, the allied French and English forces penetrated to Peking. But no attempt was made to interview its ruler; and after destroying one of the lesser palaces, the forces withdrew, without having effected anything beyond the addition of a subsidiary protocol to the original terms of the treaty.

The regard in which the British were held by the Chinese at this period is shown by the constant recurrence of attacks on missionaries, whose presence in the country was especially authorised by the treaty of Tientsin. Murders were frequent, and owing to the lack of energy and strength of purpose shown by the English, the murderers, were rarely brought to justice. The assassination of Augustus Margary, a British consular official, travelling with a special pass granted by the Chinese authorities in 1875, was permitted to remain unpunished for over eighteen months, and the compensation extorted from the Chinese by the convention of Chifu was ludicrously insufficient to meet the requirements of the case.

A further example of the policy pursued by this country in regard to China is afforded by the brutal murder of Mr. Fleming, who was done to death on 4th November, 1898, which has not evoked any action on the part of the government up to the present moment.

The failure of this country to take any steps in the matter of the cession of the Liaotung peninsula to Japan, the toleration shown by us of Russian aggressions in North China, our acquiescence in Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and the tacit acceptance of the indefensible Manchurian railway agreement, have all tended, not only to tie our hands and prejudice our interests in the Far East, but to further damage our prestige in the eyes alike of Russia, China and Japan. We stand at present discredited in Eastern Asia, our weakness explained as due to our inability to counteract the action of Russia, and our power to assert ourselves has come, thanks to the repeated vacillations of our government, to be regarded as a negligible quantity. Repeated opportunities for the protection of our interests and the assertion of our strength have been neglected, and our action in regard to recent developments in the Far East has been characterised by a lack of intelligence and want of foresight rarely equalled.

Over and above the impotence displayed by the government in its Asiatic policy, its members seem to have become infected with a terror of Russia almost humorous in its manifestations. Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon, Mr. Brodrick, Mr. Wyndham, practically every member of the administration, appear to be consumed by a desire to refrain from thwarting Russia, so strong, as to tempt them not only to acquiesce in her every move, but to gratuitously justify each succeeding breach of treaties or understandings attempted by that Power. They all appear to have adopted the part of apologist for Russian action ; and each fresh departure on the part of that aggressive Power has been followed by an apologia in the British Parliament.

On 8th February, 1898, Lord Curzon, at that time

under secretary for foreign affairs, said in the House of Commons—

“Up to now Russia has done nothing in respect of Port Arthur which she has not been perfectly entitled under treaty rights to do. Russia has sent ships of war to Port Arthur; and if blame is to be attached to her for so doing, her Majesty's government must be included in the accusation, for a fortnight ago we did exactly the same thing. The right to send ships of war to Port Arthur is a right which we enjoy together with other Powers under the treaty of Tientsin, and, when occasion arises, we shall do it again.”

At the time that this statement was made, Russia was busy fortifying the harbour of Port Arthur, and the demand made by her for the withdrawal of our ships from that place was immediately acceded to by the British government. A few short weeks after the above announcement the formal lease for the cession of Port Arthur was signed, in which occurs the following passage—

“The governments of the two countries agree that as Port Arthur is solely a naval port, only Russian and Chinese vessels are to be allowed to use it, and it is to be considered as closed as far as the war and merchant vessels of other nations are concerned.”¹

The speed with which at this period one Russian undertaking was broken after another served to draw public attention to the weakness of the government; and a debate was held in both houses on the subject of our interests in China, in the course of which Lord Salisbury uttered these words—

“Not only have we not surrendered one iota of our treaty rights, but we have no intention of surrendering them . . . and I will say there is no effort which this country will not make rather than allow those rights to be destroyed.”

Brave words these! Like many others uttered by politicians on the government side of the house, they were relegated to the limbo of forgetfulness as soon as they had served their purpose. Nothing has been done, of any

¹ See Appendix B.

nature whatever, to maintain the unquestioned rights of this country in China, and the evasion of its manifest duty was followed by the government's adherence to the fatuous "peace proposals" of the Tsar, by which it was so thoroughly hoodwinked as to afford considerable amusement to an amazed Europe.

Nor is it only in refraining from combating the advances of Russia that the representatives of this country have neglected their opportunities. Various undertakings of the utmost value to the interests of the country have been neglected until the possibility of their attainment has been lost. England has refrained from using her opportunities for the construction of railways and other undertakings for developing the country, until they have been acquired by rival nations. Even in the valley of the Yangtse Kiang, where British influence is supposed to be supreme, concessions for the construction of railways are held by France, Russia and America, which must prove a constant source of friction when constructed. And after talking of the trunk railway which has been in contemplation between Burma and the Yangtse Kiang for six years, a length of twenty-five miles has been completed out of a total of 230, while Russia has during the same period been pushing her railways on at the rate of 500 miles yearly.

The decrepitude of Great Britain in her Eastern policy is admitted on all hands. The only people who remain in ignorance of what is going on are the government and the masses; and so long as the latter fail to appreciate the true inwardness of events, the government are not likely to attempt to reform. The aggressiveness of Russia is no new development. So far back as 1850, Thomas Taylor Meadows, who knew the Far East thoroughly, wrote :—

"England, America, and France will, if they are wise, wage severally or collectively a war of exhaustion with Russia, rather than allow her to conquer China; for when she does that, she will be mistress of the world."¹

¹ *The Chinese and their Rebellions.*

Every authority who has studied the question, every person who has lived in the Far East, has been agreed as to the gravity of the situation, for years past. Mr. Henry Norman, writing in 1894, says :—

“My own view is that the fate of China will be partition among other nations. China has hitherto ‘salted all the seas that run into her ;’ and obstruction the only force in China upon which it is safe to rely, has served her well. But she has never had to face a prospect like that which lies before her to-day. I think she will ultimately go to pieces under the pressure of the conflicting interests that focus upon her.”¹

Professor Douglas, than whom no one speaks with greater knowledge or authority, said in 1898 :—

“Our government, and other governments, were absolutely blind to China’s condition before the war. They thought an alliance with China was worth a great deal. China has proved herself since to be absolutely useless as an ally, and incapable of resisting any force applied to her. China is a *congeries* of States without any real central power whatever. Dynasty succeeds dynasty, but things are always carried on on the same system. It is possible that England, America and Japan may combine in case of necessity to save China as far as her present frontiers go from the rapacity of Russia. It is of course necessary to our interest to maintain the *status quo*.”

And Mr. Archibald Colquhoun writes :—

“The fact is that our diplomacy as against Russia has been a failure in Asia. The whole history of the Russian advance teaches us that lesson. What is wanted on our side is a plan solidly backed, and a man. Instead we have trusted to phrases and have lived on illusions.”²

The whole of Lord Charles Beresford’s report of his mission to China in 1898–1899 bristles with indictments against the folly and incapacity of the government. During his extensive tour, Lord Charles came into contact with every prominent man in the Far East, and the chorus of complaint which he everywhere listened to was remarkable in its unanimity.

¹ *The Peoples and Politics of the Far East.*

² *China in Transformation.*

The British Chamber of Commerce at Tientsin expressed itself on the subject of British interests in China as follows :—

“ The British section of the Chamber has carefully followed the action of her Majesty’s Government over matters affecting China for some considerable time, and has observed with constantly increasing anxiety the infringements of the invaluable treaty of Tientsin, under which trade has flourished. They consider the existing deplorable state of affairs is very largely if not entirely due to the absolute absence of any definite policy, the complete apathy shown to, or the apparently vague idea possessed of, the extent of British and other interests now placed in jeopardy.”¹

And, again, Lord Charles writes :—

“ From my conversation with Chinese authorities, foreigners as well as British in Peking, an opinion was distinctly formed in my mind that British prestige is certainly below that of Russia. I hardly ever made a suggestion to any prominent Chinese official which I thought might tend to the security of British trade and commerce, that I was not met with the question, ‘ But what would Russia say to that ? ’ The idea is gaining ground all over China that Great Britain is afraid of Russia.”²

It would be easy to prolong such quotations indefinitely. Every writer of reputation who has dealt with the subject is agreed alike as to the decline of British influence, the neglect of British opportunities, and the increase of Russian dominion in the Far East. The damage is done. The only question is, whether it can be remedied and the past retrieved.

The action of Germany and Russia in the seizure of Kiao Chau and Port Arthur served to attract public attention to Far Eastern affairs. The methods adopted by the government for quieting public indignation in regard to Port Arthur have already been discussed, but the government appears to have realised that something more than a justification of its attitude of *non possumus* was required ; and accordingly a catchword was framed and uttered broadcast having for its object the gratifying

¹ *The Break Up of China.*

² *Ibid.*

of the national vanity in the idea that the country had determined to insist on the granting of its demands for equality of treatment and opportunity as compared with other nations in the Far East.

The phrase by which this principle became known was the "open door," its signification being that the door of trade should be kept open for Great Britain in every place where it is made available to any other country in China. The idea is a practical embodiment of the principle of free trade, and, as such, is naturally unacceptable to those nations which are only able to trade advantageously under the imposition of a policy of protection. Of the nations holding commercial relations with the Far East, Great Britain, America and Japan are alike interested in the maintenance of the free trade principle. France is bound to protection in her own sphere, while her trade, like that of Germany, is so small with China proper as to make her comparatively indifferent on the subject of tariffs. Russia is necessarily an ardent opponent of the principle of free trade, for the reason that she is unable to hold her own with manufactured articles except under the favour of rigid protection. At the very outset therefore it becomes evident that the interests of Britain's only effective rival in the Far East are opposed to the principle laid down, and that the "open door" can never be cordially adopted in the Russian sphere of influence.

In order to make the principle operative under existing conditions, it would therefore be necessary for Great Britain to be prepared to exhibit such strength in her determination to bring about the desired end, as would necessitate dissenting countries giving in to her wishes under fear of the employment of effective force.

It has long been apparent to the most casual observer, that Britain's position in the Far East is one of lamentable weakness. Her fleet in the China seas is doubtless capable of holding its own, and would prove a formidable opponent in case of hostilities; but her effective force for the purpose of coercing other countries on land, is, and must remain comparatively insignificant. Yet, despite this fact, the

government took its stand on the policy of the "open door," which it vowed was to be insisted on at all hazards.

Lord Curzon, challenged as to the governmental policy in regard to China on the 1st March, 1898, said:—

"The principles which have underlain the policy of the government are the maintenance of the integrity of China, the preservation of our treaty rights under the treaty of Tientsin, and the most favoured nation rights. These three articles are the main charter of our commercial position in China, and we cannot consent either to their abandonment or infraction."

Lord Salisbury, about the same period, said :—

"There is no doubt that these are suggestions that our treaty rights in China might be set aside, and that the comparative freedom of action which we have achieved by the treaty of Tientsin might be destroyed by the action of other European Powers. I will say that there is no effort which this country will not make rather than allow those rights to be destroyed."

And Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, spoke in a similar strain when he protested :—

"There are interests in which this country is vitally interested and concerned, and of course we are all of us prepared to run the risk of war for interests which we think are vital."

In token of the unanimity of the government in this direction Sir Michael Hicks Beach put the case even more strongly :—

"What we wanted in China was not territorial acquisition. We desired to open it and its hundreds of millions to the benefit of the trade of the world. The government were absolutely determined at whatever cost, even if necessary at the cost of war, that the door should not be shut."

In face of these protestations, no steps were taken by the government to ensure the carrying out of their declared intentions. Manchuria was given over to Russia without protest. Serious interference with our interests at Newchang and elsewhere, were suffered to pass without remark, and after a prolonged wrangle over the terms of the Northern Railway concession, which had been granted

by the Chinese to a British syndicate, the clauses in that concession were materially altered to suit the demands of the Russian chargé d'affaires !

In furtherance of the much advertised policy of the "open door," the government, with a great flourish of trumpets, issued, on the 28th July, 1898, the correspondence which had been conducted between Sir Claude Macdonald and the Tsungli Yamen on the subject of the non-alienation of the Yangtse Valley, where British commerce had obtained a prominence over that of other countries, even greater than at the maritime ports. On the strength of this correspondence it is claimed that we hold an undertaking from the Chinese government never to place any portion of the Yangtse Valley under the control of any other Power than our own. A perusal of the correspondence¹ will, however, serve to show that the undertaking given is of the vaguest. Practically, all that is accorded is a pledge on the part of China not to alienate any land in the valley of the Yangtse Kiang so long as she is herself able to hold that region ; and there can be little doubt but that if England is really intent on retaining her interests in that sphere, she must sooner or later be prepared to oppose the attempt of another Power to dominate it by force of arms.

Yet another instance in which British policy has failed is that of the obtaining of a lease for a coaling station by Russia at Masanpho harbour in Southern Korea. The facts concerning this venture have already been narrated. As soon as the news reached this country, questions were asked in the house as to its truth ; and the government apologists duly replied, with the customary qualification of the breach of Russia's undertaking never to occupy any territory in Korea. It was stated by Mr. Brodrick that it was true that Russia had obtained the lease of a coaling station at Masanpho, that such a concession did not accord any exclusive privilege, and that Russia was well within her rights in acting as she had done. The subject was then allowed to drop ; but it tended to confirm the evidence of governmental incapacity, and to make additionally plain

¹ See Appendix B.

its intention of refraining from any steps, however necessary to the country's interests, which might place it in opposition to Russia.

It would be mere blindness not to see the connection between the eccentricities of British policy in China, and the crisis in which that country is plunged to-day. In the celestial mind, the place of patriotic feeling is filled by an innate dislike to foreigners and their ways. There is a consistent feeling of revulsion against foreign intercourse among the whole of the Chinese population, a feeling which is only to be overcome by dint of a gradual increase in contact, and an abstention from any aggressive measures, such as might lead the people to fear an attempt to force Western ideas on them. The awakening of the Chinese to the parlous condition of their country commenced with their defeat in the Japanese war. Their sense of danger was heightened by the seizure of Kiao Chau, an act utterly unjustified by the murder of two missionaries; and England, who had herself suffered many such losses, and owned the preponderating influence in China, should have insisted on the withdrawal of a claim to Chinese territory as an act of compensation. She failed to do so; and after a second time abstaining from protesting against the spoliation of China by the seizure of Port Arthur, she joined in the scramble and herself took Wei Hai Wei. By this time the Chinese had come to realise that the final partition of their country was only a matter of time, and the more enlightened natives appreciated the necessity of making a stand. The demand of Italy for a lease on Sanmun Bay was peremptorily refused; and those who were in a position to appreciate celestial feeling realised that China was in no mood to accord further concessions. Yet demands continued to be made with increasing frequency. Russia, Germany, France and America each chipped in with its application for exclusive privileges; and England after permitting others to obtain facilities for the development of those districts in which her interests and influence were paramount, joined her demands to the others.

By this time the feeling in China became intense, and the sudden activity of the puny reform party, which succeeded in inspiring the Emperor Kwangsu with its ideas, served to precipitate matters to a crisis. The forced retirement of the emperor, together with his subsequent abdication, and the seizure of power by the dowager empress, were the natural outcome of the indignation which had been aroused. The success of these acts prompted Tsi Hsi to further measures. Feeling secure in the attitude she had assumed, she decided on utilising the opportunity to rid the country of the hated foreigner for all time.

The Chinese rabble, always ready to evidence the relationship between man and the brute creation, responded to her call with alacrity. But the rising of last May served to teach no lesson to the Powers. Its true significance was disregarded, and the development of a movement for the abolition of foreign intercourse was accepted as evidence only of a local rising. All doubt was, however, dispelled by the reinforcing of the rabble by the regular army. The situation was further accentuated by the seizure of power by Prince Tuan, and the inauguration of anarchy in Peking.

And then at last the Powers realised that it was a national war that was being waged against them; and, impotent by dint of their neglect to make preparations, the great nations of the world stood like penned sheep on the outskirts of the empire, waiting until the necessary force could be accumulated, while their accredited representatives with their womenfolk and staffs fought with the energy of despair against the infuriated hell hounds of Peking!

The situation rapidly became one of the most shocking known to history. And, to make matters worse, measures which could with ease have been employed for the saving of the lives endangered, were not taken owing to the petty jealousies of the Powers. Japan alone of those concerned was in a position to hurl large bodies of troops against the fiends who were turning the Legations of Peking into

shambles. Japan expressed her willingness to go forth to the rescue of humanity, but Russia would not permit her ; and England, France, Germany and America stood by, impotent to move a hand to save their kith and kin,—for fear of Russia ! Such actions may be justified on the score of expediency ; but I deny that they are either in accord with the principles of civilisation or Christianity. Rather than tolerate such an *impasse* the nations which pretend to be enlightened, should have made common cause, and at any cost swept the masterful monster whose sway brings a curse in its course, off the face of Asia. The horrors of slavery, the iniquities of the older Indian princes, the atrocities of Ashantee and Benin, all pale before the hideous spectacle of the disunited Powers who rule the world, standing idle, each more intent on its own ultimate profit, than on hastening to the rescue of its imperilled people.

England has much to answer for in her recent conduct. The cost of her inaction has yet to be reckoned, and its settlement is likely to react upon her fortunes for many a day.

The policy of Russia is especially opposed to that favoured by the commercial Powers. No secret is made of her intention to utilise every opportunity afforded by the situation to profit in her aim for the eventual absorption of China, and her refusal to co-operate with the Powers ; and the announcement already made in her semi-official press that her interests are outside those of other countries, and that she intends insisting on the maintenance of the *status quo* at Peking, give promise of a condition of affairs which may necessitate this country having at any moment to choose between declaring war on Russia, or the abandonment of its rights in North China.

The time when ordinary methods would have served to assure Britain's position in the Far East is past. A continued course of neglect to maintain her interests, a repeated acceptance of snubs from foreign Powers, and the absence of an intelligent policy, have served to make her an element of relatively small importance in Asiatic

councils ; and the one means by which she may yet regain her lost opportunities is by the assumption of a capable policy, and the employment of the necessary means to carry it through at all costs.

The one favourable characteristic in the aims of this country in the Far East is to be found in the fact that they are non-aggressive. England seeks no territory, neither does she desire to dominate other nations. Her ambitions are purely commercial, and she wishes only to retain those opportunities for trade and intercourse which she has herself created.

But while she seeks no exclusive privileges, she cannot permit such to be acquired by her rivals. While desiring no favour at the hands of others, she must resist all attempts at the attainment of undue advantages by rival nations, and, above all, is she bound to resent the attempt to close any portion of China or Korea to her trade. While this is the passive policy on which it is her duty to embark, she must remain watchful and ready to oppose any measures which, while not directly threatening the closure of her markets, may yet tend to give undue advantage to another Power. Thus her policy in Korea, while mainly consisting in the further opening up of the country to her trade, must include the maintenance of the *status quo* in all respects, especially in regard to territory, since the adaptability of Korean harbours to naval requirements would enable any Power possessed of one of these to attain an undue superiority in the Far East which might tend to upset the balance of power. In regard to China this necessity is even more obvious. Japan may be trusted to take care of herself, and there is no fear of any Power obtaining territorial concessions or exclusive rights in the island empire.

The direct policy of England towards China, then, must be one of watchful toleration. The quelling of the present trouble must be undertaken jointly by the Powers, or at least by a majority of them. It is only after the rebels have been taught a salutary lesson, and a responsible government has been set up, that it will become necessary

for Britain to give expression to her policy, which, assuming she intends taking her stand on the principles which have been so frequently enunciated, must be to take exception to the cession of an acre of Chinese soil, or the accordance of a single exclusive privilege, to any Power whatsoever. It must be either this, or an avowed abandonment of the "open door" policy, and a substitution of allocated spheres of influence. The adoption of this latter would in all probability be easier of attainment than the continuation of the existing course ; but it would entail a sacrifice of our trade in North China, which would be absorbed by Russia, and in South China, which would be handed over to France. And the further question arises, whether those Powers, Russia most of all, would consent to be bound by any limits which might be drawn, it being highly probable that she would continue that course of repeated and insistent evasion of frontiers by which she has so rapidly overrun the half of Asia.

In order to keep Russia behind her agreed boundaries, it is necessary to line them with a force capable of resisting any attempt on her part to break through. With a cordon such as that maintained by Germany along her European frontier, Russia is quiet enough. With any less precaution, she cannot be entrusted to abide by any undertaking, however binding in terms. The question then arises, can we erect such a barrier in China as will enable us to wall her behind her frontier ? The answer to this question must, I think, be in the negative. The only natural barriers available in that country which might serve the purpose are the great rivers which flow east and west across the land. The Peiho is too far north to content the Russian appetite. The Hoang-ho is unsuited to such a purpose, owing to its course and changing bed, while the Yangtse Kiang is too far south, and serves only to divide the area of the British sphere in two parts. To permit Russia to obtain a firmer footing on the Yangtse than she already has, would be to entail the loss to England of the trade of that region ; but if we do not take steps to secure our interests there,

Russia will usurp them, and that before many months are over.

The prospect of arriving at a friendly demarkation of our respective spheres of interest is thus not very encouraging. Such an arrangement would entail the maintenance of a considerable force of troops in China, would be costly, and would as likely as not prove successful only for a time. But the carrying out of the policy of the "open door" is little easier. By dint of railways and State-supported enterprise Russia can, and will, gradually obtain a preponderating influence in any region on which she has designs, and, having asserted her influence by these means, will not scruple, when things are ripe, to grasp the reward of her temerity. She has already followed out this policy in the valley of the Yangtse Kiang, where, by the Lu-han railway concession, which is really hers, she possesses the right to create a means of access better than our own; and her recent action in the case of the dispute over the land owned by a British firm at Hankow was as unjustifiably arrogant, as was the response made by our Foreign Office puerile.

It is no use any longer concealing the fact that our politicians are no match for the Russians. This is demonstrated by every incident which has occurred between the two during the past twenty years. It is shown by the readiness with which successive governments allow themselves to be dictated to by Russian diplomatists, and by the pitiable weakness displayed towards Russia by Lord Salisbury and his colleagues. To cope satisfactorily with her we require a strong and capable man, aware of the resources of the country and resolute to use them in case of need to secure the preservation of our interests. Such a man we have not got to-day; nor do the circumstances controlling the selection of our rulers give much promise of our finding one. A month of Lord Palmerston or Benjamin Disraeli would have stayed Russian aggression in Asia long ago. And by an enlightened appreciation of the trend of events they would have prevented the recent crisis in Peking, or at least rendered the tragic

circumstances with which it was accompanied impossible.

It comes therefore to this. With a capable man at the helm and a strong policy, Britain is capable of holding her own against Russia and the world. With a continuation of the follies of the past three years, she must continue to remain incompetent; and whether she succeeds in establishing an understanding respecting the "open door," or whether she adopts the alternative and elects for a sphere of influence, it matters not, as, while she remains unstable, she will fail to ensure the respecting of either.

Added strength to her attitude and the adoption of a definite policy are thus vitally necessary to any attempt on the part of England to regain her lost prestige in the Far East. But more than this is needed—much more. The policy above suggested is needful in order that a *modus vivendi* may be arrived at in regard to other nations; but it will not ensure the equally necessary understanding with the native races, or the adequate protection of our interests in their countries. In order to attain these desiderata it is necessary to reorganise our system and offer a premium for that ability among our servants which has hitherto remained at a discount.

The stupid party has ruled Great Britain for too long. Thanks to it we have suffered most of the great misfortunes which have been inflicted on us during our recent history. The war of secession, the Crimean war, the Transvaal war of 1881, and the present struggle in South Africa, all of them unnecessary, were thrust upon the country by the sheer stupidity and incompetence of those entrusted with our rule; and to the same cause may be justly credited the decline in our influence in the Far East.

What have we ever done to win the goodwill of the people of Asia? After forcing ourselves on them, and overcoming their aversion to the opening of intercourse, have we ever striven to impress them with our superiority? We have disregarded their prejudices, instead of overcoming them. We have caused them endless irritation

by our neglect to respect their most treasured predilections. We have carried everything with a high hand, and shot them down without compunction on each attempt to refrain from the advantage of our intercourse; and we have forced our religions on them with such marked want of common sense as to deprive our teaching of its value, and disgust the converts who have come in for ulterior ends. The rival missionary societies in China teach religion each according to its own lights, and are not agreed even as to the Chinese equivalent for the name of the Creator! Small wonder, then, that the celestials laugh at our attempts to reform a people who have followed the same creed for thousands of years, and who from one end of the country to the other are taught the same dogma in identically the same terms.

The folly of our missionary methods is further accentuated by their connection with other interests. If there be any truth in the plaint that the attempted Christianising of the Chinese is undertaken for the good of the people's souls, then should the missionary be kept apart from the trader and prospector. But he is not. The one invariably follows the other; and the Chinese realise that the advent of the disciple of Christ is the symbol of the approach of the "barbarian" trader, who in turn will be succeeded by the concession-hunter and exploiter.

The Chinese are an ultra-conservative and superstitious people. They regard railways much as do the Afghans: as the devil's work, and something to be regarded with horror on account of their affecting the *Feng Shui*, or luck of the country through which they run. Why then force railways on them? Would it not be wiser to continue to gradually open up the country by trading with the natives in those things which they require; and when the country is opened up, and not before, then let railways be built as the people become ready for them. We have refrained from inflicting railways on the Afghans! Why force them on the Chinese?

Nor have our diplomatic relations with the Chinese been more fortunate. Of all the ministers we have sent

to Peking, only two have possessed qualifications which specially fitted them for their post. Sir Thomas Wade and Sir Harry Parkes were both Chinese scholars ; and each having lived in the country for years, possessed an intimate knowledge of celestial character, which enabled him to deal with the Chinese as no others have done since. Instead of choosing the best and most capable man available for such a post, our Foreign Office appoints a rising soldier or consul who has graduated in America or Africa, and whose limit of knowledge respecting China consists of a dim idea that it is somewhere in Asia ! And in regard to Chinese prejudices, we seem to delight in disregarding those which the natives hold most dear, while in less vital matters we endanger our interests by upholding the dictates of their superstition.

The first necessity for this country, if she hopes to regain influence among the Chinese, is to appoint a suitable and competent minister at Peking, who must speak Chinese, and possess a good knowledge of the people. Mr. Jamieson, Mr. Lytton, or Mr. Bourne, three gentlemen who have distinguished themselves by the able manner in which they have performed their consular duties, are men of the type referred to. Recent events in Peking afford an opportunity which should be taken to provide residences more suited to the situation, and better fitted to hold their own against attack than the old buildings. The next minister appointed should be provided with a force of guards sufficient to hold the Legation against any odds, and should be provided with guns and ammunition suited to a lengthy siege. The question of course remains to be settled whether Peking is to continue to be the capital of China, or whether it be removed elsewhere. The most suitable alternative would be to transfer the seat of government to the old Southern capital at Nanking, as was proposed by General Gordon ; but, while such a change would be greatly to the interest of Great Britain, it would for that reason be met by the strongest opposition by Russia and France, and it is hardly likely that it would be carried out.

Beyond improving our representation at Peking, or wherever the capital of China may be, our duty will consist mainly in preserving the *status quo*, not precisely as it exists, but rather as it would exist were the provisions contained in the various treaties carried out. The first necessity in framing a country's policy is to rightly appreciate the attitude of those Powers which are similarly interested. A review of the interests of these in the case of the Far East renders the duty of England in that region clear.

France, Germany, Italy, and the lesser Powers possessing interests in Eastern Asia are by their circumstances passive rather than active factors in the situation. The distance of their Asiatic interests from their naval and military bases must prevent their hastily taking part in any demonstration which is not of vital importance to their prosperity, and the difficulty of maintaining communication with the Pacific must restrain their ambitions in this direction. The conflicting nations, whose interests by no means coincide, and who are in a position to effectively demonstrate their power on the spot, are Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and Japan; and it is the action of these, supported or not by the countries less concerned, that must control the destinies of the Pacific borderland. The United States, possessing, like ourselves, interests purely commercial, may be acquitted of any design of territorial aggression; and the peaceful inclinations of that country must always restrain it from hostile action, except under the greatest provocation. The unsettled state of the Philippine Islands, moreover, is likely to require a continued concentration of American effort in that quarter for some years to come, and must tend to make her the more disinclined for further action in Asiatic waters. On the other hand, the policy of the United States is so strongly in accord with that of Great Britain as to make her our natural ally; and it is safe to regard her as a supporter in any attempt made for the maintenance of commercial intercourse in the Far East.

The interests of Japan are in many respects identical

with those of England, the only point on which they diverge being the territorial question. As I have already pointed out, Japan needs for her continued progress and development an increase of territory, where her surplus population may find opportunities for colonisation; and this need has of late years become so well defined that it is rapidly becoming a question whether Japan is to attain her aim and expand, or whether her people will have to emigrate in search of a means of earning a livelihood. The outcome of this problem rests with the Powers; but it can scarcely be denied that the claims of Japan for an outlet for her crowded people is at least as valid as was the need of Russia for an ice free port, so readily conceded to her by the British government.

In regard to Russia, the lessons of her past history have been so marked as to leave little ground for speculation in the mind of the publicist. Her aim stops short at nothing less than the absorption of Eastern Asia. So long as she is opposed by no Power stronger than herself, she will irresistibly forge ahead, despite pledges, treaties, or understandings; and the diplomatist who is prepared to set any store by her promises must be destined to see the failure of his policy. Any steps adopted for the maintenance of the integrity of China must be taken with the full knowledge of Russia's aim, and no efforts for the opening of the country can succeed, unless they are accompanied by measures for the restraining of Russia's aggressions.

There is only one way in which this end can be attained. Russia must be made to realise that no further extension of her exclusive interests in China or Korea will be tolerated, and that any march she steals on other nations, will be met by her forcible expulsion from the territory she has seized. If she be once given to understand this fact, she will accept the situation, as she has done before, without venturing to risk her forces in a hopeless contest. During the whole of her history Russia has never voluntarily embarked on hostilities with a Power stronger than herself. Her rigid observance of her European frontier bears evidence to the possibility of keeping her

quiet by the silent threat of the employment of force on the first symptom of territorial aggression. As soon as her Asiatic frontier is closed by similar means, Russia will abandon her expansive aims, and settle down to develop the already more than ample territory she has seized. Until that course is followed, she will continue her mischievous tactics and add to the spoils of her duplicity.

Thus it becomes the duty of Great Britain to check Russia, quite as much as it is her policy to maintain the integrity of China. The one is not to be accomplished without the other; and, until the necessary course be taken, there can be nothing but unrest in the Far East.

Yet, curiously enough, this manifest duty does not appear to have been realised by more than a few political students in this country. So far from aiming at staying the continued spoliations of the Tsar, the people of England seem of late to have entered by common consent into conspiring to encourage Russia in whatever she undertakes, and to refrain from even criticising the most outrageous breaches of common honesty in which she so often indulges. This tendency has of late been exhibited alike by the government, the houses of parliament, and a considerable proportion of the press: and one constantly comes across the most persistent disregard of hard facts, exhibited in order that the real issue may be avoided, and the situation met by one of the time-honoured expedients which have always failed; of which the most frequent and most futile is the arrival at "an understanding" with Russia.

A durable understanding with Russia is an impossibility, since, unless it be backed by a display of superior available force, no understanding will be adhered to by that country for a single moment after it is her interest to evade it. England has made dozens of understandings with that astute nation, and always with the same result. She has accepted scores of pledges and solemn undertakings, no one of which has been observed beyond the time that

Russia found it convenient to break it; and it would be utter folly to expect her to turn over a new leaf and adopt an honest system of diplomacy in regard to the Far East, where her interests are keener and her needs more pressing than they have ever been elsewhere.

The history of Russian understandings comprises a record of hypocrisy and want of faith unequalled in modern history. From Khiva to Manchuria from Merv to Port Arthur, her gains have been attained by abandoned pledges and promises withdrawn, which should have sufficed to reveal the value of the Russian word, and the futility of regarding her as a Power to be trusted. The observation by Russia of her undertakings is on a par with that accorded by the Chinese to their treaties. Both people are ever ready to extract themselves from an emergency by signing anything, without the least intention of being bound by it.

The recent action of Russia in regard to the China crisis would serve to open the eyes of any observer whose intelligence was not cramped by the existing pro-Russian sympathy of the government, parliament, and press. The game being played from St. Petersburg (by the author of the historic peace conference) is to pose as the ally and protector of China, in order that, once the rebellion is quelled, Russia may come to be regarded as the best friend of the Chinese, who will, it is hoped, be willing to accept Russian protection, and thus enable her to rule China through the government, just as she does Bokhara, which, while actually Russian soil, remains an independent khanate in name.

The situation is not without a spice of humour. Russia posing as the protector of China is the latest version of the pot calling the kettle black. Except in point of the technical and linguistic education of her "classes," Russia is infinitely behind China in point of civilisation. The government of the celestial empire, nominally a paternal autocracy, is actually that of a republican confederation. China is corrupt, but I doubt whether the corruptness of the mandarinat is greater than that of the Tchinnovnik

classes in Russia. The people, despite their vastly superior numbers, are certainly freer and less liable to police interference than the moujik. The Chinaman is a far better agriculturist than the Russian, and such a thing as an illiterate is practically unknown; whereas in Russia ninety-six per cent. of the population cannot read. The celestial is, moreover, less hampered in his movements than the Russian. He is at liberty to travel from one end of the country to the other without hindrance, and passports are unknown. And, finally, the dislike of the Chinese to foreigners and their impatience of foreign intercourse, while not existing among the Russian people, is fully shared by the authorities, who place every difficulty in the way of strangers who desire to visit their dominions.

Yet with an assurance savouring of impertinence, Russia boasts of her "civilising mission," and pushes on in her attempt to grip the whole of China within her grasp. It is only necessary to turn to those countries which are enthralled under the sway of the Tsar to realise how Russia treats her conquered races. The Amir of Bokhara, the Khan of Khiva, the people of Merv, the Tajiks and Gulches of the Upper Oxus and the Kirghiz of the Pamirs, could their evidence be taken, would be able to enlighten civilisation on that score; and if the true tale were told in all its hideousness, humanity would be bestirred from its self-righteous complaisance and would enter on a crusade for the emancipation of these peoples, to whom the lot of the victims of the erstwhile slave trade was comparative happiness.¹

From any standpoint, then, it is the duty of England to stem the tide of Russian expansion. It is needful, in order to secure the integrity of China, and to maintain that country open to the trade of the world. It is desirable, for the benefit of civilisation in order to prevent the

¹ See Marvin's *Russian Campaign among the Turkomans*, Ravenstein's *Russians on the Amur*, A. C. Yates's *Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission*, Cobbold's *Innermost Asia*, and the author's *Russia in Asia*.

Chinese falling under Russian dominion. It is vital, in order that the further southward march of Russia may be stayed, and her capacity for becoming a great naval Power and disturbing the peace of the world be restricted. It remains to be seen how this duty may be best performed.

The interests of Great Britain in the Far East may be summarised as being comprised in the maintenance of all existing treaty rights in China, Japan and Korea. The safeguarding of such rights entails of course the restraining of any other Power from acts which would result in their infraction; and the prevention of such a course is of fully equal importance to the mere preservation of the rights themselves at the hands of the Chinese. Hitherto it has been deemed sufficient to look to China for the prevention of any interference from outside. This course has, however, failed utterly, partly from the insistent action of other Powers, and partly owing to the inability of China to maintain any course of independent action against the desires of her despoilers. The course to be followed by Great Britain in regard to China is then simple. It may be summed up in two paragraphs setting out the requirements of this country, which, in order to be ensured, must be insisted on if necessary by war. They are:—

1. The maintenance of all existing treaty rights, and the immediate operation of all those clauses in treaties which have so far remained unobserved.

This would ensure the opening up of the whole country to foreign travel, trade, and residence; the opening of the waterways to foreigners, the suppression of piracy, the opening of several treaty ports which remain closed, and the abolition of the *likin* dues.

2. The notification that the cession of any territory, or accordance of exclusive privileges, to any country, will be resented; and the granting of any rights to one Power which are not equally granted to all other Powers is forbidden.

These requirements embody the settlement of the whole

question. But it would be useless to expect that the granting of them by China would suffice to ensure their observance. To this end it would be necessary to send a copy of them to all the Powers, with a notification that Great Britain was determined to insist on their operation, and that no efforts will be spared to render them obligatory.

Such a course, supported by an attitude which left no room for doubt as to our intention to enforce our requirements at all costs, would ensure the observance of our just demands even by Russia ; and the certainty that the United States and Japan would act with us in such a policy places the result beyond the region of doubt. Anything short of that must fail to consolidate our interests, or restore our prestige from the position to which it has become debased to the high place it formerly occupied.

Failing the adoption of the course suggested, it remains only to retreat from the position we have expressed our determination to maintain, and to revert to a policy of spheres of influence, which means a scramble for territory in Eastern Asia. In such a case, Russia would of course retain Manchuria—That is lost to us definitely in any case, and at once assert her dominion over the province of Pechili. France would advance to the Sikiang ; Germany enlarge her sphere of activity in Shantung ; and England would as likely as not witness a struggle between the various parties known to our politics, on the question of the exact limits to be drawn as defining the British sphere in the region of the Yangtse Kiang. The difficulties of demarkating any such sphere of influence have already been descanted on. Without reckoning with the federalists who so seriously interfere in the protection of the country's interests, the problem is beset with difficulties, and, unless held by a strong force ready at any moment to oppose aggression, the maintenance of such limits must be extremely difficult.

England's duty, therefore, is plain in regard to China and the Far East. It comprises the preservation of exist-

ing countries, the maintenance of free trade and treaty obligations, and the opposition of all attempts at infringing the same. It remains to be seen whether our rulers are possessed of a sufficient sense of duty to carry out such a policy ; or whether, by a continuation of their past record of vacillation, impotence, and folly, they allow our trade to be interfered with and our interests to be disregarded, in the coming struggle for empire on the Pacific.

CHAPTER XI

THE STORY OF THE CRISIS

Anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese—British vacillation and its consequences—The trouble in Pechili—Rising of the rabble—Remonstrance of the foreign Ministers—Destruction of the railway—Isolation of Peking—Admiral Seymour's advance—Taking of the Taku Forte—Murder of the German Minister—Capture of Tientsin—News from the Legations—Conflicting rumours—The advance of 1860—That of 1900—Delay on the part of the Powers—Dr. Morrison's letter to the *Times*—Advance of the relief force—Its successful progress—Relief of Peking and succour of the besieged—The arming of the Chinese—Who is responsible?—The Russian press on the situation—The prospect of the future—Difficulties of the situation—The position of Japan.

THE reader who has perused these pages thus far will not be at a loss to appreciate the true inwardness of the events which culminated in the outbreak of last May. While never welcomed by the Chinese, the presence of foreigners among them had, by the lapse of time, come to be regarded as a necessary evil. The profits derived from intercourse with them, and the realisation of the superior force at their disposal—for the lessons of 1839 and 1860 are not even yet forgotten—tended to reconcile the celestials to a continued intercourse with the "outer barbarians;" but while the Chinaman's attitude thus became one of passive toleration, it never exceeded this; and in all the history of the intercourse between the people of the two nations, no well authenticated instance of real friendship or intimate exchange of ideas has been placed on record. Neither have the Chinese ever profited by the opportunities afforded by the presence of

the "foreign devil." The people are to-day as exclusive, as conservative, and as arrogant in their relations with Western people as when they first forced their way upon the natives of Canton in the seventeenth century. European ideas have never found a footing in China. Western learning has always been tabooed, and the methods of our civilisation in point of honesty and communion, have been consistently resisted.

The exhibition of our strength of purpose, and the display of our indisputable capacity to back it up by force if resisted, tended, however, to impress the celestials with the only instinct by means of which they can be influenced—the sense of fear; and by dint of this they had been taught to regard the government of Great Britain with respect.

The vacillation of Lord Salisbury and his colleagues during the events of 1898, however, served to lessen this feeling of respect among the Chinese to a diminishing point, and by degrees they came to regard this country as a decaying Power, which, while at one time a masterful nation, had ceased to be of sufficient importance to be respected. Nor did the action of our rivals in China tend to develop an increased regard in the celestial estimation.

The repeated absorption of Chinese territory, first by Germany, next by Russia, and finally by ourselves, evoked a feeling of irritation among the more intelligent classes throughout the country, which served to encourage them to use their influence on the masses. Among the latter there is always a large proportion ready to seize on any excuse to rise in opposition to the existing state of things. Many millions of Chinese have never been reconciled to the Manchu conquest and the present dynasty. Others are avowed enemies of the Christian religion, which it has for so long been sought to force with such utter want of tact and coherence on the celestials; and others, again, are avowed enemies of the "foreign devils," who, in increasing numbers, have during recent years flocked to their shores, and sought to introduce their inventions and ideas on an unappreciative public. Under these conditions it is easy to understand that the agitation started

last year by certain of the mandarins and literati classes found plenty of sympathisers among the people ; and the astonishment caused by the famous reform manifestoes of the Emperor Kwangsu gave place to a renewed feeling of anti-foreign irritation when the retrogressive edicts of the dowager empress followed the attainment of the *coup d'état*. The most remarkable subject for astonishment in the whole transaction is the failure on the part of the representatives of the Powers at Peking to realise the impending danger. These gentlemen, men who would be supposed to possess some knowledge of men and things, and who should have some appreciation of the celestial character, appear to have lived on serenely in a fool's paradise. None of them succeeded in realising the situation. None ventured to take the most evident precautions, precautions which should, one would suppose, have been taken long before, in order to render the always possible outbreak of anti-foreign rioting futile to endanger their lives. In a city like Peking, with its rabble, measures should be taken to render it possible to place the Legations in a state of siege at a moment's notice. A large store of arms and ammunition should be kept ready for use, and provisions sufficient for a period of several months ought to be in stock. No such precaution appears to have been taken ; and the peril of the Legations, terrible as it was, can only be regarded as due to the thoughtlessness of those responsible for their defence.

On this point there can be no two opinions. Experience has shown over and over again, that however great the disproportion between a defending force of Europeans and an attacking force of Chinese, the former are invariably able to hold their own, so long as their arms and ammunition serve to keep the enemy at bay. No celestial will charge a body of Europeans properly armed. The only tactics known to the Chinese are an assault by means of a rush, and this they will never attempt so long as they have to face a well directed fire. The strength of the Legation garrisons was ample to cope with any force of Chinese which could be brought to bear upon the Legation

walls, in the relatively narrow thoroughfares alongside; and it will be found, when authentic details reach us, that the defenders suffered only owing to scarcity of ammunition and insufficiency of food.

The development of the acute stage of the riotous proceedings which culminated in the siege of the Legations was gradual. Rioting first occurred in Southern Pechili early in January last. The outbreak was not at once connected with any marked anti-foreign feeling; and the abdication of the Emperor Kwangsu on the 24th of that month attracted so much attention as to prevent the combined rising outside the capital being seriously regarded. The fact that no steps were being taken by the authorities to quell the incipient rebellion did not, however, escape the attention of the representatives of the Powers and on the 27th January a united protest was issued to the Tsungli Yamen from the British, French, German, and American Legations, demanding the publication of an edict, characterising the rebels as being dangerous to the State, and declaring the members of the secret societies involved liable to severe penalties. After the usual attempt to evade responsibility, and refraining for some time from taking any action, the Tsungli Yamen replied that the required edict had been issued. The steps taken were however, utterly insufficient, and so evidently due to the influence of the foreign ministers as to be promptly disregarded by those whom they were intended to impress. The activity of the rebels continued; and by the end of April, numbers of a secret society, known as "Sect of the Red Fish," found their way to Tientsin, where a persecution was inaugurated against the native Christians, who in that region are fairly numerous. Property belonging to the French missionaries was destroyed; houses and chapels were sacked and burned. The French minister at Peking remonstrated without effect. Rioters found their way to Peking, and besides attacking the native converts, hurled open insult on any foreigners they chanced to meet. Having thus thrown down the challenge, the rabble gave vent to their

passions, fell upon the railway, and tore up the rails, thus severing communication with the coast.

At this stage the representatives of the Powers appear to have become alarmed, and applied for a number of guards to be supplied from their respective squadrons in Chinese waters, and these were despatched without loss of time. Men, mostly, sailors to the number of 450 in all, reached the Legations in the last week in May; but, beyond this precaution, the ministers do not appear to have taken any measures for withstanding attack.

While the Legations were thus seeking protection in Peking, the rebels continued to gain in strength; and it became known that the lead was being taken by the I-ho-Chuan, a league of Chinese patriots, the chief anti-foreign organisation in North China, known by the name of "Boxers." These conspirators seized the railway at Paoting Fu, and overran the country; murdering all the native Christians, and burning all the mission houses they came across. Messrs. Norman and Robertson, two English missionaries, were assassinated at Yungching; and the rebels flocked towards Tientsin, with the evident intention of capturing the European concessions there, and murdering the foreigners. Villages were attacked and burned, and as the rebels advanced they were joined by numbers of regular troops. The chancellor of the Japanese Legation was attacked by soldiers in the streets of Peking and murdered, and the rabble started stoning Europeans wherever seen.

On receiving news of these proceedings, Admiral Seymour, the senior officer in command at Taku, decided to march to Peking at the head of an international force 2,000 strong. The troops and bluejackets left the coast on the 10th June. Tientsin was reached in safety, but a short distance beyond the allies were surrounded by an overwhelming rabble, and, being unprovided with sufficient guns to force a passage, had to retreat. Meanwhile a Russian and American relief force marched on Tientsin, which place was held by the Chinese. On the 17th June, the Taku forts opened fire on the allied fleets, which

replied with a bombardment. The forts were subsequently taken and garrisoned by British and Russian sailors. This course served to irritate the Chinese, who lost no time in perpetrating further atrocities. A scheme was devised for enticing the foreign representatives at Peking to the Tsungli Yamen, and murdering them there. Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, happened to start early on this errand, and was set upon and murdered in the streets. This act so infuriated the German guards that they fell upon the Tsungli Yamen and destroyed it. Matters had now become serious. Peking was isolated. The railway destroyed, and the telegraph cut. The inmates of the various Legations found themselves besieged by a howling mob of wretches who thirsted for their blood, and the air became thick with rumour from Chinese sources, alternating, from assurances of the safety of the foreigners under the protective influence of the government, to announcements of the bombardment of the Legations and the murder of their defenders.

On the 27th the allies captured the Chinese arsenal at Tientsin. On the 3rd July it became known that Prince Tuan had declared himself ruler on behalf of his infant son, who was acknowledged emperor. This worthy took personal command of the troops, and urged them to destroy all foreigners throughout the province. A reign of barbarism set in, and the streets of Peking began to run with blood.

During all this time no serious effort was made either to cope with the rebels or to relieve the beleaguered Legations. The fact is not creditable to any of the Powers concerned, and, when examined by the light of a knowledge of the attendant circumstances, it appears all the more reprehensible. Judging alike by the nature of the country, the characteristics of the people, and the light of previous experience, it should have been perfectly feasible for a force of from 8,000 to 10,000 men—and more than this were available—to gain Peking by a forced march, and bring succour to the European men, women and children, whose dire distress was echoed in the written

message from Sir Robert Hart which reached Tientsin on the 29th June: "The foreign colony is besieged in the Legations. The situation is desperate. Hasten." Despite the appalling urgency of this message nothing was done, because the allied forces feared to do anything! It was urged that the troops available were insufficient; that the rainy season was beginning, and that the country would soon be impassable; that a very large force would be requisite to storm the walls of Peking;—in short, every difficulty was urged against the making of the attempt. And so nothing was done beyond the ordering of the despatch of troops by Great Britain, Russia, Germany and Japan, the British force being obtained by further denuding the garrison of India, already materially weakened by the drafts made for service in South Africa.

There was no good reason for all this delay. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind but that a small but properly equipped force could have made its way to Peking, and obtained an entrance to that city, in face of any opposition the Chinese were capable of offering. Such a feat had already been performed when the Allies marched on the celestial capital in 1860; and what has been once accomplished by determined men can be accomplished again.

After Mr. Robert Bruce had been repulsed from the entrance to the Peiho in 1859, a force of French and English troops set out for Peking from Taku to obtain the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin. The troops did not reach Pehtang until the middle of July. The united forces numbered 17,000. Sir Hope Grant's command was made up for the most part of Indian troops, including, one Sikh regiment, four Punjaub regiments, and two contingents from Bombay, with two irregular Sikh cavalry brigades. After the Taku forts had been seized, it was found that the whole of the surrounding country was under water, and practically impassable. Sir Hope Grant subsequently wrote: "We encountered great difficulty in dragging the artillery along. The horses got bogged, the guns sank up to their axle trees, and the

waggon stuck fast. At last we were compelled to leave the waggon bodies behind us, and content ourselves with the gun and waggon limbers. The Punjaubees, finding their boots an impediment, preferred throwing them away, and pushed boldly on."

The force was greatly diminished by the necessity to leave men to hold the line of communications. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Allies reached Tientsin on 23rd August (the height of the rainy season). Here camps were formed, and the troops rested until the 8th September, when Sir Hope Grant, at the head of only 1,500 men, marched to Hosiwu, half way to Peking. They met with little opposition, for the reason that the people were already impressed by the force which had marched through their country; and here we find the dominant note to the whole situation. The Chinaman is only to be impressed by force! All other reasoning is wasted on him. Let him see that sufficient force is available, and, without the necessity of using it, he becomes submissive. Let him believe that sufficient force is not available, and he remains a terror.

The losses among the allied troops in 1860 were slight. The only tragedy by which the advance was accompanied was the capture of a party of Europeans, of whom six were barbarously done to death. The only two engagements fought, those at Chan Chia Wan, and Palikao Bridge, both against enormous odds, resulted in the utter rout of the Chinese, and Peking was reached without further adventure, with results that have already been recorded.

What was possible in 1860 is surely possible to-day. The Chinese have not changed. Despite the tuition they have received, their nature remains the same; and, above all, it must be remembered that they have never held their own against a European foe, however disproportionate. The much belauded feats of the "ever victorious army" of General Gordon were performed against a Chinese rabble; and their failure to hold their own on each occasion, with one trifling exception, when they have been opposed to

the Japanese, affords further evidence of their lack of military spirit.

While the representatives of the Powers were thus remaining inactive at Tientsin, events were moving apace around the beleaguered Legations. Various rumours of the wildest description became current. It was stated that the Legations had fallen and their inmates been slain; that the Europeans had been succoured by Prince Tuan and placed for safety in the palace; that the ministers and their staffs had driven off the rabble and taken refuge in a disused palace. Every day brought a fresh statement. On the 20th July a cipher message was received from Mr. Conger, the United States minister. On the 25th came a letter from Sir Claude Macdonald stating that it would not be possible to hold out many more days, and reporting forty-four deaths among the besieged; and on the 26th came another message from Mr. Conger, which read "Relief soon, if at all." Then, after six days of silence, a letter, undoubtedly written by Dr. Morrison, the well known Peking correspondent of the *Times*, on the 21st July, was received by that paper, and published in its columns on the 2nd August. The letter is as follows:—

There has been a cessation of hostilities since July 18: but, for fear of treachery, there has been no relaxation of vigilance. The Chinese soldiers continue to strengthen the barricades around the besieged area, and also the batteries on the top of the imperial city wall; but in the meantime they have discontinued firing, probably because they are short of ammunition. The main bodies of the imperial soldiers have left Peking, in order to meet the relief forces. Supplies are beginning to come in, and the condition of the besieged is improving. The wounded are doing well, the hospital arrangements being admirable. One hundred and fifty cases have passed through the hospital, none of them septic.

The Tsungli Yamen have forwarded to the British minister a copy of a despatch telegraphed by the emperor to the queen, attributing all the deeds of violence "which have been committed to bandits, and requesting her Majesty's assistance to extricate the Chinese government from their difficulties. The queen's reply is not stated; but the Chinese minister in Washington has telegraphed that the United States government will gladly assist the Chinese authorities. This despatch to the queen was sent to

the Tsungli Yamen by the Grand Council on July 3; yet the day before an imperial edict was issued calling upon the Boxers to continue to render loyal and patriotic services in exterminating the Christians. The edict also commanded the viceroys and governors to expel all the missionaries from China, and to arrest all the Christians, and compel them to renounce their faith. Other decrees applauding the Boxers speak approvingly of their burning out and slaying the converts. Their leaders are stated in a decree to be princes and ministers.

Another decree, which was issued on July 18, made a complete *volte-face*, due to the victories of the foreign troops at Tientsin. In this decree, for the first time, one month after the occurrence, allusion was made to the death of Baron von Ketteler, which was attributed to the action of local brigands, though it is undoubted that it was premeditated, and that the assassination was committed by an imperial officer, as the survivor, Herr Cordes, can testify.

The force besieging the Legations consists of imperial soldiers under Yung Lu and Tung Fuh Siang, whose gallantry is applauded in imperial decrees, though their gallantry consisted in bombarding for one month defenceless women and children cooped in the Legation compounds, using shell, shrapnel, round shot, and expanding bullets. The Chinese undermined the French Legation, which is now in ruins; but the French minister was not present, M. Pichon having fled for protection to the British Legation on the first day of the siege.

The greatest peril we suffered during the siege was from fire; the Chinese, in their determination to destroy the British Legation, burning the adjoining Han-lin Academy, one of the most sacred buildings in China, and sacrificing the unique library, which has been reduced to ashes. The Chinese throughout, with characteristic treachery, posted proclamations assuring us protection, and the same night made a general attack in the hope of surprising us unawares. There is still no news of the Pei-tang Cathedral.

The following are the casualties:—Killed.—British—Captain Strouts, R.M.L.I., Messrs. Phillips and Scadding, civilians, Messrs. David Oliphant, consular assistant, and Henry Warren, student-interpreter; Italians, seven; Russians, three, and M. Sitroff, of the Russo-Chinese Bank; Germans, ten; Austrians, four, including Captain Thormann, commander of the *Zenta*, cruiser; Americans, seven; Japanese, Captain Ando and five marines, M. Nikamura and M. Kojima, students; French, M. Herbert and eight men, M. Wagner, of the Chinese customs, and M. Gruintgens, engineer. The wounded number 138, including Captain Halliday, severely, the American surgeon, Dr. Lippitt, severely, and Captain Myers

who are all doing well. All the ministers and the members of the Legation and their families are in good health, and the general health of the community is excellent. We are contentedly awaiting relief.

The receipt of this letter served to stimulate the Allies to action. On the 6th August a force of 12,000 strong, consisting of British, French, Russians and Japanese marched, out from Tientsin for the rescue of the Europeans in Peking. After a brief and futile resistance on the part of the body of rebels two miles beyond the city, the Allies marched on Peitsang, where the Chinese had thrown up earthworks, with the object of giving battle. They were speedily driven out and put to flight, and a second stand was similarly overcome at Yangtsun. The result was never in doubt. A squadron of Indian cavalry got in among the Chinese and promptly routed them, with heavy loss; and the Allies resumed their march without further molestation, until just after reaching Tungchow, where another skirmish left the road to Peking open.

The celestial capital was entered without serious opposition on the 15th August, thus ending a siege which had kept the inmates of the Legations prisoners ever since the 10th June.

The whole of the circumstances which had led to the attack on the Legations will probably never be known. The dowager empress and Prince Tuan, the ringleaders in the anti-foreign conspiracy, have fled, it is reported, to Sigan Fu, the ancient capital of China. The Emperor Kwangsu is reported to have fled, and none but minor Chinese officials remained, but there is reason to believe that recent events, if not actually inspired by Russian agents, were encouraged by Muscovite protestations of friendship for the dowager empress, who thus became primed for the execution of her plans. The greed for territory and the love of intrigue are equally strong in the Russian character; and her policy of backing up the Chinese against the European Powers in order that she might pose as the protector of China for her own ends, has been

consistently displayed during the past six months. The supplying of improved armaments to a race permeated with hatred of Europeans would be in line with this policy ; and the scandalously outspoken manner in which the semi-official Russian press has dealt with the situation leaves little doubt as to the real aims of the ministers of the Tsar. In Russia the press is so strictly censored that nothing can be published without the official imprimatur. Any outspoken articles may be safely credited to the inspiration of the powers at St. Petersburg, and as such supplies a fair index to the trend of Russian policy. A few extracts from such "literature" may be instructive.

In the *Gazeta* of the 22nd June appeared an article on the situation of M. Avsseyenko, a well known Russian writer :

"The danger is, that the restless British policy may regard the present state of affairs as a suitable opportunity for extending its 'sphere of influence' in China, and for disturbing Russia's great interests in the Far East. For such a change in the position Russia must hold itself fully prepared ; and it must be mindful of the fact that Great Britain always treats cautiously an opponent ready to strike."

The Russian journalist then goes on to prove that Russia is in the fortunate position of being able to concentrate large bodies of men between Tientsin and Peking far more speedily than any other Power.

"By making proper use of this advantage, Russia must win equally in Europe as in Asia. Great Britain will be compelled to operate in the most circumspect manner, and a political victory gained over the British love of discord will be in itself a great gain, which will enhance the international standing of the fortunate opponent. A waiting and threatening rôle assumed by Russia in China would beyond a doubt result in making the most favourable impression from a Russian aspect. The Asiatic races and governments respect force far more than magnanimity. If Russia will co-operate with the other Powers in suppressing the revolt, and in so doing take the leading place by virtue of the number of its bayonets and field guns, it would then be, in the eyes of the Chinese, the first Power entitled to a decisive voice in settling the affairs of the Far East."

On the 1st July the official *Bourse Gazette* of St. Petersburg published the following rhapsody :—

“ Russia, which went solid with Europe so long as it was a case of stern necessity that it should play a leading part in delivering the foreign ambassadors and subjects, and delivering Tientsin and Peking, can work with neither Great Britain nor with Germany so soon as these tasks are achieved. There is no doubt that a different construction is put upon ‘satisfaction and guarantees’ in London and Berlin than is the case in St. Petersburg and Paris. The whole policy of Europe in dealing with China since 1895 has been engaged solely in obtaining guarantees and satisfaction from the Peking government for its missionaries, merchants and every kind of agent. Thus it is that we see to-day the results of this exercise of force in the name of civilisation. Russia has not the least occasion to wage war upon China for the sake of satisfaction and guarantees which it does not need. From Tientsin the Russian troops will go to set free Peking, and so soon as Peking is relieved, then Russia’s military work in China will cease. Everything in the history of the Russo-Chinese relations teaches us that the ‘kingdom of the middle’ can count upon the support of Russia, not only in suppressing the revolt, but also in ridding the capital of the presence of foreign troops.”

On the same date the *Nova Vremya* joined in the chorus in these words :—

“ If it is seen that the ‘big fist’ movement is threatening the Chinese government, then Russia can march on Peking to help the government against the rebels. But if there is no such danger, and if the Chinese regular forces oppose the foreign troops, then it will be illogical to seize Peking. Such a step would be the beginning of hostile action against China. Perhaps other Powers will not be disinclined to begin a war with China ; but Russia has no such wish. Russia aims only at restoring law and order in China.”

On the 6th July the same widely read organ of Russian opinion returned to the charge in this diatribe :—

“ As Russia is not at war with China, but is fighting only against a rebellious outbreak on the part of the people, it must await the development of events, and at the same time take all necessary steps for meeting accidents. That this is the course of action to be pursued is proved by the mobilisation of the troops

in the Amur territory, and by calling up the Siberian reserves." The *Moscow Vedomosti* believes that Great Britain and Japan are "laying their heads together against Russia," and calls upon Russia to keep a very watchful eye upon such an alliance. "In settling the approaching difficulties in China, Russia must step forward in the full panoply of its might and with a complete appreciation of its aims, so that simply by the charm of its unconquerable might it may bring to nought all attempts to injure its lawful interests."

And the *Svet*, a most typically Muscovite production, harangued its readers thus:—

"It is now the moment for all the Powers, and especially for Russia, to recognise the indisputable fact that there is no room in China for Great Britain; that the time has now fully come for putting a limit to British lust, and that now the most favourable moment has arrived for revealing the weakness of Great Britain and for settling our long list of accounts with that Power. Fate itself has played into Russia's hands. Never before was the condition of affairs so bad for Great Britain, and never before was she so helpless. Fate now gives us the possibility of overthrowing the artificial might of Great Britain without going to war with it; and this opportunity must be made the most of."

The unanimity in tone among these papers leaves no doubt as to their vaticinations being inspired; and their marked hatred of England is endorsed by the more reputable *Grashdanin*, which draws attention to the fact that Great Britain has allied herself secretly with Japan, and that if either of these Powers get a footing in China they will never leave it. This view is furthered by the *Svet*, which urges that the intrusion of Japan in China must be regarded as equivalent to an invasion by Great Britain.

In face of such views it is of course hopeless to expect Russia to honestly co-operate with the Powers in the reforming of China; and her efforts are more likely to be devoted to hindering concerted action in the hope of gaining advantages for herself, than in aiding at the regeneration of China.

But is such a reformation under existing conditions possible? I think not. The racial antagonism between

the Chinese and Europeans is too marked to allow of any mutual understanding. The actual bitterness of its rivalry is only now for the first time being shown; and we realise that even men who are acquainted with Western methods, and have used them to their own ends, men like Li Hung Chang and Chang Chi Tung, are avowed enemies of the European. The highest ideal of the celestial is to reserve China for the Chinese, and to rid the country of the foreigners' presence for all time. By means of force the Chinese may be restrained. The government may be reconstituted or patched up; the cities may be dominated by armed men: but a friendly feeling is not to be developed between the ancestor-worshipping oriental and the exploiting European!


What, then, is the way out of the difficulty?

Frankly there is none. China must always remain a protesting Power, and the only means possible for preventing the recurrence of tragedies such as that which has so recently been averted at Peking, is to deal out such a penalty to those of its perpetrators who may be caught, as will not be forgotten for a century to come; and to follow this up by the maintenance of a force in China sufficient to dominate the country. The action of Russia in the case of Geok Tepe is the only one which would meet the present case. Peking, or at least the inner forbidden city, with its sacred buildings, should be razed to the ground. Its site might be devoted to the erection of a series of monuments inscribed with inscriptions explanatory of their origin and with a warning that the destruction of the imperial palace and the execution of its offending inhabitants was undertaken by the Powers, as a penalty for the atrocious attack on their representatives; with the additional threat, that a repetition of the offence will be followed by the destruction of the whole city and the extinction of its population.

It is scarcely likely that such a course of action will be taken. Great Britain, which has even distinguished itself by a reluctance to employ strong measures, however necessary, would probably recoil from such a step. Russia,

in furtherance of her hypocritical policy of friendship for China, would certainly protest; and the sacrifice of property involved would doubtless deter the Powers from such a revenge. But no amount of indemnity, no series of edicts, however stringent, will suffice to bring the enormity and inhumanity of the offence home to the Chinese, or secure an immunity from its recurrence at a future time.

Nor is the acuteness of the situation limited to its hopelessness. By common accord, necessitated by stress of circumstance, Japan has received the mandate of the Powers to deal with the Chinese rebellion. However helpless the Powers may momentarily be, such a step is lamentable to the interests of the Far East. The strength which the island empire will secure by the free hand she has attained, must react on the interests of all countries, and tend to give Japan an altogether disproportionate power in the future of the Pacific. That the Japanese are alike more civilised and more cultured than the Russians is unquestioned. But their dominion of China would for that reason be the more disastrous to European, and more especially to British interests. Russia in arming the Chinese, and there is good reason to suspect that she has been guilty of this crime, aimed at gaining a future alliance with the celestials for the purpose of controlling the entrance of Japan. Japan, if she once succeeds in gaining the control of China, will possess not only the means to combat Russia and check her advance, but to dictate to the Powers interested in further Asia. Her presence on the mainland of Asia would entirely change the situation, with consequences vital to the interests of the Powers. The whole balance of interest would become changed. A consideration of that balance and its effect on the future of the Far East may be deferred to a fresh chapter.



CHAPTER XII

THE PROSPECT

Causes controlling the future of the Far East—Civilisation bound to triumph over barbarism—Dislike of hearing the truth—British interests imperilled in Asia—The remedy—Necessity for prompt and decisive action—Contrast between British and German methods—Germany's Asiatic policy—The United States—The future struggle—Tangible interests—Contrasts in method—The balance of action—The financial question—China's debt—The debts of Western Powers—The ambitions of Russia—Prospects of their fulfilment—The absorption of Manchuria—Mongolia—North China—Lessons of history—The prospect.

THE future of the Far East is governed by so many and such various sets of circumstances, that an attempt at forecasting its probable outcome must be preceded by an examination of the different factors at work. The interest in the politics of further Asia has always centred in China, which in a sense is the dominant element in the whole, and China is at the moment in a state of flux which may have results startling in its ultimate consequences.

Although, by a mutual understanding among the Powers, the existing developments in the celestial empire are not regarded as constituting a state of war, the situation during the siege of the Legations can only be summarised as an attempt on the part of the Chinese to rid themselves once and for all of the presence of the hated foreigner, and far from being on friendly terms with the rest of humanity, China may be said to be at war with civilisation.

The ultimate outcome of this condition of things is, of course, clear. Civilisation, by dint of its superior force and resources, must triumph, and revolting barbarism is

destined to lie at the mercy of the nations it has flouted.

But while the eventual result is foredoomed, its attainment must be largely governed by the attitude assumed by the various Powers concerned. And the means employed carry with them vast possibilities to each. A careful analysis of the policies of Europe must convince the logical reasoner that any satisfactory solution of the whole question by dint of a mutual understanding is impossible. And, further than this, it must be evident that those various subterfuges by which certain nations seek to protect their interests without increasing their responsibilities must invariably fail, and in the end necessitate either the abandonment of the aim sought, or entail far greater expenditure of blood and treasure than would have been necessary if the needful steps had been taken at the outset.

Of all countries, Britain is the worst offender in this respect. She has ever refused to be forewarned, and no single emergency in her historic record has yet found her prepared. Like the trader whose business has developed out of proportion to his capital, she is placed metaphoric-ally on her beam ends at the first set back ; and while her marvellous resources, aided by the wonderful energy of her people, has so far invariably served to right her, and enable her to emerge more or less unscathed from her peril, it would be extremely dangerous to make a precedent of her successful struggles, which should never have been entailed, or to rely on a continuation of her past extraordinary luck in the future.

It is the custom to place the discredit of our lack of preparation for emergencies on the shoulders of the government for the time being. This is not just. However shortsighted a government may be, it is in the hands of the country, and with the country rests the power, to insist on the carrying out of its behests. But the nation will not concern itself in matters of the utmost interest to its prosperity and existence. To take but one example ; one only has to look at the War Office, an establishment

which has consistently proved itself incompetent, has on more than one occasion imperilled the very existence of the empire, and is a monument of arrogant incompetence and self-sufficiency. On the outbreak of the Transvaal war the War Office made the country the laughing-stock of Europe. By its ignorance, unpreparedness, and neglect, it sacrificed hundreds of lives, wasted millions of money, and enabled the rebel Boers to all but succeed in their attempts to drive the British in South Africa into the sea. The result was an outcry from one end of the country to the other. "The War Office must go" was the cry; corruption and society influence must be abolished; the system must be reformed; and similar expressions of opinion were heard on all sides. And what has been effected? Nothing! No attempt has ever been made to obtain a fair and full inquiry into the maladministration during the present campaign, and nothing will be done, for the disgrace of 1899 is already forgotten; and in the event of our becoming plunged in a fresh war, the same scandals would as likely as not be repeated.

So long as the British public remains content to retain incompetence at the helm of state, so long will the ship of empire be mismanaged. And there are more serious possibilities for the country than a campaign against a body of 40,000 rebellious Boers.

It is a custom among a certain class of people to regard the utterance of any unpleasant truth as the act of an alarmist, an alarmist in the sense of a person who talks nonsense which may be safely disregarded. If a publicist draws attention to an unfriendly act on the part of Russia, he is branded as a "Russophobe," and as such treated with disdain. If he ventures to query the proclaimed superiority of our fleet, his question, instead of being answered, is pointed at in derision. An indication of possible danger to the empire, because it supplies unpleasant reading, is viewed as an offence; and so repeated warnings are disregarded, and their authors sneered at.

Aware of all this, I still have no hesitation in pointing out that British interests in the Far East are gravely im-

perilled. That our fortunes in Eastern Asia are close on a turning point. That a great crisis is at hand, and that we are utterly unprepared to cope with it.

The policy of England in Asia has for years past been that which is prompted by the gambler's instinct. We have staked much without effecting any insurance; and for the security of our capital we have relied on luck. In the result, I admit that we have hitherto not been disappointed. We have been far luckier than we deserved. But luck is fickle, and has a knack of turning at times, and it would be the utmost folly to continue such an impotent course.

During the whole of the passing century Britain has been expanding her empire, which now reaches to the uttermost ends of the earth. She has, during this period, made no attempt to increase her defences proportionately to her liabilities. It needs no disquisition on my part to prove to demonstration, that in face of the current international honesty and state of political parties, a possession can only be regarded as secure so long as its owner is in a position to retain it against any attack which may be directed against it. And I assert that, despite the much boasted strength of the British fleet, and the undoubtedly splendid material of the British army, England is not in a position to defend her interests in the Far East, and that she will lose them, unless she is prepared to replace her past indolence by a hastened activity, and provide those means for defence which she at present lacks. The entire normal British garrison in the Far East, where our interests predominate over the total of those possessed by all the other Powers, is under 3,000 men! Our usual fleet in Eastern waters has long been unequal to the combined strength of our enemies. To deal with any sudden trouble in that quarter we rely on the despatch of reserve vessels from home, and troops from India. But the time necessary for the despatch of a squadron from home, or even from the Mediterranean, is crucial to the issue, and the strength of our army in India is never all that is desirable. At any moment that our attention

happens to be required in two opposite parts of the world, our forces in one or both must prove inadequate ; and our fate may rest at the mercy of a long despised foe.

The state of things which has been allowed to continue in China for the past forty years would be ludicrous were it not lamentable. With a trade of upwards of fifty million sterling, spread over a gigantic empire, with some 12,000 subjects resident in the country, with interests extending from the gulf of Pechili to the gulf of Tonkin, England is not in a position to place a guard of a thousand troops in any part of China in less than five weeks without dangerously weakening the insignificant force at Hong Kong. What value can the British government place on our possession in the Far East ? How can it hope to protect our interests in that quarter of the world ?

A careful review of the circumstances involved leads infallibly to the conclusion that England in the past has been blind alike to her interest and her duty. She has consistently shirked facing her responsibilities, and sought to meet them by subterfuges pitiful in their insufficiency. Among the most favoured and most futile of these are the principles known by the catchwords "buffer State" and a "friendly understanding." By the former is implied a nominally independent, and usually powerless country which is interposed between a British frontier and that of a rival Power, with the object of keeping the two apart, and receiving the full brunt of the shock in any attack which may be aimed at the territory under British rule. The latter oft-used means of obtaining a *modus vivendi* is predestined to failure for the reason that England never seeks to take steps to ensure the carrying out of the terms of any understanding arrived at, which is accordingly evaded by the signatory Power the moment it becomes her interest to waive it. A "friendly understanding," supported by an effective garrison capable of enforcing its terms in the event of any attempt at its breach, may remain effective for all time ; but, without some such safeguard, no convention is worth the paper it is written on. To put it plainly, Britain seeks to

maintain her empire "on the cheap," and, above all, to conduct it with regard to those insular prejudices to which so many of the English people have become wedded without ever having carefully thought them out. Of these the most invidious is the presumed aversion of the British public to conscription in any form. No government dares to pluck up courage to face this prejudice; and in consequence our army remains disproportionately weak, and absurdly costly, as compared to the country's needs.

In relation to the Far East the continuation of these absurdities is doomed. The time has arrived when Britain must make up her mind whether her interests on the Pacific coastline are worth preserving or no. If the answer be in the affirmative, the cost must not be shirked; but our strength must be increased until it reaches the same standard as that of our rivals on the spot. If the answer be in the negative, then it will be wise to reconcile ourselves to the loss of our Asiatic prestige, and to gracefully retire from the Chinese empire before we find ourselves ejected by our rivals and the Chinese.

The difficulties of the present situation are considerably complicated by the conflicting interests of the Powers concerned. Nor are their varying characteristics calculated to enable them to work harmoniously together. The action of Britain and Germany may be said to represent the two extremes. The former has throughout her intercourse with China exhibited a mildness and a readiness to be deceived, ill calculated to develop a sense either of fear or respect among the Chinese. Germany has indulged in her national characteristic of bullying to such a degree as to cause the celestials to regard her with a hatred even greater than that with which they view Russia. Apart from her utterly unjustifiable seizure of Kiao Chau, Germany's whole relations with the Chinese have been tinged by an attitude of brutality. The behaviour of Prince Henry of Prussia during his visit to China was throughout insolent and patronising, and made a very bad impression not only on the Chinese, but on all with whom he came into contact; and the conduct of Baron

von Ketteler during his residence in Peking was that of a conqueror rather than an ambassador. In regard to their personal bearing, the Russians are far wiser than the Germans. Count Cassini, M. Pavloff, and M. de Giers were alike famed for their politeness and geniality; and though they neither of them spared the celestials, and lacked all scruple in the attainment of their ends, their conduct in their intercourse with the mandarins has invariably been such as to gratify the conceit of those functionaries, and the utmost care has been taken to avoid giving them offence. Notwithstanding the uncouthness of German manners and the roughness of Teutonic diplomacy, the Kaiser's agents have served him well, and by the exertion of sheer brute force have attained a position in China which bids fair to make Germany a very formidable rival of Great Britain in the near future. In her methods there are two features, which, utterly lacking among British officials, tend to simplify the attainment of her aims, and increase the respect, bred of fear, with which she is regarded by the Chinese. Germany is in her oriental policy alike insistent and stable. Protests do not affect her. Her course of action is dictated not by a party government liable to lose office, but by a patriotic dictator who realises what the country needs, and strives to attain it at whatever cost, and, having decided on the course desirable, it is followed persistently until attained. By the employment of these means Germany has, in the brief space of two years, attained a voice in the councils of China equal to that possessed by Great Britain after two centuries of intercourse with that country. And, as the celestials have learned that Germany always carries out her threats, while England rarely threatens and seldom acts, the contrast in the appreciation of the two by the Chinese will be understood. It is indeed safe to predict that whatever the ultimate outcome of the present situation in China, Germany will profit; while Great Britain will emerge with a loss of prestige and decreased influence, never to be regained.

It has been suggested that a species of alliance is about to be arranged between this country and Germany in regard to the Far East. It has been stated that the interests of the two Powers are identical in Further Asia, and that united they would be able to control the destinies of empire on the Pacific. This supposition was hazarded by a prominent statesman at the beginning of the present year, and was welcomed in many of our most influential journals. It seems to me that the suggestion is on the face of it manifestly absurd, and a little consideration will show its utter fatuity.

The main principle in the policy of Germany must always be a *modus vivendi* with Russia. This end is not the outcome of any racial or friendly feeling, but is due to the merest necessity. Without in any way feeling called upon to endorse the policy of Russia, Germany would never avow herself opposed to it, so long as her own interests are not jeopardised. The policies of Great Britain and of Russia are so opposite as to render them unreconcilable; and any Power entering on an alliance with this country in regard to the Far East must oppose Russia by its tacit adherence to Great Britain. For this reason, then, no Anglo-German alliance is possible, and there is yet another. The ambitions of Germany are by no means limited to the development of her Chinese possessions. Her aim is directed rather towards the Western hemisphere, where she has designs in South America which must bring her into rivalry with the United States. The founding of a Teutonic empire in the neighbourhood of the Brazils, a feat of which little has yet been heard, but which is nearer attainment than is supposed, must give great offence to the North American republic; and it would be impossible for Great Britain to support Germany in such a venture. Germany knows this, and has no intention of strengthening the hand of England in Asia without an adequate return. All ideas of a German alliance may therefore be abandoned as chimerical and absurd.

The Kaiser's present policy is one of pause. He sees

in the present situation in China an opportunity for profit. If the lives of two missionaries are worth a whole province, that of an imperial minister is worth half an empire; and though it is scarcely probable that the murder of Baron von Ketteler will be made the excuse for a further piece of land-grabbing, there can be no doubt that Germany will demand a price such as will astonish the world. The large force now on its way to China, where it was despatched with much bombastic leave-taking by the Kaiser in person, has not been sent to far off Asia to practise route marching. It is intended to supply a force available to secure any demands which may be made; and the fact that no hint has yet been given of Germany's intentions in this direction prompts one to believe that her claims when made will be heavy ones. And the means available for enforcing such a claim will serve to further strengthen the position of Germany in the Far East, and by contrast weaken that of England to a further degree.

For this situation Britain has herself to thank. But for her pusillanimous timidity in the past, Germany would not to-day be in the position she is in with regard to the Far East. Without her consent, encouragement and assistance, she would never have tasted the joys of colonial existence. Her colonies in Africa and the Pacific have been gained only by the aid of Great Britain, in more than one instance by direct transfer from that country, and her ambition for increased world-power has been largely increased by the secret treaty arrived at between the two countries over East Africa, which, when it is disclosed, will be found to be a very one-sided one for this country. Britain, having helped Germany to become a colonial power, is about to find that she has raised a Frankenstein likely to prove too powerful to be quelled, and by doing so she has rendered her own prospects in the Far East worse than they ever were before.

Nor is Germany suffering the grass to grow under her feet while waiting developments. She is leaving no stone unturned to equip herself for the coming struggle which

she means to win. The immense development in the German mercantile marine of late years is unparalleled in mercantile history. In the past twenty-five years it has increased by a thousand vessels with a capacity of upwards of 800,000 tons, and by dint of liberal subsidies she is rapidly getting the passenger traffic of the world into her hands. With a view to protect her shipping she is now busily engaged in constructing a navy, which as soon as the requirements of the naval act of 1898 are carried out, will give her twenty battleships and forty-five cruisers, a navy, which in proportion to the length of coast line it has to guard, will be vastly superior to the British. But this programme is merely tentative. The latest naval enactment provides for an expenditure of one hundred millions sterling in addition, spread over nineteen years; and when this is complete in 1920, she will possess forty battleships and sixty-five cruisers.

The one Power which might be looked to for support in traversing the aims of Germany in Asia is the United States. But an examination of the methods of that country does not encourage a hopeful forecast. In one respect America resembles Great Britain, for her policy is equally fatuous and unstable. The exterior policy of the United States is controlled not so much by the empire's interests as by the periodic clamourings of political parties; and steps fraught with peril have been more than once taken in response to the outcry of an influential elector, or as a sop to a wavering clique. Neither country appears to realise that foreign policy is something altogether apart from party wirepulling; that it concerns the existence of the nation, as well as the continuance of office; and that the first duty of a State is to take the necessary measures for living at peace with its neighbours, in order that its prosperity may be assured. Neither of America's ventures into the field of colonial empire has been remarkably successful. Cuba is likely to prove a white elephant of the first degree. The Philippines, despite the two years which have elapsed since their seizure, remain in a state of rebellion; and the one creditable episode in the whole

transaction was the attitude exhibited by Admiral Dewey to the German admiral who sought to interfere at the bombardment of Manila, a course which undoubtedly prevented the execution of a plan by which the Kaiser sought to gain a footing in the islands equally with the United States.

In respect to her newly-attained empire, the American republic has much to learn, but it can only tend in the end to her advantage. She will realise ere long that foreign colonies carry with them grave responsibility, and that the intercourse rendered necessary by their possession, with foreign nations, demands the highest qualities of diplomacy, which cannot be replaced by mere bluff. In short, we shall see America learning to "go slow," and as she comes to realise the perils inseparable from world power, she will come more and more into line with our own requirements, and tend to take joint action in common emergencies. For the present, the United States is given rather to shirk responsibility, and, like ourselves, suffers indignities at the hands of other nations which demand prompt resentment.

With regard, however, to an alliance between the two countries, I am as sceptical as in the case of Germany. Like ourselves, the Americans are intuitively distrustful of foreign understandings, and anxious to avoid the imbroglios into which they are apt to lead. And to quote Professor Reinsch,¹ "the day of alliances is over. The struggle of the future will be commercial, not political, and in commerce all are rivals, for trade implies a struggle for existence." The aims of England and of America are in this respect identical. Each seeks to develop its trade with as small a capital expenditure, and as little risk as possible, and neither cares to embark in gigantic ventures which may result in loss. But while thus at one in point of policy, the difference in the position of the two countries is so great as to affect them very differently. America, having no prestige to maintain in the Far East, can afford to limit her opportunities

¹ *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century.*

within the bounds of circumstances. Britain has much to lose in China apart from her trade, for her prestige there affects her repute in India, and to imperil that would be to shatter the foundations of the empire.

The United States possesses on the other hand one very marked advantage over Great Britain in regard to her traffic with Eastern Asia. She is so very much nearer; and her base in the Philippines, when those islands are finally pacified and brought under an enlightened rule, will prove of inestimable value as a centre of distribution. Indeed it will probably be found that the importance of these islands as a commercial centre will transcend their value as mere territorial gain; and their utility is enhanced by the possession of the various Pacific islands which lie between them and the American coast-line.

The relative influence of the various Powers in the Far East must, however, be weighed with regard to the tangible interests by each in that region. In this connection the stake possessed by Great Britain is immeasurably greater than that of all the others put together; and it follows that this country should exert a control correspondingly great in the international councils affecting Far Eastern countries. I have already shown that this is not the case; and the reader who has followed me thus far will divine that the decline of British influence is entirely due to the shortcomings of British policy. It is true that the onus of this condition of things does not rest *ab initio* on the British government. It is due to our politicians to own that the causes which have destroyed our prestige in the Far East have been set in motion by the agents of rival Powers. The responsibility of our government lies in the fact that it has consistently refrained from taking steps to resist the efforts made by these persons to oust us from our once assured position. There has during the past two years been an active conspiracy, in which the representatives of Russia and France, aided at times by Germany, have openly attacked our interests and affronted our agents. The aggressions have at times come near exceeding the common limits

of diplomatic courtesy. To quote only one instance given by Mr. A. R. Colquhoun.¹ For thirty years it had been the custom for the British minister at Peking to rent every year from the Tsungli Yamen a disused temple in the hills outside Peking as a summer residence for the Legation staff. The first act of Count Cassini on taking up his residence as Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Peking was to outbid the British minister for the temple; and the glee with which he referred to it at the close of spring advertised the jubilation he felt at the slight thus inflicted on his rival. In a country like China, the occupation of a building, so long and regularly tenanted by the British Legation, by the Russian minister, could not be wasted on the observant natives; and the smartness of the Russian diplomatist doubtless contributed to that decline in British influence which has of late years been so marked in China.

Enough has been said on the subject of British policy to demonstrate the utter inefficiency of the means employed to either deal with the situation or protect our existing interests in China. The British record in the Far East during the past two years, has been a catalogue of neglected duty and wasted opportunities. We have suffered Russia, France and Germany to spoliage the celestial empire and to make inroads on our interests and our spheres. We have tolerated the breach of treaties, the outrage of understandings, and the disregard of pledges. We have condoned the withdrawal of guarantees given for value received; have winked at political outrages, and countenanced acts, the true import of which is yet to be seen. China and Korea have been earmarked along their frontiers, whole provinces have been scheduled over, and preliminaries to future aggressions been approved.

While Great Britain has permitted these aggressions, she has taken steps neither to gain for herself corresponding advantages, nor to preserve in their integrity those privileges which she has long enjoyed. While protesting

¹ *The Overland to China*, p. 183.

as to her determination to uphold the principle of the "open door," that door has been slammed in her face by Russia and by France, and is now in process of being bricked up. Her announcement of her intention to maintain her influence in the Yangtse valley at all costs, repeated by Mr. Brodrick so recently as the 15th August, was discredited on the following day by the counteracting of the order to land British troops for the protection of the British settlement at Shanghai, on the mandate of the French consul at that place; and an amused world was afforded the instructive spectacle of a British admiral telegraphing home for instructions as to whether, in face of this consular protest, he was to carry out his orders or no. One can picture how Nelson or any other naval commander of his time would have acted in similar circumstances!

In the matter of commercial and engineering concessions, the contrast between Great Britain and other countries is as great. The many vaunted British concessions are practically worthless, for the reason that they comprise no guarantee of the security of the capital required to be invested. In the case of Russia, France and Germany, these countries see that their subjects are thoroughly protected in this direction; but our own government refrain from safeguarding British capital, and, as a consequence, the railways and other undertakings authorised are not proceeded with.

I have said enough to show that the prospect discoverable in the Far East depends rather on the balance of action on the part of the competing Powers than on the efforts of the countries most concerned; and I propose to examine the probabilities in the light of these. It must be borne in mind that the regeneration of China is the more difficult owing to the contrast between the ideas of her ruling classes, and those of the representatives of the Powers interested in her future. Of the possibility of consolidating her resources there can be no question; but any attempt in this direction must be made either on oriental or on Western lines. A compromise between the two is

an impossibility. One of the most interesting of the features concerning China is the exceptional financial condition of the country. With immense resources, as yet in the infancy of their development, China is, notwithstanding the amount of speculation indulged in by the officials, thoroughly solvent; while her debt, compared with that of other nations, is infinitesimally small. Her budget, extending to a sum of some fifteen millions sterling, suffices for her expenditure, and her liabilities are practically entirely due to the wars in which she has suffered defeat. Her total indebtedness amounts to a trifle over fifty millions sterling.¹ Compared with the debt of other nations this amount is surprisingly small, especially when the temptation put in the government's way is borne in mind. The table below shows the debt of the various Powers interested in Asia.² There is no reason, therefore, why China should not pull herself together, and develop her resources on a sound financial basis.

But the question arises, whether she would be allowed to do this by the interested Powers. Having got a hold on China, there is little likelihood of Russia, Germany or France quitting their footing. Indeed, all the symptoms point the other way. Russia is gradually creeping nearer and nearer to Peking, from which she will ere long dominate the whole of North China; while France misses no opportunity of increasing her foothold in the South. And the recent advent of Germany tends to hasten events and make the fate of China more certain. Each of these Powers protests loudly against any attempt at partitioning

¹ China's debt has been raised as follows:

| | | |
|------------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| 1887 German loan | £ 250,000 | at 5½ per cent. |
| 1894 Foreign silver loan . . | 1,635,000 | „ 7 „ |
| 1895 Foreign gold | 3,000,000 | „ 7 „ |
| 1895 Foreign gold | 15,820,000 | „ 5 „ |
| 1896 Anglo-German | 16,000,000 | „ 5 „ |
| 1898 Anglo-German | 16,000,000 | „ 4½ „ |

² Outstanding debt of Powers interested in Asia:

| | |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| Great Britain | £ 683,000,000 |
| France | 1,284,000,000 |
| Germany | 502,897,000 |
| Russia | 987,000,000 |
| Japan | 41,167,000 |

the country, while each is working for that event. Of the three, however, the aim of Russia is the more definite and the more certain ; for her descent on China is not a mere adventure, but a portion of a world policy which will go far to revolutionise the fortunes of Asia. It is no use blinking facts. Russia intends to absorb China, and unless Great Britain revolutionises her methods, she will do it. While engaged on this process, Russia, by dint of her prescience and decentralisation, will make a corresponding advance in Persia and Afghanistan until she reaches the British frontier, which she will have made conterminous with her own, from the Persian Gulf to the Burmese border ; and then, failing an awakening on the part of England, will begin the final struggle for the supremacy of the world, the assault on India. This forecast is no wild prophecy. It is as certain to come in time, always excepting our rulers come to their senses before the critical moment, as it is that the sun will rise to-morrow. The struggle will only be undertaken by Russia when she feels certain of victory. Its inauguration will mark the downfall of British empire in Asia for all time.

At the moment Russia is on the verge of a great achievement. She is about to close her grip over Manchuria, for she realises that the moment has come when she can afford to discard subterfuge and show her hand. From Port Arthur to Nerchinsk the whole stretch of territory will be hers, and then she will be at liberty to turn her attention to rounding off her new acquisitions by tackling Korea. Once possessed of Manchuria she will be provided with an excuse for such a course. Her plea for a naval base in South Korea,¹ to serve as a half way

¹ The possession of a port in South Korea has long been a cherished aim of Russia. She came very near it in 1861, when the frigate *Possadnik* arrived with a party of Russians off the north island of Tsushima, when a landing was effected and the Russian flag hoisted. The Russians then proceeded to cultivate the soil and form a colony. News of this breach of international courtesy reached Japan, to whom the island belongs, and a British ship was sent to Tsushima, when the commander notified the Russian officer that he intended also landing a party of British sailors, who would remain as long as did the Russians. On receipt of this message the Russians immediately re-embarked and left the island, never to return.

house between Port Arthur and Vladivostok, will prove at least as good as was her demand for an ice free port which our puerile politicians deemed a just and reasonable claim. And, once she obtains a footing in the peninsula, Russia will work along the coast in both directions, until, at a suitable moment she, will arouse the susceptibilities of Japan. Then will come the struggle which must be fraught with the gravest consequences to the world. If Russia prove the conqueror, she will claim the control of the Pacific, and hold it for her own. If she be defeated, Japan will overrun Korea and Manchuria, even up to the Amur river; and too powerful to be restrained from without, will set about the founding of a new empire, with consequences which cannot be foreseen.

Nor does this catalogue exhaust the moves of Russia. Mongolia is already under her sway as far as Urga, and the construction of the forthcoming Gobi railway will supply the excuse she needs for its total annexation. This will unite the provinces of Ili and Semipalatinsk with Manchuria and Siberia, and will open the road for resumed operations on Tibet, which, incapable of resistance, will speedily follow the fate impending over Kashgar, Yarcand, and Sarikol, thus bringing the Muscovite to the borders of Sikkim, Nepal and Kashmir.

The seizure of the provinces of Western China would naturally follow the impounding of Tibet. Kansu, Sechuan, and Yunnan, with their vast mineral and agricultural wealth, would serve to provide the sinews of war for the carrying out of the Russian programme; and the absorption of the Yangtse valley, already under the Russian hoof at Hankow, would form a natural sequence to the events which precede it.

One vital point to be borne in mind, a point which does not appear to have obtruded itself on the intelligence of our Foreign Office officials, is, that whatever the cost and danger of opposing Russia may be while she is yet on the fringe of Eastern Asia; they must become infinitely

greater the moment she begins her descent across the Asiatic continent. Had our government possessed the courage to resist Russian action in Manchuria, we should have been able to make things so unpleasant for her at Vladivostok, Nikolaievsk and up the Amur river, as to speedily bring her to her knees and compel her to retire beyond her proper boundaries, under peril of blockading her empire all round and destroying her fleets. When once Russia has secured the frontiers of Asia, her advance inland will be beyond our power of resistance. Britain could never place an army in the field capable of resisting the million men and more which Russia could despatch. And if we ventured our single army in its utmost strength against such a force, a second and third would be sent to take us in the flank and cut off our retreat with consequences utterly disastrous to our cause. Wherefore the wicked folly of our present paralytic attitude becomes more marked, and the observer asks whether the British nation has become deaf, blind and dumb, that it makes no pretence of seeing or hearing or acting in this matter, which is of vital importance to a continuance of its existence.

The history of England conveys no lesson more marked than the determination on the part of its people to protect their interests when assailed by other nations. In the furtherance of this principle we have without hesitation taken to arms against every nation which has presumed to insult us, or trespass on our rights. Thus we have been at war with France on sixteen occasions. Three times have we fought and conquered Spain, our record in the case of Holland being the same. Except in the case of the Crimean war, a venture undertaken without cause and carried on without judgment, we have tolerated from Russia a series of injustices, an amount of interference, and a policy of aggrandisement, which while it has inflicted material damage to our interests, has destroyed our prestige, and rendered us ridiculous in the eyes of other nations. We have never attempted to face Russia, be-

traying a pusillanimity which can only be put down to a distrust of our strength and ability to teach her the lesson she badly needs; and to-day we stand discredited in Asia, waiting patiently, while Russia views the triumphs she has attained, and considers the direction of her next move. British diplomacy has come to such a pass that it is defeated at every turn. Our feeble efforts, never made in serious earnest, invariably fail to check the onward movement of our great rival, and our voice in the councils of the world is rapidly becoming like that of China—listened to with an air of simulated attention, to be immediately disregarded as of no account.

Such is the position to which England has been relegated by the consistent neglect on the part of her rulers to safeguard her interests. The country is politically on the downward grade, and it is every day becoming more difficult to stay her descent. Only the most absolute *volte face*, applied unhesitatingly and directed by a statesman endowed with brains and instigated by true patriotic feeling can save the situation. A Palmerston or a Disraeli might bring about the salvation of England, while a continuation of the methods of a Salisbury or a Chamberlain can only plunge her deeper in the mire than she already is.

The prospect in the Far East is clouded. Its ultimate outcome must, by dint of the working of the forces I have discussed, be partition and absorption until the whole of the map becomes reconstituted. The lion's share must go to Russia. Of that there can be no question. China will by slow degrees be divided, first into nominal spheres of influence; subsequently into protectorates; finally into colonies and possessions of the various Powers. Korea as a national entity is doomed. The only question is whether it will fall to Russia or Japan, and it remains only to be seen whether England will at the eleventh hour pull herself together and strive to save the Yangtse valley as her share of the spoil, or whether she will by a

continuation of her past and present tactics, allow herself to be elbowed out of Central China even as she has been out of Manchuria, and is about to be out of the North. Such is the outcome of the situation, such the problem to be solved. The prospect is not a pleasant one; but there is yet time to divert it, if only we bestir ourselves and act before it is too late.

APPENDIX A.

CHRONOLOGY OF LANDMARKS CONNECTED WITH THE HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST.

- 1160 Genghis Khan.
- 1275 Kublai Khan's embassy to Japan.
- 1275 Marco Polo visits China and Japan.
- 1511 Raphael Perestralo visits China.
- 1516 Portuguese reach Canton.
- 1517 Fernand Perez D'Andrade visits China.
- 1530 Foreign vessels first touch at Japan.
- 1543 Portuguese begin to trade with Japan.
- 1545 Mendez Pinto visits Japan.
- 1560 Portuguese obtain possession of Macao.
- 1564 First British ship in Japanese waters.
- 1571 Spaniards occupy Manila.
- 1581 Papal Missionaries arrive in China.
- 1587 Hideyoshi orders Missionaries to leave Japan.
- 1590 Portuguese hold monopoly of trade with Japan.
- 1592 Japanese invade Korea.
- 1600 William Adams reaches Japan.
- 1604 James I. issues license to discover Cathaia, Japan, and Korea.
- 1609 Dutch arrive at Hirado.
- 1611 Shogun issues patent for Dutch trade.
- 1615 Japan obtains Tsushima from Korea.
- 1613 Captain Saris arrives in Japan.
- 1616 Manchu descent on China.
- 1617 East India Company send merchant fleet to Japan.
- 1624 Dutch arrive off Macao but are driven off by Portuguese.
- 1634 Captain Weddell reaches Canton.
- 1640 Rivalry between Dutch and Portuguese leads to latter being expelled from Japan.
- 1644 Chitsou, first Manchu Emperor, ascends Chinese Throne.
- 1653 Hendrik Hamel wrecked off Korea.

- 1655 First Russian mission to China.
- 1660 Tea brought to England.
- 1662 Kanghi Emperor of China.
- 1675 Spafarik's mission to China.
- 1680 East India Company begins to trade with China.
- 1685 Venukoff and Fafarof's mission to China.
- 1686 Golovin's mission to China.
- 1687 Russia seizes Amur Territory.
- 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.
- 1689 Peter the Great Tsar.
- 1692 Ides' mission to Peking.
- 1707 Russia seizes Kamchatka.
- 1719 Ismaloff's mission to Peking.
- 1723 Yung-Ching Emperor of China.
- 1724 Treaty of Kiakhta.
- 1736 Keen Lung Emperor of China.
- 1787 Louis XVI. receives envoy from the King of Annam.
- 1791 First Portuguese missionary fails to enter Korea.
- 1793 Lord Macartney's mission to Peking.
- 1795 Duch East India Company's mission to Peking.
- 1795 Kia-king Emperor of China.
- 1797 First American ship reaches Japan.
- 1801 Alexander I. Tsar.
- 1802 French hoist republican flag at Canton, but withdraw.
- 1805 Golovkin's mission to China.
- 1816 Lord Amherst's mission to China.
- 1819 Singapore founded by Sir Stamford Raffles.
- 1820 Taoukwang Emperor of China.
- 1821 Nicholas I. Tsar.
- 1828 French vessel wrecked off Cochin China, crew massacred.
- 1834 East India Company's charter expires.
- 1834 Lord Napier arrives at Canton.
- 1834 Import of opium in China prohibited.
- 1839 British trade with China ceases.
- 1839 Hong Kong occupied by British.
- 1840 Edict against intercourse with England.
- 1840 Captain Elliot enters Peiho River.
- 1841 Sir H. Gough captures Canton and Amoy.
- 1841 Hong Kong ceded to British.
- 1841 Ningpo and Chusan taken.
- 1842 Woosung and Shanghai taken.
- 1842 Treaty of Nanking signed 29th August.
- 1844 Commercial Treaty between France and China.
- 1847 Muravieff explores Amur river.
- 1850 Taiping Rebellion breaks out.

- 1850 Hienfung, Emperor of China.
- 1851 Treaty of Kulja.
- 1853 Captain Perry with American fleet visits Japan.
- 1854 Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs established.
- 1854 Treaty of Commerce between America and Japan, 31st March.
- 1854 Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Japan, 14th October.
- 1854 Muravieff siezes Amur region.
- 1855 Treaty of Commerce, Japan and Russia, 26th January.
- 1855 Alexander II. Tsar.
- 1856 Lorcha *Arrow* seized at Canton.
- 1856 Nagasaki and Hakodadi opened to European commerce.
- 1857 Lord Elgin arrives at Hong Kong.
- 1858 Canton taken by English and French.
- 1858 Taku forts captured by allies.
- 1858 Treaty of Aigun, 28th May.
- 1858 Treaty of Tientsin, 26th June.
- 1858 Treaty of Commerce, Japan and Russia.
- 1858 Venukoff explores Ussuri River.
- 1858 Treaty of Yedo, 26th August.
- 1858 Sir Rutherford Alcock, first Consul-General for Japan.
- 1859 Mr. Bruce stopped at Taku forts.
- 1859 Commercial Treaty, America and China.
- 1859 Russia occupies Northern Saghalien.
- 1859 Saigon seized by the French.
- 1859 Sir Rutherford Alcock appointed Envoy Extraordinary for Japan.
- 1860 Lord Elgin and Baron Gros reach Shanghai.
- 1860 Chusan occupied by Great Britain.
- 1860 Capture of Peking by French and English.
- 1860 Convention of Peking signed with Russia, 14th November.
- 1861 Tsungli Yamen established.
- 1861 British and Foreign Embassies established at Peking.
- 1861 Admiral Hope explores the Yangtse Kiang.
- 1861 French seize Annam and Cochin China.
- 1861 Attack on British Embassy at Yedo.
- 1861 Tungche, Emperor of China.
- 1862 English and French aid in repressing Taepings.
- 1862 Saigon ceded to France.
- 1862 Japanese Embassy visits London and Paris.
- 1862 Foreign representatives move from Yedo to Yokohama.
- 1862 Attack on British Embassy at Yokohama.
- 1862 Prince Nagato fires on French and English vessels at Shimonoseki.

- 1863 Major Gordon leads army against Taepings.
- 1863 French Protectorate declared over Cambodia.
- 1863 British, French and American squadron bombards Japanese forts.
- 1863 Japanese close treaty ports.
- 1864 End of Taeping Rebellion.
- 1864 Combined fleets destroy Japanese batteries.
- 1865 Mutsuhito becomes Mikado.
- 1866 Chinese envoys visit Europe.
- 1866 Massacre of French missionaries in Korea.
- 1866 French expedition to Korea.
- 1866 *General Sherman* wrecked and crew massacred in Korea.
- 1867 Restoration in Japan, Mutsuhito sole Emperor, Shogunate abolished.
- 1867 Oppert's expedition to Korea.
- 1868 Attack on Yangchow Mission by literati.
- 1868 Burlingame Treaty signed at Washington.
- 1868 Daimyo insurrection in Japan.
- 1869 Supplementary convention to Treaty of Tientsin signed.
- 1869 Tycoon submits to the Mikado.
- 1870 Massacre of French Consul, priests and sisters at Tientsin.
- 1870 Russia occupies Urga.
- 1871 Chung How, Chinese envoy, arrives in London.
- 1871 American expedition to Korea.
- 1872 First Japanese railway, Yokohama to Shinagawa, opened.
- 1872 Japanese Ambassador received by Queen Victoria.
- 1873 First audience granted to foreign Ministers by Tungche.
- 1873 Treaty between China and Japan.
- 1873 Massacre of Japanese in Formosa.
- 1874 French obtain Treaty of Hué.
- 1875 Kwangsu Emperor of China.
- 1875 Murder of Augustus Margary at Manwyne.
- 1875 Mikado decrees a new Constitution for Japan.
- 1875 Neutral zone between China and Korea abolished.
- 1875 Japanese fleet fired on by Koreans. Expedition to Kang-wa.
- 1875 Southern Saghalien ceded to Russia by Japan.
- 1876 Shanghai-Woosung Railway opened.
- 1876 Chifu convention, 13th September.
- 1876 Mikado opens Japanese Parliament at Yedo.
- 1876 Treaty between Japan and Korea.
- 1876 Fusan opened to Japanese trade.
- 1877 Decree giving equal rights to Chinese Christians.
- 1877 Woosung Railway purchased by Chinese.
- 1877 Kwo Tajen first accredited Chinese Minister to London.
- 1877 Satsuma Rebellion in Japan.

- 1877 First Japanese ironclad launched at Poplar.
- 1878 Woosung Railway removed to Formosa.
- 1878 Kulja dispute with Russia.
- 1878 Herr von Brandt fails to obtain audience in Korea.
- 1879 Marquis Tseng arrives in London.
- 1879 Treaty of Ili signed by Chung How.
- 1880 Chemulpho opened to foreign trade.
- 1881 Decree issued convoking Japanese national assembly in 1890.
- 1881 Alexander III. Tsar.
- 1881 Treaty of Ili.
- 1881 British ships visit Korea but fail to obtain trade facilities.
- 1882 American Treaty with Korea.
- 1882 Revolution in Seoul.
- 1883 Trouble with France in Tonkin.
- 1883 Sir Harry Parkes appointed Minister at Peking.
- 1883 Treaty of Commerce, Japan and Korea.
- 1883 Treaty between Great Britain and Korea, 26th November.
- 1884 Treaty between China and France.
- 1884 Keelung bombarded by the French.
- 1884 Admiral Courbet destroys Chinese fleet at Fuchow.
- 1884 French Ambassador leaves Peking.
- 1884 French Protectorate recognised over Tonkin and Annam.
- 1884 Russian Treaty with Korea.
- 1884 Insurrection in Korea, China assumes sovereignty.
- 1885 Peace signed between France and China.
- 1885 Death of Sir Harry Parkes.
- 1885 Sir Robert Hart appointed British Minister in Peking.
- 1885 French Treaty with China.
- 1885 Convention between China and Japan *re* Korea.
- 1886 Sir John Walsham succeeds Sir R. Hart.
- 1886 Burmese Frontier Convention between Great Britain and China.
- 1886 Great Britain occupies Port Hamilton.
- 1887 Kwangsu Emperor of China.
- 1887 Great Britain withdraws from Port Hamilton.
- 1887 Russia pledges herself never to occupy Korea.
- 1887 Count Ito introduces Western dress and habits in Japan.
- 1887 China issues proclamation re-asserting her suzerainty over Korea.
- 1888 Tientsin-Taku Railway opened.
- 1888 Overland Trade Convention, Russia and Korea.
- 1889 New Constitution promulgated by Mikado.
- 1889 New commercial treaties with European Powers and Japan.
- 1889 Treaty between Japan and Korea.

- 1890 Chungking Convention signed.
- 1890 Massacre of Christians at Jongtuytsin.
- 1890 Decree granting right of audience to Ministers at Peking.
- 1890 New Civil Code in Japan.
- 1890 First Japanese Parliamentary election.
- 1890 First Japanese Parliament opened by Emperor, 29th November.
- 1891 Tsar issues rescript for constructing Siberian Railway.
- 1891 Tsarevitch travels through Asia and is wounded in Japan.
- 1892 Mr. Nicholas O'Connor Minister at Peking.
- 1893 Eastern section Siberian Railway opened.
- 1893 Increase of Japanese Navy agreed on.
- 1894 Kwangsu receives Foreign Ministers.
- 1894 Nicholas II. Tsar.
- 1894 Rebellion in Korea, Japanese troops occupy Seoul.
- 1894 Korea renounces Chinese suzerainty.
- 1894 China declares War on Japan, 4th August.
- 1894 Chinese defeated at Ping Yang.
- 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
- 1894 Battle of the Yalu, 17th September.
- 1894 Japanese take Kinchow and Talienwan.
- 1894 Japanese take Port Arthur.
- 1894 Massacre of Chinese at Port Arthur.
- 1895 Independence of Korea proclaimed.
- 1895 Japanese take Wei Hai Wei.
- 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki signed, 17th April.
- 1895 Russia, France and Germany protest, 23rd April.
- 1895 Japanese abandon claim to Liaotung Peninsula.
- 1895 French Frontier Treaty signed with China.
- 1895 Massacre of missionaries at Whasang by vegetarians.
- 1895 Missionaries attacked at Fatshan.
- 1895 Edict ordering construction of Peking-Tientsin Railway.
- 1896 Sir Claude MacDonald, Minister at Peking.
- 1896 Li Hung Chang attends coronation at Moscow, and goes round the world.
- 1896 Cassini Convention.
- 1896 Trans-Manchurian Railway agreement.
- 1896 Russo-Japanese Convention respecting Korea.
- 1897 Lu-Han Central Railway concession granted.
- 1897 German missionaries murdered in Shantung.
- 1897 Germany occupies Kiao Chau, 14th November.
- 1897 Russia occupies Port Arthur, 18th December.
- 1898 Kiao Chau leased to Germany, 10th January.
- 1898 German monopoly of development in Shantung announced 26th February.

- 1898 Russia recognises China's sovereign rights over Manchuria.
- 1898 Convention leasing Port Arthur and Talienwan signed, 27th March.
- 1898 German Consul claims Shantung as sphere of German influence.
- 1898 Chinese Loan of 16 millions concluded with Great Britain and Germany.
- 1898 Convention leasing Wei Hai Wei to Great Britain, 1st July.
- 1898 Russia opposes Newchang Railway concession.
- 1898 Imperial edict founding a Chinese university on European lines.
- 1898 Edict according the right of memorialising Chinese Throne.
- 1898 Tsar issues Peace Manifesto.
- 1898 Dowager Empress Tsi Hsi assumes control of Government, 22nd September.
- 1898 Rescript withdrawing Emperor's edicts, 27th September.
- 1898 Kang Yu Wei escapes to Hong Kong.
- 1898 Chang Yen Huan banished.
- 1898 British, German and Russian Guards arrive at Peking.
- 1898 United States seizes Manila.
- 1898 Reactionary edicts issued by Dowager Empress.
- 1898 Kowloon extension agreement signed, 9th June.
- 1899 Anglo-Russian agreement *re* Spheres of Influence.
- 1899 Peace Conference meets at the Hague.
- 1899 Notification from United States *re* Open Door.
- 1899 Extraterritoriality ceases in Japan.
- 1899 Russian squadron sent to Masanpho.
- 1900 Kiakhta-Peking Railway concession announced.
- 1900 Russia obtains lease of coaling station at Masanpho.
- 1900 Murder of Christians by Chinese at Kao-lou-tsun, 14th May.
- 1900 Powers send detachments to guard Legations at Peking, 30th May.
- 1900 Two missionaries murdered at Yenching, 1st June.
- 1900 Anti-foreign rising becomes general. Communications cut. Legations isolated, 4th June.
- 1900 Admiral Seymour with 2,000 men leaves Tientsin for relief of Peking, 10th June.
- 1900 M. Sugiyama, chancellor of Japanese Legation, murdered by Imperial soldiers in Peking, 11th June.
- 1900 Admiral Seymour surrounded by rebels at Langfang, 12th June.
- 1900 Taku forts fire on allied fleets, who bombard and capture them after six hours fighting, 17th June.

- 1900 Foreign settlements at Tientsin attacked by Boxers and Imperial troops, 17th June.
- 1900 Baron von Ketteler, German Minister in Peking, murdered by soldiers while on his way to the Tsungli Yamen, 18th June.
- 1900 Allied force 8,000 strong land at Taku and march on Tientsin, which they relieve, 23rd June.
- 1900 Admiral Seymour, who has succeeded in holding his own, though unable to advance or retire at Langfang, relieved by force 2,000 strong. He returns to Tientsin, 26th June.
- 1900 Despairing message received from Sir Robert Hart, 1st July.
- 1900 Report that Legations have fallen and inmates massacred, 4th July.
- 1900 Native city of Tientsin captured by allies, 14th July.
- 1900 Chinese rise in Manchuria and declare war against Russia, 17th July.
- 1900 Letter, describing incidents in the siege of the Legations, received from the *Times* correspondent in Peking, 1st August.
- 1900 Allied force 12,000 strong, leave Tientsin for relief of Peking Legations. Large numbers of Chinese dispersed with heavy loss at Pei-tsang, 5th August.
- 1900 Allied force occupies Yung-tsun, 6th August.
- 1900 Allied force enters Hosi-wu, 9th August.
- 1900 Chang Kia Wan occupied by the Allies, 11th August.
- 1900 Tungchow taken by the Japanese, 12th August.
- 1900 Allies force an entrance into Peking by blowing up the gates. Legations found still standing. Occupants safe. The Dowager Empress, Prince Tuan, and the rest of the palace party found to have disappeared. 15th August.
- 1900 Sacred Imperial city entered by the Allies, 17th August.

APPENDIX B

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

TREATY OF NERCHINSK

Signed between Russia and China 27th August, 1689

1. THE boundary between Russia and China is to be formed by the river Kerbechi, near the Shorna, which enters the Amur, and the long chain of mountains extending from its sources to the Eastern Ocean. The rivers or rivulets which flow from the southern slope of these mountains, as well as all territories to the south of them, will thus belong to China. The territories and rivers to the north of the said mountain chain remain with the Empire of Muscovy. The boundary is further to be found by the river Argun, which enters the Amur; the territories south of the said river belong to the Emperor of China, those to the north of it to the Empire of Muscovy. The towns or dwelling-houses at present situated to the south of the Argun shall be moved to the northern bank of the river.

2. The fortress built by the Russians at a place called Atbazeir shall be demolished, and the subjects of the Tsar residing there shall remove with their property to Muscovite territory. Hunters of either empire shall on no pretence cross the frontiers. If one or two persons cross the frontier to hunt, steal, or pilfer, they shall be arrested and given up to the nearest Imperial officers to be punished according to their deserts. In case, however, armed parties of ten or fifteen people cross the frontiers to hunt or plunder, or in case of any person being killed, a report shall be sent in to both emperors, and the parties found guilty shall be punished with death. On no account shall war be declared in consequence of any excess committed by private parties.

3. Everything which has occurred hitherto is to be buried in eternal oblivion.

4. Neither party shall receive fugitives or deserters from the

date of this treaty. Subjects of either empire flying to the other shall be arrested and given up to the nearest authority on the frontier.

5. Subjects of Muscovy now in China, or Chinese now in the Empire of Muscovy, may remain where they are.

6. In consideration of this present treaty of peace and the reciprocal good understanding of the two empires, persons may pass from one empire to the other, provided they are furnished with passports, and they shall be permitted to carry on commerce and to sell or purchase at pleasure.

Copies of the above treaty, properly signed and sealed, shall be exchanged by the plenipotentiaries. The various articles of the treaty shall be engraved on stones in Tartaric, Chinese, Russian, and Latin, to be erected on the frontiers between the two empires as a permanent testimony to the good understanding between them.

TREATY OF NANKING

Signed between England and China August 29th, 1842

Ratified June 26th, 1843

I.

THERE shall henceforward be peace and friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of China and between their respective subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the dominions of the other.

II.

His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British subjects, with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint, at the cities and towns of Canton, Amoy, Foo-Chow-foo, Ningpo, Shanghai; and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., will appoint Superintendents, or Consular officers, to reside at each of the above named cities or towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants, and to see that the first duties and other dues of the Chinese Government, as hereafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's subjects.

III.

It being obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects should have some port whereat they may careen and refit their ships when required, and keep stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Britain &c., the island of Hong Kong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, her heirs and successors, and to be governed by such laws and regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., shall see fit to direct.

IV.

The Emperor of China agrees to pay the sum of six millions of dollars, as the value of the opium which was delivered up at Canton in the month of March, 1839, as a ransom for the lives of Her Britannic Majesty's Superintendent and subjects who had been imprisoned and threatened with death by the Chinese high officers.

V.

The Government of China having compelled the British merchants trading at Canton to deal exclusively with certain Chinese merchants, called Hong Kong merchants (or Co-Hong), who had been licensed by the Chinese Government for that purpose, the Emperor of China agrees to abolish that practice in future in all ports where British merchants may reside and to permit them to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please; and His Imperial Majesty further agrees to pay to the British Government the sum of three millions of dollars, on account of debts due to British subjects by some of the said Hong Kong merchants, or Co-Hong, who have become insolvent, and who owe very large sums of money to subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.

VI.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty having been obliged to send out an expedition to demand and obtain redress for the violent and unjust proceedings of the Chinese high authorities towards Her Britannic Majesty's officer and subjects, the Emperor of China agrees to pay the sum of twelve millions of dollars, on account of the expenses incurred; and Her Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary voluntarily agrees on behalf of Her Majesty to deduct from the said amount of twelve millions of dollars any sums which may have been received by Her Majesty's combined forces, as ransom for cities and towns in China, subsequent to the 1st day of August, 1841.

VII.

It is agreed, that the total amount of twenty-one millions of dollars, described in the three preceding articles, shall be paid as follows.

Six millions immediately.

Six millions in 1843; that is, three millions on or before the 30th of the month of June, and three millions on or before the 31st of December.

Five millions in 1844; that is, two millions and a half on or before the 30th of June and two millions and a half on or before the 31st of December.

Four millions in 1845; that is, two millions on or before the 30th of June, and two millions on or before the 31st of December.

And it is further stipulated, that interest, at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, shall be paid by the Government of China on any portion of the above sums that are not punctually discharged at the periods fixed.

VIII.

The Emperor of China agrees to release, unconditionally, all subjects of Her Britannic Majesty (whether natives of Europe or India) who may be in confinement at this moment in any part of the Chinese Empire.

IX.

The Emperor of China agrees to publish and promulgate, under His Imperial sign manual and Seal, a full and entire amnesty and act of indemnity to all subjects of China, on account of their having resided under, or having had dealings and intercourse with or having entered the service of, Her Britannic Majesty, or of Her Majesty's officers; and His Imperial Majesty further engages to release all Chinese subjects who may be at this moment in confinement for similar reasons.

His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to establish at all the ports which are, by article 2 of this treaty, to be thrown open for the resort of British merchants, a fair and regular tariff of export and import customs and other dues, which tariff shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information, and the Emperor further engages that when British merchandise shall have been once paid at any of the said ports the regulated custom and dues, agreeable to the tariff to be hereafter fixed, such merchandise may be conveyed by Chinese merchants to any province or city in the interior of the Empire of China, on paying a further amount as transit duties, which shall not exceed ¹ per cent on the tariff value of such goods.

XI.

It is agreed that Her Britannic Majesty's Chief Officer in China shall correspond with the Chinese high officers both at the capital and in the Provinces, under the term "communication"; the subordinate British officers and Chinese high officers in the

¹ See declaration on this subject, which follows the treaty.

Provinces under the terms "statement" on the part of the former, and on the part of the latter "declaration"; and the subordinates of both countries on a footing of perfect equality; merchants and others not holding official situations and therefore not included in the above, on both sides, to use the term "representation" in all papers addressed to, or intended for the notice of, the respective Governments.

XII.

On the assent of the Emperor of China to this treaty being received, and the discharge of the first instalment of money, Her Britannic Majesty's forces will retire from Nanking and the Grand Canal, and will no longer molest or stop the trade of China. The military post at Chiu-hai will also be withdrawn; but the islands of Koolangsoo, and that of Chusan, will continue to be held by Her Majesty's forces until the money payments, and the arrangements for opening the ports to British merchants, be completed.

XIII.

The ratification of this Treaty by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., and His Majesty the Emperor of China shall be exchanged as soon as the great distance which separates England and China will admit; but in the meantime counterpart copies of it, signed and sealed by the plenipotentiaries on behalf of their respective Sovereigns, shall be mutually delivered, and all its provisions and arrangements shall take effect.

Supplementary Articles.

I.

The tariff of export and import duties, which is hereunto attached, under the seals and signatures of the respective plenipotentiary and commissioners, shall henceforward be in force at the five ports of Canton, Foo-Chow-foo, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai.

II.

The General Regulations of Trade, which are hereunto attached, under the seals and signatures of the respective plenipotentiary and commissioners, shall henceforward be in force at the five aforementioned ports.

III.

All penalties enforced or confiscations made under the third clause of the said General Regulations of Trade shall belong and be appropriated to the public service of the Government of China.

IV.

After the ports of Canton, Foo-Chow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai shall be thrown open, English merchants shall be allowed to trade only at those five ports. Neither shall they repair to any other ports or places, nor will the Chinese people at any other ports or places be permitted to trade with them. If English merchant vessels shall, in contravention of this agreement, and of a proclamation to the same purport to be issued by the British plenipotentiary, repair to any other ports or places, the Chinese Government officers shall be at liberty to seize and confiscate both vessels and cargoes, and should Chinese people be discovered clandestinely dealing with English merchants at any other ports or places, they shall be punished by the Chinese Government in such manner as the law may direct.

V.

The fourth clause of the General Regulations of Trade, on the subject of commercial dealings and debts between English and Chinese merchants, is to be clearly understood to be applicable to both parties.

VI.

It is agreed that English merchants and others residing at, or resorting to, the five ports to be opened, shall not go into the surrounding country beyond certain short distances to be named by the local authorities, in concert with the British Consul, and on no pretence for purposes of traffic. Seamen and persons belonging to the ships shall only be allowed to land under authority and rules which will be fixed by the Consul, in communication with the local officers; and should any persons whatever infringe the stipulations of this Article, and wander away into the country, they shall be seized and handed over to the British Consul for suitable punishment.

VII.

The Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship provides for British subjects and their families residing at the cities and towns of Canton, Foo-Chow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai, without molestation or restraint. It is accordingly determined that ground and houses, the rent or price of which is to be fairly and equitably arranged for according to the rates prevailing amongst the people, without exaction on either side, shall be set apart by the local officers in communication with the Consul, and the number of houses built, or rented, will be reported annually to

the said local officers by the Consul for the information of their respective Viceroys and Governors, but the number cannot be limited, seeing that it will be greater or less according to the resort of merchants.

IX.

If lawless natives of China, having committed crimes or offences against their own Government, shall flee to Hong Kong or to the English ships of war, or English merchant ships, for refuge, they shall, if discovered by the English officers, be handed over at once to the Chinese officers for trial and punishment; or if, before such discovery be made by the English officers, it should be ascertained or suspected by the officers of the Government of China whither such criminals and offenders have fled, a communication shall be made to the proper English officer, in order that the said criminals and offenders may be rigidly searched for, seized, and, on proof or admission of their guilt, delivered up. In like manner, if any soldier or sailor, or any other person, whatever his caste or country, who is a subject of the Crown of England, shall, from any cause or on any pretence, desert, fly, or escape into the Chinese territory, such soldier or sailor or other person shall be apprehended and confined by the Chinese authorities, and sent to the nearest British Consul or other Government officer. In neither case shall concealment or refuge be afforded.

X.

At each of the five ports to be opened to British merchants one English cruiser will be stationed to enforce good order and discipline amongst the crews of merchant shipping, and to support the necessary authority of the Consul over British subjects. The crew of such ship of war will be carefully restrained by the officer commanding the vessel, and they will be subject to all the rules regarding going on shore, and straying into the country, that are already laid down for the crews of merchant vessels. Whenever it may be necessary to relieve such ships of war by another, intimation of that intention will be communicated by the Consul, or by the British Superintendent of Trade, where circumstances will permit, to the local Chinese authorities, lest the appearance of an additional ship should excite misgivings amongst the people; and the Chinese cruisers are to offer no hindrance to such relieving ship, nor is she to be considered liable to any port-charges or other rules laid down in the General Regulations of Trade, seeing that British ships of war never trade in any shape.

XI.

The port of Chusan and Koolangsoo will be withdrawn, as provided for in the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship, the moment all the moneys stipulated for in that treaty shall be paid; and the British plenipotentiary distinctly and voluntarily agrees that all dwelling-houses, store-houses, barracks, and other buildings that the British troops or people may have occupied, or immediately built or repaired, shall be handed over, on the evacuation of the posts, exactly as they stand, to the Chinese authorities, so as to prevent any pretence for delay, or the slightest occasion for discussion or dispute on those points.

XII.

A fair and regular tariff of duties and other dues having now been established, it is to be hoped that the system of smuggling which has heretofore been carried on between English and Chinese merchants—in many cases with the open connivance and collusion of the Chinese custom-house officers—will entirely cease; and the most peremptory proclamation to all English merchants has been already issued on this subject by the British plenipotentiary, who will also instruct the different consuls to strictly watch over, and carefully scrutinise, the conduct of all persons, being British subjects, trading under his superintendence. In any positive instance of smuggling transactions coming to the Consul's knowledge, he will instantly apprise the Chinese authorities of the fact, and they will proceed to seize and confiscate all goods, whatever their value or nature, that may have been so smuggled; and will also be at liberty, if they see fit, to prohibit the ship from which the smuggled goods were landed from trading further, and to send her away as soon as her accounts are adjusted and paid. The Chinese Government officers will, at the same time, adopt whatever measures they may think fit with regard to the Chinese merchants and custom-house officers who may be discovered to be concerned in smuggling.

XIII.

All persons, whether natives of China or otherwise, who may wish to convey goods from any one of the five ports of Canton, Foo-Chow-foo, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai to Hong Kong, for sale or consumption, shall be at full and perfect liberty to do so, on paying the duties on such goods, and obtaining a pass, or port-clearance, from the Chinese custom-house at one of the said ports. Should natives of China wish to repair to Hong Kong to purchase goods, they shall have free and full permission to do so; and

should they require a Chinese vessel to carry away their purchases, they must obtain a pass, or port-clearance, for her at the custom-house of the port whence the vessel may sail for Hong Kong. It is further settled, that in all cases these passes are to be returned to the officers of the Chinese Government as soon as the trip for which they may be granted shall be completed.

XIV.

An English officer will be appointed at Hong Kong, one part of whose duty will be to examine the register and passes of all Chinese vessels that may repair to that port to buy or sell goods; and should such officer at any time find that any Chinese merchant vessel has not a pass, or register, from one of the five ports, she is to be considered as an unauthorised or smuggling vessel, and is not to be allowed to trade, whilst a report of the circumstance is to be made to the Chinese authorities. By this arrangement it is to be hoped that piracy and illegal traffic will be effectually prevented.

XV.

Should natives of India who may repair to Hong Kong to trade incur debts there, the recovery of such debts must be arranged for by the English Courts of Justice on the spot; but if the Chinese debtor shall abscond, and be known to have property, real or personal, within the Chinese territory, the rule laid down in the fourth clause of the General Regulations for Trade shall be applied to the case; and it will be the duty of the Chinese authorities on application, by and in concert with the British Consuls, to do their utmost to see justice done between the parties. On the same principle, should a British merchant incur debts at any of the five ports, and fly to Hong Kong, the British authorities will, on receiving an application from the Chinese Government officers, accompanied by statements and full proofs of the debts, institute an investigation into the claims, and, when established, oblige the defaulter or debtor to settle them to the utmost of his means.

XVI.

It is agreed that the custom-house officers at the five ports shall make a monthly return to Canton of the passes granted to vessels proceeding to Hong Kong, together with the nature of their cargoes, and a copy of these returns will be embodied in one return, and communicated once a month to the proper English

officer at Hong Kong; the said English officer will, on his part, make a similar return or communication to the Chinese authorities at Canton, showing the names of Chinese vessels arrived at Hong Kong, or departed from that port, with the nature of their cargoes; and the Canton authorities will apprise the custom-houses at the five ports, in order that, by these arrangements and precautions all clandestine and illegal trade, under the cover of passes, may be averted.

Additional Convention, signed April 4th, 1846.

I.

His Majesty the Emperor of China having on his own part distinctly stated that when in the course of time mutual tranquillity shall have been insured, it will be safe and right to admit foreigners into the city of Canton, and the local authorities being for the present unable to coerce the people of that city, the plenipotentiaries on either side mutually agree that the execution of the above measure shall be postponed to a more favourable period; but the claim of right is by no means yielded or abandoned on the part of Her Britannic Majesty.

II.

British subjects shall in the meanwhile enjoy full liberty and protection in the neighbourhood, on the outside of the city of Canton within certain limits fixed according to previous treaty, comprising seventy localities of which the names were communicated by the district magistrates to the British Consul on the 21st of November, 1845. They may likewise make excursions on the two sides of the river where there are not numerous villages.

III.

It is stipulated, on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of China, that on the evacuation of Chusan by Her Britannic Majesty's forces, the said island shall never be ceded to any other foreign Power.

IV.

Her Britannic Majesty consents, upon her part, in case of the attack of the invader, to protect Chusan and its dependencies, and to restore it to the possession of China as of old; but as this stipulation proceeds from the friendly alliance between the two nations, no pecuniary subsidies are to be due from China on this account.

v.

Upon the receipt of the sign-manual of His Majesty the Emperor of China to these presents, it is agreed, on account of the distance which separates the two countries, that the island of Chusan shall be immediately delivered over to the Chinese authorities; and on the ratification of the present condition by Her Britannic Majesty, it shall be mutually binding on the high contracting Powers.

TREATY OF TIENTSIN.

*Signed between Great Britain and China, June 26th, 1858.
Ratified 24th October, 1860.*

I.

THE Treaty of Peace and Amity between the two nations, signed at Nanking on the twenty-ninth day of August, in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, is hereby renewed and confirmed.

The Supplementary Treaty and General Regulations of Trade having been amended and improved, and the substance of their provisions having been incorporated in this treaty, the said Supplementary Treaty and General Regulations of Trade are hereby abrogated.

II.

For the better preservation of harmony in future, Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and His Majesty the Emperor of China mutually agree that, in accordance with the universal practice of great and friendly nations, Her Majesty the Queen may, if she see fit, appoint Ambassadors, Ministers, or other Diplomatic Agents to the Court of Peking; and His Majesty the Emperor of China may, in like manner, if he see fit, appoint Ambassadors, Ministers, or other Diplomatic Agents to the Court of St. James's.

III.

His Majesty the Emperor of China hereby agrees that the Ambassador, Minister, or other Diplomatic Agent so appointed by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, may reside with his family and establishment permanently at the capital, or may visit it occasionally, at the option of the British Government. He shall not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the Sovereign of an independent nation on a footing of equality with that of China. On the other hand, he shall use

the same forms of ceremony and respect to His Majesty the Emperor as are employed by the Ambassadors, Ministers, or Diplomatic Agents of Her Majesty towards the Sovereigns of independent and equal European nations.

It is further agreed, that Her Majesty's Government may acquire at Peking a site for building, or may hire houses for the accommodation of Her Majesty's Mission, and that the Chinese Government will assist it in so doing.

Her Majesty's Representative shall be at liberty to choose his own servants and attendants, who shall not be subjected to any kind of molestation whatever.

Any person guilty of disrespect or violence to Her Majesty's representative, or to any member of his family or establishment, in deed or word shall be severely punished.

IV.

It is further agreed, that no obstacle or difficulty shall be made to the free movements of Her Majesty's Representative, and that he, and the persons of his suite, may come, go, and travel at their pleasure. He shall, moreover, have full liberty to send and receive his correspondence to and from any point on the sea-coast that he may select, and his letters and effects shall be held sacred and inviolable. He may employ, for their transmission, special couriers, who shall meet with the same protection and facilities for travelling as the persons employed in carrying despatches for the Imperial Government; and, generally, he shall enjoy the same privileges as are accorded to officers of the same rank by the usage and consent of Western nations.

All expenses attending the Diplomatic Mission of Great Britain shall be borne by the British Government.

V.

His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to nominate one of the Secretaries of State, or a President of one of the boards as the high officer with whom the Ambassador, Minister, or other Diplomatic Agent of Her Majesty the Queen shall transact business, either personally or in writing, on a footing of perfect equality.

VI.

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain agrees that the privileges hereby secured shall be enjoyed in her dominions by the Ambassadors, Ministers, or Diplomatic Agents of the Emperor of China accredited to the Court of Her Majesty.

VII.

Her Majesty the Queen may appoint one or more Consuls in the dominion of the Emperor of China; and that such Consul or Consuls shall be at liberty to reside in any of the open ports or cities of China, as Her Majesty the Queen may consider most expedient for the interests of British commerce. They shall be treated with due respect by the Chinese authorities, and enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the Consular Officers of the most favoured nation.

Consuls and Vice-Consuls in charge shall rank with Intendants of Circuits; Vice-Consuls, Acting Vice-Consuls, and Interpreters, with Prefects. They shall have access to the official residences of these officers, and communicate with them, either personally or in writing, on a footing of equality, as the interests of the public service may require.

VIII.

The Christian religion as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching it or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities, nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or interfered with.

IX.

British subjects are hereby authorised to travel, for their pleasure or for purposes of trade, to all parts of the interior, under passports which will be issued by their Consuls and countersigned by the local authorities. These passports, if demanded, must be produced for examination in the localities passed through. If the passport be not irregular, the bearer will be allowed to proceed, and no opposition shall be offered to his hiring persons, or hiring vessels for the carriage of his baggage or merchandise. If he be without a passport, or if he commit any offence against the law, he shall be handed over to the nearest Consul for punishment, but he must not be subjected to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint. No passport need be applied for by persons going on excursions from the ports open to trade to a distance not exceeding 100 li, and for a period not exceeding five days.

The provisions of this article do not apply to crews of ships, for the due restraint of whom regulations will be drawn up by the Consul and the local authorities.

To Nanking, and other cities disturbed by persons in arms against the Government, no pass shall be given until they shall have been recaptured.

X.

British merchant-ships shall have authority to trade upon the Great River (Yang-tse). The upper and lower valley of the river being, however, disturbed by outlaws, no port shall for the present be opened to trade, with the exception of Chin-Kiang, which shall be opened in a year from the date of the signing of this treaty.

So soon as peace shall be restored, British vessels shall also be admitted to trade at such ports as far as Han-Kow, not exceeding three in number, as the British Minister, after consultation with the Chinese Secretary of State, may determine shall be ports of entry and discharge.

XI.

In addition to the towns and cities of Canton, Amoy, Foo-Chow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, opened by the Treaty of Nanking, it is agreed that British subjects may frequent the cities and ports of Newchang, Sang-Chow, Tai-Wan (Formosa), Chan-Chow (Swatow), and Kiung-Chow (Hainan). They are permitted to carry on trade with whomsoever they please, and to proceed to and fro at pleasure with their vessels and merchandise.

They shall enjoy the same privileges, advantages, and immunities at the said towns and ports as they enjoy at the ports already opened to trade, including the right of residence, of buying or renting houses, of leasing land therein, and of building churches, hospitals, and cemeteries.

XII.

British subjects, whether at the ports or at other places, desiring to build or open houses, warehouses, churches, hospitals, or burial grounds, shall make their agreement for the land or buildings they require at the rates prevailing among the people, equitably, and without exaction on either side.

XIII.

The Chinese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the employment, by British subjects, of Chinese subjects in any lawful capacity.

XIV.

British subjects may hire whatever boats they please for the transport of goods or passengers, and the sum to be paid for such boats shall be settled between the parties themselves, without the interference of the Chinese Government. The number of these boats shall not be limited, nor shall a monopoly in respect either of the boats or of the porters or coolies engaged in carrying the goods, be granted to any parties. If any smuggling takes place in them, the offenders will, of course, be punished according to law.

XV.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British authorities.

XVI.

Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China.

British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the Consul, or other public functionary authorised thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

XVII.

A British subject having reason to complain of a Chinese, must proceed to the Consulate and state his grievance. The Consul will inquire into the merits of the case, and do his utmost to arrange it amicably. In like manner, if a Chinese have reason to complain of a British subject, the Consul shall no less listen to his complaint and endeavour to settle it in a friendly manner. If disputes take place of such a nature that the Consul cannot arrange them amicably, then he shall request the assistance of the Chinese authorities, that they may together examine into the merits of the case, and decide it equitably.

XVIII.

The Chinese authorities shall at all times afford the fullest protection to the persons and property of British subjects, whenever these shall have been subjected to insult or violence. In all cases of incendiarism or robbery, the local authorities shall at once

take the necessary steps for the recovery of the stolen property, the suppression of disorder, and the arrest of the guilty parties, whom they will punish according to law.

XIX.

If any British merchant vessel, while within Chinese waters, be plundered by robbers or pirates, it shall be the duty of the Chinese authorities to use every endeavour to capture and punish the said robbers or pirates, and to recover the stolen property, that it may be handed over to the Consul for restoration to the owner.

XX.

If any British vessel be at any time wrecked or stranded on the coast of China, or be compelled to take refuge in any port within the dominions of the Emperor of China, the Chinese authorities, on being apprised of the fact, shall immediately adopt measures for its relief and security; the persons on board shall receive friendly treatment, and shall be furnished, if necessary, with the means of conveyance to the nearest Consular station.

XXI.

If criminals subjects of China shall take refuge in Hong Kong, or on board the British ships there, they shall, upon due requisition by the Chinese authorities, be searched for, and, on proof of their guilt, be delivered up.

In like manner, if Chinese offenders take refuge in the houses or on board the vessels of British subjects at the open ports, they shall not be harboured or concealed, but shall be delivered up, on due requisition by the Chinese authorities, addressed to the British Consul.

XXII.

Should any Chinese subject fail to discharge debts incurred to a British subject, or should he fraudulently abscond, the Chinese authorities will do their utmost to effect his arrest, and enforce recovery of the debts. The British authorities will likewise do their utmost to bring to justice any British subject fraudulently absconding or failing to discharge debts incurred by him to a Chinese subject.

XXIII.

Should natives of China, who may repair to Hong Kong to trade, incur debts there, the recovery of such debts must be arranged for

by the English Courts of Justice on the spot; but should the Chinese debtor abscond, and be known to have property, real or personal, within the Chinese territory, it shall be the duty of the Chinese authorities, on application by and in concert with the British Consul, to do their utmost to see justice done between the parties.

XXIV.

It is agreed that British subjects shall pay on all merchandise imported or exported by them the duties prescribed by the tariff; but in no case shall they be called upon to pay other or higher duties than are required of the subjects of any other foreign nation.

XXV.

Import duties shall be considered payable on the landing of the goods, and duties of export on the shipment of the same.

XXVI.

Whereas the tariff fixed by Article X. of the Treaty of Nanking, and which was estimated so as to impose on imports and exports a duty at about the rate of five per cent. *ad valorem*, has been found, by reason of the fall in value of various articles of merchandise therein enumerated, to impose a duty upon these considerably in excess of the rate originally assumed as above to be a fair rate, it is agreed that the said tariff shall be revised, and that as soon as the treaty shall have been signed, application shall be made to the Emperor of China to depute a high officer of the Board of Revenue to meet, at Shanghai, officers to be deputed on behalf of the British Government to consider its revision together, so that the tariff as revised may come into operation immediately after the ratification of this treaty.

XXVII.

It is agreed that either of the High Contracting Parties to this treaty may demand a further revision of the tariff, and of the commercial articles of this treaty at the end of ten years, but if no demand be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the tariff shall remain in force for ten years more, reckoned from the end of the preceding ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

XXVIII.

Whereas it is agreed in Article X. of the Treaty of Nanking, that British imports, having paid the tariff duties, should be conveyed into the interior free of all further charges, except a transit duty the amount whereof was not to exceed a certain percentage on tariff value; and whereas no accurate information having been furnished of the amount of such duty, British merchants have constantly complained that charges are suddenly and arbitrarily imposed by the provincial authorities as transit duties upon produce on its way to the foreign market, and on imports on their way into the interior to the detriment of trade; it is agreed that within four months from the signing of this treaty at all ports now open to British trade, and within a similar period at all ports that may hereafter be opened, the authority appointed to superintend the collection of duties shall be obliged, upon application of the Consul, to declare the amount of duties leviable on produce between the places of production and the port of shipment, and upon imports between the consular port in question and the inland markets named by the Consul, and that a notification thereof shall be published in English and Chinese for general information.

But it shall be at the option of any British subject desiring to convey produce purchased inland to a port or to convey imports from a port to an inland market, to clear his goods of all transit duties by payment of a single charge. The amount of this charge shall be leviable on exports at the first barrier that they may have to pass, or on imports at the port at which they are landed; and on payment thereof, a certificate shall be issued which shall exempt the goods from all further inland charges whatsoever.

It is further agreed that the amount of this charge shall be calculated as near as possible at the rate of two-and-a-half per cent. *ad valorem*, and that it shall be fixed for each article at the conference to be held at Shanghai for the revision of the tariff.

It is distinctly understood that the payment of transit dues by commutation or otherwise, shall in no way affect the tariff duties on imports or exports, which will continue to be levied separately and in full.

XXIX.

British merchant-vessels of more than one hundred and fifty tons burden shall be charged tonnage dues at the rate of four mace per ton; if of one hundred and fifty tons and under, they shall be charged at the rate of one mace per ton.

Any vessel clearing from any of the open ports of China for any other of the open ports or for Hong-Kong, shall be entitled on application of the master to a special certificate from the customs, on exhibition of which she shall be exempted from all further payment of tonnage dues in any open port of China for a period of four months to be reckoned from the date of her port-clearance.

XXX.

The master of any British merchant vessel may within forty-eight hours after the arrival of his vessel, but not later, decide to depart without breaking bulk, in which he will not be subject to pay tonnage dues. But tonnage dues shall be held due after the expiration of the said forty-eight hours. No other fees or charges upon entry or departure shall be levied.

XXXI.

No tonnage dues shall be payable on boats employed by British subjects in the conveyance of passengers, baggage, letters, articles of provision, or other articles not subject to duty, between any of the open ports. All cargo boats, however, conveying merchandise subject to duty shall pay tonnage dues, once in six months, at the rate of four mace per register ton.

XXXII.

The Consuls and Superintendents of Customs shall consult together regarding the erection of beacons or lighthouses, and the distribution of buoys and lightships as occasion may demand.

XXXIII.

Duties shall be paid to the bankers authorised by the Chinese Government to receive the same in its behalf, either in sycee or in foreign money, according to the assay made at Canton, on the thirteenth of July, one thousand eight hundred and forty-three.

XXXIV.

Sets of standard weights and measures, prepared according to the standard issued to the Canton Custom House by the Board of Revenue, shall be delivered by the Superintendent of Customs to the Consul at each port, to secure uniformity and prevent confusion.

XXXV.

Any British merchant-vessel arriving at one of the open ports shall be at liberty to engage the services of a pilot to take her into port. In like manner, after she has discharged all legal dues and duties, and is ready to take her departure, she shall be allowed to select a pilot to conduct her out of port.

XXXVI.

Whenever a British merchant-vessel shall arrive off one of the open ports, the Superintendent of Customs shall depute one or more Customs officers to guard the ship. They shall either live in a boat of their own, or stay on board the ship, as may best suit their convenience. Their food and expenses shall be supplied them from the Custom House, and they shall not be entitled to any fees whatever from the master or consignee. Should they violate this regulation, they shall be punished proportionately to the amount exacted.

XXXVII.

Within twenty-four hours after arrival, the ship's papers, bills of lading, &c., shall be lodged in the hands of the Consul, who will, in a further period of twenty-four hours, report to the Superintendent of Customs the name of the ship, her register tonnage, and the nature of her cargo. If, owing to neglect on the part of the master, the above rule is not complied with within forty-eight hours of the ship's arrival, he shall be liable to a fine of fifty taels for every day's delay. The total amount of penalty, however, shall not exceed two hundred taels.

The master will be responsible for the correctness of the manifest, which shall contain a full and true account of the particulars of the cargo on board. For presenting a false manifest he will subject himself to a fine of five hundred taels; but he will be allowed to correct, within twenty-four hours after delivery of it to the Custom's officers, any mistake he may discover in his manifest, without incurring this penalty.

XXXVIII.

After receiving from the Consul the report in due form, the Superintendent of Customs shall grant the vessel a permit to open hatches. If the master shall open hatches and begin to discharge any goods without such permission, he shall be fined five hundred taels, and the goods discharged shall be confiscated wholly.

XXXIX.

Any British merchant who has cargo to land or to ship, must apply to the Superintendent of Customs for a special permit. Cargo landed or shipped without such permission will be liable to confiscation.

XL.

No transshipment from one vessel to another can be made without special permission, under pain of confiscation of the goods so transhipped.

XLI.

When all dues and duties shall have been paid, the Superintendent of Customs shall give a port-clearance, and the Consul shall then return the ship's papers, so that she may depart on her voyage.

XLII.

With respect to articles subject, according to the tariff, to an *ad valorem* duty, if the British merchant cannot agree with the Chinese officer in affixing a value, then each party shall call two or three merchants to look at the goods, and the highest price at which any of these merchants would be willing to purchase them shall be assumed as the value of the goods.

XLIII.

Duties shall be charged upon the net weight of each article, making a deduction for the tare weight of congee, &c. To fix the tare on any article, such as tea, if the British merchant cannot agree with the Custom House officer, then each party shall choose so many chests out of every hundred, which, being first weighed in gross, shall afterwards be tared, and the average tare upon these chests shall be assumed as the tare upon the whole, and upon this principle shall the tare be fixed upon all other goods and packages. If there should be any other points in dispute which cannot be settled, the British merchant may appeal to his Consul, who will communicate the particulars of the case to the Superintendent of Customs, that it may be equitably arranged. But the appeal must be made within twenty-four hours, or it will not be attended to. While such points are still unsettled, the Superintendent of Customs shall postpone the insertion of the same in his books.

XLIV.

Upon all damaged goods a fair reduction of duty shall be allowed, proportionate to their deterioration. If any disputes

arise, they shall be settled in the manner pointed out in the clause of this treaty, having reference to articles which pay duty *ad valorem*.

XLV.

British merchants who may have imported merchandise in any of the open ports and paid the duty thereon, if they desire to re-export the same, shall be entitled to make application to the Superintendent of Customs, who, in order to prevent fraud on the revenue, shall cause examination to be made by suitable officers, to see that the duty paid on such goods, as entered in the Custom House books, correspond with the representation made, and that the goods remain with their original marks unchanged. He shall then make a memorandum on the port-clearance of the goods and of the amount of duties paid, and deliver the same to the merchant; and shall also certify the facts to the officers of Customs of the other ports. All which being done, on the arrival in port of the vessel in which goods are laden, everything being found on examination there to correspond, she shall be permitted to break bulk and land the said goods, without being subject to the payment of any additional duty thereon. But if, on such examination, the Superintendent of Customs shall detect any fraud on the revenue in the case, then the goods shall be subject to confiscation by the Chinese Government.

British merchants desiring to re-export duty-paid imports to a foreign country, shall be entitled, on complying with the same conditions as in the case of re-exportation to another port in China, to a drawback certificate, which shall be a valid tender to the Customs in payment of import or export duties.

Foreign grain brought into any port of China in a British ship, if no part thereof has been landed, may be re-exported without hindrance.

XLVI.

The Chinese authorities at each port shall adopt the means they may judge most proper to prevent the revenue suffering from fraud or smuggling.

XLVII.

British merchant vessels are not entitled to resort to any other than the ports of trade declared open by this treaty. They are not unlawfully to enter other ports in China, or to carry on clandestine trade along the coasts thereof. Any vessel violating this provision shall, with her cargo, be subject to confiscation by the Chinese Government.

XLVIII.

If any British merchant-vessel be concerned in smuggling, the goods, whatever their value or nature, shall be subject to confiscation by the Chinese authorities, and the ship may be prohibited from trading further, and sent away as soon as her accounts shall have been adjusted and paid.

XLIX.

All penalties enforced, or confiscations made, under this treaty, shall belong and be appropriated to the public service of the Government of China.

L.

All official communications addressed by the diplomatic and Consular Agents of Her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese authorities shall henceforth be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a Chinese version, but it is understood that, in the event of there being any difference of meaning between the English and Chinese text, the English Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense. This provision is to apply to the treaty now negotiated, the Chinese text of which has been carefully corrected by the English original.

LI.

It is agreed that henceforward the character "I" (barbarian), shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese authorities, either in the capital or in the provinces.

LII.

British ships of war coming for no hostile purpose, or being engaged in the pursuit of pirates, shall be at liberty to visit all ports within the dominions of the Emperor of China, and shall receive every facility for the purchase of provisions, procuring water, and if occasion require, for the making of repairs. The commanders of such ships shall hold intercourse with the Chinese authorities on terms of equality and courtesy.

LIII.

In consideration of the injury sustained by native and foreign commerce from the prevalence of piracy in the seas of China, the high contracting parties agree to concert measures for its suppression.

LIV.

The British Government and its subjects are hereby confirmed in all privileges, immunities, and advantages conferred on them by previous treaties; and it is hereby expressly stipulated that the British Government and its subjects will be allowed free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities and advantages that may have been, or may be hereafter, granted by His Majesty the Emperor of China to the Government or subjects of any other nation.

LV.

In evidence of her desire for the continuance of a friendly understanding, Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain consents to include in a separate Article, which shall be in every respect of equal validity with the articles of this treaty, the conditions affecting indemnity for expenses incurred and losses sustained in the matter of the Canton question.

LVI.

The ratifications of this treaty under the hand of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, respectively, shall be exchanged at Peking, within a year from this day of signature.

In token whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this treaty.

Done at Tientsin, this twenty-sixth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight; corresponding with the Chinese date, the sixteenth day, fifth moon, of the eighth year of Hien Fung.

Separate Article concluded 26th June, 1858.

It is hereby agreed that a sum of two million of taels, on account of the losses sustained by British subjects through the misconduct of the Chinese authorities at Canton; and a further sum of two millions of taels, on account of the military expenses of the expedition, which Her Majesty the Queen has been compelled to send out for the purpose of obtaining redress, and of enforcing the due observance of treaty provisions, shall be paid to Her Majesty's representatives in China by the authorities of the Kwang-tung province.

The necessary arrangements with respect to the time and mode of effecting these payments shall be determined by Her Majesty's

Representative, in concert with the Chinese authorities of Kwang-tung.

When the above amount shall have been discharged in full, the British forces will be withdrawn from the City of Canton.

Ratification Convention signed at Peking 24th October, 1860.

I.

A breach of friendly relations have been occasioned by the act of the Garrison of Taku, which obstructed Her Britannic Majesty's Representative when on his way to Peking for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Tientsin in the month of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China expresses his deep regret at the misunderstanding so occasioned.

II.

It is further expressly declared that the arrangement entered into at Shanghai in the month of October, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, between Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, and His Imperial Majesty's Commissioners, Kweiliang and Hwashana, regarding the residence of Her Britannic Majesty's Representative in China, is hereby cancelled, and that in accordance with Article III. of the treaty of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, Her Britannic Majesty's Representative will henceforth reside, permanently or occasionally, at Peking, as Her Britannic Majesty shall be pleased to decide.

III.

It is agreed that the separate Article of the treaty of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight is hereby annulled, and that in lieu of the amount of indemnity therein specified, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China shall pay the sum of eight millions of taels, in the following proportions or instalments, namely, at Tientsin, on or before the 30th day of November, the sum of five hundred thousand taels; at Canton, on or before the first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty, three hundred and thirty-three thousand and thirty-three taels, less the sum which shall have been advanced by the Canton authorities towards the completion of the British factory site of Shameen; and the remainder at the ports open to foreign trade, in quarterly payments, which shall consist of one-fifth of the gross revenue from Customs there collected, the first of the said payments being

due on the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty, for the quarter terminating on that day.

It is further agreed that these moneys shall be paid into the hands of an officer whom Her Britannic Majesty's Representative shall specially appoint to receive them, and that the accuracy of the amounts shall, before payment, be duly ascertained by British and Chinese officers appointed to discharge this duty.

In order to prevent further discussion, it is moreover declared that of the eight millions of taels herein guaranteed, two millions will be appropriated to the indemnification of the British Mercantile Community at Canton, for losses sustained by them ; and the remaining six millions to the liquidation of war expenses.

IV.

It is agreed that on the day on which this Convention is signed His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China shall open the port of Tientsin to trade, and that it shall be thereafter competent to British subjects to reside and trade there, under the same conditions as at any other port of China, by treaty open to trade.

V.

As soon as the ratifications of the treaty of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight shall have been exchanged, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China will, by decree, command the high authorities of every province to proclaim throughout their jurisdictions that Chinese, in choosing to take service in British colonies or other parts beyond sea, are at perfect liberty to enter into engagements with British subjects for that purpose, and to ship themselves and their families on board any British vessels, at the open ports of China ; also that the high authorities aforesaid shall, in concert, with Her Britannic Majesty's Representative in China, frame such regulations for the protection of Chinese emigrating as above as the circumstances of the different open ports may demand.

VI.

With a view to the maintenance of law and order in and about the harbour of Hong Kong, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to cede to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors, to have and to hold as a dependency of Her Britannic Majesty's Colony of Hong Kong, that portion of the township of Cowloon in the province of Kwang-Tung, of which a lease was granted in perpetuity to Harry Smith Parkes, Esquire, Companion of the Bath, a member

of the Allied Commission, at Canton on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by Lau T'sung-Kwang, Governor-General of the Two Kwang.

It is further declared that the lease in question is hereby cancelled, that the claims of any Chinese to property on the said portion of Cowloon shall be duly investigated by a mixed commission of British and Chinese officers, and that compensation shall be awarded by the British Government to any Chinese whose claim shall be by that said Commission established should his removal be deemed necessary by the British Government

VII.

It is agreed that the provisions of the treaty of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, except in so far as these are modified by the present Convention, shall without delay come into operation as soon as the ratifications of the treaty aforesaid shall have been exchanged. It is further agreed that no further ratification of the present Convention shall be necessary, but that it shall take effect from the date of its signature, and be equally binding with the treaty above-mentioned on the high contracting parties.

VIII.

It is agreed that as soon as the ratifications of the treaty of the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight shall have been exchanged, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China shall by decree command the high authorities in the capital, and in the provinces, to print and publish the aforesaid treaty and the present Convention for general information.

IX.

It is agreed that as soon as the Convention shall have been signed the ratification of the treaty of the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight shall have been exchanged and an Imperial decree, respecting the publication of the said Convention and Treaty, shall have been promulgated, as provided for by Article VIII. of this Convention. Chusan shall be evacuated by Her Britannic Majesty's troops there stationed, and Her Britannic Majesty's force now before Peking shall commence its march towards the city of Tientsin, the forts of Taku, the north coast of Shantung and city of Canton, at each or all of which places it shall be at the option of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland to retain a force until the indemnity of eight millions of taels, guaranteed in Article III., shall have been paid.

TREATY OF YEDO

Signed between Great Britain and Japan, August 26th, 1858.

I.

THERE shall be perpetual peace and friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors, and His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan, and between their respective dominions and subjects.

II.

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland may appoint a Diplomatic Agent to reside at the city of Yedo, and Consuls or Consular Agents to reside at any or all the ports of Japan which are opened for British commerce by this treaty.

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General of Great Britain shall have the right to travel freely to any part of the Empire of Japan.

His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan may appoint a Diplomatic Agent to reside in London and Consuls or Consular Agents at any or all the ports of Great Britain.

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General of Japan shall have the right to travel freely to any part of Great Britain.

III.

The ports and towns of Hakodadi, Kanagawa and Nagasaki shall be opened to British subjects on the 1st of July, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine. In addition to which the following ports and towns shall be opened to them at the dates hereinafter specified:—

Nee-e-gata, or, if Nee-e-gata be found to be unsuitable as a harbour, another convenient port on the west coast of Nipon, on the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty.

Hiogo, on the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three.

In all the foregoing ports and towns British subjects may permanently reside. They shall have the right to lease ground and purchase the buildings thereon, and may erect dwelling and warehouses; but no fortification or place of military strength shall be erected under pretence of building dwelling or warehouses; and to see that this Article is observed, the Japanese authorities shall have the right to inspect from time to time any buildings which are being erected, altered or repaired.

The place which British subjects shall occupy for their buildings, and the harbour regulations, shall be arranged by the British Consul and the Japanese authorities of each place, and, if they cannot agree, the matter shall be referred to and settled by the British Diplomatic Agent and the Japanese Government. No wall, fence or gate shall be erected by the Japanese around the place where British subjects reside, or anything done which may prevent a free egress or ingress to the same.

British subjects shall be free to go where they please within the following limits at the opened ports of Japan.

At Kanagawa to the River Togo (which empties into the Bay of Yedo between Kawasaki and Sinagowa) and ten *ri* in any direction.

At Hakodadi ten *ri* in any direction.

At Hiogo ten *ri* in any direction, that of Kioto excepted, which city shall not be approached nearer than ten *ri*. The crews of vessels resorting to Hiogo shall not cross the River Enagawa, which empties into the bay between Hiogo and Osaca.

The distance shall be measured by land from the goyoso, or town-hall, of each of the foregoing ports, the *ri* being equal to four thousand two hundred and seventy-five yards English measure.

At Nagasaki British subjects may go into any part of the Imperial domain in its vicinity.

The boundaries of Nee-e-gata, or the place that may be substituted for it, shall be settled by the British Diplomatic Agent and the Government of Japan.

From the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, British subjects shall be allowed to reside in the city of Yedo, and from the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, in the city of Osaca for the purposes of trade only. In each of these two cities a suitable place, within which they may hire houses, and the distance they may go, shall be arranged by the British Diplomatic Agent and the Government of Japan.

IV.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects in the dominions of His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British authorities.

V.

Japanese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Japanese authorities according to the laws of Japan.

British subjects who may commit any crime against Japanese subjects, or the subjects or citizens of any other country, shall be tried and punished by the Consul, or other public functionary authorised thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

VI.

A British subject having reason to complain of a Japanese must proceed to the Consulate and state his grievance.

The Consul will inquire into the merits of the case, and do his utmost to arrange it amicably. In like manner, if a Japanese have reason to complain of a British subject, the Consul shall no less listen to his complaint, and endeavour to settle it in a friendly manner. If disputes take place of such a nature that the Consul cannot arrange them amicably, then he shall request the assistance of the Japanese authorities, that they may together examine into the merits of the case, and decide it equitably.

VII.

Should any Japanese subject fail to discharge debts incurred to a British subject, or should he fraudulently abscond, the Japanese authorities will do their utmost to bring him to justice, and to enforce recovery of the debts; and should any British subject fraudulently abscond or fail to discharge debts incurred by him to a Japanese subject, the British authorities will in like manner, do their utmost to bring him to justice, and to enforce recovery of the debts.

Neither the British nor Japanese Governments are to be held responsible for the payment of any debts contracted by British or Japanese subjects.

VIII.

The Japanese Government will place no restrictions whatever upon the employment, by British subjects, of Japanese in any lawful capacity.

1858

IX.

British subjects in Japan shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and for this purpose shall have the right to erect suitable places of worship.

X.

All foreign coin shall be current in Japan, and shall pass for its corresponding weight in Japanese coin of the same description.

British and Japanese subjects may freely use foreign or Japanese coin in making payments to each other.

As some time will elapse before the Japanese will become acquainted with the value of foreign coin, the Japanese Government will, for the period of one year after the opening of each port, furnish British subjects with Japanese coin in exchange for theirs, equal weights being given, and no discount taken for re-coinage.

Coins of all description (with the exception of Japanese copper coin) as well as foreign gold and silver uncoined, may be exported from Japan.

XI.

Supplies for the use of the British navy may be landed at Kanagawa, Hakodadi, and Nagasaki, and stored in warehouses, in the custody of an officer of the British Government, without the payment of any duty; but if any such supplies are sold in Japan, the purchaser shall pay the proper duty to the Japanese authorities.

XII.

If any British vessel be at any time wrecked or stranded on the coasts of Japan, or be compelled to take refuge in any port within the dominions of the Tycoon of Japan, the Japanese authorities, on being apprised of the fact, shall immediately render all the assistance in their power; the persons on board shall receive friendly treatment, and be furnished, if necessary, with the means of conveyance to the nearest Consular station.

XIII.

Any British merchant vessel arriving off one of the open ports of Japan shall be at liberty to hire a pilot to take her into port. In like manner, after she has discharged all legal dues and duties, and is ready to take her departure, she shall be allowed to hire a pilot to conduct her out of port.

XIV.

At each of the ports open to trade, British subjects shall be at full liberty to import from their own or any other ports, and sell

there, and purchase therein, and export to their own or any other ports, all manner of merchandise, not contraband, paying the duties thereon, as laid down in the tariff annexed to the present treaty, and no other charges whatsoever.

With the exception of munitions of war, which shall only be sold to the Japanese Government and foreigners, they may freely buy from Japanese and sell to them any articles that either may have for sale without the intervention of any Japanese officers in such purchase or sale, or in making or receiving payments for the same; and all classes of Japanese may purchase, sell, keep or use any articles sold to them by British subjects.

XV.

If the Japanese Custom House officers are dissatisfied with the value placed on any goods by the owner, they may place a value thereon, and offer to take the goods at that valuation. If the owner refuses to accept the offer, he shall pay duty on such valuation. If the offer be accepted by the owner, the purchase-money shall be paid to him without delay, and without any abatement or discount.

XVI.

All goods imported into Japan by British subjects, and which have paid the duty fixed by this treaty, may be transported by the Japanese into any part of the empire without the payment of any tax, excise or transit duty whatever.

XVII.

British merchants who may have imported merchandise into any open port in Japan, and paid duty thereon, shall be entitled, on obtaining from the Japanese custom-house authorities a certificate stating that such payment has been made, to re-export the same, and land it in any other of the open ports without the payment of any additional duty whatever.

XVIII.

The Japanese authorities at each port will adopt the means that they may judge most proper for the prevention of fraud or smuggling.

XIX.

All penalties enforced, or confiscations made under this treaty, shall belong to and be appropriated by the Government of His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan.

XX.

The articles for the regulation of trade which are appointed to this treaty shall be considered as forming part of the same, and shall be equally binding on both the contracting parties to this treaty and on their subjects.

The Diplomatic Agent of Great Britain in Japan, in conjunction with such person or persons as may be appointed for that purpose by the Japanese Government, shall have power to make such rules as may be required to carry into full and complete effect the provisions of this treaty, and the provision of the Articles regulating trade appended thereto.

XXI.

This treaty being written in English, Japanese and Dutch languages, and all the versions having the same meaning and intention, the Dutch version shall be considered the original, but it is understood that all official communications addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to the Japanese authorities, shall henceforward be written in English. In order, however, to facilitate the transaction of business, they will, for a period of five years from the signature of this treaty, be accompanied by a Dutch or Japanese version.

XXII.

It is agreed that either of the high contracting parties to this treaty, on giving one year's previous notice to the other, may demand a revision thereof on or after the first of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, with a view to the insertion therein of such amendments as experience shall prove to be desirable.

XXIII.

It is hereby expressly stipulated that the British Government and its subjects will be allowed free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been or may be hereafter granted by His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan to the Government or subjects of any other nation.

XXIV.

The ratification of this treaty under the hand of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the name and seal of His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan respectively, shall be exchanged at Yedo, within a year of this day of signature.

In token whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this treaty.

THE TREATY OF PEKING.

Signed between Russia and China 14th November, 1860. Ratified at St. Petersburg, 1st January, 1861.

1. THE eastern frontier between the two empires shall commence from the juncture of the rivers Slulka and Argun, will follow the course of the river Amur to the junction of the river Usuri with the latter. The land on the north of the river Amur belongs to the empire of Russia, and the territory on the south to the junction of the river Usuri to the empire of China. Further on the frontier line between the two empires ascends the rivers Usuri and Sengacha to where the latter issues from Lake Kinka; it then crosses the lake, and takes the direction of the river Belen-ho or Tur; from the mouth of that river it follows the mountain range to the mouth of the river Hupfu, a tributary of the Tinfun, and from that point the mountains situated between the river Hun Chum and the sea, as far as the river Tumen-Kiang. Along this line the territory on the east side belongs to the empire of Russia, and that on the west to the empire of China.

2. Defines the frontiers between Russia and China towards the west, and confirms Russia in the possession of the country around Lakes Balkash and Issik Kul.

3. Arranges the appointment of a joint commission for placing the frontier marks. For the inspection of the eastern frontiers the commissioners will meet at the mouth of the Usuri in the month of April, 1861.

4. On the whole frontier line established by articles 1 and 2 of the present treaty, trade free of all duty or restrictions is established between the subjects of the two States.

5. Restores to the merchants of Kiakhta the right of going to Peking, and they may also trade at Urga and Kalyan. At Urga a Russian consulate may be established. Russia merchants provided with passports may travel throughout China, but must not congregate in a greater number than two hundred in the same locality.

6. Grants to the Russians a site for a factory, with church, &c., at Kashgar. The Chinese Government is not, however, responsible for any pillage of travellers by tribes beyond its control.

7. At the places thrown open, no restrictions whatever are to be imposed upon commercial transactions, which may be carried on on credit or otherwise as best suits the interests of the parties concerned.

8. Russia may establish consuls at Kashgar and Urga to watch over the conduct of the merchants, who are to be punished by the laws of the country to which they belong. The Chinese may also send consuls to Russian town. Commercial disputes are to be settled by arbitrators chosen by the parties concerned. Criminals seeking refuge in either country are to be given up, to be judged by the Government to which they are subject.

9. Annuls the treaties concluded at Nerchinsk 1689, and at Kiakhta 1727.

10. Refers to the restoration of cattle which may have strayed across the frontiers.

11. Regulates the transmission of written despatches on a reciprocal amicable footing between the authorities of the respective empires.

12. Settles the postal arrangements between the two empires. Letters are to leave Peking and Kiakhta once a month; parcels, Kiakhta every two months, Peking once in three months. Twenty days are allowed for the transmission of letters, forty days at the utmost for parcels.

13. Determines that the ordinary correspondence between the two Governments is to be sent through the post, but that during the residence of a Russian envoy at Peking despatches of special importance may be forwarded by couriers.

14. Empowers the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia to conclude any additional arrangements with the frontier authorities of a nature to facilitate intercourse.

15. States that after the exchange of ratifications the treaty will be in full force.

CONVENTION OF CHIFU.

Signed between Great Britain and China, 13th September, 1876.

Ratified 17th September, 1876.

Section I. Settlement of the Yün Nan Case.

(i.) A MEMORIAL is to be presented to the Throne, whether by the Tsung-li Yamen or by the Grand Secretary Li is immaterial, in the sense of the memorandum prepared by Sir Thomas Wade. Before presentation, the Chinese text of the Memorial is to be shown to Sir Thomas Wade.

(ii.) The Memorial having been presented to the Throne, and the Imperial decree in reply received, the Tsung-li Yamen will communicate copies of the Memorial and Imperial decree to Sir Thomas Wade, together with a copy of a letter from the Tsung-li Yamen to the Provincial Governments, instructing them to issue a proclamation that shall embody at length the above Memorial and Decree. Sir Thomas Wade will thereon reply to the effect that for two years to come officers will be sent by the British Minister to different places in the Provinces to see that the Proclamation is posted. On application from the British Minister or the Consul of any port, instructed by him to make application, the high officers of the provinces will depute competent officers to accompany those so sent to the places which they go to observe.

(iii.) In order to the framing of such regulations as will be needed for the conduct of the frontier trade between Burma and Yün Nan, the Memorial submitting the proposed settlement of the Yün Nan affair will contain a request that an Imperial decree be issued directing the Governor-General and Governor, whenever the British Government shall send officers to Yün Nan, to select a competent officer of rank to confer with them and to conclude a satisfactory arrangement.

(iv.) The British Government will be free for five years, from the first of January next, being the 17th day of the 11th moon of the second year of the reign Kwang Su, to station officers at

Ta-li-Fu or at some other suitable place in Yün Nan to observe the conditions of trade, to the end that they may have information upon which to base the regulations of trade when these have to be discussed. For the consideration and adjustment of any matter affecting British officers or subjects, these officers will be free to address themselves to the authorities of the province. The opening of the trade may be proposed by the British Government, as it may find best, at any time within the term of five years or upon the expiry of the term of five years. Passports having been obtained last year for a mission from India into Yün Nan, it is open to the Viceroy of India to send such mission at any time he may see fit.

(v.) The amount of indemnity to be paid on account of the families of the officers and others killed in Yün Nan; on account of the expenses which the Yün Nan case has occasioned, and on account of claims of British merchants arising out of the action of officers of the Chinese Government up to the commencement of the present year, Sir Thomas Wade takes upon himself to fix at two hundred thousand taels, payable on demand.

(vi.) When the case is closed, an Imperial letter will be written, expressing regret for what has occurred in Yün Nan. The mission bearing the Imperial letter will proceed to England immediately. Sir Thomas Wade is to be informed of the constitution of this Mission for the information of his Government. The text of the Imperial letter is also to be communicated to Sir Thomas Wade by the Tsung-li Yamen.

Section II. Official Intercourse.

(i.) In the Tsung-li Yamen's Memorial of the 28th September, 1875, the Prince of Kung and the Ministers stated that their object in presenting it had not been simply the transaction of business in which Chinese and foreigners might be concerned; missions abroad and the questions of diplomatic intercourse lay equally within their prayer.

To the prevention of further misunderstanding upon the subject of intercourse and correspondence, the present conditions of both having caused complaint in the capital and in the provinces, it is agreed that the Tsung-li Yamen shall address a circular to the Legations inviting foreign Representatives to consider with them a code of etiquette, to the end that foreign officials in China, whether at the ports or elsewhere, may be treated with the same regard as is shown them when serving abroad in other countries, and as would be shown to Chinese agents so serving abroad.

The fact that China is about to establish missions and consulates abroad renders an understanding on these points essential.

(ii.) The British Treaty of 1858, Article XVI, lays down that "Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by Chinese authorities, according to the laws of China. British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the Consul or any other public functionary authorized thereto according to the laws of Great Britain.

"Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides."

The words "Functionary authorized thereto" are translated in the Chinese text "British Government."

In order to the fulfilment of its treaty obligations, the British Government has established a Supreme Court at Shanghai, with a special code of rules, which it is now about to revise. The Chinese Government has established at Shanghai a mixed Court; but the officer presiding over it, either from lack of power or, dread of unpopularity, constantly fails to enforce his judgments.

It is now understood that the Tsung-li Yamen will write a circular to the Legations, inviting foreign Representatives at once to consider with the Tsung-li Yamen the measures needed for the more effective administration of justice at the ports open to trade.

(iii.) It is agreed that whenever a crime is committed affecting the person or property of a British subject, whether in the interior or at the open ports, the British Minister shall be free to send officers to the spot to be present at the investigation.

To the prevention of misunderstanding on this point, Sir Thomas Wade will write a note to the above effect, to which the Tsung-li Yamen will reply, affirming that this is the course of proceeding to be adhered to for the time to come. It is further understood that so long as the laws of the two countries differ from each other, there can be but one principle to guide judicial proceedings in mixed cases in China, namely, that the case is tried by the official of the defendant's nationality, the official of the plaintiff's nationality merely attending to watch the proceedings in the interests of justice. If the officer so attending be dissatisfied with the proceedings it will be in his power to protest against them in detail. The law administered will be the law of the nationality of the officer trying the case. This is the meaning of the words *hui t'ung*, indicating combined action, in judicial proceedings, in Article XVI of the treaty of Tientsin; and this is the course to be respectively followed by the officers of either nationality.

Section III.—Trade.

(i.) With reference to the area within which, according to the treaties in force, likin ought not to be collected on foreign goods at the open ports, Sir Thomas Wade agrees to move his Government to allow the ground rented by foreigners (the so-called Concessions) at the different ports to be regarded as the area of exemption from likin; and the Government of China will thereupon allow I-ch'ang in the province of Hu-Pei, Wu-hu in Au-Hui, Wên-Chow in Che-Kiang, and Pei-hai (Pak-hoi) in Kwang-Tung, to be added to the number of ports open to trade, and to become Consular Stations. The British Government will further be free to send officers to reside at Ch'ung K'ing to watch the conditions of British trade in Ssu-Ch'uen. British merchants will not be allowed to reside at Ch'ung K'ing or to open establishments or warehouses there, so long as no steamers have access to the port. When steamers have succeeded in ascending the river so far, further arrangements can be taken into consideration.

It is further proposed as a measure of compromise that at certain points on the shore of the Great River, namely Ta-tung and Ngau Ching, in the province of Au-Hui; Hu-K'on, in Kiang-Si; Wu-suëh, Lu-chi-k'on, and Tha-shih, in Hu Kuang; these being all places of trade in the interior, at which as they are not open ports, foreign merchants are not legally authorised¹ to land or ship goods, steamers shall be allowed to touch for the purpose of landing or shipping passengers or goods; but in all instances by means of native boats only, and subject to the regulations in force affecting native trade.

Produce accompanied by a half-duty certificate may be shipped at such points by the steamers, but may not be landed by them for sale. And at all such points, except in the case of imports accompanied by a transit duty certificate or exports similarly certificated, which will be severally passed free of likin on exhibition of such certificates, likin will be duly collected on all goods whatever by the native authorities. Foreign merchants will not be authorised to reside or open houses of business or warehouses at the places enumerated as ports of call.

(ii.) At all ports open to trade, whether by earlier or later agreement, at which no settlement area has been previously defined, it will be the duty of the British Consul, acting in concert with his colleagues the Consuls of other Powers, to come to an understanding with the local authorities regarding the definition of the foreign settlement area.

¹ In the Chinese text this sentence reads “. . . are not authorised, according to the Tungtze Regulations, to land and ship, &c.”

(iii.) On opium, Sir Thomas Wade will move his Government to sanction an arrangement different from that affecting other imports. British merchants, when opium is brought into port, will be obliged to have it taken cognisance of by the Customs and deposited in bond, either in a warehouse or a receiving hulk, until such time as there is a sale for it. The importer will then pay the tariff duty on it and the purchasers the *likin*; in order to the prevention of the evasion of the duty. The amount of *likin* to be collected will be decided by the different Provincial Governments, according to the circumstances of each.

(iv.) The Chinese Government agrees that transit duty certificates shall be framed under one rule at all ports, no difference being made in the conditions set forth therein; and that so far as imports are concerned the nationality of the person possessing and carrying these is immaterial. Native produce carried from an inland centre to a port of shipment, if *bona fide* intended for shipment to a foreign port, may be by treaty certificated by the British subject interested, and exempted by payment of the half duty from all charges demanded upon it *en route*. If produce be not the property of a British subject, or is being carried to a port not for exportation, it is not entitled to the exemption that would be secured if by the exhibition of a Transit Duty Certificate. The British Minister is prepared to agree with the Tsung-li Yamen upon rules that will secure the Chinese Government against abuse of the privilege as affecting produce.

The words *nei ti*, inland, in the clause of Article VII. of the rules appended to the tariff, regarding carriage of imports inland, and of native produce purchased inland, apply as much to places on the sea coasts and river shores as to places in the interior not open to foreign trade, the Chinese Government having the right to make arrangements for the prevention of abuses thereat.

(v.) Article XLV. of the treaty of 1858 prescribes no limit to the term within which a drawback may be claimed upon duty paid imports. The British Minister agrees to a term of three years, after expiry of which no drawback shall be claimed.

(vi.) The foregoing stipulation, that certain ports are to be opened to foreign trade, and that landing and shipping of goods at six places on the Great River is to be sanctioned, shall be given effect to within six months after receipt of the Imperial Decree approving the memorial of the Grand Secretary Li. The date for giving effect to the stipulations affecting exemption of imports from *likin* taxation within the foreign settlements, and the collection of *likin* upon opium by the Customs' Inspectorate at the same time as the tariff duty upon it, will be fixed as soon as the

British Government has arrived at an understanding on the subject with other foreign Governments.

(vii.) The Governor of Hong Kong having long complained of the interference of the Canton Customs' Revenue Cruisers with the junk trade of that Colony, the Chinese Government agrees to the appointment of a commission, to consist of a British Consul, an officer of the Hong Kong Government and a Chinese official of equal rank, in order to the establishment of some system that shall enable the Chinese Government to protect its revenue without prejudice to the interests of the Colony.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

Her Majesty's Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year by way of Peking through Kau-Su and Koko-Nor, or by way of Ssu-Ch'uen to Tibet, and thence to India, the Tsung-li Yamen, having due regard to the circumstances, will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the high provincial authorities and to the Resident in Tibet. If the mission should not be sent by these routes, but should be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Tibet, the Tsung-li Yamen, on receipt of a communication to the above effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident in Tibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take due care of the mission; and passports for the mission will be issued by the Tsung-li Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND KOREA.

Signed 26th November, 1883. Ratified 28th April, 1884.

I.

(1) **THERE** shall be perpetual peace and friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, her heirs and successors, and His Majesty the King of Korea, his heirs and successors, and between their respective dominions and subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the dominions of the other.

(2) In case of differences arising between one of the high contracting parties and a third power, the other high contracting party, if requested to do so, shall exert its good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement.

II.

(1) The high contracting parties may each appoint a Diplomatic Representative to reside permanently or temporarily at the capital of the other, and may appoint a Consul-General, Consuls, or Vice-Consuls, to reside at any or all of the ports or places of the other which are open to foreign commerce. The Diplomatic Representatives and Consular functionaries of both countries shall freely enjoy the same facilities for communication, personally or in writing, with the authorities of the country where they respectively reside, together with all other privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by Diplomatic or Consular functionaries in other countries.

(2) The Diplomatic Representative and the Consular functionaries of each Power, and the members of their official establishments shall have the right to travel freely in any part of the dominions of the other, and the Korean authorities shall furnish passports to such British officers travelling in Korea, and shall provide such escort for their protection as may be necessary.

(8) The Consular officers of both countries shall exercise their functions on receipt of due authorisation from the Sovereign or Government of the country in which they respectively reside, and shall not be permitted to engage in trade.

III.

(1) Jurisdiction over the persons and property of British subjects in Korea shall be vested exclusively in the duly authorised British judicial authorities, who shall hear and determine all cases brought against British subjects by any British or other foreign subject or citizen without the intervention of the Korean authorities.

(2) If the Korean authorities or a Korean subject make any charge or complaint against a British subject in Korea, the case shall be heard and decided by the British judicial authorities.

(3) If the British authorities or a British subject make any charge or complaint against a Korean subject in Korea, the case shall be heard and decided by the Korean authorities.

(4) A British subject who commits any offence in Korea shall be tried and punished by the British judicial authorities according to the laws of Great Britain.

(5) A Korean subject who commits in Korea any offence against a British subject shall be tried and punished by the Korean authorities according to the laws of Korea.

(6) Any complaint against a British subject involving a penalty or confiscation by reason of any breach either of this treaty or of any regulation annexed thereto, or of any regulation that may hereafter be made in virtue of its provisions, shall be brought before the British judicial authorities for decision, and any penalty imposed and all property confiscated in such cases shall belong to the Korean Government.

(7) British goods, when seized by the Korean authorities at an open port, shall be put under the seals of the Korean and the British Consular authorities, and shall be detained by the former until the British judicial authorities shall have given their decision. If this decision is in favour of the owner of the goods, they shall be immediately placed at the Consul's disposal. But the owner shall be allowed to receive them at once on depositing their value with the Korean authorities, pending the decision of the British judicial authorities.

(8) In all cases, whether civil or criminal, tried either in Korean or British Courts in Korea, a properly authorised official of the nationality of the plaintiff or prosecutor shall be allowed to attend the hearing, and shall be treated with the courtesy due to

his position. He shall be allowed, whenever he thinks it necessary, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to protest against the proceedings or decision.

(9) If a Korean subject who is charged with an offence against the laws of his country takes refuge on premises occupied by a British subject, or on board a British merchant vessel, the British Consular authorities, on receiving an application from the Korean authorities, shall take steps to have such person arrested and handed over to the latter for trial. But without the consent of the proper British Consular authority, no Korean officer shall enter the premises of any British subject without his consent, or go on board any British ship without the consent of the officer in charge.

(10) On the demand of any competent British Consular authority, the Korean authorities shall arrest and deliver to the former any British subject charged with a criminal offence, and any deserter from a British ship of war or merchant vessel.

IV.

(1) The ports of Chemulpo (Fenchuan), Wöusan (Gensan), and Pusan (Fusan), or if the latter port should not be approved, then such other port as may be selected in its neighbourhood, together with the city of Hanyang and of the town of Yanghwa Chin, or such other place in that neighbourhood as may be deemed desirable, shall, from the day on which this treaty comes into operation, be opened to British commerce.

(2) At the above-mentioned places British subjects shall have the right to rent or to purchase land or houses, and to erect dwellings, warehouses and factories. They shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion. All arrangements for the selection, determination of the limits, and laying out of the sites of the foreign settlements, and for the sale of land, at the various ports and places in Korea open to foreign trade, shall be made by the Korean authorities in conjunction with the competent foreign authorities.

(3) These sites shall be purchased from the owners, and prepared for occupation by the Korean Government, and the expense thus incurred shall be a first charge on the proceeds of the sale of the land. The yearly rental agreed upon by the Korean authorities in conjunction with the foreign authorities shall be paid to the former, who shall retain a fixed amount thereof as a fair equivalent for the land tax, and the remainder, together with any balance left from the proceeds of land sales, shall belong to a municipal fund to be administered by a council,

the constitution of which shall be determined hereafter by the Korean authorities in conjunction with the competent foreign authorities.

(4) British subjects may rent or purchase land or houses beyond the limits of the foreign settlements, and within a distance of 10 Korean *li* from the same. But all land so occupied shall be subject to such conditions as to the observance of Korean local regulations and payment of land tax as the Korean authorities may see fit to impose.

(5) The Korean authorities will set apart, free of cost, at each of the places open to trade, a suitable piece of ground as a foreign cemetery, upon which no rent, land tax, or other charges shall be payable, and the management of which shall be left to the municipal council above mentioned.

(6) British subjects shall be allowed to go where they please without passports within a distance of 100 Korean *li* from any of the ports and places open to trade, or within such limits as may be agreed upon between the competent authorities of both countries. British subjects are also authorised to travel in Korea for pleasure or for purposes of trade, to transport or sell goods of all kinds, except books and other printed matter disapproved of by the Korean Government, and to purchase native produce in all parts of the country under passports which will be issued by their Consuls and countersigned or sealed by the Korean local authorities. These passports, if demanded, must be produced for examination in the districts passed through. If the passport be not irregular, the bearer will be allowed to proceed, and he shall be at liberty to procure such means of transport as he may require. Any British subject travelling beyond the limits above-named without a passport, or committing, when in the interior, any offence, shall be arrested and handed over to the nearest British Consul for punishment. Travelling without a passport beyond the said limits will render the offender liable to a fine not exceeding 100 Mexican dollars, with or without imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month.

(7) British subjects in Korea shall be amenable to such municipal, police and other regulations for the maintenance of peace, order and good government as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the two countries.

V.

(1) At each of the ports or places open to foreign trade British subjects shall be at full liberty to import from any foreign port, or from any Korean open port, to sell or to buy from any Korean

subjects or others, and to export to any foreign or Korean open port, all kinds of merchandise not prohibited by this treaty, on paying the duties of the tariff annexed thereto. They may freely transact their business with Korean subjects or others without the intervention of Korean officials or other persons, and they may freely engage in any industrial occupation.

(2) The owners or consignees of all goods imported from any foreign port upon which the duty of the aforesaid tariff shall have been paid shall be entitled, on re-exporting the same to any foreign port at any time within thirteen Korean months from the date of importation, to receive a drawback certificate for the amount of such import duty, provided that the original packages containing such goods remain intact. These drawback certificates shall either be redeemed by the Korean Customs on demand, or they shall be received in payment of duty at any Korean open port.

(3) The duty paid on Korean goods when carried from one Korean open port to another shall be refunded at the port of shipment on production of a Customs' certificate showing that the goods have arrived at the port of destination, or on satisfactory proof being produced of the loss of the goods by shipwreck.

(4) All goods imported into Korea by British subjects, and on which the duty of the tariff annexed to this treaty shall have been paid, may be conveyed to any Korean open port free of duty, and when transported into the interior shall not be subject to any additional tax, excise or transit duty whatsoever in any part of the country. In like manner, full freedom shall be allowed for the transport to the open ports of all Korean commodities intended for exportation, and such commodities shall not, either at the place of production, or when being conveyed from any part of Korea to any of the open ports, be subject to the payment of any tax, excise or transit duty whatsoever.

(5) The Korean Government may charter British merchant-vessels for the conveyance of goods or passengers to unopened ports in Korea, and Korean subjects shall have the same right, subject to the approval of their own authorities.

(6) Whenever the Government of Korea shall have reason to apprehend a scarcity of food within the kingdom, His Majesty the King of Korea may, by decree, temporarily prohibit the export of grain to foreign countries from any or all of the Korean open ports, and such prohibition shall become binding on British subjects in Korea on the expiration of one month from the date on which it shall have been officially communicated by the Korean authorities to the British Consul at the port concerned, but shall not remain longer in force than is absolutely necessary.

(7) All British ships shall pay tonnage dues at the rate of thirty cents Mexican per register ton. One such payment will entitle a vessel to visit any or all of the open ports in Korea during a period of four months without further charge. All tonnage dues shall be appropriated for the purposes of erecting lighthouses and beacons and placing buoys on the Korean coast, more especially at the approaches to the open ports and in deepening or otherwise improving the anchorages. No tonnage dues shall be charged on boats employed at the open ports in landing or shipping cargo.

(8) In order to carry into effect and secure the observance of the provisions of this treaty, it is hereby agreed that the tariff and trade regulations hereto annexed shall come into operation simultaneously with this treaty. The competent authorities of the two countries may from time to time revise the said regulations with a view to the insertion therein, by mutual consent, of such modifications or additions as experience shall prove to be expedient.

VI.

Any British subject who smuggles or attempts to smuggle goods into any Korean port or place not open to foreign trade shall forfeit twice the value of such goods and the goods shall be confiscated. The Korean local authorities may seize such goods and may arrest any British subject concerned in such smuggling or attempt to smuggle. They shall immediately forward any person so arrested to the nearest British Consul for trial by the proper British judicial authority, and may detain such goods until the case shall have been finally adjudicated.

VII.

(1) If a British ship be wrecked or stranded on the coast of Korea, the local authorities shall immediately take steps to protect the ship and her cargo from plunder, and all the persons belonging to her from ill-treatment, and to render such other assistance as may be required. They shall at once inform the nearest British Consul of the occurrence, and shall furnish the shipwrecked persons, if necessary, with means of conveyance to the nearest open port.

(2) All expenses incurred by the Government of Korea for the rescue, clothing, maintenance and travelling of shipwrecked British subjects, for the recovery of the bodies of the drowned, for the medical treatment of the sick and injured, and for the

burial of the dead, shall be repaid by the British Government to that of Korea.

(3) The British Government shall not be responsible for the repayment of the expenses incurred in the recovery or preservation of a wrecked vessel, or the property belonging to her. All such expenses shall be a charge on the property saved, and shall be paid by the parties interested therein upon receiving delivery of the same.

(4) No charge shall be made by the Government of Korea for the expenses of the Government officers, local functionaries, or police who shall proceed to the wreck, for the travelling expenses of officers escorting the shipwrecked men, nor for the expenses of official correspondence. Such expenses shall be borne by the Korean Government.

(5) Any British merchant ship compelled by stress of weather or by want of fuel or provisions to enter an unopened port in Korea shall be allowed to execute repairs and to obtain necessary supplies. All such expenses shall be defrayed by the master of the vessel.

VIII.

(1) The ships of war of each country shall be at liberty to visit all the ports of the other. They shall enjoy every facility for procuring supplies of all kinds, or for making repairs, and shall not be subject to trade or harbour regulations, nor be liable to the payment of duties or port charges of any kind.

(2) When British ships of war visit unopened ports in Korea, the officers and men may land, but shall not proceed into the interior unless they are provided with passports.

(3) Supplies of all kinds for the use of the British Navy may be landed at the open ports of Korea, and stored in the custody of a British officer without the payment of any duty. But if any such supplies are sold, the purchaser shall pay the proper duty to the Korean authorities.

(4) The Korean Government will afford all the facilities in their power to ships belonging to the British Government which may be engaged in making surveys in Korean waters.

IX.

(1) The British authorities and British subjects in Korea shall be allowed to employ Korean subjects as teachers, interpreters, servants, or in any other lawful capacity, without any restriction on the part of the Korean authorities; and in like manner no restrictions shall be placed upon the employment of British subjects by Korean authorities and subjects in any lawful capacity.

(2) Subjects of either nationality who may proceed to the country of the other to study its language, literature, laws, arts, or industries, or for the purpose of scientific research, shall be afforded every reasonable facility for doing so.

X.

It is hereby stipulated that the Government, public officers, and subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall, from the day in which this treaty comes into operation, participate in all privileges, immunities, and advantages, especially in relation to import or export duties on goods and manufactures, which shall then have been granted or may thereafter be granted by His Majesty the King of Korea to the Government, public officers, or subjects of any other Power.

XI.

Ten years from the date on which this Treaty shall come into operation, either of the high contracting parties may, on giving one year's previous notice to the other, demand a revision of the treaty or of the tariff annexed thereto, with a view to the insertion therein, by mutual consent, of such modifications as experience shall prove to be desirable.

XII.

(1) This treaty is drawn up in the English and Chinese languages, both of which versions have the same meaning, but it is hereby agreed that any difference which may arise as to interpretation shall be determined by reference to the English text.

(2) For the present all official communications addressed by the British authorities to those of Korea shall be accompanied by a translation into Chinese.

XIII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and by His Majesty the King of Korea, under their hands and seals; the ratifications shall be exchanged at Hanyang (Söul) as soon as possible, or at latest within one year from the date of signature, and the treaty, which shall be published by both Governments, shall come into operation on the day on which the ratifications are exchanged.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries above-named have signed the present treaty, and have thereto affixed their seals.

TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION.

Signed between Great Britain and Japan, 14th July, 1894.

Ratified, 25th August, 1894.

L.

THE subjects of each of the two high contracting parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other contracting party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property.

They shall have free and easy access to the Courts of Justice in pursuit and defence of their rights; they shall be at liberty equally with native subjects to choose and employ lawyers, advocates, and representatives, to pursue and defend their rights before such courts, and in all other matters connected with the administration of justice they shall enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by native subjects.

In whatever relates to rights of residence and travel; to the possession of goods and effects of any kind; to the succession to personal estate, by will or otherwise; and the disposal of property of any sort, in any manner whatsoever which they may lawfully acquire, the subjects of each contracting party shall enjoy in the dominions and possessions of the other the same privileges, liberties and rights, and shall be subject to no higher imposts or charges in these respects than native subjects, or subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation. The subjects of each of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the dominions and possessions of the other entire liberty of conscience, and, subject to the laws, ordinances and regulations, shall enjoy the right of private or public exercise of their worship, and also the right of burying their respective countrymen according to their religious customs, in such suitable and convenient places as may be established and maintained for that purpose.

They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatsoever, to

pay any charges or taxes other or higher than those that are, or may be, paid by native subjects, or subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

II.

The subjects of either of the contracting parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatsoever, whether in the army, navy, National Guard or Militia; from all contributions imposed in lieu of personal service, and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions.

III.

There shall be reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation between the dominions and possessions of the two high contracting parties.

The subjects of each of the high contracting parties may trade in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other by wholesale or retail in all kinds of produce, manufactures and merchandise of lawful commerce, either in person or by agents, singly or in partnerships with foreigners or native subjects; and they may there own or hire and occupy the houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises which may be necessary for them, and lease land for residential and commercial purposes, conforming themselves to the laws, Police and Customs Regulations of the country like native subjects. They shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the dominions and possessions of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, and shall enjoy, respectively, the same treatment in matters of commerce and navigation as native subjects, or subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation, without having to pay taxes, imposts or duties, of whatever nature or under whatever denomination, levied in the name or for the profit of the Government, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations or establishments of any kind, other or greater than those paid by native subjects, or subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation, subject always to the laws, ordinances and regulations of each country.

IV.

The dwellings, manufactories, warehouses and shops of the subjects of each of the high contracting parties in the dominions and possessions of the other, and all premises appertaining thereto destined for purposes of residence or commerce, shall be respected.

It shall not be allowable to proceed to make a search of, or a

domiciliary visit to, such dwellings and premises, or to examine or inspect books, papers or accounts, except under the conditions and with the forms prescribed by the laws, ordinances and regulations for subjects of the country.

V.

No other or higher duties shall be imposed on the importation into the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty of any article, the produce or manufacture of the dominions and possessions of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, from whatever place arriving; and no other or higher duties shall be imposed on the importation into the dominions and possessions of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of any article the produce or manufacture of the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, from whatever place arriving, than on the like article produced or manufactured in any other foreign country; nor shall any prohibition be maintained or imposed on the importation of any article, the produce or manufacture of the dominions and possessions of either of the high contracting parties into the dominions and possessions of the other, from whatever place arriving, which shall not equally extend to the importation of the like article, being the produce or manufacture of any other country. This last provision is not applicable to the sanitary and other prohibitions occasioned by the necessity of protecting the safety of persons, or of cattle, or of plants useful to agriculture.

VI.

No other or higher duties or charges shall be imposed in the dominions and possessions of either of the high contracting parties on the exportation of any article to the dominions and possessions of the other than such as are, or may be, payable on the exportation of the like article to any other foreign country; nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the exportation of any article from the dominions and possessions of either of the two contracting parties to the dominions and possessions of the other which shall not equally extend to the exportation of the like article to any other country.

VII.

The subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall enjoy in the dominions and possessions of the other exemption from all transit duties and a perfect equality of treatment with native subjects in all that relates to the warehousing, bounties, facilities and drawbacks.

VIII.

All articles which are or may be legally imported into the ports of the dominions and possessions of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan in Japanese vessels may likewise be imported into those ports in British vessels without being liable to any other or higher duties or charges of whatever denomination than if such articles were imported in Japanese vessels; and, reciprocally, all articles which are or may be legally imported into the ports of the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in British vessels may likewise be imported into those ports in Japanese vessels without being liable to any other or higher duties or charges of whatever denomination than if such articles were imported in British vessels. Such reciprocal equality of treatment shall take effect without distinction, whether such articles come directly from the place of origin or from any other place.

In the same manner there shall be perfect equality of treatment in regard to exportation, so that the same export duties shall be paid, and the same bounties and drawbacks allowed in the dominions and possessions of either of the high contracting parties on the exportation of any article which is or may be legally exported therefrom, whether such exportation shall take place in Japanese or in British vessels, and whatever may be the place of destination, whether a port of either of the contracting parties or of any third Power.

IX.

No duties of tonnage, harbour, pilotage, lighthouse, quarantine, or other similar or corresponding duties of whatever nature or under whatever denomination, levied in the name or for the profit of the Government, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations or establishments of any kind shall be imposed in the ports of the dominions and possessions of either country which shall not equally and under the same conditions be imposed in the like cases on national vessels in general or vessels of the most favoured nation. Such equality of treatment shall apply reciprocally to the respective vessels, from whatever port or place they may arrive, and whatever may be their place of destination.

X.

In all that regards the stationing, loading and unloading of vessels in the ports, basins, docks, roadsteads, harbours, or rivers of the dominions and possessions of the two countries, no privilege shall be granted to national vessels which shall not be equally granted to vessels of the other country; the intention of the high contracting parties being that in this respect also the respective vessels shall be treated on the footing of perfect equality.

XI.

The coasting trade of both the high contracting parties is excepted from the provisions of the present treaty, and shall be regulated according to the laws, ordinances and regulations to the subjects or citizens of any other country.

A Japanese vessel laden in a foreign country with cargo destined for two or more ports in the dominions and possessions of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan may discharge a portion of her cargo at one port, and continue her voyage to the other port or ports of destination where foreign trade is permitted for the purpose of landing the remainder of her original cargo there, subject always to the laws and Custom House regulation of the two countries.

The Japanese Government, however, agrees to allow British vessels to continue as heretofore, for the period of the duration of the present treaty, to carry cargo between the existing open ports of the Empire, excepting to or from the ports of Osaka, Nügata, and Ebisu-minato.

XII.

Any ship of war or merchant vessel of either of the high contracting parties which may be compelled by stress of weather, or by reason of any other distress, to take shelter in a port of the other, shall be at liberty to refit therein, to procure all necessary supplies, and to put to sea again, without paying any dues other than such as would be payable by national vessels. In case, however, the master of a merchant vessel should be under the necessity of disposing of a part of his cargo in order to defray the expenses, he shall be bound to conform to the regulations and tariffs of the place to which he may have come.

If any ship of war or merchant vessel of one of the contracting parties should run aground or be wrecked upon the coasts of the other, the local authorities shall inform the Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul or Consular Agent of the district of the occurrence; or, if there be no such Consular officer, they shall inform the Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul, or Consular Agent of the nearest district.

All proceedings relative to the salvage of Japanese vessels wrecked or cast on shore in the territorial waters of Her Britannic Majesty shall take place in accordance with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of Great Britain; and, reciprocally, all measures of salvage relative to British vessels wrecked or cast on shore in the territorial waters of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan shall take place in accordance with the laws, ordinances and regulations of Japan.

Such stranded or wrecked ship or vessel, and all parts thereof, and all furnitures and appurtenances belonging thereunto, and all goods and merchandise saved therefrom, including those which may have been cast into the sea, or the proceeds thereof, if sold, as well as all papers found on board such stranded or wrecked ship or vessel, shall be given up to the owners or their agents, when claimed by them. If such owners or agents are not on the spot, the same shall be delivered to the respective Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents upon being claimed by them within the period fixed by the laws of the country; and such Consular officers, owners or agents shall pay only the expenses incurred in the preservation of the property, together with the salvage, or other expenses, which would have been payable in the case of a wreck of a national vessel.

The goods and merchandise saved from the wreck shall be exempt from all the duties of the Customs unless cleared for consumption, in which case they shall pay the ordinary duties.

When a ship or vessel belonging to the subjects of one of the contracting parties is stranded or wrecked in the territories of the other, the respective Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents shall be authorised to assist, in case the owner or master, or other agent is present, and requires such assistance to be given.

XIII.

All vessels which, according to Japanese law, are to be deemed Japanese vessels, and all vessels which, according to British law, are to be deemed British vessels, shall for the purposes of this treaty be deemed Japanese and British vessels respectively.

XIV.

The Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents of each of the contracting parties residing in the dominions and possessions of the other, shall receive from the local authorities such assistance as can by law be given to them for the recovery of deserters from the vessels of their respective countries.

It is understood that this stipulation shall not apply to the subjects of the country where the desertion takes place.

XV.

The high contracting parties agree that in all that concerns commerce or navigation, any privilege, favour, or immunity which either contracting party has actually granted, or may hereafter grant, to the Government, ships, subjects or citizens of any other State, shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the

Government, ships, subjects or citizens of the other contracting party, it being their intention that the trade and navigation of each country shall be placed, in all respects, by the other on the footing of the most favoured nation.

XVI.

Each of the high contracting parties may appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, pro-Consuls and Consular Agents in all the ports, cities and places of the other, except in those where it may not be convenient to recognise such officers.

This exception, however, shall not be made in regard to one of the contracting parties without being made likewise in regard to every other Power.

The Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, pro-Consuls and Consular Agents may exercise all functions, and shall enjoy all privileges, exemptions and immunities which are, or may hereafter be, granted to Consular officers of the most favoured nation.

XVII.

The subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall enjoy in the dominions and possessions of the other the same protection as native subjects in regard to patents, trade-marks, and designs, upon fulfilment of the formalities prescribed by law.

XVIII.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government, so far as they are concerned, give their consent to the following arrangements:—

The several foreign settlements in Japan shall be incorporated with the respective Japanese Communes, and shall thenceforth form part of the general municipal system of Japan.

The competent Japanese authorities shall thereupon assume all municipal obligations and duties in respect thereof, and the common funds and property, if any, belonging to such settlements, shall at the same time be transferred to the said Japanese authorities.

When such incorporation takes place, the existing leases in perpetuity under which property is now held in the said settlements shall be confirmed, and no conditions whatsoever other than those contained in such existing leases shall be imposed in respect of such property. It is, however, understood that the Consular Authorities mentioned in the same are in all cases to be replaced by the Japanese authorities.

All lands which may previously have been granted by the Japanese Government free of rent for the public purposes of the

said settlements shall, subject to the right of eminent domain, be permanently reserved free of all taxes and charges for the public purposes for which they were originally set apart.

XIX.

The stipulations of the present treaty shall be applicable, so far as the laws permit, to all the Colonies and foreign possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, excepting to those hereinafter named, that is to say, except to India, the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Cape, Natal, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, New Zealand.

Provided always that the stipulations of the present treaty shall be made applicable to any of the above-named Colonies or foreign possessions on whose behalf notice to that effect shall have been given to the Japanese Government by Her Britannic Majesty Representative at Tokio within two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty.

XX.

The present treaty shall, from the date it comes into force, be substituted in place of the Conventions respectively of the 23rd day of the 8th month of the 7th year of Kayei, corresponding to the 14th day of October, 1854, and of the 13th day of the 5th month of the 2nd year of Keion, corresponding to the 25th day of June, 1866; the treaty of the 18th day of the 7th month of the 5th year of Ansei, corresponding to the 26th day of August, 1858, and all Arrangements and Agreements subsidiary thereto concluded or existing between the high contracting parties; and from the same date such Conventions, Treaty, Arrangements and Agreements shall cease to be binding, and, in consequence, the jurisdiction then exercised by British Courts in Japan, and all the exceptional privileges, exemptions and immunities then enjoyed by British subjects as a part of or appurtenant to such jurisdiction shall absolutely and without notice cease and determine, and thereafter all such jurisdiction shall be assumed and exercised by Japanese Courts.

XXI.

The present treaty shall not take effect until at least five years after its signature. It shall come into force one year after His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government shall have given notice to Her Britannic Majesty's Government of its wish to have the same brought into operation. Such notice may be given at any time after the expiration of four years from the date hereof. The treaty shall remain in force for the period of twelve years from the date it goes into operation.

Either high contracting party shall have the right, at any time after eleven years shall have elapsed from the date this treaty takes effect, to give notice to the other of its intention to terminate the same, and at the expiration of twelve months after such notice is given this treaty shall wholly cease and determine.

XXII.

The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokio as soon as possible and not later than six months from the present date.

PROTOCOL.

(1) It is agreed by the contracting parties that one month after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed this day, the import tariff hereunto annexed shall, subject to the provisions of Article XXIII. of the treaty of 1858 at present subsisting between the contracting parties, as long as the said Treaty remains in force and thereafter, subject to the provisions of Articles V. and XV. of the treaty signed this day, be applicable to the articles therein enumerated, being the growth, produce or manufacture of the dominions and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty upon importation into Japan. But nothing contained in this Protocol, or the tariff hereunto annexed, shall be held to limit or qualify the right of the Japanese Government to restrict or to prohibit the importation of adulterated drugs, medicines, food or beverages; indecent or obscene prints, paintings, books, cards, lithographic or other engravings, photographs, or any other indecent or obscene articles; articles in violation of patent, trade-mark or copyright laws of Japan; or any other article which for sanitary reasons, or in view of public security or morals, might offer any danger.

The *ad valorem* duties established by the said tariff shall, so far as may be deemed practicable, be converted into specific duties by a Supplementary Convention, which shall be concluded between the two Governments within six months from the date of this Protocol; the medium prices, as shown by the Japanese Customs Returns during the six calendar months preceding the date of the present Protocol, with the addition of the cost of insurance and transportation from the place of purchase, production or fabrication to the port of discharge, as well as commission, if any, shall be taken as the basis for such conversion. In the event of the Supplementary Convention not having come into force before the expiration of the period fixed for the said tariff to take effect, *ad valorem* duties in conformity with the rule recited at the end of the said tariff shall, in the meantime, be levied.

In respect of articles not enumerated in the said Tariff, the General Statutory Tariff of Japan for the time being in force shall from the same time apply, subject, as aforesaid, to the provisions of Article XXIII. of the treaty of 1858 and Articles V. and XV. of the treaty signed this day respectively.

From the date the tariffs aforesaid take effect, the import tariff now in operation in Japan in respect of goods and merchandise imported into Japan by British subjects shall cease to be binding.

In all other respects, the stipulations of the existing treaties and conventions shall be maintained unconditionally until the time when the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed this day comes into force.

(2) The Japanese Government, pending the opening of the country to British subjects, agrees to extend the existing passport system in such a manner as to allow British subjects, on the production of a certificate of recommendation from the British Representative in Tokio, or from any of Her Majesty's Consuls at the open ports in Japan, to obtain upon application passports available for any part of the country, and for any period not exceeding twelve months, from the Imperial Japanese Foreign Office in Tokio, or from the chief authorities in the Prefecture in which an open port is situated; it being understood that the existing rules and regulations governing British subjects who visit the interior of the Empire are to be maintained.

(3) The Japanese Government undertakes, before the cessation of British Consular jurisdiction in Japan, to join the International Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright.

(4) It is understood between the two high contracting parties that, if Japan think it necessary at any time to levy an additional duty on the production or manufacture of refined sugar in Japan, an increased Customs duty equivalent in amount may be levied on British refined sugar when imported in Japan so long as such additional tax or inland duty continues to be raised.

Provided always that British refined sugar shall in this respect be entitled to the treatment accorded to refined sugar being the produce or manufacture of the most favoured nation.

(5) The undersigned plenipotentiaries have agreed that this Protocol shall be submitted to the two high contracting parties at the same time as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed this day, and that when the said treaty is ratified the agreements contained in the Protocol shall also equally be considered as approved, without the necessity of a further formal ratification.

TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI

*Signed between China and Japan 17th April, 1895. Ratified
8th May, 1895.*

I.

CHINA recognises definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China in derogation of such independence and autonomy shall wholly cease for the future.

II.

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon :—(a) The southern portion of the province of Fêng Tien, within the following boundaries :—

The line of demarkation begins at the mouth of the river Yaen, and ascends the stream to the mouth of the river Au-ping; from thence the line runs to Fêng Huang, from thence to Haicheng, from thence to Ying Kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Ying Kow it follows the course of that stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarkation.

This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêng Tien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liao Tung, and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

(b) The Island of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

(c) The Pescadores group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich, and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.

III.

The alignments of the frontiers described in the preceding Article, and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to verification and demarkation on the spot by a joint Commission of Delimitation, consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more Chinese delegates, to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.

The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.

The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.

IV.

China agrees to pay Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels. The said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve months after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal annual instalments as follows:—The first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years, the second within three years, the third within four years, the fourth within five years, the fifth within six years, and the sixth within seven years after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.

China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of the said instalments. In case the whole amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, all interest shall be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or for any less period, if then already paid, shall be included as a part of the principal amount of the indemnity.

V.

The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall be at

liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period, those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.

Each of the two Governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act, send one or more Commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province, and within the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications such transfer shall be completed.

VI.

All treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese plenipotentiaries a treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and a convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade. The Treaties, Conventions, and Regulations now subsisting between China and European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation of the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships and subjects, shall in every respect be accorded by China most-favoured-nation treatment.

China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present Act:—

I. The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects under the same conditions, and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns, and ports of China.

(1) Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.

(2) Chung King, in the province of Szechuan.

(3) Suchow, in the province of Kiang Su.

(4) Hangchow, in the province of Chekiang.

The Japanese Government shall have the right to station Consuls at any or all of the above-named places.

2. Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be extended to the following places:—

(1) On the Upper Yangtse River, from Ichang to Chung King.

(2) On the Woosung River and the Canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow.

The rules and regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named routes until new rules and regulations are conjointly agreed to.

(3) Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for storage of the articles so purchased or transported without the payment of any taxes or exactions whatever.

(4) Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects in China.

In the event of additional rules and regulations being necessary in connection with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.

VII.

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act.

VIII.

As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan, of Wei Hai Wei, in the province of Shantung.

Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs revenue of China as security for

the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of said indemnity.

It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

IX.

Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.

X.

All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.

XI.

The present Act shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year of Meifi, corresponding to 14th day of the 4th month of the 21st year of Kuang Hst.

I.

The Japanese military forces which are under Article VIII. of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, to temporarily occupy Wei Hai Wei shall not exceed one brigade, and from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the said Treaty of Peace, China shall pay annually one-fourth of the amount of the expenses of such temporary occupation, that is to say, at the rate of 500,000 Kuping taels per annum.

II.

The territory temporarily occupied at Wei Hai Wei shall comprise the Island of Liu Kung and a belt of land 5 Japanese ri wide along the entire coast-line of the Bay of Wei Hai Wei.

No Chinese troops shall be permitted to approach or occupy any places within a zone 5 Japanese *ri* wide beyond the boundaries of the occupied territory.

III.

The civil administration of the occupied territory shall remain in the hands of the Chinese authorities. But such authorities shall at all times be obliged to conform to the orders which the Commander of the Japanese Army of Occupation may deem it necessary to give in the interest of the health, maintenance, safety, distribution or discipline of the troops.

All military offences committed within the occupied territory shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Japanese military authorities.

The foregoing separate Articles shall have the same force, value and effect as if they had been word for word inserted in the Treaty of Peace signed this day.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

We recently at the request of the Emperor of China appointed plenipotentiaries for the purpose of conferring with the Ambassadors sent by China and of concluding with them a Treaty of Peace between the two Empires. Since then the Governments of the two Empires of Russia and Germany and of the French Republic, considering that the permanent possession of the ceded districts of the Fêng-tien Peninsula by the Empire of Japan would be detrimental to the lasting peace of the Orient, have united in a simultaneous recommendation to our Government to refrain from holding those districts permanently.

Earnestly desirous as we always are for the maintenance of peace, nevertheless we were forced to commence hostilities against China for no other reason than our sincere desire to secure for the Orient an enduring peace. The Governments of the Three Powers are in offering their friendly recommendations similarly actuated by the same desire, and we, out of our regard for peace, do not hesitate to accept their advice. Moreover, it is not our wish to cause suffering to our people or to impede the progress of the national destiny by embroiling the Empire in new complications, and thereby imperilling the situation and retarding the restoration of peace.

China has already shown, by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, the sincerity of her repentance for her breach of faith with

us, and has made manifest to the world our reasons and the object we had in view in waging war with that Empire.

Under these circumstances we do not consider that the honour and dignity of the Empire will be compromised by resorting to magnanimous measures, and by taking into consideration the general situation of affairs. We have therefore accepted the advice of the friendly Powers, and have commanded our Government to reply to the Governments of the three Powers to that effect.

We have specially commanded our Government to negotiate with the Chinese Government respecting all arrangements for the return of the peninsular districts. The exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace has now been concluded, the friendly relations between the two Empires have been restored, and cordial relations with all other Powers have been strengthened.

We therefore command all our subjects to respect our will, to take into careful consideration the general situation, to be circumspect in all things, to avoid erroneous tendencies, and not to impair or thwart the high aspirations of our Empire.

TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA.

Signed May 14th, 1896.

I.

FOR the remedy of the financial difficulties of Korea, the Governments of Russia and Japan will advise the Korean Government to retrench all superfluous expenditure, and to establish a balance between expenses and revenues. If, in consequence of reforms deemed indispensable it may be necessary to have recourse to foreign loans, both Governments shall, by mutual consent, give their support to Korea.

II.

The Governments of Russia and Japan shall endeavour to leave to Korea, as far as the financial and economical situation of that country will permit, the formation and maintenance of a national armed force and police of such proportions as will be sufficient for the preservation of the internal peace, without foreign support.

III.

With a view to facilitate communications with Korea the Japanese Government may continue (continuera) to administer the telegraph lines which are at present in its hands.

It is reserved to Russia (the rights) of building a telegraph line between Seoul and her frontiers.

These different lines can be repurchased by the Korean Government so soon as it has means to do so.

IV.

In case the above matters should require a more exact or detailed explanation, or if subsequently some other points should present themselves upon which it may be necessary to confer, the representatives of both Governments shall be authorised to negotiate in a spirit of friendship.

STATUTES OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Formation of the Company.

1. ON the strength of the agreement concluded on the 27th August (8th September), 1896, by the Imperial Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank, a company is formed, under the name of the "Eastern Chinese Railway Company," for the construction and working of a railway within the confines of China, from one of the points on the western borders of the province of Wei-Lun-Tsian to one of the points on the eastern borders of the province of Ghirin, and for the connection of this railway with those branches which the Imperial Russian Government will construct to the Chinese frontier from Trans-Baikalia and the Southern Ussuri lines.

Observation.

The company is empowered, subject to the sanction of the Chinese Government, to exploit, in connection with the railway, or independently of it, coal mines, as also to exploit in China other enterprises—mining, industrial and commercial. For the working of these enterprises, which may be independent of the railway, the company shall keep accounts separate from those of the railway.

The formation of the company shall be undertaken by the Russo-Chinese Bank.

With the formation of the company all rights and obligations are transferred to it in regard to the construction and working of the line ceded in virtue of the above-named agreement of the 27th August (8th September), 1896.

The company shall be recognised as formed on the presentation to the Minister of Finances of a warrant of the State Bank, certifying the payment of the first instalment on the shares. In any case, such payment must be made not later than two months from the day of confirmation of the present statutes.

The succeeding instalments on the shares shall be paid in such order of gradation that the shares shall be fully paid up at their nominal value not later than one year from the day of formation of the company.

Owners of shares of the company may only be Russian and Chinese subjects.

Term of Concession.

2. In virtue of the agreement with the Chinese Government, the company shall retain possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway during the course of eighty years from the day of the opening of traffic along the whole line.

Obligation towards the Russian Government.

3. In recognition that the enterprise of the Chinese Eastern Railway will be realised only owing to the guarantee given by the Russian Government in regard to the revenue of the line for covering working expenses, as well as for effecting the obligatory payments on the bonds (§§ 11, 16), the company on its part binds itself to the Russian Government, during the whole term of the concession, under the following obligations:—

(A) The Chinese Eastern Railway, with all its appurtenances and rolling-stock, must be always maintained in full order for satisfying all the requirements of the service of the line in regard to the safety, comfort and uninterrupted conveyance of passengers and goods.

(B) The traffic on the Chinese Eastern line must be maintained conformably with the degree of traffic on the Russian railway lines adjoining the Chinese line.

(C) The trains of all descriptions running between the Russian Trans-Baikal and Ussuri lines shall be received by the Chinese Eastern Railway and dispatched to their destination, in full complement, without delay.

(D) All through trains, both passenger and goods, shall be despatched by the Eastern Chinese Railway at rates of speed not lower than those which shall be adopted on the Siberian Railway.

(E) The Chinese Eastern Railway is bound to establish and maintain a telegraph along the whole extent of the line, and to connect it with the telegraph wire of the Russian adjoining railways, and to receive and despatch without delay through telegrams sent from one frontier station of the line to another, as also telegrams sent from Russia to China, and conversely.

(F) Should, with the development of traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway, its technical organisation prove insufficient for satisfying the requirements of a regular and uninterrupted

passenger and goods traffic, the Chinese Eastern Railway shall immediately, on receipt of a notification on the part of the Russian railways to augment its capacity to a corresponding degree, adopt the necessary measures for further developing its technical organisation and the traffic on it. In the event of a difference of opinion arising between the above-mentioned railways, the Chinese Eastern Railway shall submit to the decision of the Russian Minister of Finances. If the means at the command of the Chinese Eastern Railway prove insufficient for carrying out the necessary work of its development, the board of management of the railway may at all times apply to the Russian Minister of Finances for pecuniary assistance on the part of the Russian Government.

(G) For all transit conveyance of passengers and goods, as also for the transmission of telegrams, there will be regulations established by agreement of the company with the Russian Government for the whole term of duration of the concession.

2. Maximum tariffs, which cannot be raised without the consent of the Russian Government during the whole term above referred to. Within these limits the tariffs of direct communication, both for railway carriage and telegrams, will be fixed by the board of management of the company on the strength of a mutual agreement with the Russian Minister of Finances.

(H) The Russian letter and parcels post, as also the officials accompanying the same, shall be carried by the Chinese Eastern Railway free of charge.

For this purpose the company shall set apart in each ordinary passenger train a carriage compartment of three fathoms in length. The Russian postal authorities may, moreover, if they deem it necessary, place on the line postal carriages, constructed by them at their own cost; and the repair, maintenance (interior fittings excepted), as well as the running of such carriages with the trains, shall be free of charge and at the cost of the railway.

The above-mentioned engagements, by which, as already stated, the grant of a guarantee by the Russian Government is conditioned, and the consequent realisation of the enterprise of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be binding on the railway until the same, after the expiration of the 80 years' term of the concession, shall, without payment, become the property of the Chinese Government. The redemption of the line from the company before the above-mentioned term in accordance with § 30 of the present statutes shall not in any way diminish the effect of the above specified engagements, and these latter, together with the railway, shall be transferred to its new proprietor.

In the same manner, during the course of the whole 80 years' term of the concession, the following privileges granted to the

railway by the Imperial Chinese Government shall remain in force :—

(a) Passengers' luggage, as also goods, carried in transit from one Russian station shall not be liable to any Chinese Customs duties, and shall be exempt from all internal Chinese dues and taxes.

(b) The rates for the carriage of passengers and goods, for telegrams, etc., shall be free from all Chinese taxes and dues.

(c) Goods imported from Russia into China by rail and exported from China to Russia in the same manner shall pay respectively an import or export Chinese duty to the extent of one-third less as compared with the duty imposed at Chinese seaport custom-houses.

(d) If goods imported by the railway are destined for conveyance inland they shall in such case be subject to payment of transit duty to the extent of one-half of the import duty levied on them, and they shall then be exempted from any additional imposts. Goods which shall not have paid transit duty shall be liable to payment of all established internal carrier and *tits-zin* dues.

Immunities of the Company in regard to Russian Customs Duties.

4. In regard to the place of acquisition of materials for the requirements of the railway, the company shall not be liable to any limitations. If materials be obtained beyond the confines of Russia they shall, on importation through Russian territory, be freed from payment of Russian customs duties.

Technical Conditions. Periods of Time for the Commencement and Termination of the Work.

5. The breadth of the railway track must be the same as that of the Russian lines (5 feet).

The company must commence the work not later than the 16th August, 1897, and conduct it in such a manner that the whole line shall be completed not later than six years from the time when the direction of the line shall be finally determined and the necessary land assigned to the company.

When tracing the line of the railway, cemeteries and graves, as also towns and villages, must, so far as possible, be left aside of the railway.

When effecting the connection, in accordance with clause 1 of these statutes, of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the Russian Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri lines, the company shall have the right, with a view of reduction of expenditure, of abstaining from

building its own frontier stations, and of utilising the frontier stations of the above-named Russian lines. The conditions on which they shall be so utilised shall be determined by agreement of the board of the company with the boards of the respective railways.

Tariffs.

6. The tariffs for the carriage of passengers and goods, as also for supplementary carriage rates, shall be determined by the company itself within the limits indicated in clause 3.

Order of Examination of Legal Suits and the Establishment of Rules for Railway Conveyance.

7. Crimes, litigation, etc., on the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be dealt with by local authorities, Chinese and Russian, on the basis of existing treaties.

In regard to the carriage of passengers and goods, the responsibility for such conveyance, the lapse of time for claims, the order of recovering money from the railway when adjudged, and the relations of the railway to the public shall be defined in rules drawn up by the company and established before the opening of the railway traffic; and these rules shall be framed in accordance with those existing on Russian railways.

Maintenance of Security and Order on the Railway.

8. The Chinese Government has undertaken to adopt measures for securing the safety of the railway and of all employed on it against any extraneous attacks.

The preservation of order and decorum on the lands assigned to the railway and its appurtenances shall be confided to police agents appointed by the company.

The company shall for this purpose draw up and establish police regulations.

Foundation Capital of the Company.

9. The whole amount of the capital of the company shall be determined according to the cost of construction calculated on the basis of estimates framed when the survey of the line was carried out. The foundation capital shall be charged with (a) the payment of interest and amortisation of the foundation capital during the construction of the railway; (b) the purchase from the Russian Government of the results of the surveys of the direction of the railway to Manchuria which were made by Russian engineers; the

sum payable for these surveys will be determined by agreement of the Russian Minister of Finances with the company.

The capital of the company shall be formed by the issue of shares and bonds.

Share Capital.

10. The share capital of the company shall be fixed at 5,000,000 nominal credit roubles, and divided into 1,000 shares at 5,000 nominal credit roubles.

The shares are to be issued at their nominal value.

The guarantee of the Russian Government does not extend to them.

BOND CAPITAL.

Guarantee of Russian Government on Bonds.

11. The remaining portion of the capital of the company will be formed by the issue of bonds. The bonds will be issued in measure of requirement, and each time with the special sanction of the Minister of Finances. The nominal amount and value of each separate issue of bonds, the time and condition of the issue, as also the form of these bonds, shall be subject to the sanction of the Minister of Finances.

The Russian Government will guarantee the interest on and amortisation of the bonds.

For the realisation of these bonds the company must have recourse to the Russo-Chinese Bank, but the Russian Government reserves to itself the right of appropriating the bond loan at a price which shall be determined between the company and the bank, and to pay to the company the agreed amount in ready money.

Guarantee of Realised Bond Capital.

12. As payments are received for bonds guaranteed by the Russian Government, the company shall be bound to keep such sums, or interest-bearing securities purchased with the same by permission of the Russian Minister of Finances, under the special supervision of the Russian Ministry of Finances.

Out of the above receipts the company shall have the right to make the following payments:—

(a) According to actual fulfilment of the work in progress and execution of orders, and at the time when various expenditure shall become necessary, such payments to be made on the scale and on the conditions specified in the working estimates.

(b) During the construction of the line, of interest, as it

becomes due, on the bonds issued by the company, subject to the conditions of their issue, and the company shall pay the sums necessary for the above purpose within the limits of the amount realised by it in the emission of its bonds.

Shares.

13. On the payment of the first allotment on the shares, the founders shall receive temporary certificates on which subsequently, when the board of management of the company shall have been formed, the receipt of the further instalments on the shares will be inscribed.

When the shares shall be fully paid up, the temporary certificates issued to the founders shall be replaced by shares.

The shares of the company are issued to bearer, under the signature of not fewer than three members of the board of management. To the shares will be attached a coupon-sheet for the receipt once yearly under them of any dividend that may be payable. On the coupon-sheets becoming exhausted new sheets will be issued. A dividend on the shares out of the net profits of any year, supposing such accrue, shall be payable on the adoption by the general meeting of shareholders of the annual report for that year, and the dividend shall be payable at the offices of the company, or at such places which it may indicate.

The company shall notify for general information in the *Official Gazette* and in the *Finance Messenger*, as also in one of the Chinese newspapers, the extent and place of payment of the dividend.

Reserve Capital.

14. The reserve capital is destined :—

(a) For the capital repair of the railway, its buildings and appurtenances.

(b) For defraying extraordinary expenditure of the company in repairing the railway and its appurtenances.

The reserve capital of the company is formed out of annual sums put aside from the net profits of the working of the railway.

The reserve capital must be kept in Russian State interest-bearing securities, or in railway bonds guaranteed by the Russian Government.

At the expiration of the term of possession of the railway by the company, the reserve capital shall be first of all employed in the payment of the debts of the company, including among them sums due to the Russian Government, if such exist; and after the debts of the company shall have been paid, the remainder of

the reserve capital shall be divided among the shareholders. In the event of the redemption of the railway by the Chinese Government, the reserve capital becomes the property of the shareholders.

Net Revenue.

15. The net revenue of the company shall be the remainder of the gross receipts after deduction of working expenses. Under these expenses are classed :—

(a) General outlays, including assignments towards pension and relief funds, if such be established on the line.

(b) Maintenance of the staff of the board of management, and of all the services; as also the maintenance of employés and labourers not on the permanent list.

(c) Outlays for materials and articles used for the railway, as also expenditure in the shape of remuneration for using buildings, rolling-stock, and other various requisites for the purposes of the railway.

(d) Outlays for the maintenance, repair, and renewal of the permanent way, works of construction, buildings, rolling-stock, and other appurtenances of the railway.

(e) Expenditure connected with the adoption of the measures and instructions of the board of management for insuring the safety and regularity of the railway service.

(f) Expenditure for the improvement and development of the railway, as also for creating and developing its resources.

Additional Payments by the Russian Government under the Guarantee, and the Order of Settlement of Accounts between the Company and the Russian Government in respect of these additional Payments.

16. Should the gross receipts of the railway prove insufficient for defraying the working expenses and for meeting the yearly payments due on the bonds, the company will receive the deficient sum from the Russian Government, through the Russian Minister of Finances. The payments referred to will be made to the company as advances, at a rate of interest of 6 per cent. per annum. Sums paid in excess to the company in consequence of its demands and on account of the guarantee will be deducted from succeeding money payments.

On the presentation to the general meeting of shareholders of the annual report of the working of the railway for a given year, the company shall at the same time submit to the general meeting, for confirmation, a detailed statement of the sums owing by

the company to the Russian Government, with the interest that has accrued thereon. On the confirmation of this statement by the general meeting, the board of management shall deliver to the Russian Government an acknowledgment of the company's debt, to the full determined amount of the same, and this acknowledgment, until its substitution by another, shall bear annually interest at the rate of 6 per cent.

The acknowledgment above mentioned, given by the board of management to the Russian Government, shall not be subject to bill or deed stamp tax.

Subjects of minor importance are dealt with in the following sections:—

17. Distribution of net profits of the railway.
18. Functions of board of management, the seal of which will be at Peking and St. Petersburg.
19. Constitution of the board, which is to consist of nine members, elected by the shareholders. The chairman is to be appointed by the Chinese Government. The vice-chairman is to be chosen by the members of the board from among themselves.
20. Order of transaction of the business of the board.
21. General meetings of shareholders, and the subjects that shall come under their notice.
22. Order of convening general meetings.
23. Conditions under which general meetings shall be recognised as legally held.
24. Participation of shareholders in proceedings of general meetings.
25. Local management of works of construction.
26. Local management of railway when in working order.
27. Questions to be submitted for confirmation by Russian Minister of Finances.
28. Committee of audit.

Gratuitous Entrance into Possession of Railway by Chinese Government.

29. In accordance with the agreement concluded with the Chinese Government, the latter, after the expiration of eighty years of possession of the railway by the company, enters into possession of it and its appurtenances.

The reserve and other funds belonging to the company shall be employed in paying the money due to the Russian Government under the guarantee (§ 16), and in satisfaction of other debts of the company, and the remainder shall be distributed among the shareholders.

Any money that may remain owing by the company to the Russian Government at the expiration of eighty years in respect of the guarantee shall be written off. The Russo-Chinese Bank will incur no responsibility in respect of the same.

Right of the Chinese Government to acquire the Railway on the expiration of Thirty-Six Years.

30. In accordance with the agreement concluded with the Chinese Government, on the expiration of thirty-six years from the time of completion of the whole line and its opening for traffic, the Chinese Government has the right of acquiring the line, on refunding to the company in full all the outlays made on it, and on payment for everything done for the requirements of the railway, such payments to be made with accrued interest.

It follows as a matter of course that the portion of the share capital which has been amortised by drawing, and the part of the debt owing to the Russian Government under the guarantee, and repaid out of the net profits (§ 17) will not constitute part of the purchase-money.

In no case can the Chinese Government enter into possession of the railway before it has lodged in the Russian State Bank the necessary purchase-money.

The purchase-money lodged by the Chinese Government shall be employed in paying the debt of the company under its bonds, and all sums, with interest, owing to the Russian Government, the remainder of the money being then at the disposal of the shareholders.

PRÉCIS OF THE GERMAN AGREEMENT WITH CHINA WITH REGARD TO KIAO-CHAU.

Signed 10th January, 1898.

(From the Chinese Text.)

PREAMBLE.

THE preamble states that the Ts'ao chow missionary case has been settled, and that China, being willing to make a return for the aid previously given her by Germany, the following Agreement has been made, in the hope of further cementing the friendship of the two countries, and fostering commercial relations :—

Section I.

(1) The Emperor of China, desiring to strengthen the friendship of the two countries, and to increase their military power, agrees that within 100 Chinese *li* (about 30 miles) of Kiao-chau Bay, German troops shall have full liberty of movement, but the sovereign rights of China remain. If China desires to take any administrative measures she must first come to an arrangement with Germany. There is to be no obstruction by China of German improvements of waterways, &c., and the stationing of troops, &c., by China within the territory named requires a previous agreement with Germany.

(2) As the Emperor of Germany desires that Germany, "like other Powers," should have a coaling and docking depot on the Chinese coast, the Emperor of China has already agreed to lease to Germany the territory north and south of Kiao-chau Bay for a term, in the first instance, of ninety-nine years. Germany may erect forts, etc., for the protection of the place.

(3) The administration of the leased territory during the term of the lease is left entirely to Germany.

The boundaries are then described. (These are difficult to follow in the Chinese text, the names of places being different from those on foreign maps. The area has, however, been officially made known at Berlin.)

The exact boundaries are to be settled after joint survey.

Chinese men-of-war and merchant vessels and vessels belonging to nations in amity with Germany will receive from her equally friendly treatment at Kiao-chau. The waters of the bay being placed entirely under German control, Germany may at any time make regulations for the vessels of other nations, and such regulations must be equally observed by Chinese vessels. There will be no other difficulties made.

(4) Germany to buoy the approaches. Dues to meet the cost of harbour improvements will be payable by the vessels of all nations including China. But Chinese vessels will be liable to no other dues.

(5) If before the term of this lease expires Germany desires to restore Kiao-chau Bay to China, the latter will repay the expenses incurred there, and will grant a more suitable place to Germany. The latter agrees never to lease to another Power the territory leased to her by China.

Chinese within the leased territory may remain, provided they show themselves law-abiding, and will receive German protection.

Land required by Germany is to be bought from the proprietor.

Offenders against Chinese law escaping into the territory leased to Germany are to be given up to the Chinese officials on written application, but the latter are not to effect arrests in that territory themselves.

As to the Customs stations, of which some are stated to exist beyond the 100 *li* radius, it is provided that arrangements and regulations are to be subsequently drawn up.

(There seems to be a hiatus in the Chinese text which runs, after referring to the existing stations outside the 100 *li* radius: "But within the 100 *li* radius it has been agreed. . . ." and there breaks off. Probably, "that no Chinese Customs stations shall be permitted," is left out.)

Section II.

(1) China agrees to permit Germany to construct two railway lines in the Province of Shantung: one from Kiao-chau, past Wei Hsien, Ching Chan, Poshan, Tzŭ-ch'uan, and Tsou-p'ing to Chi-nan, and the Shantung frontier; the other from Kiao-chau to I-chou, and thence past Lai-wu Hsien to Chi-nan Fu. The railway from Chi-nan Fu to the frontier of Shantung is not to begin until the line to Chi-nan Fu has been built, in order that arrangements may be made for a junction with the main line constructed by China. The route of the line is to be left for future arrangement.

(2) For the construction of the above-mentioned lines a German-Chinese company is to be formed (the Deutsche-

Chinesische Gesellschaft), in which German and Chinese merchants may take shares.

(3) Arrangements for carrying out the above are to be made by the two countries as soon as possible.

The German-Chinese company is to receive favourable treatment from China, and to enjoy all the other privileges granted to Chinese-European (or foreign) commercial companies established elsewhere in China.

This article is conceived only in the interests of commerce; it has no other design, and the railways mentioned in no way constitute an annexation of Shantung territory.

(4) Within 30 *li* (10 miles) of the above railways, as, for instance, in Wei Hsien and Po-shan Hsien, on the northern line from Kiao-chau to Chi-nan Fu, and in I-chou Fu and Lai-wu Hsien, on the southern line from Kiao-chau, *via* I-chou to Chi-nan Fu, Germany is permitted to excavate coal, &c. The necessary works may be undertaken by German and Chinese merchants combining their capital. Mining regulations will be subsequently drawn up. The German merchants and workmen, as in the case of railways, receive favourable treatment from China, and the same privileges as other companies.

This Article is also conceived only in the interests of trade, and has no other design.

Section III.

If within the Province of Shantung any matters are undertaken (N.B., the wording is very wide) for which foreign capital or assistance is invited, China agrees that the German merchants concerned shall first be asked whether they wish to undertake the works and provide the materials. If they do, China may make any arrangements she pleases.

The remainder of the Convention provides for ratification and exchange of ratifications.

**DESPATCH FROM HER MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT
PEKING, FORWARDING COPIES OF THE NOTES
EXCHANGED WITH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
RESPECTING THE NON-ALIENATION OF THE
YANG-TSZE REGION.**

SIR C. MACDONALD TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY.

Peking, February 20th, 1898.

At my interview with the Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamén, on the 9th instant, I produced a draft of the note I intended addressing to them with regard to non-alienation of the Yang-tsze region. This was accepted with little demur, with the insertion of the words "now entirely hers," which, as recording an undeniable fact, I agreed to put in. Copies of the notes subsequently exchanged are inclosed.

SIR C. MACDONALD TO THE TSUNG-LI YAMÉN.

Peking, February 9th, 1898.

MM. LES MINISTRES :—

Your Highnesses and your Excellencies have more than once intimated to me that the Chinese Government were aware of the great importance that has always been attached by Great Britain to the retention in Chinese possession of the Yang-tsze region, now entirely hers, as providing security for the free course and development of trade.

I shall be glad to be in a position to communicate to Her Majesty's Government a definite assurance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation. Such an assurance is in full harmony with the observations made to me by your Highnesses and your Excellencies.

I avail, &c.,
(Signed) **CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.**

THE TSUNG-LI YAMÊN TO SIR C. MACDONALD.

February 11th, 1898.

The Yamên have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the British Minister's despatch of the 9th February, stating that the Yamên had more than once intimated to him that the Chinese Government were aware of the great importance that has always been attached by Great Britain to the retention in Chinese possession of the Yang-tsze region, now entirely hers, as providing security for the free course and development of trade. The British Minister would be glad to be in a position to communicate to Her Majesty's Government a definite assurance that China would never alienate (any territory) in the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation.

The Yamên have to observe that the Yang-tsze region is of the greatest importance as concerning the whole position (or interests) of China, and it is out of the question that territory (in it) should be mortgaged, leased, or ceded to another Power. Since Her Britannic Majesty's Government has expressed its interest (or anxiety), it is the duty of the Yamên to address this note to the British Minister for communication to his Government.

CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA CONCERNING PORT ARTHUR AND TALIENTWAN.

(Signed March 27th, 1898.)

THE Governments of Russia and China being desirous of adding some stipulations to the treaty concluded at Peking on the 15th March, 1898 (Russian Calendar), the plenipotentiaries of both Governments have agreed upon the following:—

Article I. In accordance with the IInd Article of the original treaty the northern territory leased and yielded to Russia—Port Arthur, Talientwan, and the Liaotung Peninsula—shall commence from the north side of A-tang Bay on the west coast of Liaotung and shall pass through the ridge of A-tang Mountain (the mountain ridge being included in the leased ground) to the east coast of Liaotung near the north side of Pi-tzu-wo Bay. Russia shall be allowed the use of all the waters adjacent to the leased territory and all the islands around it.

Both countries shall appoint special officers to survey the ground and determine the limits of the leased territory.

Art. II. To the north of the boundary fixed in Art. I. there shall, in accordance with Art. V. of the Peking Treaty, be a neutral ground, the northern boundary of which shall commence on the west coast of Liaotung at the mouth of the Kai-chou River, shall pass north of Yu-yen-ch'ang to the Ta-yang River, and shall follow the left bank of that river to its mouth, which shall be included in the neutral territory.

Art. III. The Russian Government consents that the terminus of the branch line connecting the Siberian Railway with the Liaotung Peninsula shall be at Port Arthur and Talientwan, and at no other port in the said peninsula.

It is further agreed in common that railway privileges in districts traversed by this branch line shall not be given to the subjects of other Powers. As regards the railway which China shall [may] herself build hereafter from Shan-hai-kuan in extension to a point as near as [lit. nearest to] possible to this branch line, Russia agrees that she has nothing to do with it.

Art. IV. The Russian Government assents to the request of the Chinese Government that the Administration and police of the City of Kinchow shall be Chinese. Chinese troops will be withdrawn from Kinchow and replaced by Russian troops. The inhabitants of the city have the power to use the roads from Kinchow to the north boundary of the leased territory, and the waters usually required near the city, but they have no power to use the sea-coast roundabout.

Art. V. The Chinese Government agrees [lit. agrees to recognise]—

1. That without Russia's consent no concession will be made in the neutral ground for the use of subjects of other Powers.
2. That the ports on the sea-coast east and west of the neutral ground shall not be opened to the trade of other Powers.
3. And that without Russia's consent no road and mining concessions, industrial and mercantile privileges shall be granted in the neutral territory.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA
RESPECTING AN EXTENSION OF HONG KONG
TERRITORY.

Signed June 9th, 1898: Ratified August 6th, 1898.

WHEREAS it has for many years past been recognised that an extension of Hong Kong territory is necessary for the proper defence and protection of the Colony.

It has now been agreed between the Governments of Great Britain and China that the limits of British territory shall be enlarged under lease to the extent indicated generally on the annexed map. The exact boundaries shall be hereafter fixed when proper surveys have been made by officials appointed by the two Governments. The term of this lease shall be ninety-nine years.

It is at the same time agreed that within the city of Kowloon the Chinese officials now stationed there shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with the military requirements for the defence of Hong Kong. Within the remainder of the newly-leased territory Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Chinese officials and people shall be allowed as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to Hsinan.

It is further agreed that the existing landing-place near Kowloon city shall be reserved for the convenience of Chinese men-of-war, merchant and passenger vessels, which may come and go and lie there at their pleasure; and for the convenience of movement of the officials and people within the city.

When hereafter China constructs a railway to the boundary of the Kowloon territory under British control, arrangements shall be discussed.

It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the district included within the extension, and that if land is required for public offices, fortifications, or the like official purposes, it shall be bought at a fair price.

If cases of extradition of criminals occur, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the existing treaties between Great Britain and China and the Hong Kong regulations.

The area leased to Great Britain, as shown on the annexed map, includes the waters of Mirs Bay and Deep Bay, but it is agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use those waters.

This Convention shall come into force on the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, being the thirteenth day of the fifth moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kuang Hsü. It shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of the two countries, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RESPECTING WEI HAI WEI

Signed July 1st, 1898. Ratified October 5th, 1898.

IN order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China, and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China agree to lease to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland Wei Hai Wei, in the Province of Shantung, and the adjacent waters, for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.

The territory leased shall comprise the Island of Liu Kung, and all the islands in the Bay of Wei Hai Wei, and a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the entire coast-line of the Bay of Wei Hai Wei. Within the above-mentioned territory leased Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction.

Great Britain shall have in addition the right to erect fortifications, station troops, or take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes at any points on or near the coast of the region east of the meridian, 121° 40' east of Greenwich, and to acquire on equitable compensation within that territory such sites as may be necessary for water supply, communications, and hospitals. Within that zone Chinese administration will not be interfered with, but no troops other than Chinese or British shall be allowed therein.

It is also agreed that within the walled city of Wei Hai Wei Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction, except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the territory leased.

It is further agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use the waters herein leased to Great Britain.

It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or

expulsion of the inhabitants of the territory herein specified, and that if land is required for fortifications, public offices, or any official or public purpose, it shall be bought at a fair price.

This Convention shall come into force on signature. It shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of the two countries, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

**EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND RUSSIA WITH REGARD TO
THEIR RESPECTIVE RAILWAY INTERESTS
IN CHINA.**

No. 1.

SIR C. SCOTT TO COUNT MURAVIEFF.

THE Undersigned, British Ambassador, duly authorised to that effect, has the honour to make the following declaration to his Excellency Count Muravieff, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

Great Britain and Russia, animated by a sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows:—

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tsze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government.

The two contracting parties, having nowise in view to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or existing treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the present arrangement, which, by averting all cause of complications between them, is of a nature to consolidate peace in the Far East, and to serve the primordial interests of China herself.

(Signed)

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

St. Petersburg, April 28th, 1899.

No. 2.

COUNT MURAVIEFF TO SIR C. SCOTT.

The undersigned, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised to that effect, has the honour to make the following declaration to his Excellency Sir Charles Scott, British Ambassador:—

Russia and Great Britain, animated by the sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows:—

1. Russia engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government.

2. Great Britain, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, and on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

The two contracting parties, having nowise in view to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or of existing treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the present arrangement, which, by averting all cause of complication between them, is of a nature to consolidate peace in the Far East, and to serve the primordial interests of China herself.

The undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

COUNT MURAVIEFF.

St. Petersburg, April 16 (28), 1899.

No. 3.

SIR C. SCOTT TO COUNT MURAVIEFF.

In order to complete the notes exchanged this day respecting the partition of spheres for concessions for the construction and working of railways in China, it has been agreed to record in the present additional note the arrangement arrived at with regard to the line Shanghai-Kuan-Newchwang, for the construction of which a loan has been already contracted by the Chinese Government with the Shanghai-Hong Kong Bank, acting on behalf of the British and Chinese Corporation.

The general arrangement established by the above-mentioned

notes is not to infringe in any way the rights acquired under the said Loan Contract, and the Chinese Government may appoint both an English engineer and a European accountant to supervise the construction of the line in question, and the expenditure of the money appropriated to it.

But it remains understood that this fact cannot be taken as constituting a right of property or foreign control, and that the line in question is to remain a Chinese line, under the control of the Chinese Government, and cannot be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese company.

As regards the branch line from Siaoheichan to Sinminting in addition to the aforesaid restrictions, it has been agreed that it is to be constructed by China herself, who may permit European—not necessarily British—engineers to periodically inspect it, and to verify and certify that the work is being properly executed.

The present special Agreement is naturally not to interfere in any way with the right of the Russian Government to support, if it thinks fit, applications of Russian subjects or establishments for concessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a south-westerly direction, would traverse the region in which the Chinese line terminating at Sinminting and Newchwang is to be constructed.

(Signed)

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

St. Petersburg, April 28, 1899.

No. 4.

COUNT MURAVIEFF TO SIR C. SCOTT.

In order to complete the notes exchanged this day respecting the partition of spheres for concessions for the construction and working of railways in China, it has been agreed to record in the present additional note the Agreement arrived at with regard to the line Shanghaikuan–Newchwang, for the construction of which a loan has been already contracted by the Chinese Government with the Shanghai–Hong Kong Bank, acting on behalf of the British and Chinese Corporation.

The general arrangement established by the above-mentioned notes is not to infringe in any way the rights acquired under the said Loan Contract, and the Chinese Government is at liberty to appoint both an English engineer and a European accountant to supervise the construction of the line in question and the expenditure of the money appropriated to it. But it remains well understood that this fact cannot be taken as constituting a right of property or foreign control, and that the line in question is to

remain a Chinese line, subject to the control of the Chinese Government, and cannot be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese company.

As regards the branch line from Siaoheichan to Sinminting, in addition to the aforesaid restrictions, it has been agreed that it is to be constructed by China herself, who may permit European—not necessarily British—engineers to periodically inspect it, and to verify and certify that the works are being properly executed.

The present special Agreement is naturally not to interfere in any way with the right of the Russian Government to support, if it think fit, applications of Russian subjects or establishments for concessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a south-westerly direction, would traverse the region in which the Chinese line terminating at Sinminting and Newchwang is to be constructed.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

COUNT MURAVIEFF.

St. Petersburg, April 16 (28), 1899.

APPENDIX C.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AUTHORITIES OF THE FAR EAST.

A complete bibliography of the Far East would extend to such proportions as to require a volume to itself. A catalogue of even the more valuable works which have appeared on this subject would comprise many hundreds of entries, which could only confuse the reader, instead of aiding him in the selection of those volumes suited to his requirements. For this reason I have decided to follow the course adopted by me in the appendix to *Russia in Asia*, and give in the form of a bibliographical chapter a classified list of the most authoritative writings dealing with the countries and peoples of Further Asia. I have been guided in the inclusion or exclusion of the various works available by their intrinsic value as tested by personal experience, and for this reason it will be found that while several volumes by well-known writers do not figure in the following catalogue, their places are filled by others, which while less famous than they deserve to be, are well worthy of consultation.

THE FAR EAST.

Until the publication of the present volume, no attempt appears to have been made to supply a compact history of the countries of Further Asia. The nearest approach to a general survey of the Far East is that provided by Lord Curzon in his *Problems of the Far East*, of which a second edition was published in 1896. While admirable in its manner, and authoritative, the book is now somewhat behind the times, and might be brought up to date with advantage. Another work which includes a survey of all the countries of Further Asia is Mr. Henry Norman's *Peoples and*

Politics of the Far East, which, though published in 1895, contains much material which is of present interest. To these may be added Professor Reinsch's *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation*, a valuable work full of thought and suggestion.

CHINA.

The best history of China is that by Mr. D. C. Boulger, which leaves nothing to be desired. Those who desire a more condensed manual will find Professor Douglas's volume in the "Story of Nations Series" invaluable. The political history of the country, more especially in regard to the relation between the Celestial Empire and the European Powers, is fully dealt with in the present author's *China in Decay*. Those seeking more detailed matter relating to the trade and resources of the country may consult Lord Charles Beresford's *Break up of China*, and Mr. A. R. Colquhoun's *China in Transformation*. For an account of the characteristics of the Chinese people the best books extant are Professor Douglas's *Society in China*, Mr. A. H. Smith's *Chinese Characteristics*, the same author's *Village Life in China*, and Mr. Holcomb's *The Real Chinaman*.

Of the numerous works describing the country and giving incidentally an insight into the life of the people, the most valuable are Dr. Morrison's *An Australian in China*, Mrs. Bishop's *Yangtze Valley and Beyond*, Mr. Archibald Little's *Through the Yangtze Gorges*, and above all Miss Scidmore's *China, the Long-Lived Empire*.

The chief of the various volumes dealing with the early Chinese wars have been referred to in the course of the foregoing pages. Of these Stanley Lane Poole's *Life of Sir Harry Parkes*; Sir H. B. Loch's *Personal Narrative of Occurrences*; Lord Wolseley's *Narrative of the War with China*; Sir George Staunton's *Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China*, and Laurence Oliphant's *Narrative of Lord Elgin's Mission* are the most valuable.

The China-Japanese War claimed many historians, of whom the best are Vladimir¹ and Inouyé.² Eastlake and Yamada's *Heroic Japan* also possesses considerable merit.

¹ *The China-Japanese War.*

² *Japan-China War.*

JAPAN.

Of histories, the best are those of Sir Francis Adams,¹ and Sir C. J. Reed.² Unfortunately, neither of these is up to date. Doctor Murray's monograph in the "Story of Nations Series," while less replete in detail, is complete and recent. In addition to these we have Mr. Griffi's *Mikado's Empire*, Count Inagaki's *Japan and the Pacific*, Lord Curzon's *Problems of the Far East*, already referred to; and for an intimate knowledge of the subjects coming under its title, Mr. B. H. Chamberlaine's *Things Japanese*.

Mr. House's monographs on certain episodes are also of value, notably his *Shikoshima Affair*, and the *Japanese Expedition to Formosa*. Much interesting reading is also to be found in Mr. Griffi's *Life of Townsend Harris*, the same author's *Life of Commodore Perry*, and Mr. Mounsey's *Satsuma Rebellion*.

Japan does not seem to have inspired as many recent authors as has China, and few of the books which have been published possess any other than mere passing interest. The best work on the Japanese and their customs is Mr. Norman's *Real Japan*, now somewhat out of date, and Mr. J. Morris's *Advance Japan*, which has deservedly come to be regarded as a standard work.

KOREA.

The historians of Korea are Mr. W. E. Griffis³ and the Rev. J. Ross.⁴ Both are admirable. The revised edition of the former leaves nothing to be desired. Mrs. Bishop's *Korea and her Neighbours* is a readable and interesting record of history and travel by a skilled observer. Ernest Oppert's *A Forbidden Land* is a literary curiosity as well as an amusing book. Lord Curzon's *Problems* is indispensable in connection with the political outlook in Korea, and is the only book which deals with the international question, unless we take into account Mr. Griffi's *America in the East*.

RUSSIA.

The most recent history of Russia in the Far East is that included in the author's *Russia in Asia*, and as regards China enlarged on in *China in Decay*. The early conquests of Siberia are recorded in Ravenstein's *Russians on the Amur*. Recent volumes dealing with Siberia are Reid's *From Peking to Petersburg*, Vladimir's *Russia on the Pacific*, and Simpson's *Side Lights on Siberia*.

¹ *History of Japan*.

² *The Hermit Nation*.

³ *Japan, its History, Traditions, &c.*

⁴ *History of Corea*.

FRANCE.

Of the numerous volumes on the countries of the Indo-Chinese possessions of France, Ferry's *Le Tonkin*, Garnier's *Voyage d'Exploration de l'Indo-Chine*, Captain Norman's *Colonial France*, and the same author's *Tonkin, or France in the Far East*, are the best. A good deal of light is thrown on French methods by Mr. Henry Norman in his *Peoples and Politics of the Far East*, and Mr. Smyth deals with the same subject in *Five Years in Siam*.

INDEX

NOTE.—All Place Names appear in Capitals.

- ABDICATION** of the Emperor Kwangsu, 224
Abel Clark cited, 29
Abolition of the Shogunate in Japan, 72
Adams, William, 19
ADEN, 106
Agreements, see **Treaties**
AIGUN, Treaty of, 40, 111
Ainos, 59
Aizu daimyo, 72
ALBAZIN, 23
Alcock, Sir Rutherford, 65, 104
Alexander I., Tsar, 28, 59
 — **II. Tsar**, 10
 — **III. Tsar**, 114
ALEXANDROVSK, 39
Allies march on Peking, 38
 — destroy Summer Palace, 38
 — move to relieve Legations, 231
AMERICA, United States of, and China, 26, 130
 — — — — and Japan, 60, 61
 — — — — and Korea, 91
 — **Aims in Asia**, 103, 246
 — first sends vessel to China, 25
 — — — — to Japan, 28, 61
 — — — — treaty with Russia re Pacific, 30
 — — — — treaty with Japan, 62
 — — — — treaty with Korea, 91
 — — — — policy, 246
Amherst, Lord, 28, 193
AMOY, 126, 159
AMUR Province, area and population, 11
AMUR River, 39, 254
Anglo-Russian agreement re spheres, 56
ANIWA Bay, 68
ANNAM, area and population, 10
 — early relations with France, 26
 — Anti-foreign feeling in China, 136
 — Anti-opium edicts, 31
 — Antiquity of Eastern Asia, 1
 — **ANWEI** province, 4
 — Area of Britain in the Far East, 12
 — China, 3
 — France in the Far East, 10
 — Japan, 8
 — Korea, 6
 — Russia in the Far East, 11
 — United States of America, 13
 — **ARGUN** river, 23
 — Army, see under countries
 — **Arrow** Loro-ha, 36
 — **Arsenals**, 46, 159
 — **ASAN**, 48, 93
 — **ASIA**, interests of the Powers in, 164
 — debt of the Powers in, 251
 — **Aston, W. G.**, cited, 82
 — **Attack** on British Embassy at Yedo, 65
 — — — — — **Yokohama**, 66
 — — — — **Peking** Legations, 229
 — Audience, the first, 46
 — **Avsseyenko, M.**, cited, 232
 — **Awakening** of Japan, the, 58

BALDWIN, MAJOR, 70
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., cited, 202
Barbara Taylor, 90
Battles, Asan, 48, 93
 — **Peitsang**, 231
 — **Ping Yang**, 48
 — **Yalu**, 48
 — **Beach, Sir Michael Hicks**, see **Hicks Beach**
 — **Beresford, Lord Charles**, cited, 160, 199, 200
 — **Berneux, French** missionary, 86
 — **Bibliography**, 359
 — **Bird, Lieutenant**, 70

- Bishop, Mrs. I., cited, 80
 Blockade of Canton, 32
BOGUE Forts, 32, 33, 36
 Bokhara, 16
 Bonham, Mr., 194
 Boulger, D. C., cited, 35
 Bourne, Mr., 212
Bourse Gazette cited, 233
 Bowring, Sir John, 36, 194
 Boxers, 225
 Brandt, Herr von, see von Brandt.
 Bremer, Sir Gordon, 32
BRITAIN, see **GREAT BRITAIN**
 British fleet arrives off Canton, 32
 ——— Taku forts, 38
 ——— aims in Asia, 103
 ——— diplomatic agents, 122
 ——— policy, 207
 ——— hesitation in regard to China, 193
 ——— Legation attacked in Japan, 65, 66
 ——— treaties with China, 34, 37, 44, 105, 194
 ——— ——— Japan, 63, 64, 77
 ——— ——— Korea, 91
 ——— aims purely commercial, 104
 ——— trade predominance in the Far East, 106
 British East India Company, 20
 Broderick, Mr., cited, 250
BROUGHTON BAY, 146
 Bruce, Frederick, 38
 Bruce, Robert, 227
 Bruyère, Barthélémy, missionary, 85
 Burlingame, 42
CALCUTTA, 106
CAMBALUC, 16
CAMBODIA, area and population, 10
 Cannes, Lieutenant, 70
CANTON, 126
 ——— Blockade of, 32
 Cassini, Count, 49, 243, 249
 Causes of the recent crisis, 223
 Cecile, Admiral, 61, 85
 Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, cited, 255
CHAN CHIA WAN, fight at, 228
 Chang Chi Tung, Viceroy, 235
 Chang Chow, 37
 Chang Yin Huang, 54
Charity reaches Japan, 19
CHEKIANG province, 4
CHELIABINSK, 114
CHEMULPHO, 90, 93
CHIFU, treaty of, 44
CHINA, area and population, 3
 ——— eighteen provinces of, 3
 ——— Japanese War, 47
 China, Japanese War, events leading up to, 93
 ——— and Japan, contrast between, 134
 ——— political condition of, 178
 ——— the future of, 184
 ——— financial condition, 251
 Chinese Empire, area and population, 3
 ——— fleet, 160
 ——— seized by Admiral Courbet, 45
 ——— character not properly understood in England, 106
 ——— army, 161
 ——— debt, 251
 ——— revenue, 242
 ——— attitude towards foreigners, 142
CHINKIANG, 33
CHITA, 50
 Chitsou, see Kublai Khan
 Chitsou, first Manchu Emperor of China, 84
CHOSŌN see **KOREA**
CHOSU, 69, 70, 71
 Chronology, 257
CHULLA, 85
CHUSAN island, 32
 Coalfields in China, 5
 Cobbold, R. P. cited, 217
COCHIN CHINA, area and population, 10
 Colquhoun, A. R., cited, 199, 249
 Confucius, 108
 Conger, Mr., 229
 Constitutional Government in Japan, 76
 Conventions, see treaties
 Cooper, Captain, 61
 Copper in China, 5
Cornwallis, the, 34
 Corruptness of Chinese, 108
 Countries of the Far East, the
 Coup d'état at Peking, the, 54
 Courbet, Admiral, 45
 Crisis, the story of the, 221
 Curzon, Lord, cited, 80, 132, 197, 202
DALNY see **TALIENWAN**
 D'Andrade, Don Fernand Perez, 17
 Dallet, Père, cited, 80
 Dawn of Western influence, the, 15
 Debt of China, 251
 ——— Powers interested in Asia, 251
 Defences of China, 160, 161
 ——— Japan, 162
 de Giers, M., 243
 de Lange, 24
 Dening, W., cited, 82
 de Rosny, cited, 58
Déroulade, 87

Diana, 60
 Dickins, F. V., cited, 58
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 209, 255
 Douglas, Professor R. K., cited, 35, 107, 199
 Dowager Empress, see Tai Hsi
 DUI, 39
 Dutch seek to obtain a footing in Macao, 20
 Dutch East India Co., 19
 ———— send mission to Peking, 27
 Dynasty Han, 81
 — Sisi, 81
 — Mongal, 15
 East India Company, see British East India Co.
 ———— see Dutch East India Co.
 Eastlake, F. W., and Yamada, Y. A., cited, 58
 Echizen daimyo, 72
 Edicts reform, 53
 — retrogressive, 54
 Eighteen provinces, the, of China, area and population, 3
 ———— 4
 Eleang, Mandarin, 32
 Elgin, Lord, signs Japanese treaty, 37, 64
 Elliot, Captain, 30, 193,
 Emperor of China, Chitsou, see Kublai Khan
 ———— Hung Wu, 82
 ———— Kanghi, 23, 24
 ———— Keen Lung, 27
 ———— Kiaking, 28
 ———— Kublai Khan, 15, 82
 ———— Kwangsu, 45, 46, 224, 231
 ———— Taoukwang, 32
 ———— Tungche, 46
 ———— Yangti, 81
 ———— Japan Mutsuhito, 72
 ———— Korea Li Hsi, 95, 97
 Empress Dowager, see Tai An, Tai Hsi
 Empress reaches Canton, 25
 ENGLAND see GREAT BRITAIN
 "Ever Victorious Army," the, 228
 Exclusiveness of Asiatic races, 2
 Extra-territoriality in Japan, 77
 FAFAR of Ivan, 22
 FATSHAN, 35
 Feechen, 160
 Feng Shui, 211
 Fischer, I. E., cited, 15
 Flying Fish, 91
 FOOCHOW, 126

FORMOSA island, area and population, 8
 ———— dispute re, 43,
 ———— ceded to Japan, 48, 77
 ———— blockaded by Admiral Leaspés, 45
 Fournier, Admiral, 45
 FRANCE, Colonial policy of, 124
 ———— co-operates with Great Britain in China, 38
 ———— obtains protectorate over Cochin China, 45
 ———— takes Tonkin, 45
 ———— sends expedition to Korea, 85
 ———— early relations with Annam, 26
 ———— aims in Indo China, 124
 ———— in the Far East, 12
 Franco Chinese War, 45
 French in China, 37
 ———— Korea, 85
 ———— Cochin China, 45
 ———— Tonkin, 45
 ———— Annam, 26
 ———— march on Peking, 38
 ———— destroy summer palace, 38
 ———— missionaries murdered at Tientsin, 42
 ———— Indo China, 9
 Fuching, 160
 FUKIEN province, 4
 FUSAN, 7, 83, 89, 145
 Gazette cited, 232
 General Sherman, 87
 GENSAN, 90
 GEOK TEPE, 235
 German missionaries murdered in Shantung, 49
 ———— policy in the Far East, 243
 ———— aims of, 244
 ———— navy, increase of, 246
 Germans, occupy Kiao Chau, 49, 125
 GERMANY, early relations with China, 125
 Giles, 107
 GOBI, railway across the, to Peking, 253
 Gold, 5
 ———— standard adopted in Japan, 78
 Golovin, Feodor Alexievitch, 22
 Golovkin, Colonel, 28
 Golovnin, Captain, 60
 Gordon, General, 41
 Gough, Sir Hugh, 32, 33
 Government in China, 141
 ———— Japan, 76
 ———— Korea, 143
 Grand Canal, 81
 Grant, Sir Hope, 227
 Grashdanin, cited, 234

GREAT BRITAIN

- — — — — treaties with China, 34, 37, 44, 105, 194
- — — — — Japan, 64, 77, 63
- — — — — Korea, 91
- — — — — trade of, 110, 111
- — — — — war with China, 32, 38
- — — — — declines to support China against Russian aggression, 119
- — — — — government methods, 121
- — — — — superiority of resources, 151
- Great Britain's interests in the Far East, 218
- Griffis, W. E., cited, 80
- Gromoboy, 178
- Gros, Baron, 37
- Guards sent to Peking Legations, 55
- Gulcha, 217
- Gulf of Tartary, 59
- Gundry, R. S., cited, 80

Hai Chai, 160*Hai Shen*, 160*Hai Schew*, 160*Hai Tien*, 160*Hai Yung*, 160

HAKODATE, 63, 64

HAMILTON, PORT, see Port Hamilton

HANKOW, 126

Han dynasty, 81

HAN, River, 4, 88

Harbours, Kiao Chau, 156

— Hong Kong, 12, 154

— Masanpho, 99

— Port Arthur, 158

— Wei Hai Wei, 156

Harris, Townsend, 63

Hart, Sir Robert, 45, 227

HAWII, 78

Henakin, Mr., mortally wounded, 65

Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, cited, 202

Hideyoshi, 18

— invades Korea, 82

HIOGO, 64, 66

HIRADO, 19, 20

HIROSHIMA, 93

Ho, Duke, 29

HOANG HO, 208

HONAN province, 4

HONDO, area and population, 8

HONG KONG, area and population, 12

— — — — — occupied by British, 32

— — — — — ceded to British, 32

— — — — — description of, 154

— — — — — map of, 151

— — — — — see also Kowloon

Hope, Admiral Sir James, 41

Hosiwu, 228

HUNAN province, 4

Hung Ti-yong-On, 93

Hung Wu, Emperor of China, 82

HUPEH province, 4

IDES, GENERAL E. Y., 23

Ignatieff, General, 40

Ii Kamonno Kami, murder of, 65

ILI, 253

Inagaki, Marquis, cited, 59

Indian Mutiny, 37

Inouye, Count, 58, 96

Interests of the Powers in China, 110

— — — — — Asia, 164

Invasion of Korea, 82

IRKUTSK, 59, 114

Iron in China, 5

Iamaloff, Captain Leon, 24

Ito, Count, 77

ITURUP island, 59

Ivan V., Tsar, 22

JAMES, H. E. M., cited, 35

Jamieson, Mr., 212

JAPAN, area and population, 8

— constitution, 75, 76

— future of, 148, 187, 188, 190

— railways in, 75

— and China, 188

— — — — — Korea, 75, 147

— — — — — Russia, 78, 146

— the greatest effective Power in the Far East, 152

— recognises independence of Korea, 75

Japanese army, 162

— navy, 162, 163

— invade Korea, 82, 89

— people, 8

— legation burned at Seoul, 91

JEHOL, 27

Jesuit missionaries visit Japan, 18

— — — — — in Annam, 26

Jingu, empress of Japan, 81

JUNGARIA, area and population, 3

Jurisdiction in Japan, 77

KAGOSHIMA, 67, 68, 75

Kai Chai, 160

KAMAKURA, 70

KAMCHATKA seized by Russia, 23

KANAGAWA, 64

Kanghi, Emperor of China, 23, 24

KANGWA island, 87

Kang Yu Wei, 55

KANSU province, 4, 253

KASHGAR, 253

KASHMIR, 253

KAWASAKI, 67

- Keen Lung, Emperor of China, 27
KELUNG, 45
KERBECHI river, 23
 Keshen, 32
 Ketteler, Baron von, see Von Ketteler.
 Keying, mandarin, 33
KHABAROVKA, 114
KHIVA, 216
KIAKHTA, treaty of, 25
 Kiaking, Emperor of China, 28
KIANGSI province, 4
KIANGSU province, 4
KIAO CHAU, seized by Germany, 49, 125
 — description of, 156
 — maps
Kienchang, 69
 Kim early missionary, 84
 Kim Ok Kiun, 47, 92
KINCHOW, 48
 Kirghiz, 217
KIRIN, 118
KIUNGCHOW, 37
KOJE island, 7
KONSTANTINOVSK, 39
KOREA, conspiracy in, 47, area and population, 6
 — and China, 81, 83
 — and Japan, 75, 94, 147
 — reforms in, 95
 — rising in, 92, 93
 — invasion of, by Japan, 82, 89
 — independence guaranteed, 48, 75
 — murder of the Queen, 96
 — situation of, 6
 — coast line, 6
 — the coming struggle for, 144
 — government of, 7, 143
 — future of, 144
 Korean people, the, 6
 — army, 162
KOWLOON, ceded to Great Britain, 154
 — extended, 56
 — map, 151
Kowshing, the, 48, 189
 Kowtow, the, 21
 Kublai Khan, 15, 82
KUNASHIRI, 60
 Kuiper, admiral, 67
KURE, 163
KURILE islands, 59, 68, 113
KUSHUNKOTAN, 59
 Kuwana daimyo, 72
KWANGSI province, 4
 Kwangsu, Emperor of China, 45, 46, 224, 231
 — issues edicts, 53, 54
 Kwangsu abdicates, 224
KWANGTUNG province, 4
KWEICHOW province, 4
KYOTO, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72
KYUSHU, area and population, 8

LAMAIRESSE, E., CITED, 58
 Lang, captain, R.N., 46
 Lay, H. N., 107
 Legaspi, Michael Lopez, 18
 Legations, peril of the Peking, 229
 Lespés, admiral, 45
LIAO TUNG, peninsula, 48, 77
 — ceded to Japan, 48
 — leased to Russia, 50, 114
 Li Hsi, Emperor of Korea, taken prisoner by Japanese, 95
 — takes refuge in Russian Legation, 97
 Li Hung Chang, 48, 77, 89, 235
 Lin Tsisoo, viceroy of Canton, 31
 Li Tuan Feng, 54
 Liverpool, Lord, 28
 Lobanow, prince, 49
 Loo, viceroy of Kwangtung, 31
 Louis XVI. of France, receives ambassador from Aman, 26, 124
 Lu han railway, 51, 208
 Lytton, Mr., 212

MACAO, 18, 126
 Macartney, Lord, 27
 Macartney, Sir Halliday, 46
 MacDonald, Sir Claude, 229
 McGowan, cited, 35
MAISURU, 163
MALTA, 106
MANCHURIA, area and population, 3
 — the most important dependency of China, 6
 Manchurian railway, 50, 118
 Manchus, 111
 Mandarins, corruptness of the, 108
MANILA, 13, 247
MANWYNE, 195
 Maps, the Far East strategic map, 1
 — China, showing territory seized by Russia and France, 15
 — Hong Kong and Kowloon, 151
 — Japan, 58
 — Kiao Chau, 157
 — Korea, 80
 — Port Arthur, 161
 — Russian railways in China, 175
 — Vladivostok, 159
 — Wei Hai Wei, 155
 Marco Polo, see Polo, Marco
 Margary, Augustus Raymond, murder of, 195

- Marvin, Charles, cited, 217
MASANPHO, Russian concession at, 99, 203
Massacres Tientsin, 42
 ——— **Whasang**, 42
Maubant, Pierre, catholic priest, 85
Mayers, 107
Meadows, Thomas Taylor, cited, 198
Medhurst, 107
Mencius, 198
MERV, 216, 217
Middendorf, Avon, cited, 15
Michelborne, Sir Edward, 19
Min, Prince of Korea, assassinated, 92
MIN River, 4, 45
Mineral deposits in China, 5
Missionaries, murder of German in Shantung, 49
 ——— in Korea, 84
 ——— murdered in Pechili, 225
 ——— murdered at Tientsin, 42
 ——— murdered at Whasang, 42
Missionary outrages, 42
Missionary question, the, 211
Mito Castle, 65, 74
Miura, Viscount, 56
MONGOLIA, area and population, 3
Mori Arinori, Viscount, assassinated, 76
Morris, cited, 80
Morrison, 61
Morrison, Mr., wounded, 65
Morrison, Dr. G. E. cited, 229
Morrison, Robert, first Protestant missionary to China, 28
Moscow, 114
Muravieff, General, 39
 ——— Count, his assurances re Port Arthur, 117
 ——— his manifesto re the open door, 130
Murder of German missionaries in Shantung, 49
 ——— French consul and sisters at Tientsin, 42
 ——— **Augustus Margary**, 195
 ——— **Mori Arinori**, Viscount, 76
 ——— **Min**, Prince, 92
 ——— **Ii Kamonno Kami**, 65
 ——— **Kim Ok Kiun**, 93
 ——— **Missionaries at Whasang**, 42
 ——— **Messrs. Norman and Robinson** at Yangching, 225
 ——— **Lieut. de Cannes**, 70
 ——— **Major Baldwin and Lieut. Bird**, 70
 ——— **Baron von Ketteler**, 226
 ——— **Okubo Toshimiki**, 75
 ——— **Englishmen in Embassy at Yedo**, 69
Murray, Dr. David, cited, 58
Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan, 72
 ——— assumes sole control, 73
NAGASAKI, 59, 62, 64, 69, 71
NANKING, taken by the British, 33
 ——— captured by the Taepings, 41
 ——— visited by British fleet, 33
 ——— treaty of, 34
 ——— docks, 159
Nan Shui, 160
Nan Yin, 160
Napier, Lord, 30, 193
Naval engagements, Bogue forts, 32, 33, 36
 ——— Canton, 32
 ——— Taku forts, 38, 226
 ——— Yalu, 48
Navy, the, Chinese, 159, 160
 ——— Japanese, 162, 163
Neale, Colonel, 67
NEPAL, 253
NERCHINSK, 22, 50, 118, 253
Nerchinsk, treaty of, 22
Neutral zone between China and Korea, 7, 89
NEWCHANG, 37, 48, 120
Nicholas II, Tsar, 49
NIGATA, 64
NIKOLAIEVSK, 254
NINGPO, 32, 126
NIPPON, see JAPAN
Non-interference, policy of, 110
Norman, Henry, cited, 199
Norman, Mr., wounded at Yungching, 225
Northern Railway of China, 51
Nova Vremya cited, 233
OCCIDENT and Orient, 133
O'Connor, Sir N. R., 117
ODESSA, 112
OKHOTSK, Sea of, 39
Okubo Toshimiki, assassination of, 75
Oliphant, Mr., wounded, 65
Oliphant, David, killed at Peking, 230
 "Open Door," the, 128, 129, 201
 ——— attempted understanding as to, 57, 130
Opening up of the Far East a gradual process, 2
Opening up of China, 35
 ——— Japan, 58
 ——— Korea, 80
Opium first sent to China, 26
 ——— amount of trade, 27
 ——— destroyed at Canton, 31
Oppert, Ernest, 88
Oriental mind, the, 133

- OSAKA**, 19, 64, 66
Osborne, Captain Sherard, 46
Ostiaks, 111
OTSA, attack on the Tsarevitchat, 76
Owari daimyo, 72
- PACIFIC**, 30
PAKHOI, 126
PALIKAO BRIDGE, fight at, 228
Palmerston, Lord, 209, 255
PAOTING FU, 225
Parke, Sir Harry, 71, 73, 107
Parliamentary election, the first
 Japanese, 76
Party politics in England, 121
Partition of China, the, 169
Party government in England, 121
Pavloff, M., 100, 145, 243
Pearson, C. H., cited, 132
PECHILI, province, 4
 — Gulf of, 145
Pegasus, H. M. S., 90
PEIHO, 4
 — allies force their way up, 128
PEITSANG, 231
PEKING, the Northern capital, 16
 — entered by allies (1860), 38
 — destruction of Summer Palace,
 38
 — siege of the Legations, 229
 — relief of, by allies (1900), 231
 — treaty of, 40, 111
 — direct railway to, across Mon-
 golia, 253
Perestrato, Raphael, 17
Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 61
PESCADORES Islands, area and
 population, 8
 — — seized by France, 45
 — — ceded to Japan, 48
Peter the Great, 22, 24
PHILIPPINE Islands, area and popu-
 lation, 13
 — — seized by Spain, 18
 — — — United States, 103,
 213, 246
Pichon, Mons, 230
Phillips, Mr., killed at Peking, 230
Pierre, Captain, 85
PING YANG, battle of, 48
Pinto, Fernan Mendez, 17
Pitt, William, 27
Policy, American, 103, 131, 246
 — British, 207
 — Chinese, 107, 135, 187
 — French, 12
 — German, 125
 — Japanese, 138, 139
 — Korean, 140, 143
 — Portuguese, 125
 — Policy, Russian, 111, 145
 — — Contrast between British and
 Russian, 123
Polo Marco, 16
Polo Nicolo, 16
Population, China, 3
 — Japan, 8
 — Korea, 6
 — Manchuria, 3
PORT ARTHUR ceded to Japan,
 48
 — — leased to Russia, 50
 — — description of, 158
 — — plan
 — — Russian assurances respect-
 ing, 117
PORT HAMILTON, 7
Ports, Treaty, see Treaty Ports
PORTUGAL, 18, 125
Portuguese arrive at Macao, 18
 — fail to enter Korea, 26
 — influence ends in Japan, 18
 — policy, 125
Possadnik, 252
Pottinger, Sir Henry, 33
Pontiatine, Admiral, 63
Powers, interests of in China, 110
PRIMORSK province, 11
Prince Henry of Prussia, 242
Progressive party in China, 54
Prospect, the, 237
Prussia, Prince Henry of, 242
PULO CONDORE island, ceded to
 France, 26
- QUELPART** island, 7
- RAFFLES**, SIR STAMFORD, 29
Railway, the first in Japan, 75
 — Manchurian, see Manchurian
 Railway
 — Siberian, see Siberian Railway
 — Lu Han, see Lu Han Railway
 — Northern of China, see Northern
 Railway of China
 — Tientsin Chinkiang, 51
 — Kunlon Ferry, 51
 — Direct Mongolian to Peking,
 253
 — Shantung, 51
 — Ningpo and Hankow, 51
 — Prospects in China, 52
Ravenstein, E. S., cited, 15, 217
Receptions, see Audience
Red Fish, sect of the, 224
Reform edicts, 53
Rein, Dr. J. J., cited, 58
Reinsch, Professor, cited, 247
**Relative strength and interests of
 Powers in Far East**, 153

- Relief of the Legations in Peking, 231
 Revision of Japanese treaties, 79
 Richardson, C. L., murder of, 67
 Rival aims in the Far East, 163
 — policies, 101
 Rivers, Amur, 39, 254
 — Argun, 23
 — Kerbechi, 23
 — Min, 4, 45
 — Peiho, 4
 — Sikiang, 4
 — Tumen, 6
 — West River, see Sikiang
 — Yalu, 6, 89.
 — Yangtse kiang, 4, 33
 Robertson, Mr., murdered at Yung-ching, 225
 Rodgers, Rear-Admiral, 88
 Ross, Rev. John, cited, 80
Rossia, 178
 Roze, Admiral, 87
Rurik, 178
RUSSIA IN ASIA, area and population, 11, 153
 — policy of, 122, 216
RUSSIA and France, 173
 — — China, 21, 185
 — — Japan, 147
 — — Korea, 98, 145
 — her strength in the Far East, 171
 — never enters on hostilities with a stronger Power, 214
 — impossibility of an understanding with, 215
 Russian occupation of Port Arthur, 114
 — colony in Peking, 23
 — diplomacy, 167
 — press, 232-234
 — policy, stability of, 122
 — — during recent crisis, 206
 — influence with the Chinese, 129
 — treaty of Aigun, 40, 111
 — — Nerchinsk, 22, 50, 118, 253
 — — Peking, 40, 111
 — — aims in Korea, 147
 — railway agreement, 118
 — government, 120
 Russo-Chinese Bank, 118
 Saburo, Shimagu, 66
SAGHALIN island, area and population, 11
 — — Russian activity in, 59
 — — sieges by Russia, 68, 113
ST. PETERSBURG, 68
 Salisbury, Lord, cited, 116, 192, 197, 202, 255
SANMUN BAY, 204
 San Francisco, 64
Saramang, 61
SARIKOL, 253
 Saris, Captain John, 20, 58
SASSEBO, 163
SATSUMA, 66, 67, 69, 72
 Scadding, Mr., killed at Peking, 230
SECHUAN province, 4, 253
 "Sect of the Red Fish," 224
SELENGINSK, 22
SEMIPALATINSK, 253
Semiramis, 69
SEOUL, 7, 87
 — occupied by the Japanese, 91
 Seymour, Sir Michael, 36
 — Admiral, 225
SHANGHAI, 33, 126
 — arsenal, 159
SHAN HAI KUAN, 56, 120
SHANSI province, 4
SHANTUNG province, 4, 125
 Shaw, Captain, first American consul to China, 26
SHENSI province, 4
SHIKOKU, area and population, 8
 Shimagu Saburo, 66
SHIMODA, 63
SHIMONOSEKI affair, the, 69, 70
 — treaty, 48, 77
 — — protests against by the Powers, 49, 78
SHINRA province, 81
SHIROYAMA, 75
 Shogun, 59, 63, 64, 67, 69, 71
 Shogunate, abolition of the, 72
 Shufeldt, Commodore, 90
SIBERIA, 21
 Siberian Railway, 47, 113, 114
 — — conditions and prospects, 175-177
 Siege of the Legations in Peking, 229
SIGAN FU, 231
SIKIANG, or West river, 4
SIKKIM, 253
 Silk, 4
 Simpson, I. V., cited, 113
SINGAPORE, 12, 29, 106
SIN MINTING, 120
 Sisi dynasty, 81
 Situation, the, 1, 50
SPAIN, 18
 Spafarik, Nicolas, 24
 Statistical tables, empire in the Far East, 7
 — — area and population, China, 3
 — — — — — Japan, 8
 — — — — — Indo-China, 10

- Statistical, area and population,
 Russia, 11
 ——— relative strength and in-
 terests of Powers in Far East, 153
 ——— territory and trade with
 China, 110
 ——— trade with Japan, 111
 ——— Asiatic interests of Powers,
 164
 ——— debt of Powers in Asia
 Staunton, Sir George, cited, 27
 Stirling, Admiral Sir John, 63
 Strouts, Captain, killed at Peking,
 230
SUIFU, 51
Surprise, 87
Sui cited, 232
SWATOW, 126
 Swinger, 90
Sylvia, 90

TAEPIING rebellion, 41, 42
TAIWAN, 37
 Tai Wen Kun, the, 96
 Tajiks, 217
TAKU forts, 159
 ——— docks, 159
 ——— taken by allies, 226
TALIENWAN, 48
Tancrede, 69
TANGCHOW, 37
 Taoukwang, Emperor of China, 32
Tardif, 87
 Tea trade, 4, 21
 Territory owned by the Powers in
 China, 110
 ——— seized by Russia, 111
 — Germany, 125
 — France, 124
 — England, 126
 — Portugal, 126
 The countries of the Far East, 1
 The duty of Britain, 192
 The situation, 150
 The story of a crisis, 221
TIBET, area and population, 3, 253
TIENTSIN, 126
 ——— treaty, 37, 105, 194
 ——— convention, 92
 ——— massacre, 42
 ——— Chamber of Commerce cited, 200
 ——— native arsenal taken by allies,
 226
Times, letter from Dr. Morrison to
 the, 229
 Tokugama Yoshinobu, 72
TOKYO, 74
 ——— treaty of, 98
TOLLA SAN, royal graves at, 88
TONGCHIN, 87
 Tong Haks, 93
TONGNAI, 89
TONKIN, area and population, 10
 ——— seizure of, by France, 125
 Toshimichi, Okubo, assassination of,
 75
TOURANE, ceded to France, 26
 Trade of various Powers in China, 110
 Transport across Siberia, 177, 178
 Trans-Siberian railway, see Siberian
 railway
 Treaties, Anglo-Russian spheres
 (1898), 56, 355
 ——— Aigun (1858), 40, 111
 ——— Chifu (1876), 44
 ——— Japan and England (1894), 77
 ——— Japan and Korea (1896), 75
 ——— Kiao Chau (1898), 49, 125, 344
 ——— Kowloon extension (1893), 56, 351
 ——— Peking (1860), 111
 ——— Port Arthur (1898), 40, 349
 ——— London (1894), 77
 ——— Manchurian Railway (1896)
 ——— Shimonoseki (1895), 43, 77, 326
 ——— Tientsin (1858), 37, 105, 194, 277
 ——— Nanking (1842), 34, 267
 ——— Nerchinak (1889), 25, 50, 118,
 253, 265
 ——— Seoul (1883)
 ——— Wei Hai Wei (1898), 53, 353
 ——— Yangtse Valley agreement (1898),
 203, 347
 ——— Yedo (1858), 64
 ——— Chemulpho (1882), 91
 ——— United States and Japan (1854),
 62
 ——— Japan and England (1854), 63
 ——— Japan and Russia (1895), 78
 Treaty ports, 126
 Tsai, Prince, 38
 Tsar Alexander I., 23, 59
 ——— Alexander II., 10
 ——— Alexander III., 114
 ——— Nicholas II., 14
 ——— Peter I., 22, 24
 Tsarevitch visits Japan, 76
 Tai Hsi, dowager-empress, issues
 edicts counter to Kwangsu, 55
 ——— ——— attempts to get
 rid of foreigners, 205
TSITSIHAI, 21, 50
 Tsungli Yamen, 41
TSUSHIMA ISLANDS, 7, 252
 Tuan, Prince, 205, 226, 227, 231
TUMEN RIVER, 6
 Tungche, Emperor of China, 46
 Tung Fuh Siang, General, 230
TUNGCHOW, 29
 Tunguses, 111
TURKISTAN, area and population, 3